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Abstract
Although financial autonomy is a recurrent notion in the literature on fiscal fed-
eralism and decentralisation, it has seldom been the focus of scientific analysis.
This book explores the meaning of financial autonomy at subnational levels of
government, its relationship with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as its impact
on the three economic branches of government activity: allocation, distribution,
and stabilisation. The major contribution of the book is a structured overview of
the factors that may potentially impinge on the freedom of subnational authorities
with regard to their budget decisions. This analytical tool may help pave the way
towards the elaboration of more accurate techniques for measuring subnational
financial autonomy in future. A tentative application of the new theoretical frame-
work is provided in the second part of the book that delves into the complex issues
of municipal revenue and expenditure autonomy in Hungary after .

Résumé
Bien que l’autonomie financière soit une notion fréquemment utilisée dans la
littérature du fédéralisme financier et de la décentralisation, elle a été rarement
au centre de l’attention scientifique. Ce livre explore les acceptions du terme
de l’autonomie financière, sa relation avec le principe de subsidiarité, ainsi que
son impact sur les trois branches de l’activité économique du gouvernement :
l’allocation, la redistribution et la stabilisation. L’apport principal du livre est un
synoptique des facteurs ayant la capacité de restreindre la marge de manoeuvre
des collectivités locales dans la prise de décisions budgétaires. Cet outil d’analyse
peut contribuer à tracer la voie vers le développement de techniques de mesure
d’autonomie plus précises dans l’avenir. Une ébauche d’application du nouveau
cadre théorique est proposée dans la deuxième partie du livre qui offre également
une analyse approfondie des défis complexes relevant de l’autonomie budgétaire
des communes de la Hongrie depuis .

Ismerteto˝
Noha a költségvetési önállóság fogalma a fiskális föderalizmus és decentralizáció
irodalmában rendszeresen felmerül, a témáról eddig ritkán készült tudományos
elemzés. A jelen kötet tüzetes vizsgálatnak veti alá a helyi önkormányzati költ-
ségvetési önállóság mibenlétét, a szubszidiaritás elvéhez való viszonyát, valamint
a helyi autonómiának az állami gazdaságpolitika három alapveto˝ feladatára, az
allokációra, a disztribúcióra és a stabilizációra gyakorolt hatását. A tanulmány fo˝
eredményként rendszerezett áttekintést nyújt mindazokról a tényezo˝kro˝l, amelyek
korlátozhatják a helyi önkormányzatok önállóságát egyes költségvetési döntések
meghozatalában. Ez az elemzo˝ eszköz a szerzo˝ reményei szerint a jövo˝ben támaszul
szolgálhat a mainál pontosabb mérési technikák kidolgozásában. A kötet második
része kísérletet tesz az új elméleti keret alkalmazására és egyúttal részleteiben tár-
gyalja a magyarországi települések  utáni kiadási és bevételi autonómiájának
komplex összefüggésrendszerét.
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CHAPTER 
Introduction
The daily political discussion about the decentralisation of the public sector in 
Hungary features autonomy as one of the most frequently mentioned but most
poorly defined terms. Much of the disagreement between the central government
and the elected local authorities results essentially from the lack of consensus about
the meaning of this key term. Local governments complain about having autonomy
in virtually all local affairs except for financial ones. The central government, in
turn, refers to the numerous laws and decrees that establish local autonomy in
expenditure, revenue and budgetary issues and deplores the fact that local gov-
ernments do not make sufficient use of their legal rights. Municipalities consider
their autonomy seriously restricted by the decrease in the proportion of central
funding for local public goods and services. The centre finds, however, that local
autonomy can only emerge through increased participation of local governments
in raising funds for their activities. It expects local policymakers to assume more
responsibility for their decisions and actions, while the latter find that responsible
behaviour is conditional upon unfettered autonomy. Although the centre pursues
the objective of empowering local governments, mayors feel increasingly powerless
to perform their mandate.
The arguments on both sides contain at least a grain of truth, yet the battle is
idle because the underlying notions are fuzzy. Reviewing the press and various
platforms of the academic debate in those nearly two decades that followed the
adoption of the Act LXV of  on Local Governments (ALG), one has the
impression that much of the energy wasted on the controversy about local financial
autonomy could have been channelled into more constructive undertakings. As
 most of the scientific investigations pursued throughout the world, the present
piece of research was motivated by the quest for truth: Is local financial autonomy
in Hungary shrinking or growing nowadays? Which party is closer to the truth? To
what extent are the arguments on either side justified?
These questions cannot be answered without a thorough analysis of the contents
of local financial autonomy. Although it is an essential feature of fiscal decen-
tralisation and a recurrent notion in the literature about fiscal federalism and
decentralisation, local financial autonomy is seldom treated as a separate subject
and has never been investigated systematically in the context of post-socialist decen-
tralisation in Hungary. Particularly since , researchers in and outside Hungary
as well as government institutions and international organisations have made a
sizeable effort to provide an overview of the decentralised intergovernmental fiscal
system in Hungary (e.g. K N, ; K et al., ; G
et al., ) and to analyse some of its particular aspects or problems (e.g. V-
, ; K et al., ; B, ). However, these studies focus on the
institutions and processes of decentralisation without explicit reference to how they
affect the autonomy of local governments. The present paper takes therefore local
financial autonomy as a starting point for the discussion of intergovernmental
arrangements. This change of perspective leads us to formulate the following
research questions:
. Is there a workable solution to define local financial autonomy? What
conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of existing definitions? How
does local financial autonomy relate to the concurring economic and other
objectives of a decentralised fiscal system? Which factors can constrain local
financial autonomy? How is local financial autonomy currently measured?
. Is it possible to capture the development of local financial autonomy in
Hungary throughout the s and s? If the conditions for a dynamic
analysis cannot be met, what results can be expected from a snapshot view?
More particularly, if we consider local financial autonomy as not only the
right but also the ability to manage local expenditures and revenues and bal-
ance the budget independently (C  E, a), who is actually
providing for the necessary capacity? To what extent are the legislative and
executive powers at both national and local levels (thus the Parliament, the
central government, mayors and voters) responsible for empowering the
lowest level of government to be responsive to citizens’ preferences?
Correspondingly, this research project has two objectives. The first one is the
systematic accumulation and dissemination of state-of-the-art wisdom about local
autonomy in general and local financial autonomy in particular. This is done
through an exhaustive literature review as well as through the development of a
set of matrices that capture the various constraints on the specific components of
local financial autonomy.
The second objective had to go through several modifications and compromises
in the course of the research. Initially, the objective was the establishment of a
dynamic overview about the financial autonomy of the various categories of local
governments in Hungary whereby (i) autonomy would be captured in its process
and (ii) classification would be made not only along the official (constitutional)
categories of administrative units, but also along their population size, geographic
location and urban versus rural character. Such a comprehensive dynamic analysis
would allow us to answer the gretchenfrage of whether the room for manoeuvre of
local communities has become larger or narrower since , or more precisely,
which aspects of local financial autonomy have changed in which direction. It
turned out soon, however, that such an analysis requires an immense database with
micro-level data of the approximately , municipalities from  to present
time, whereby data should be based on a constant methodology in order to be
comparable throughout the period under review. Accepting the system of clusters
applied by the Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron County Directorate of the Hungarian State
Treasury for collecting and editing financial data about subnational governments
in the framework of a contract with the Ministry of the Interior could have po-
tentially facilitated the job. However, their statistical yearbook titled Major Local
Government Indicators on Public Finance, Infrastructure and Real Estate does not
provide sufficient detail on several aspects that would be essential for the analysis
of local financial autonomy, and their micro-level data are hardly accessible.
Narrowing the scope of the analysis was thus inevitable. The first idea in this
direction was to focus on a single policy area. Primary education has the dis-
tinction of being one of the few expenditure domains with abundant datasets of
fair quality. However, in order to find out to what extent the autonomy of local
authorities increased or decreased in the years following the decentralisation of this
function, one should first comb through the entire legislation and identify each
provision touching upon the responsibilities of local governments or any of their
subcategories with regard to primary education, and then estimate the marginal
cost of complying with those provisions. In the context of incremental (rather
According to an insider, the printed datasheets fill an entire room, and the compilation of an
electronic dataset according to pre-defined characteristics is labour-intensive and hence expensive.
 than ‘big bang’) decentralisation such as the one in Hungary, the first working
step would already demand several years of work. While the responsibilities of
local authorities concerning primary education emerge from the ALG and the Act
LXXIX of  on Public Education, the terms of service provision are specified in
a multitude of decrees published by the central government and the Ministry of
Education. Moreover, the attempt to seize the development of local government
responsibilities in primary education is comparable to shooting on a moving tar-
get, as the legislation is subject to frequent amendments. Estimating the costs of
compliance in a second step is even more difficult, if not impossible. Although
the Ministry of Finance regularly prepares such estimates in order to calculate the
marginal increase in the amount of grants, these estimates are seldom based on
true cost calculations; such an exercise would anyway lead to different results in
the various clusters of local governments, since the conditions of service provision
vary across the country.
Finally, for each measure restricting expenditure autonomy with a cost effect
higher than zero (i.e. new mandates), one should be able to find out whether the
loss of expenditure autonomy has been compensated by an increase in revenues. If
the new mandate is fully funded, it is a step towards centralisation: it restricts local
autonomy but has a neutral effect on the local budget. By contrast, if municipal-
ities need to co-finance the task from their own resources, then the interference
with expenditure autonomy is no longer neutral for their budget. Because of the
dominance of unconditional grants and the principle of the unified budget in
Hungary, however, any investigation into this direction is doomed to failure: local
governments may compose their preferred funding mix out of own and transferred
revenues. Besides, even micro-level data are silent about which share of the total
expenditure on primary schools in a given year was due to mandatory tasks and
which part reflected the particular preferences of the local constituency.
These recognitions have finally called for a radical change in the second research
objective. The initial plan of investigating how the financial room for manoeuvre
of local governments in Hungary developed throughout the years gave way to
another idea, namely to exploring the contents of local financial autonomy and its
major institutional constraints. In order to channel our research in this otherwise
immense field, we have formulated a set of assumptions:
. While autonomy may be de iure identical for all local government units (as
is stipulated in the ALG), its actual content (de facto autonomy) is a function
of the existing legal, political, economic and other framework conditions.
. Both constitutive elements of local financial autonomy, namely the right
and the ability to manage local revenues and expenditures and modulate the
local budget constraint, are subject to various exogenous and endogenous
restrictions.
. Exogenous legal restrictions impose a limit on the rights, while exogenous
non-legal (political, demographic, socio-economic, etc.) restrictions reduce
the ability of local authorities to manage local financial affairs. Both types
of restrictions may affect local governments either directly or indirectly.
Together with the endless variety of endogenous constraints, they determine
the effective financial autonomy of municipalities.
At the methodological level, the change of the subject necessitated a switch from
the idea of a quantitative dynamic analysis to that of a qualitative study of economic
institutions. Correspondingly, New Institutional Economics provides the cognitive
framework of this paper, completed by relevant insights from Constitutional
Political Economics and the theory of Public Choice. The analysis is positive in the
sense that it describes the actual situation instead of prescribing what should be
done. It is qualitative insofar as only descriptive statistics are used, with the purpose
of underpinning some of our statements. The quality (structure, comparability,
etc.) of the currently available data does not permit any sophisticated econometric
modelling; anyway, such an approach is not essential for a purely institutional
analysis of local financial autonomy.
Nevertheless, as any other scientific work, the present study is subject to a
number of limitations.
First, the focus of the study is on financial autonomy. Political, administrative,
cultural and other aspects of local autonomy may have a varying degree of influ-
ence on the financial room for manoeuvre. Some of these impose endogenous
constraints on local financial autonomy and will be treated as such. For time and
space limits, however, these other aspects will not be elaborated systematically.
Second, the various categories of local governments (capital city, capital districts,
towns with and without county rights, and villages) will not be regularly distin-
guished throughout the paper. The structure of the available data seldom allows a
separate study of these constitutional categories. However, wherever it is possible
to detect a significant difference between these categories in terms of local financial
autonomy, we will deal with it explicitly.
Third, we abandoned the idea of a dynamic analysis because it is impossible
to track all changes that occurred to local financial autonomy during the s
and s. However, we are aware of the fact that also the contents and con-
straints of local financial autonomy change over time, following logically from the
 ever-changing nature of institutions. Therefore, the paper considers only those
institutions that existed throughout most of the period under review. Short-lived
measures are excluded from the scope of the study. By contrast, institutions that
have been going through gradual improvement (e.g. local taxation) are examined
upon their changing impact on local financial autonomy. Statistical time series
from  (or  in some cases) to  are provided only where they serve
the purpose of illustrating a change; otherwise, statements are underpinned by
snapshot data from selected years of the period under review.
Fourth, we assume that local governments are benevolent actors whose only
objective is the satisfaction of citizens’ needs. The assumption that the local
community and the mayor have perfectly identical views about how local financial
autonomy should be filled with content exempts us from the need to look behind
potential interest conflicts between the two parties. Correspondingly, we also
ignore whether voters exercise their right of controlling the local executive via
instruments of direct democracy (initiative, referendum, assembly, etc.) or via
representation.
The study is divided in four major parts. Following this Introduction, Part I
provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of local financial autonomy. The
aim of Chapter  is to position the present study both in the worldwide research
on fiscal decentralisation and in the context of political economics. With regard
to the first issue, we present the neoclassical approach to fiscal federalism and
decentralisation as well as its limitations, the recognition of which has marked
the more recent discussion of multi-level government systems. Three important
departures from the orthodox neoclassical economics provide the closer scientific
context of our study. To what extent the theory of Public Choice, New Institutional
Economics, and Constitutional Political Economics are relevant for the study of
local financial autonomy, is discussed in the second part of the section. Chapter 
offers a comprehensive overview of the theory of local autonomy in general and
local financial autonomy in particular. It starts with an investigation on why local
autonomy is generally associated with positive values. This introduction is fol-
lowed by a literature review with particular emphasis on the various definitions
and interpretations of local (financial) autonomy. Local autonomy is then brought
into relationship with other (competing) objectives generally pursued in decen-
tralised systems. In a following step, we propose a working definition for each of
the three components of local financial autonomy (expenditure autonomy, rev-
enue autonomy, and budgetary autonomy) and draw up a matrix-type inventory
of the exogenous and selected endogenous constraints on each of these compo-
nents. Chapter  continues with an overview about the existing techniques for
measuring the individual components of local financial autonomy and concludes
with a section about the relationship between local autonomy and the principle of
subsidiarity.
Part II is dedicated to the study of local financial autonomy in practice. With an
introduction into the legal and institutional framework of decentralisation in Hun-
gary, Chapter  lays the fundament for the discussion in the subsequent chapters
and clarifies some of the key terms that are unique to the intergovernmental fiscal
system in Hungary. Chapters  to  constitute perhaps the most important part of
the entire study. They investigate the way in which the various intergovernmental
institutions and arrangements increase or restrain local expenditure autonomy,
revenue autonomy, and budgetary autonomy. The matrices of exogenous and
endogenous constraints developed in Chapter  serve here implicitly to ensure that
nothing is omitted, while the discussion deliberately follows a different structure
that is better adapted to the respective domains of local financial autonomy. Local
expenditure autonomy in Chapter  is analysed under two aspects: (i) autonomy
in expenditure decisions and (ii) autonomy in service delivery. The structure of
Chapter  is based upon the classification of local government revenues. Finally,
Chapter  explores the sources of vertical fiscal imbalance in local budgets and
examines the available policy instruments to restore equilibrium. All three chap-
ters focus implicitly on rights, ability, and the various constraints imposed upon
these, even though the discussion might occasionally seem to be detached from
the methodological framework elaborated in Chapter .
In Part III, we return to the three matrices in order to see which of the potential
constraints on local financial autonomy affect local governments in Hungary and
which intergovernmental institutions represent these constraints. Chapters  and 
serve also to formulate a set of conclusions and to provide some ideas for future
research.

PART I
Theoretical Approaches to
Local Financial Autonomy

CHAPTER 
The Changing Perspective
on Fiscal Decentralisation
The role of Chapter  is to present the broader scientific context of our study and 
to mark those strands of research that provide the methodological background for
the more specific analysis of local financial autonomy. Section . will thus briefly
summarise the assumptions and logic of the neoclassical theory of fiscal federalism
and decentralisation and address its major limitations. Section . discusses three
alternative approaches that are decisive for the present investigations, namely
the theories of Public Choice, New Institutional Economics, and Constitutional
Political Economy.
. The neoclassical approach to fiscal decentralisation
.. Elements and
assumptions
The quality and quantity of public services provided in a
country depends on the financial rules and incentives that
govern the interactions among the various actors of the pub-
lic sector. System characteristics such as the actual number
of hospital beds in a given region, the quality of primary education, the size of
unemployment benefits, the timeliness of disaster recovery interventions or the
efficiency of waste collection and public transport find their explanation partly in
the constitution of the government and the formal and informal fiscal interactions
among its various levels. The actual pattern of interactions and the underlying
 rules also affect macro-level characteristics like the volume of national debt, the
extent of economic disparities, growth rates or competitiveness.
Academic interest in intergovernmental fiscal relations emerged as early as in
the s. T’s () seminal article on the theory of local expenditure
prepared the ground for a never-cessing debate on the welfare gains and losses of
decentralisation. Three years later, Richard A. Musgrave published The Theory of
Public Finance (), the first systematic overview about the functions and work-
ing mechanisms of the public sector, without actually discussing the specific case
of multi-tier government systems. Confronted with the reality in industrialised
countries during the s and s, O (), K () and M
and M () did considerable pioneer work in applying Musgrave’s initial
theory of fiscal functions to the more realistic situation of multi-level government.
Their major concern was to find out more about the appropriate way of decentrali-
sation as well as the optimal assignment of responsibilities and resources among the
different government tiers. The result of these inquiries, the so-called neoclassical
model of fiscal federalism, is often criticised today for its excessively normative
character; nevertheless, it induced further reflection among public finance scholars
about the particularities of multi-tier government systems. Oates’ interpretation
of ‘federalism’ acted as a catalyst for the worldwide research of intergovernmental
fiscal relations. He envisioned
[. . . ] a spectrum of structures of the public sector along which the difference is
essentially one of degree rather than kind. At one end of the spectrum is a unitary
form of government with all decisions made by the central authority, and at the
opposite pole is a state of anarchy. Aside from the two polar points themselves,
the other positions on the spectrum represent federal organizations of the public
sector moving from a greater to a lesser degree of centralization of decision-making.
(O, , p. )
Stipulating that ‘in economic terms most if not all systems are federal’ (ibid.),
Oates opened the way to a worldwide academic discussion on the application of
Musgrave’s theory in a huge variety of political, social and economic contexts
represented by a multitude of countries. Primary interest was directed on the re-
sponsibilities that the various levels of government need to assume in order to fulfil
the three traditional fiscal functions (also called objectives) of the state; namely,
resource allocation, income and wealth distribution, and macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion (M and M, , p.  ff. and  ff.). The set of institutions
that determined these roles and responsibilities were called intergovernmental
fiscal relations. These consist of seven major theme blocks:
. Legal and institutional framework
. Assignment of expenditures
. Tax assignment
. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers
. Territorial structure and the size of jurisdictions
. Fiscal equalisation
. Budgeting, borrowing and bailout.
The neoclassical model of fiscal federalism relies, as its name suggests, on the
premises of the neoclassical (also called orthodox, or mainstream) welfare eco-
nomics whose main objective is to explore the behaviour and interactions of eco-
nomic agents within a given institutional system (O, ). The neoclassical
welfare economics relies on three fundamental assumptions:
– The institutional environment is exogenously given or, at least, it has a
neutral effect on the economy.
– The entire economy is a market where the price system coordinates demand
and supply. Prices reflect the individual valuations of marginal utility and
marginal cost, thus inducing economic actors to make rational choices.
– The state resembles a benevolent dictator who is fully informed about the
preferences of individuals and seeks to maximise the benefit of the entire
society.
The neoclassical model of the correct design of intergovernmental fiscal relations,
as developed by Tiebout, Musgrave, and Oates, rely on three additional hypotheses:
The proposed theme blocks result from a combination of several different views about the content
of intergovernmental fiscal relations; see e.g. M and M (, p.  ff.), K
(), E and Y (, p.  ff.), and D and W (, p. ). Some authors treat
tax assignment () and intergovernmental fiscal transfers () under the collective term ‘revenue
assignment’. Others split up the legal and institutional framework () in a way that each of the
thematic blocks includes the rules and institutions pertaining to that specific block. For B
et al. (, p.  ff.), intergovernmental fiscal relations consist only of intergovernmental transfers
as well as arrangements for tax harmonisation and coordination.
 – Capital and labour are perfectly mobile.
– The frontiers between jurisdictions are not yet drawn, or at least they can be
modified any time without excessive costs.
– Intergovernmental fiscal institutions designed and implemented according
to the propositions are functional and stable over time and space.
Starting from these premises, the neoclassical model regards subnational jurisdic-
tions as small and open economies whose abilities and interests do not necessarily
coincide with those of the central government. First, interjurisdictional disparities
in the ability to provide local public services induce undesirable internal migra-
tions that result in social and political tensions. Second, subnational expenditures
that have a significant impact on demand or are particularly sensitive to cycles
(e.g. unemployment benefits) may run counter to the stabilisation objective of the
centre. By contrast, the closeness of decentralised governments to their electorate
permits a more sensitive adaptation of the offer of public services to the interre-
gional variations in preferences and a higher accountability and responsiveness of
policymakers. Additional gains can be realised from experimentation and innova-
tion at subnational levels. For these reasons, and in order to maximise efficiency
in a decentralised system, the neoclassical model proposes to assign the allocation
function to the subnational governments while keeping the stabilisation and distri-
bution functions at the central or federal level (M and M, ,
p. ). According to the recommendations of this model for the revenue side of the
budget, the assignment of taxes should take account of the differences in taxpayer
mobility among the various levels of government; horizontal and vertical fiscal
gaps that necessarily arise from such an exercise should be filled with transfers and
grants-in-aid. These latter instruments can also be used in a way to neutralise ex-
ternal effects resulting from the decentralised provision of public services. Finally,
the neoclassical theory proposes to create optimal size jurisdictions that ensure a
coincidence between the groups of decision-makers, taxpayers, and beneficiaries
(‘principle of fiscal equivalence’; O, ).
.. Limitations and
challenges
In his later years, Musgrave realised that ‘the economic
rationale for fiscal policy is one thing, and the existing set
of fiscal institutions is another. These institutions [. . . ]
are the product of a multiplicity of historical forces, not necessarily well suited
to perform the normative tasks set in the preceding discussion’ (M and
M, , p. ). W () was the first economist to take a clear
distance from the pure normative approach inherent to the neoclassical model.
Two decades later, reflecting about how to design or operate a system of devolved
government in practice, King found that ‘the balance of the arguments may well tilt
one way in one country and another way elsewhere, and it may move from time to
time even within a particular country. Thus an attempt to find a unique definitive
system would be absurd’ (K, , p. ).
Other authors followed suit, abandoning the normative approach in order to
provide descriptive analyses of the practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Two decades had passed before the spirit of ‘learning from each other’ conquered
the academic thinking about fiscal federalism and decentralisation (B-
 and W, , p.  ff.). An overview of the literature on the practical
aspects of fiscal federalism in general, and decentralisation processes in Eastern
Europe in particular, reveals two kinds of departure from the neoclassical approach.
The dynamics and diversity of
decentralised systems
Studying the process of decentralisation in post-
communist transition countries, B et al. (b,
p. ) found that some subnational government
structure (and accordingly, some kind of intergovernmental fiscal relations) existed
there already under the centralised unitary system. However, the political and
fiscal autonomy of lower-level authorities was severely limited, which left them the
role of simple executive agents of the centre. Today, parallel to the changes in the
political regime in recent decades, intergovernmental relations are undergoing a
thorough change resulting from an extensive political and fiscal decentralisation.
This change conduces not only to more autonomous but also to more responsible
governance at all levels. The deepening integration with the European Union and
the perspective of joining the euro zone also act as catalysers in this process.
Nearly twenty years after publishing his seminal work on fiscal federalism,
O () acknowledged that the vertical structure of government is not static.
Whether a state has a long-standing tradition in fiscal federalism or has just re-
cently started to decentralise powers, intergovernmental fiscal relations are under
continuous change. Ronald L. Watts speaks in this context about the dynamics of
decentralisation (W, , p. ). Both the influence from the outside envi-
 ronment and systemic interactions inside the government structure may make it
necessary to adapt intergovernmental fiscal relations to the changing circumstances.
Developments in the national and international market environment induce fluctu-
ations in public sector revenues, which may necessitate the revision of the existing
revenue assignment scheme. Technological innovation may raise demand for addi-
tional public services, which eventually spurs the central government to consider
the questions of which government tier or other economic agent should provide
these services and how they should be financed. External rules such as the deficit
and debt criteria applying to the member states of the Economic and Monetary
Union have increased pressure on central governments to coordinate borrowing
practices between the different government tiers, thus controlling the accumulation
of debt. Other exogenous factors include subtle changes in the common value
system of the society (especially the subjective importance attached to equity and
efficiency) that may ultimately call for adjustments in the interregional redistribu-
tion policy or in the funding of service-providing facilities. In Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE), the relatively fluid and sensitive character of the political balance
adds to the uncertainty. As H (, p. ) notes, the models of public
administration reform vary from one government period to another. G ()
speaks in this context about different political regimes having different priorities
with regard to decentralisation. Endogenous changes in the vertical structure of
government include, for instance, the territorial reorganisation aimed at higher
efficiency in the provision of local public goods and services.
Beside their inherent dynamics, intergovernmental fiscal systems are also char-
acterised by spatial diversity. Notwithstanding the similarity of the paths of de-
centralisation followed after  and the resulting common problems (e.g. fuzzy
expenditure assignment, unfunded mandates, unpredictable revenue flows, trans-
fer dependence of subnational levels), transition countries also demonstrate a great
variety of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. One of the most fundamental dif-
ferences lies in the economic constitution of the state. While most states adopted a
decentralised unitary model, a few opted for a federal system (Serbia and Montene-
gro from  to , Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia). Beyond this major
difference, the form and the content of actual intergovernmental arrangements
vary with the actual geographic and demographic characteristics, the political and
institutional context as well as the actual stage of decentralisation. In addition,
since the reforms are complex and lengthy by nature, decentralisation progresses at
a varying pace across the countries of the region (P and Z, , p. ).
Consequently, each building block of intergovernmental fiscal relations represents
a multitude of national variations at any point of time during the overall decen-
tralisation process in the region (D and W, , p. ; B and S,
, p.  ff.). While it is undoubtedly reasonable to apply uniform policy advice to
such common problems as transfer dependence or interregional spillovers, diffi-
culties resulting from the particular setting of one country or another call for more
differentiated solutions.
The impact of local autonomy
on the fulfilment of fiscal and
other functions of the state
From the s, various authors especially from
Europe (S, ; D, ; W,
, ; T-M, b; B et al.,
) realised that the state of the American econ-
omy in the s—characterised by nearly perfect mobility and competing jurisdic-
tions—had a limited validity for the study of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements
in practice. According to these authors, the mere fact that the subcentral units in
any decentralised system enjoy a certain level of autonomy puts into perspective the
validity of the neoclassical normative teaching on the appropriateness of assigning
specific fiscal functions (objectives) to the various levels of government. Notably,
respecting the autonomy of decentralised jurisdictions implies allowing them to
have a different view than the one held by the centre about the optimal pattern of
intergovernmental fiscal relations. Moreover, the continuous debate between and
within government tiers about the content and relative importance of the three
main objectives of the state, namely allocative efficiency, distributional equity, and
macroeconomic stability, is an inherent feature of decentralised systems. Social de-
velopment and economic growth improve the technical efficiency of public service
provision, which makes that some of the responsibilities that were once assigned
to the centre for efficiency reasons may now just as well be met by lower-level
governments. Against this background, Scott and others consider that it may be
justifiable to devolve both the redistribution and stabilisation functions to the
lower levels of government.
This argument receives further support from two recognitions. As for the re-
distribution function, experience tells that labour in Europe is only imperfectly
mobile (S, , p. ). Hence, income redistribution policies pursued by
lower-level governments do not necessarily induce distortional migration; more-
over, additional benefit may be reaped from the proximity of decision-makers
to beneficiaries. As for the objective of macroeconomic stabilisation, a strictly
centralised policy—however efficient—imposes an inequitable burden on those
constituent units that are not responsible for the macroeconomic imbalance. In-
stead, a stabilisation policy involving the participation of lower levels is likely to
 be more equitable than a strictly centralised one, and it may help avoid adverse
cyclical behaviour of subnational governments.
As D (, p. ) observes, the adherents of the normative neoclassi-
cal economics have made little effort to analyse the divergent views, the relative
competence and the responsiveness of the various government tiers with regard
to the three main objectives of the state. However, the recently emerged positive
approach to fiscal federalism could possibly close this gap. The recognition that
the objectives of allocative efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic
stability, receive different weights in the various countries depending on the spe-
cific historical, political and social situation of the latter is well documented in
T-M (b, p. ) and B et al. (). Furthermore, every country
exhibits a specific pattern of how the different levels of government valuate these
objectives in relation to each other.
In Spain, for instance, the intermediate level of government is becoming increas-
ingly active in social policy without experiencing any ‘welfare tourism’ (M,
). As for stabilisation, especially in countries struggling with macroeconomic
imbalances (such as those in CEE), central governments are being advised to
invite subnational authorities to help shape macroeconomic management (T-
M, b, p. ). In the early stages of decentralisation, the national
government can effectively master stabilisation policy (even counteracting the
cyclical policies of subnational governments) due to its substantial influence on
the overall public budget. However, as decentralisation is progressing, maintaining
control over the macroeconomic situation becomes increasingly difficult as the
financial autonomy of lower level governments continue to grow, and bailout
grants prove to be unsustainable in the long run. Introducing cooperation in the
stabilisation policy is all the more important as the integration of these countries
in the Economic and Monetary Union implies shared responsibility for fulfilling
the Maastricht criteria. As T-M (b, p.  f.) argues, the devo-
lution of the functions of distribution and macroeconomic management does
not necessarily hurt equity and stability objectives if it is accompanied by correc-
tive measures (equalisation grants and a hard budget constraint) and if labour is
relatively immobile.
Along with the growing diversity of the views on who should do what in a
federal system, different opinions are likely to emerge about the optimal size of
jurisdictions; yet, the reorganisation of the existing constituent units may prove
difficult (if not impossible) for historical and political reasons. There are essentially
two distinct ways of consolidating fragmented territorial structures: (i) through
the amalgamation of the existing local government units (see C  E-
,  and D, ), and (ii) through the establishment of functional,
overlapping, and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ, see  S, ; F
and E, ). While amalgamations occur in most decentralised
countries, real-life examples of FOCJs are rather sporadic because of the vested
interests that tend to block such reforms (P, , p.  f.).
However, the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations cannot be based on the
sole arguments of allocative efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic
stability. Since regions are the products of history and politics, and not of simple
economic rationality, constitutional, historical, political, social and cultural factors
have an equally important role to play.
W (, ), P (), D (, ), and B
and S () were the first authors to consider objectives other than effi-
ciency, equity, and stability, in the analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
They recognised that efficiency could be defined in various ways depending on
the stakeholders’ perspective. Besides, they noted that policies founded upon the
sole criterion of efficiency were likely to come into conflict with various political
objectives of federalism such as local autonomy or the protection of ethnic mi-
norities, and each of these alternative objectives can be interpreted in a number of
different ways. In order to make federalism politically acceptable for all constituent
units, some degree of economic efficiency may need to be sacrificed. Notably,
decision-makers are often forced into a trade-off between autonomy and efficiency.
Obviously, the decision about the actual content and the weighting of these two
objectives depends on a multitude of value judgments and not on pure economic
rationality. Whose value judgment will then prevail in a government system where
subnational tiers are vested with particular powers? In normal conditions, nei-
ther tier can effectively impose its view on the others, so that a common position
about the actual balance between conflicting objectives can only arise through
negotiations.
The overall economic development of the country may also induce changes in
social attitudes towards the weighting of the various economic, political, and social
objectives. This necessarily leads to a debate about the aims of intergovernmental
fiscal relations. Against this background, it is not surprising that the procedure
of creating and amending the constitution in federal and decentralised systems
has received particular attention for the last forty years (B and T,
; B and S, ; P, ; V, ).
Consulting various government strategy papers and academic studies, H
() and D () reveal a multitude of objectives that national decentrali-
sation programmes in CEE pursue. Figure . provides a tentative classification.

Efficiency in resource allocation
(allocative efficiency)
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL OBJECTIVES
Efficiency in resource use
(productive efficiency)
Macroeconomic stability
Interpersonal / interregional equity
in income / wealth distribution
Right to local
self-government
 / autonomy
Democracy, pluralism,
citizen participation
Accountability, responsibility
Protection of
linguistic / religious
 / ethnic minorities
Transparency,
no corruption
Compliance with 
EU legislation
/ ECLSG
Vertical separation of powers
Access to a minimum level
of public services
Preservation of collective historical and cultural identities
Modern ethics in public administration
Recognition of individual /
collective (e.g. property) rights
Figure 2.1: The objectives of decentralisation in Central and Eastern Europe
[Source: the author, based on Horváth (2000) and Davey (2002)]
Not surprisingly, the right to local self-government (local autonomy) as the
central objective of decentralisation is at the cross-section of economic, political
and social/cultural objectives. At the same time, local autonomy is the objective
that puts into perspective the neoclassical teaching on the role of the state (fiscal
functions) and the question of who should do what in a federal system. As soon as
the centre grants a certain degree of autonomy to subcentral units, chances are high
that the latter will have a different view about the proper design of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations and demand to be involved into the negotiating process in
which the centre can no longer dictate the rules and priorities. On the other hand,
autonomy also requires local policymakers to develop a sense of responsibility
for their actions. The centre can ultimately use this sense of responsibility when
pursuing public policies (such as distribution or stabilisation) in the interest of the
society.
. The New Political Economy approach to fiscal decentralisation
.. Premises and directions The observation of the practice of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations has delivered a significant
input but is surely not the only factor to influ-
ence recent theoretical thinking on fiscal federalism and decentralisation. The new
pragmatic approach to the study of multi-unit government systems coincided with
the emergence of a general trend in economic sciences that turned away from the
mainstream neoclassical line to open the horizon for political and constitutional
considerations in economics.
From the s, several different approaches challenged the orthodox frame-
work that were ultimately summarised under the label of New Political Economy
(NPE). One common feature of the various strands of NPE is that they reject the
assumption of a benevolent government whose only interest is to maximise the
social welfare function. Furthermore, all of these strands attempt to explain actual
economic policies that the mainstream theory used to consider as historically given
and hence exogenous.
Figure . proposes a simple framework that highlights three different directions
in which the NPE departs from mainstream neoclassical economics and that
brought a significant input to the study of intergovernmental fiscal relations. We
may capture the differences along two main dimensions: whether the theory in
question focuses on individuals or rather on institutions, and whether it deals
primarily with economic or political markets.

ORTHODOX NEOCLASSICAL
ECONOMICS
Focus on
individuals
Focus on
institutions
Economic market
Political
market
NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMICSPUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Figure 2.2: The orthodox neoclassical economics and its challengers
[Source: the author]
Public Choice Theory The adherents of the theory of Public Choice (PC) agree
with the neoclassical economic theory of individual be-
haviour and the related principles of marginal analysis, rational choice, self-
interested utility-maximising individuals, voluntary exchange, methodological
individualism, and general equilibrium, but they reject the assumption of a benevo-
lent state. In claiming that political actors do not significantly differ from economic
actors in their behaviour, they attempt to extend the scope of neoclassical theory
beyond the limits of the narrow economic market. According to M (,
p. ), PC is ‘the economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the
application of economics to political science’. PC examines the collective political
decision-making and coordination processes within a given set of institutions (for-
mal and informal constraints), assigning a rational, utility-maximising behaviour
to policymakers, bureaucrats, voters, and economic agents alike (K, ).
New Institutional Economics Largely simultaneously to PC, another distinct re-
search programme appeared under the label of New
Institutional Economics (NIE). It departs from the orthodox theory in a different
direction than PC. While accepting the basic neoclassical principles related to the
behaviour of economic agents, the scholars of NIE do not quit the realm of the
economic market. However, they claim that the market itself is an institution in
continuous interaction with other institutions of the society, such as norms and
traditions, laws, property rights, bureaucracy, or the horizontal and vertical dis-
tribution of powers. The specific legal and institutional framework of the market
creates particular incentives that influence the decisions of individuals, so that the
choices of two individuals in similar exchange situations may be quite different
from one market to another. The adherents of NIE played a pioneer role in laying
down a common definition and a typology of institutions. According to N’s
classical definition (, p. ), institutions are ‘the humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social or economic’. They consist of informal con-
straints (such as customs, norms, traditions, taboos, religious beliefs, and codes of
conduct) and formal constraints (such as constitutions, laws, and property rights),
as well as their enforcement characteristics. In the past thirty years, North’s funda-
mental tenet claiming that institutions matter for economic performance (which
paved the way for the ‘old’ institutional economics) was completed with another
thesis, particular to NIE, according to which ‘the determinants of institutions are
susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic theory’ (M, , p. ).
These propositions triggered the development of a distinct school of heterodox
 thought in economics which was primarily represented by N (, ,
), M (), F and R (), and W (),
and whose fundamental achievement was the ‘endogenisation’ of economic insti-
tutions and the research into the way they emerge. Much of the research activity in
NIE today is spurred by the worldwide interest in development economics. While
neoclassical theory was mainly concerned with the operation of the market, it
failed to explain how markets develop, why institutions in developing countries
and transition economies are different from those in industrial countries, how they
evolve over time and how they enhance overall economic development (N,
, p. ; A, , p.  f.).
Constitutional Political
Economics
Finally, a third group of scholars criticise both the as-
sumption of a benevolent dictator and the hypothesis of
exogenously given institutions. Their forerunner is Knut
Wicksell who, in search for a just principle of taxation, observed that the tradi-
tional methods of public finance research were inadequate under modern political
conditions. He advised scholars to stop taking the state for a benevolent despot
and observe reality instead (W, , p.  f.). To lay the ground for what
is called today Constitutional Political Economics (CPE), Buchanan developed
Wicksell’s incidental observation to a more general command, according to which
it is essential to postulate some model of the state and examine the constitution
of the economic policy before evaluating alternative policy measures (B,
, p. ). CPE represents therefore a third kind of departure from orthodox
theory but is nurtured by both PC and NIE (V, , p.  ff.). In contrast
to PC, CPE focuses on the choice of constraints as opposed to the choice within
constraints (B, , p. ). In contrast to NIE, CPE is more interested in
political institutions such as constitutions, electoral systems and direct democracy,
than in market organisations such as firms, antitrust regulations or multilateral
trade conventions. As for the underlying scientific approach, CPE has a normative
and a positive branch. While the major endeavour of the normative branch is to
legitimate state activity by means of a theory of social contract (B and
T, ), the positive branch seeks to explain why and how constitutional
rules emerge and change over time and where they lead in practice (V, ).
.. Relevance Also called a ‘theory of collectives’ (K, , p. ) dealing
with the questions of collective needs, goods, and decisions,
PC theory had a determinant role to play in the recognition that the state is not
a monolithic block but a structure of widely different groups of actors linked to
each other in a ‘variable geometry’. According to the representatives of PC, it is
essential to analyse the relationship among these groups of actors, or communities,
in order to get a better understanding of how the state operates. This implies
investigations on the way they are created, their diversity in terms of size, decision-
making structures, quality and quantity of the provided public services, and the
role of local bureaucracy. PC also provides an insight into the dynamics of federal
structures, notably into the centrifugal and centripetal forces that determine the
trends of centralisation and decentralisation in a multi-level government system
(K, ). Mancur Olson raises the question about the optimal pattern of
assigning responsibilities (O, ): if collective action is needed, which type
of government or which institutions should be involved? Is it ever possible to
achieve Pareto optimality? Is negotiation an appropriate instrument for reaching a
compromise if transaction costs are high? Based on the studies of B (),
B and W (), B and G (), and B (,
) on the interjurisdictional competition for taxpayers and beneficiaries and
the efficiency limits of fiscally induced mobility of individuals, some researchers
search for potential gains from transforming historical jurisdictions into purely
functional ‘clubs’ ( S, ; F and E, ). Given the
large international and interregional variation in mobility and the difficulties of
estimating its costs, the debate on this matter is far from the end.
Another strand of PC deals with the effect of decentralisation on the behaviour
of politicians (G, ; H and W, ; D and W,
), voters and bureaucrats (T, ; N, ; B and W-
, ; W, ). Its insights are particularly valuable for exploring
the background of inefficient administration, vertical fiscal imbalance, the trans-
fer dependence of local governments and the (in)effectiveness of local pressure
groups against central authorities. W and S () even suggest that
PC arguments are indispensable to a normative study of public economics.
Although the adherents of NIE are essentially concerned with the institutions
of economic markets, they play a significant role in locating governments and
other public authorities in the broader context of social, political, and economic
institutions. In his sketch of the four levels of social analysis, W (,
p. ) identifies the vertical distribution of power (federalism) as being part of the
second level, namely the institutional environment, which consists of the ‘formal
 rules of the game’ such as constitutions, laws, and property rights. Unlike in the
case of first-level informal institutions such as customs, norms, and traditions,
here it is difficult to engineer a progressive and cumulative change. Yet, moments
of political upheaval such as breakdowns or revolutions (typical starting points in
the transformation process of CEE countries) may occasionally open up a window
of opportunity that allows the implementation of key reforms.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of NIE to the study of fiscal federalism
and decentralisation consists of the insights on the impact of economic and political
institutions on the fiscal performance of national and subnational governments.
Notably, the debt and spending behaviour of different government tiers have been
examined as a function of budgetary procedures (P, ;  H and
H, ; F and K, ; A et al., ), balanced
budget rules (E and B, ; P, ; D, a),
direct democracy and other political institutions (F and M, ;
F and K, ; P and S, ). These results
are of particular interest to transition economies where, for historical reasons,
governance and institutions have been relatively poor (C, , p. ; S,
, p. ). NIE may also help identify the reasons why successful institutions
in Western Europe do not necessarily bring similarly good results in transition
economies and what can be done for a better adaptation of institutional structures
to the existing historical, political and social context (N, ; A, ).
Finally, insofar as constitutions provide for an assignment of revenues and ex-
penditures as well as intergovernmental oversight competences, the research output
of the CPE, particularly that of the positive branch, is of a great value in the study of
decentralised systems. This output includes important insights about the optimum
size of government (B and B, , ) and the related discus-
sion on cooperative versus competitive federalism in which the adherents of PC had
similarly deep interest. At a time when transition countries in CEE are struggling
to redefine the role of the state and the relations between various government tiers,
the outcome of these debates appear to be particularly important. Other valuable
contributions of CPE include the theory of intergovernmental grants (B,
), the theory about the optimal assignment of expenditure functions as a result
of a ‘trading’ between governments (B and S, ), and some insights
on the trade-off between local autonomy and income equality or uniformity of
living conditions (Z, ). Beside autonomy and equality, stability is
a key determinant of success in any decentralised system. W () sees the
major challenge in finding the optimal set of constitutional arrangements in which
political institutions can credibly commit themselves to limiting government and
preserving markets. The particular interest for transition economies stems from
the underlying motivation of the inquiry: a government strong enough to protect
property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth
of its citizens; this dilemma is particularly relevant in the context of early post-
Soviet history. Moreover, however serious is the commitment of political actors
to create a market-preserving constitution, existing informal institutions partly
inherited from the socialist era can severely compromise the result. A most recent
distinction between de iure and de facto constitution by V (, p.  ff.)
draws the attention to the fact that the effectiveness of a formal constitution may be
weakened by ‘extra-constitutional’ factors such as unwritten norms, expectations
and attitudes of economic actors, or the lack of trust among the members of the
society.
As the above explanations suggest, there is significant overlapping among PC,
NIE, and CPE in their approach to fiscal decentralisation. Yet, there are a number
of phenomena related to intergovernmental fiscal relations and local autonomy
that cannot be explained satisfactorily with the set of arguments pertaining to a
single strand of NPE. For the rest of this study, we hope therefore to benefit from
the synergy effect arising from the similarities among the different approaches.

CHAPTER 
Local Financial Autonomy
A closer look at the way academics and politicians perceive the worldwide trend to- 
wards decentralisation and judge the performance of already existing decentralised
government systems suggests two fundamental observations. First, decentralisation
is most often associated with an increase in local autonomy. Second, the conno-
tations and values attached to decentralisation and local autonomy are almost
exclusively positive.
To what extent is this universal support for local autonomy justified? Indeed,
transferring a certain amount of power from the central government to lower-level
territorial organisations is the very meaning of decentralisation. But does this
transfer of power always imply some sort of autonomy for the lower levels, and if
yes, what is the real extent of this autonomy? May we content ourselves with the
idea that local autonomy is an inherently good thing? Or do we have a good reason
to believe that under certain circumstances, less autonomy would bring more?
These inquiries suggest that no rational debate about the desired state of affairs
can do without some way of measuring local autonomy. Particularly in the domain
of local financial autonomy, a number of qualitative and quantitative indicators
have been developed in the past few years to measure the relative position of
individual territorial units on the continuum between perfect sovereignty and full
financial dependence. Many of these indicators are criticised on the grounds that
they neglect one important component of local autonomy or another; however,
the proposed alternatives are seldom convincing. The utmost complexity of the
concept of local autonomy makes it difficult, at least at the present state of economic
research, to establish a genuinely satisfactory measure.
 The objective of this chapter is to explore the notion and the value of local
autonomy in general and local financial autonomy in particular, and to identify
possible measures of the latter. Section . provides an overview of the various
definitions of local autonomy that emerged throughout the past twenty years of
literature on decentralisation. Local autonomy is generally perceived as a good
thing that should be preserved at any price, even though it might be put into
perspective in times of threatening or creeping centralisation, or when planned
intergovernmental reforms promise a better alternative to the maintenance of
autonomy in terms of results. The pivotal question in Section . is therefore not
whether local autonomy is a good thing or a bad thing, but how the normative belief
in local autonomy as something a priori good could become so popular. Section .
suggests that local autonomy hardly deserves to be a valence issue: it can potentially
conflict other policy objectives such as economic efficiency, equity or democratic
participation. In the sections that follow, the analysis is limited to one particular
aspect of local autonomy, namely local financial autonomy. Section . postulates
local financial autonomy as being the combination of expenditure autonomy,
revenue autonomy, and budgetary autonomy. Each of these components is then
described with the help of a two-dimensional matrix of constraints that provides
a basic methodological tool for the analysis in Part II. In a quest for some more
tangible means of definition, Section . discusses past and current approaches to
measuring local financial autonomy. Finally, Section . is devoted to the principle
of subsidiarity as a special guiding rule of local (financial) autonomy and shows
how a vague definition can give rise to several different interpretations in practice.
. The concept of local autonomy
.. Early definitions: local
autonomy as a right
Although the notion of local autonomy occupies
a central position in the literature on political and
fiscal decentralisation, the recurrent use of the term
did not contribute much to the clarification of its
meaning. Obviously, it has something to do with the freedom of sub-central
government units to manage their affairs in a way that is not entirely dictated and
controlled by the central government. Yet, up to this date, the study of decentralised
governance still lacks an established definition of local autonomy and there is no
clear consensus about which elements could actually constitute it or how it could
be measured. Also, as we will see in the following section, the different groups of
policymakers (political parties, government actors, etc.) unequivocally support
and appreciate local autonomy, however, they usually do not mean the same thing
by this term and seldom agree on which field of public activity is suitable for local
control.
Local autonomy alone rarely constitutes the subject of scientific analysis. As
Clark observes, ‘most academic theorists place their work in the context of an
existing, albeit unacknowledged, institutional framework that assumes some kind
of local autonomy’ (C, , p. ). One of the classic examples is the model
of spatial competition by T () that postulates the existence of several
autonomous, competing territorial jurisdictions. If these jurisdictions had not
even a limited degree of autonomy, this would invalidate the principal assumption
of the model according to which the jurisdictions respond to the preferences of
local residents. However, the model is silent about where this autonomy stems
from and whether it is limited in one way or another.
Probably one of the most renowned early attempts to theorise local autonomy
appears in C (). Clark’s theory places local (municipal) power in relation
to higher tiers of government, laying the cornerstone for what is still referred
to as the traditional view of local autonomy, namely, that local autonomy is not
an absolute but a relative concept. Clark assumes that local governments are
goal-oriented, rational actors who strive to maximise their power. Further, he
postulates that democracy and democratic procedures do not require a specific
form of government. In this setting, he defines local autonomy along two specific
powers (or principles). The power of initiation is the power of local governments
to regulate and legislate in their own interests, or the power to act in carrying out
rightful duties. The power of immunity is the power of local governments to act
without fear of oversight; it means immunity from the authority of higher tiers of
the state. Both powers can be circumscribed extremely broadly or narrowly in the
initial intergovernmental arrangements for power sharing.
For Clark, these two basic principles give rise to a two-dimensional matrix
accommodating four extreme types of local autonomy. Figure . provides an
overview.
For the historical and philosophical discussion of these ‘ideal’ types, we refer
the reader to the original paper. One finding of the model that certainly merits to
be quoted, however, is that the real powers of American local governments are far
away from those assumed in the Tiebout model of interjurisdictional mobility. In
line with the so-called Dillon’s rule (D, , cited by C, , p. ),
It is perhaps interesting to note that also the theory of Functional, Overlapping and Competing
Jurisdictions ( S, ; F and E, ) that is closely related to the
Tiebout model circumvents the question about the source and the limits of jurisdictional autonomy.
 municipalities in the US have only those powers that are explicitly granted by
state legislatures as well as (secondary) powers related to the execution of these.
Thus, local governments are ‘creatures of the state’ with very limited initiation
powers. Immunity is virtually inexistent in this system: as Clark reports, Dillon’s
rule ensures that courts severely punish all municipal deviations from the letter of
the law. Thus, at the time when Tiebout presented his seminal model supposing
the competition among jurisdictions that enjoy at least the power of initiation
(Type ), US municipalities in reality were already much closer to Type  of local
autonomy.
Clark’s finding should not surprise the reader, since Tiebout never actually
related his model to the reality in the US. In fact, he even warned that it was ‘an
extreme model’ (, p. ). However, because of the assumptions of unrestricted
mobility and competition, later theorists tended to see in the Tiebout world an
abstract model of the American reality.
Clark also introduces the notion of local discretion, although the way he delimi-
tates it from the concept of local autonomy is not entirely clear: ‘Discretion, or the
ability of local governments to carry out in their own manner their own particular
objectives in accordance with their own standards of implementation, depends on
the prior specification of local autonomy’ (C, , p. ). He says that in a
world where both initiation and immunity are limited, local discretion is doubly
constrained and autonomy can hardly exist. For him, local autonomy (or the way
it is specified in terms of immunity and initiation powers) determines the extent
of local discretion.
It is also unclear whether in the definition above, Clark employs the expression
‘ability [. . . ] to carry out’ in the sense of an effective (administrative, financial,
technical, etc.) capacity or something else. Clark says: ‘[. . . ] if local initiative
were tightly circumscribed and the conditions in which local powers are exercised
were similarly prescribed, then local discretion would be severely limited’ (C,
, p. , emphasis added). This formulation leaves the reader uncertain about
whether these ‘conditions’ could include, for instance, the degree of financial
autonomy. Even if this were the case, though, the financial conditions prescribed by
the law or a higher tier of government (e.g. formal rules of local taxation or revenue
sharing) would not necessarily correspond to the actual financial circumstances
of local authorities, as these are also influenced by socioeconomic, demographic,
Clark supposes that local governments in the Tiebout model have limited immunity, thus they cannot
be of Type . Limiting immunity is necessary in order to restrict local governments from coercing
their residents and other local governments. Any pressure exerted by the local authority could
hinder voters from expressing their preferences, e.g. by voting with their feet.
Immunity
yes no
Initiation yes Type 1 Type 2
‘Autonomous city-state’ ‘Decentralised liberalism’
e.g. historical Venice and Florence e.g. competing jurisdictions in the 
Tiebout model
no Type 3 Type 4
‘Mill’s model’ ‘Bureaucratic apparatus’
e.g. US state governments vs. 
federal government
e.g. local councils in the former 
USSR; US municipalities vs. states 
Figure 3.1: Clark’s typology of local autonomy [Source: the author, based on Clark
(1984)]
topographic, etc. factors. Anyway, Clark’s definitions of initiation and immunity
suggest that both terms are primarily conceived as powers and not as capacity.
Regrettably, some scholars of later generations interpreted Clark’s model in an
unduly selective manner. From his suggestions that the extents of initiation and
immunity had to be specified beforehand and that US local governments were
mainly directed ‘from above’, DF (, p. ) concluded that ‘autonomy
is only something granted (either actively or passively) from “above” in limited
amounts.’ For P (, p. ), ‘local self-government in both unitary
and federal systems occurs only because a higher-level authority delegates some of
its sovereign powers and responsibilities.’ In contrast, Clark stated said explicitly
that the source of initiation remained an open question: ‘It is entirely plausible that
initiation powers are assigned by local residents. Alternatively, it is also plausible
that initiation powers are assigned by states or provinces or even the nation-state’
(C, , p. ). Such a blatant oversimplification of the original model is
incomprehensible. Clearly, if local governments’ initiation powers are assigned by
the province or the central government, then effective local autonomy is limited
because it depends on higher-level legislation. This is certainly true for local
governments and counties in Dillon’s United States (although most states have
already made provisions for municipal or county ‘home rule’) and for British
municipalities, boroughs and counties under the supremacy of the Crown in
Parliament that is the single source of sovereignty. However, it certainly does not
 apply to the Swiss cantons that inherently possess (rather than receive from above)
the powers of initiation and immunity.
The discussion about who assigns the power of initiation is interesting for two
reasons. First, if local government have no possibility to define or structure their
own initiation powers, then any attempt to define exclusive areas of local affairs will
fail. The answer to the question as to what constitutes a local affair will be dictated
by a higher-level authority or the national legislation. Second, the source of the
power of initiation has important legitimacy implications: when the limits to action
are imposed not by other institutions but by the local residents (Clark’s Types 
and ), then legitimacy flows from the bottom up; that is, local government bears
full and ultimate responsibility for its actions. In the opposite case (Types  and ),
legitimacy is top-down in the sense that both authority and responsibility for local
actions are centralised. This reveals the inherent connection between autonomy
and responsibility. As Hinings puts it aptly in his commentary on the early phase
of decentralisation in France, ‘in every decentralised system there is an internal
tension between the definitions of freedom defended by the local authorities and
the definitions of responsibility defended by the central government’ (H,
, p. , translation by the author).
One of Clark’s major contributions to the history of local government theory is
the recognition that local autonomy requires a ‘freedom to’ and a ‘freedom from’
simultaneously. This idea has largely influenced not only the ensuing academic
discussion about local autonomy but also the political thinking. On the other
hand, as P () points out, in defining local autonomy as a ‘freedom
from’, there is inevitably a systemic concern with centralisation. The implicit
message of such a definition is that any loss of local autonomy is a threat to
local democracy. Clark accepts the normative value of local autonomy without
examining its consequences, thus reinforcing the trend that would like to regard
local autonomy as a valence issue (see Section .).
While for Clark, the only thinkable constraint to local autonomy is the higher-
level authorities’ reviewing of municipal decisions with the aim to enforce their own
standards, G and K () go a step further. In their taxonomy of municipal
(‘local state’) autonomy, Type II partly corresponds to Clark’s immunity principle:
According to Art.  of the Swiss Federal Constitution, ‘the Cantons are sovereign insofar as their
sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not
transferred to the Confederation.’ At the same time, their sovereignty is limited only as far as the
cantons have voluntarily transferred part of their sovereignty to the federal level at the moment of
drafting the Constitution in . Thus, the residual power (of initiation and immunity) is vested
in the cantons and not in a central organ. See also F ().
‘The local state is autonomous to the extent that it can pursue its interests without
substantial interference by the national state’ (G and K, , p. ). Here,
however, national interference includes not only the explicit oversight function of
higher tiers and the review of local decisions, but also national political pressures
affecting local policies, as well as legal conditions or guidelines accompanying
central government grants. In contrast, the authors define Type I autonomy as
a power of local government to ‘pursue its interests without being substantially
constrained by local economic or social conditions’ (ibid, p. ). These conditions
are of three kinds:
– limits on the revenue-raising potential of local government;
– organised local economic interests diverting municipal power and policies
to their own purposes;
– local political organisations and social movements attempting to influence
the content and execution of local public policies.
An important feature of this model is the recognition of a trade-off between
Type I and Type II autonomy, particularly in the domain of economic constraints.
Shortfalls in local revenues can be overcome (increasing Type I autonomy), but
only at the cost of increased dependency from higher-level governments (decreas-
ing Type II autonomy). A local government soliciting a grant sees its Type II
autonomy decrease because it is obliged to respect the conditions of eligibility and
use (spending target) imposed by the grantor.
The last strand of classical theories defines local autonomy as the ability of local
governments to have an impact on the well-being of their citizens. W and
G find that previous interpretations of local autonomy as the power
to act according to own objectives and without constraints from higher-level
government or from economic and social factors are insufficient because they
neglect the consequences of local autonomy. For them, the fundamental question is
the following: ‘Do local governments in urban areas have autonomy in the sense
that their presence and activities have independent impacts on anything important?
Does urban politics matter?’ (W and G, , p. ). The most
important variable for W and G is the aggregate well-being of
local residents. By means of their autonomy, local governments are able to exert
some influence on this variable. They can shape the levels and the distribution
of income through taxes and transfer payments and increase citizens’ satisfaction
derived from local public services by bringing the spending pattern in line with
 community preferences. To a minor extent, they can also attain improvements in
other aspects of welfare. Locally funded child-care services may improve the quality
of family life, while zoning plans can help to preserve the physical environment
primarily given by nature. Clearly, the scope of local government’s potential to
affect local welfare is subject to a variety of constraints of an economic, social,
legal or political order. Yet, the novelty of this theory is in the outcome orientation:
once all external constraints are taken into account, the residual local autonomy is
justifiable only if it contributes to the well-being of those who provide legitimacy to
local government, namely the local population. For the first time in the literature,
the value of local autonomy is put into perspective. The only problem with the
theory of Wolman and Goldsmith—and the reason why it found hardly any echo
in the subsequent literature—is that of measuring the aggregate well-being of a
local community.
.. Recent definitions: local
autonomy as right and ability
The question of financial capacity that the early
models of local autonomy had surprisingly cir-
cumvented became a pivotal issue in the second
wave of theories emerging from the late s. An apparent driving force behind
this development was the European Charter of Local Self-Government (hereinafter:
the Charter) drawn up within the Council of Europe in . This is the first
document that defines local self-government (i.e. local autonomy) along the double
characteristics of right and ability to manage local public affairs. Box . gives back
a part of the original text that is a binding convention for all states that sign and
ratify it.
Box 3.1: Text of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, Part I (art. 2–11)
[Source: Council of Europe (1985a)]
Article 2 – Constitutional and legal foundation for local self-government
The principle of local self-government shall be recognised in domestic legislation, and
where practicable in the constitution.
Article 3 – Concept of local self-government
1. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within
the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs
under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.
The Charter employs the term local self-government in the sense of local autonomy. Nothing proves
this better than the French title of the convention: ‘Charte européenne de l’autonomie locale’.

2. This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members freely
elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which
may possess executive organs responsible to them. This provision shall in no way
affect recourse to assemblies of citizens, referendums or any other form of direct
citizen participation where it is permitted by statute.
Article 4 – Scope of local self-government
1. The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by
the constitution or by statute. However, this provision shall not prevent the attri-
bution to local authorities of powers and responsibilities for specific purposes in
accordance with the law.
2. Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise
their initiative with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their compe-
tence nor assigned to any other authority.
3. Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authori-
ties which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority
should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency
and economy.
4. Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may
not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except as
provided for by the law.
5. Where powers are delegated to them by a central or regional authority, local au-
thorities shall, insofar as possible, be allowed discretion in adapting their exercise
to local conditions.
6. Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an
appropriate way in the planning and decision making processes for all matters
which concern them directly.
Article 5 – Protection of local authority boundaries
Changes in local authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the
local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted
by statute.
Article 6 – Appropriate administrative structures and resources for the tasks of local
authorities
1. Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall be
able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt
them to local needs and ensure effective management.

2. The conditions of service of local government employees shall be such as to permit
the recruitment of high quality staff on the basis of merit and competence; to this
end adequate training opportunities, remuneration and career prospects shall be
provided.
Article 7 – Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised
1. The conditions of office of local elected representatives shall provide for free exer-
cise of their functions.
2. They shall allow for appropriate financial compensation for expenses incurred in
the exercise of the office in question as well as, where appropriate, compensa-
tion for loss of earnings or remuneration for work done and corresponding social
welfare protection.
3. Any functions and activities which are deemed incompatible with the holding of
local elective office shall be determined by statute or fundamental legal principles.
Article 8 – Administrative supervision of local authorities’ activities
1. Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be exercised according
to such procedures and in such cases as are provided for by the constitution or by
statute.
2. Any administrative supervision of the activities of the local authorities shall nor-
mally aim only at ensuring compliance with the law and with constitutional prin-
ciples. Administrative supervision may however be exercised with regard to ex-
pediency by higher-level authorities in respect of tasks the execution of which is
delegated to local authorities.
3. Administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised in such a way as
to ensure that the intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to
the importance of the interests which it is intended to protect.
Article 9 – Financial resources of local authorities
1. Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to adequate fi-
nancial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely within the frame-
work of their powers.
2. Local authorities’ financial resources shall be commensurate with the responsibili-
ties provided for by the constitution and the law.
3. Part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive from local
taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they have the power to
determine the rate.

4. The financial systems on which resources available to local authorities are based
shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable them to keep
pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of the cost of carrying out
their tasks.
5. The protection of financially weaker local authorities calls for the institution of
financial equalisation procedures or equivalent measures which are designed to
correct the effects of the unequal distribution of potential sources of finance and
of the financial burden they must support. Such procedures or measures shall not
diminish the discretion local authorities may exercise within their own sphere of
responsibility.
6. Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the way in which
redistributed resources are to be allocated to them.
7. As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financ-
ing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom
of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction. For
the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities shall have access
to the national capital market within the limits of the law.
Article 10 – Local authorities’ right to associate
1. Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to co-operate and,
within the framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in
order to carry out tasks of common interest.
2. The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection
and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international associ-
ation of local authorities shall be recognised in each State.
3. Local authorities shall be entitled, under such conditions as may be provided for
by the law, to co-operate with their counterparts in other States.
Article 11 – Legal protection of local self-government
Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy in order to secure
free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as
are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.
Compared to previous attempts to theorise local autonomy, the definition laid
down in art.  para.  of the Charter contains three new elements (C 
E, b):
 – The legal right to regulate and manage certain public affairs must be ac-
companied by the means of doing so effectively (‘ability’; in the official
French-language version: ‘capacité effective’).
– This right and ability may be defined more closely by legislation (‘within the
limits of the law’).
– Local authorities should not be limited to acting as the agents of higher
authorities (‘under their own responsibility’).
The assumption that ‘ability’ is a new element in the history of defining local
autonomy can be accepted only under the reserve that C () did not mean
the same thing when he described local discretion. Recalling the discussion from
Section .., Clark understands local discretion as ‘the ability of local governments
to carry out in their own manner their own particular objectives in accordance
with their own standards of implementation’ (C, , p. ). This rather
vague definition could lead the reader to the assumption that Clark was the first
author to define local autonomy (actually local discretion, though the difference is
not clear) along two aspects:
. the freedom to decide about the range of local public services to be provided;
. the freedom to manage the production function, in the sense of an effective
capacity to produce those services.
Accordingly, when Clark speaks about ‘to carry out [. . . ] their own particular
objectives’, in reality he means the same thing as the Charter with ‘the right to
regulate and manage’, namely, aspect  of local autonomy. Similarly, Clark’s ‘to
carry out in their own manner’ and the expression ‘means of doing so effectively’
in the Charter could both refer to aspect . However, the fact that Clark completely
ignores the questions of production function and effective capacity in the rest of
the article (his only concern being the formal power) might somewhat weaken this
argumentation.
Another novelty, one that is unquestionably attributed to the Charter, is the
careful avoidance of the terms ‘own interests’ and ‘own objectives’ so frequently
used in the earlier theories and the rejection of such vague expressions as ‘local
affairs’ or ‘own affairs’. According to the Explanatory Report accompanying the
Charter, ‘it is not possible to define precisely what affairs local authorities should
be entitled to regulate and manage. [. . . ] The traditions of member states as to
the affairs which are regarded as belonging to the preserve of local authorities
differ greatly. In reality most affairs have both local and national implications and
responsibility for them may vary between countries and over time, and may even
be shared between different levels of government’ (C  E, b).
Beside the explicit definition of local autonomy (art.  para. ), the Charter
introduces a number of principles upon which this autonomy should be based:
– Legal stability: The basic powers and responsibilities of local governments
should not be assigned to them on an ad hoc basis but be anchored in the
constitution or an act of Parliament (art.  para. );
– Residual competence: Local authorities should have the right to assume any
function that has not been excluded from their competence or assigned to
other authorities (art.  para. );
– Principle of subsidiarity: Unless there are ‘overriding considerations of effi-
ciency or economy’ (C  E, b), tasks should be assigned
to the lowest level of government (art.  para. ; see further Section .);
– No overlapping responsibilities: Overlapping should be avoided. Shared
competences, if they are necessary, should be assigned in accordance with
clear legislative provisions (art.  para. );
– Delegation with local discretion: Top-down delegation should not excessively
impinge on the sphere of independent authority of the local government
(except where uniform regulations are needed) (art.  para. );
– Consultation: Local authorities should have a real possibility to exercise
influence in matters that affect them (art.  para. );
– Shifting boundaries: Local governments should be consulted prior to amal-
gamations or other planned changes in boundaries (art. );
– Freedom of organisation: Local authorities should be free to organise their
administration according to their preferences (art. );
– Supervision of legality: The decisions and actions of local authorities should
normally be controlled only upon their conformity with the law (contrôle de
tutelle); for delegated functions it is also possible control expediency (art. 
para. );
– Tax and budget autonomy: For local autonomy to be meaningful, local
authorities must be given control over a sufficient amount of financial
resources (art. ; see further Section ..);
 – Co-operation and association: Local authorities can co-operate with other
local authorities and join national and international associations (art. );
– Legal protection: Local governments should have the right of recourse to a
judicial remedy (art. ).
During the first twenty years of application of the Charter, some of these terms
and expressions proved to be too vague, so that the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities ultimately decided to revise the convention, among others on the
following points (CLRA, ):
– The expressions ‘in due time’ and ‘in an appropriate way’ in relation to local
authorities’ right to be consulted (art.  para. );
– The term ‘normally’ concerning the supervision of legality of local govern-
ment actions (art.  para. ): in which cases of delegation is a control of
expediency justified?
– The desired character of financial systems described as ‘sufficiently diversified
and buoyant’ needs to be reformulated in a way to entail the levying of taxes
and/or the making of transfers, and that local taxes must be reasonably stable
and have a certain degree of flexibility at the same time.
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the Charter brought significant improve-
ments in the definition of the concept of local autonomy compared to previous
theories. The most important one is the introduction of financial autonomy as a
conditio sine qua non of a meaningful local autonomy. In addition, the Charter
described several further (legal, territorial, administrative, etc.) aspects of local
autonomy in unprecedented detail.
By the end of February , out of the  member countries of the Council
of Europe  ratified the Charter. In the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe, it served as the fundamental model of legislative reform and shaped
national constitutions and laws on local government substantially.
From , scholars writing about local government autonomy could no longer
ignore the innovations brought by the Charter. Alternative definitions did emerge,
however. One of the most remarkable attempts is the one made by M (,
p.  ff.) who defines local autonomy along four characteristics:
. The right to self-government in the sense of art.  para.  and art.  para.  of
the Charter, which implies thus both the right and the effective capacity to
decide and act within the limits of the law;
. The democratic character of local institutions that is manifest in the free
elections, the organisation of the municipal executive, and the participation
of citizens in the decision-making;
. The residual competence of local authorities, in the sense of art.  para.  of
the Charter;
. The control by higher tiers of government that is indissolubly related to local
autonomy. The extent of autonomy depends on the intensity of the control.
Other scholars were more interested in the nature of local autonomy than in
its components. DF (), for instance, criticises all the earlier theories
on the grounds that they consider local autonomy as a static ‘thing’ that can be
granted to and possessed by local authorities. For him, autonomy is more an
expression of power and thus a relational construct. Consequently, autonomy
cannot exist in itself but only in the context of complex extra-local relationships.
And since municipalities are so deeply embedded in their institutional environ-
ment (consisting of other municipalities, regional and central government, civil
society, business enterprises, etc.) that they can never realise complete autonomy.
Also, like all forms of power, local autonomy is inherently met by opposition and
contestation. Hence, local autonomy is ‘the ever-contested and never complete
ability of those within the locality to control the institutions and relationships that
define and produce the locality’ (DF, , p. ). The main message
of this (almost philosophical) definition is the impossibility of local autonomy as
perfect independence and isolation from the environment. P ()
joins this assumption asserting that the levels of local autonomy may alter over
time and issue even within the same constitutional system of government.
Practice suggests that the notion of autonomy is not only relative but also sub-
jective. Voters in a jurisdiction are likely to perceive and evaluate the extent of
their autonomy (or the marginal increase or decrease in autonomy) differently
across the various policy areas. For instance, the adjustment to centrally imposed
environmental norms is likely to be perceived as less painful than the loss of au-
tonomy in social affairs. There are two main factors that are likely to influence the
perception of local autonomy. The first one is the extent to which local residents
and policymakers can identify themselves with the objectives or national priorities
Here as well as in the rest of this study, we start from the hypothesis that the local government unit (or
more precisely, its executive body which is usually the council) is a ‘benevolent’ actor who pursues
no other goal than the strict implementation of the mission received from the local electorate. This
hypothesis might be strong, but at least it ensures that voters and their elected representatives have
a similar understanding of autonomy.
 behind the norm. People would uniformly like to live in a safe and clean environ-
ment, whereas they tend to disagree on the social legitimacy or the optimal degree
of income redistribution. The second factor is the degree to which local residents
and policymakers are affected by the restrictions imposed on their autonomy. Re-
strictions on air pollution are likely to affect some industries but impose no drastic
limitations on the lifestyle of individuals. By contrast, an expanding social aid
programme takes away useful resources from the realisation of other objectives
that could potentially benefit a larger share of the local constituency.
Certainly, the quality of policy instruments that local governments apply in
order to comply with the norm also influences the perception of autonomy of the
local population. Imagine, for instance, that residents are allowed to dispose of
glass, paper and plastic for free on condition that they throw them into separate
containers in signalised public areas. As long as this regime prevails, they will
consider waste reduction norms, not as a constraint on their autonomy, but rather
as an opportunity to economise on user charge liabilities. Another example is the
range of financial incentives that local governments in several countries receive
from the centre as a reward for horizontal co-operation in the provision of local
public goods and services. Here again, local voters weigh the loss of decision-
making autonomy induced by co-operation against the gain in the financial power
of the municipality. In summary, by using well-designed incentives, higher author-
ities can neutralise the loss of autonomy that lower-level governments and their
electorates necessarily incur when higher-level priorities are enforced.
Finally, a sizeable amount of written research on federalism and decentralisation
is concerned with the question of how sovereignty is devolved from the central
government to, or constitutionally shared with, lower tiers. From the perspective
of autonomy, one remarkable achievement of this strand of literature is that it
considers not only the local (municipal) tier but also the intermediate (regional,
provincial, district, etc.) tiers. While focusing on the analysis of local (municipal)
autonomy may be absolutely legitimate, it would be an error to neglect the impact
of municipal autonomy on the autonomy of other actors in a multi-level system of
governments. Nevertheless, as has been mentioned in Chapter , the present study
focuses on the financial autonomy of the lowest (municipal) tier because of time
and space limitations.
As for the sharing of sovereignty among the government tiers, B () ap-
pears to be the first author to split up the notion of decentralisation into three
We use the term sovereignty in the sense of an exclusive right to exercise supreme political authority
within a given territory. Hence, it is not a synonym of autonomy.
different concepts depending on how much power and responsibility the central
government retains when transferring a competence to lower levels. He distin-
guishes between three forms of decentralisation, each of which involves a different
level of subnational autonomy.
Deconcentration means that the higher-level authority keeps its powers and
responsibilities for a given public function while leaving the execution to the lower
authorities. This happens most often through precisely defined mandates to the
regional and local offices and line ministries of the central government, or to the
appointed prefects or governors of subnational jurisdictions. According to a more
recent definition (E and Y, , p. ), deconcentration may take place
with or without giving a minimum of authority (independent decision-making
capacity) to the territorial branch offices. In both cases, the higher authority
remains responsible for the general management and funding of the task, as well
as for the co-ordination and supervision of the deconcentrated agencies.
In the case of delegation, the lower authority has considerable discretion as
to how to carry out the delegated task, but it is fully accountable to the higher
authority which retains ultimate responsibility for what is done and provides some
or all of the necessary funding. G and V () emphasise
that the recipient of the delegated competence is a locally or regionally elected,
independent self-governing organisation and not a relocated executive agent of
the higher authority. The higher and the lower authority find themselves in a
principal-agent relationship in which the major challenge facing the principal (the
higher authority) is the lack of information about the agent’s actual capacity, his
decisions and actions, as well as the real costs of executing the task. Because of
this informational asymmetry, the principal is interested in negotiating a service
contract with the agent. As for the accountability of the agent, B (a)
notes that if delegation is accompanied by political decentralisation so that local
(regional) politicians are elected rather than appointed, then confusion may arise
since accountability runs in two directions, namely, upwards to the higher authority
and downwards to the voters.
Finally, devolution is the most complex form of decentralisation in which the re-
sponsibility for a particular function is entirely transferred to the lower authorities
that are, in this case as well, elected, independent self-governing entities. Along
with the competence transfer, these local governments are also given authority to
levy taxes and fees to finance the service (E and Y, , p. ). G-
 and V () add that with this type of transfer, the higher
authority abandons its right of oversight over the quantity and the quality of public
services offered by the lower authorities. Devolution thus also implies that the
 lower authorities are free to decide whether they wish to offer the given service to
their constituency or not. According to B (a), pure devolution is seldom
found in practice, mainly because even the most decentralised regional and local
governments remain to some extent dependent on central government funding
also for their optional tasks and, in exchange for grant money, they are supposed
to follow the rules dictated by the grantor.
Clearly, local governments enjoy the largest possible degree of autonomy in the
case of devolution and are fully dependent on higher-level authorities in the case
of deconcentration, while delegation grants them a limited degree of autonomy.
However, even if the best way to maximise local autonomy is through devolution,
it is neither realistic nor desirable to envisage an intergovernmental system in
which all public affairs with a regional or local scope are systematically devolved
to the lower tiers. Such a strategy would possibly compromise other important
objectives such as interjurisdictional equity or economic efficiency. In practice,
deconcentration, delegation and devolution are simultaneously present in every
decentralised government system and the choice between them depends on the
nature of the given public good or service and the actual demographic, geographic,
socio-economic and political context in which it has to be provided. And since
the degree of local autonomy is a function of this choice, it follows that the levels of
local autonomy can change over time and issue, in conformity with P’s
thesis () cited above.
G and V () propose a matrix that compares the advantages and drawbacks
of deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Their explicit aim is to assist national governments
in selecting that form of decentralisation which best suits the history, size, topographic conditions,
and the ethnic, linguistic and religious structure of their country. The proposed approach of
maximising the net benefit (advantages minus drawbacks) is at least questionable. First, if the
solution was as simple as that, every then national governments would be well advised to opt for
devolution which, not too surprisingly, would ultimately emerge as the absolute winning solution.
In reality, however, not even mature federal systems devolve the totality of public service functions
to the lower levels. Second, in practice, one single form of decentralisation is usually not sufficient
to take account of the diversity of the various spheres of public intervention; a reason why in most
systems deconcentration, delegation and devolution strategies are employed simultaneously at any
point of time.
. Local autonomy as a valence issue
Local autonomy is a value that seems to be acknowledged in all European democ-
racies, even though the ways it is interpreted and implemented differ widely across
the continent. We can also observe divergent policy responses being given to sim-
ilar problems. The differences in the understanding of local autonomy are to a
large part due to the various paths of historical and institutional development that
the individual countries were undergoing in the past few decades. Institutional
development is notably responsible for the diversity of objectives and motives with
which the governments pursued their recent territorial reforms.
In Great Britain, decentralisation tendencies were most often accompanied by
arguments such as enhanced diversity in service provision and a more balanced re-
lationship between the centre and the local communities (P, ). Accordingly,
the discussion about the objectives and instruments of decentralisation was largely
depoliticised and technical in nature. In France and in Eastern Europe, by contrast,
the issue was highly ideological, abolishing the ‘ancien régime’ of centralised state
power and granting liberty and responsibility to lower level territorial units being
the key objectives of the reform (H, ).
Whatever the nature of the issue in the different countries, decentralisation was
legitimated by the overall consensus that anything that is decentralised must be
a priori ‘good’. From the scientific side, this normative belief found additional
support in the literature of fiscal federalism emerging from the s. With his
Decentralization Theorem, Oates set out the theoretical foundations for a decen-
tralised provision of public services:
The Decentralization Theorem: For a public good—the consumption of which is
defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs
of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for
the central or the respective local government—it will always be more efficient (or
at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of
output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide
any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. (O, , p. )
Although Oates took great care to explain not only the case for decentralised
government but also the one for centralised government (we will discuss both in
Section ..), the actual political context in most West European countries made
the advocates of territorial reforms more receptive to the pro-decentralisation
 arguments than to the pro-centralisation ones. This is how local autonomy has
ultimately become a valence issue.
The process of European integration in general, and the weakening role of nation
states and the emergence of regions in particular, have greatly contributed to the
strengthening of local autonomy as a universal value and as a desired state of affairs
in central-local relations. This trend culminated in the issue of the Charter of
European Local Self-Government in  (already introduced in Section ..), in
which the Council of Europe labelled local authorities as ‘one of the main founda-
tions of any democratic regime’ and proposed to elevate local self-government to a
fundamental legal or constitutional principle (C  E, a).
In the early s, when France was just at the beginning of the decentralisation
process and people in the East European communist bloc could not yet even dream
about such changes, the time in Great Britain was already ripe for breaking the
taboo on local autonomy. During those years, the British national government
gradually trimmed local autonomy that decentralised authorities had always per-
ceived as an immemorial right dating back to Victorian times. Centralisation took
place as part of a large-scale reform aimed at reducing the functions and the size
and simplifying the structure of decentralised units. The experienced increase
in the central control over local government affairs provided an opportunity to
academics to revise and challenge the prevalent and overwhelmingly favourable
view on local autonomy. Is local autonomy (and hence, decentralisation) a ‘good
thing’ and everything that limits it (centralisation) a ‘bad thing’? With but a few
exceptions, academics had tended to see it this way and devoted much effort to
document precisely how central government had diminished local autonomy over
time. Critics found, however, that two implicit assumptions behind this reasoning
were at best doubtful (P, , p. ):
. The observer should identify with the interests of the local policymakers and
defend their room for manoeuvre as something inherently ‘good’.
. The existence of this room for manoeuvre produces better government
because it is more efficient, allows for greater local participation or produces
policies that are consistent with local needs and preferences.
While  makes an unfounded claim about the observer,  lacks sufficient empirical
evidence even today, as we will see in Section ..
According to Stokes’ valence model, a valence issue is one that is uniformly liked or disliked among the
electorate. Most voters would agree that corruption and unemployment are ‘bad’, while democracy
and low inflation rate are ‘good’. Position issues, in contrast, are those on which opinion is divided
(S, ).
The uncritical assumption according to which everything that is centralised is
‘bad’ was further attacked on four grounds.
First, using the term local autonomy as an evaluative criterion tends to reduce
all political conflicts to one dimension, namely to the confrontation between cen-
tralisers and autonomists, or between central government and local government,
as if other actors did not exist. Moreover, this conflict creates the impression as if
local government as a whole were a loser of certain central government decisions,
although the costs of such decisions are very often allocated disproportionately
among the different groups (types, size categories, regional clusters) of local au-
thorities. For instance, a cut in central government grants is almost unequivocally
interpreted as a reduction of local autonomy, although local governments could
potentially adjust to such restrictions (e.g. through more efficiency in resource
use) without compromising autonomy. In other words, dismissals in local govern-
ment institutions should not be regarded as an inevitable consequence of central
government policies.
Second, territorial diversity in the provision of local public services is generally
desirable. However, there is a need for a degree of uniformity with regard to certain
services, and here the centre should have the role of setting the framework for local
service delivery. The desired state of local autonomy is neither one of ‘rampant and
uncontrolled localism and the sharpening of geographical inequalities’ (J and
S, , cited by P, , p. ), nor one of isolation and independence
from central government. Although this proposition is an adequate counterweight
to the autonomist position, its practical relevance is limited for at least two reasons:
. No reliable indicator can tell when diversity is necessary and desirable and at
which point it turns into ‘rampant localism’, and, conversely, when central
policies setting the framework turn into a direct control over local govern-
ment affairs;
. Intergovernmental relations most often correspond to the marble cake model
in which layers are intermingled in a complex pattern so that a clear separa-
tion of national and local responsibilities is usually impossible.
As Webb put it, ‘there is nothing that local governments do that cannot be con-
strued, in some way, as having national implications or national importance’
(W, , cited by P, , p. ).
Third, there is no a priori reason to suggest that giving local government greater
autonomy would automatically lead to more accountability and responsiveness in
Accountability is meant here in the sense of a responsibility towards local voters. This requires the
 public decision-making. It all depends on the interest and participation of local
citizens. According to some views, when an issue becomes a local issue, it enters
a ‘lost world’ in which there is little public interest. Thus, if one is interested
in improving the accountability of policymakers and the transparency of their
decisions, then it would be more appropriate to centralise decision-making in
order to ensure greater publicity. One flaw in this assumption is that the term
public interest makes reference to general interest, whereas local interest for local
issues is generally high by nature. And as long as local interest is high, the proximity
of citizens to politicians ensures a tight control over local public decisions and
hence a satisfactory level of transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, local
citizenry can indeed lose their interest in local affairs if they are denied the right
to vote on meaningful issues. It is also true that low levels of local autonomy
are likely to reinforce the ‘cultural disdain’ for local government (i.e. the poor
knowledge about and the weak participation in local politics) and enable the centre
to usurp the powers of local councils even more.
According to the fourth and last argument against the autonomist position,
widening the room for manoeuvre of local authorities may lead to ‘bad’ government
if it allows governments to deliver lower levels or a poorer quality of services
than under a regime with more limited autonomy. This argument is misleading,
however, because it ignores that lower service levels are presumably matched
with a lower tax price, otherwise the citizens and businesses (unless they are
captive) would have already left the jurisdiction. Disapproving the possibility
of having different levels of public services in different jurisdictions also implies
the nullification of an important advantage from decentralisation, namely, the
interjurisdictional competition in terms of tax/benefit ratios.
A similar discussion about whether local autonomy is worth to be protected
at any price or not, emerged toward the end of the s in France (M,
local government to pass on revenue consequences of locally determined spending programmes to
the local electorate through taxation or user charges and to manage these revenues in a responsible
way and in the interest of the electorate. O and N () describe two further
types of accountability, namely financial and managerial accountability. Both of these imply a
responsibility towards a higher level of government.
There is one objection against this argument. If local interest for a specific issue is so low that some
well-organised interest groups can easily gain influence over local decision-making, then their
success is likely to alert the majority population and spur them to fight for a withdrawal of the
privileges acquired by those minority groups. Interest in local affairs is thus automatically restored.
G and K () touch upon this issue in their autonomy model (Section ..).
This is the case in Hungary where the Act LXV of  on Local Governments (art.  para. )
prohibits local authorities from holding a referendum about the local budget draft and on proposals
modifying the types and parameters of local taxes.
; G, ). By that time, French local governments were enjoying
a relatively vast autonomy in virtually all domains of intergovernmental fiscal
relations. For the execution of their fairly extensive public service competences,
they benefited from an intergovernmental transfer system that was dominated
by general (unconditional) non-matching grants. Borrowing decisions were only
controlled upon their conformity with national laws concerning the balanced
budget requirement, specific debt repayment rules and some other norms of
fiscal prudence. Yet, a series of endogenous and exogenous factors, namely some
recent developments in the domains of local public finance, national economy
and European institutions, pointed into the direction of a possible narrowing
of the room for manoeuvre of local authorities in the future. Two questions
arose. First, is it possible to preserve the status quo characterised by a vast local
autonomy, and if yes, under which conditions? Second, even if local autonomy
should be constrained, is there a reason to worry about it? In other words, is
autonomy worth being elevated to a fundamental right and guaranteed to every
local government at any price? These questions, as their author himself admitted
(G, ), risked to be perceived as too theoretical and without any practical
relevance, maybe also premature and highly provocative less than two decades after
the dawn of decentralisation in France. On the other hand, Gilbert estimated that
decentralisation in France had reached what he called the age of reason and the
accumulated experience had finally made it possible to raise questions that could
not be put on the agenda at the moment of the great reform. Having examined the
endogenous and exogenous variables that were supposed to modify the extent of
local autonomy in the near future, Gilbert arrived at two conclusions. First, the
considerable room for manoeuvre of local authorities in France could not plausibly
be maintained without a reform of the territorial organisation. Second, local
autonomy was to be preserved only to the limit where it did not compromise other
important objectives such as allocative efficiency and territorial equity. M
(, p. ) pointed out that the real question was not what the future of local
autonomy looked like but what kind of autonomy the local communities actually
needed and whether their aspirations were justified or not. He added that local
autonomy in France, originally conceived and encouraged by the centre, was all
too often understood in a defensive way (as something that needs protection from
stronger forces) rather than in a participative and proactive sense.
Behind this view on local autonomy, there are two centuries of French history in
which decentralisation was equivalent to the devolution of power from the central
state to local communities, which placed thus the national government in the
centre of gravity of the society. One of the aims of the constitutional reform of
  was to break with this traditional concept and to provide local authorities
more flexibility in the exercise of their competences, while depriving the central
state of some of its territorial functions and limiting its competence to economic
regulation and minority protection (N, ). The jury is still out on the
question whether the desired change in the view of local autonomy has taken place
in reality or not.
The defensive interpretation of local autonomy is characteristic of unitary states
in general and thus of most countries of the world. Local autonomy is traditionally
established in the state and by the state (M, , p. ). It is thus not an
absolute but a relative concept: it is defined in confrontation with the central power
that is embodied by the nation state. The recent emergence of regions and urban
agglomerations in Europe (many of which reach beyond provincial or national
frontiers) has somewhat weakened this bipolarity, releasing local governments from
their oppositional role vis-a-vis the centre. At the same time, however, regionalism
has also imposed some new constraints and dependencies on local communities.
. The relative importance of local autonomy
.. The benefits of local
autonomy
In the previous section, we presented local autonomy
as a valence issue in the sense that, regardless of their
political or ideological affiliation, politicians and vot-
ers unanimously view it as something that merits
support. Logically, the question arises why local autonomy is such a cherished
value in our societies and, if local autonomy is such a good thing, why national
governments and legislatives in virtually all decentralised countries restrain it in
one way or another, instead of allowing it a free play.
The reason for such an overwhelming support for local autonomy is what the
classical theory of fiscal federalism has long studied under the label ‘advantages of
local autonomy’. In some instances, the same range of arguments carries the title
‘the benefits of decentralisation’, suggesting that the very sense of decentralisation
is granting autonomy to local communities. O (, p.  ff.) limits his
analysis to the economic case for decentralised government, whereas J and
S (), K (, p.  ff.) and B () introduce some political
arguments as well.
. Local autonomy caters to varying needs and preferences
Local governments are closer to the citizens and therefore more sensitive to regional
variations in tastes and needs. Thus, if they are allowed to act autonomously, they
are likely to provide goods and services whose quality and quantity vary across
jurisdictions in accordance with the varying needs and preferences as to how these
needs are to be met. Central provision, by contrast, would necessarily tend towards
uniformity and induce compromises in the levels of consumption, and is therefore
less efficient than decentralised provision (see Oates’ Decentralization Theorem
in Section .). The underlying reasons are (i) information asymmetries resulting
from the differing proximity of central and local authorities to the electorate, and
(ii) political pressures and/or constitutional constraints that limit the capacity of
the central government to provide different levels of public services in different
jurisdictions (O, ).
Tiebout-type mobility may, but does not necessarily, promote a better tailoring
of local outputs to local preferences. The T model () stipulates that
decentralised decision-making contributes to the rise of more or less homoge-
neous communities by virtue of the free migration of individuals. Citizens who
are unsatisfied with the net fiscal benefit offered in their own jurisdiction may
move to any area that promises a more attractive fiscal package. This incites local
governments to consider the demand of their constituency, while at the same time
this demand becomes more transparent compared to the situation of zero mobility.
However, there are two problems with this argument. First, the efficiency impact is
dampened by the collateral problems caused by migration (e.g. congestion in the
‘winner’ jurisdictions, inefficiencies due to small scales of production in others).
Second, in practice, mobility is never as significant as what would be necessary in
order to facilitate the formation of optimal communities. Furthermore, the model
assumes that preferences for public goods are heterogeneous and stable over time.
If this were not the case, all local governments would seek to copy the strategy
pursued by their most successful rival and the interjurisdictional diversity in terms
of expenditure and revenue policy would drop to zero.
It is, however, not clear how the central government can determine the correct level of matching
grants for local outputs that generate spillover benefits, if it is poorly informed about the preferences
of individuals for local public services (O, , p. ). By contrast, it can efficiently deal
with negative production externalities such as environmental pollution: knowing the production
function of the polluter it can calculate the spatial dimension of the externality.
Oates observed later that even central government programmes often led to varying levels of cer-
tain public services across jurisdictions, resulting from pork-barrel politics (O, , p. ).
This is also the case when the centre imposes restrictive norms or launches benefit programmes
(particularly in the framework of equalisation and regional policy) whose validity is limited in
space.
 . Local autonomy brings responsibility and cost-efficiency
As we saw in Clark’s theory about top-down and bottom-up legitimacy (Sec-
tion ..), local autonomy and responsibility are inevitably interconnected. They
are two sides of the same coin. In order to enjoy unfettered autonomy in the do-
mains where this is formally granted to them, local politicians have to assume full
responsibility for their fiscal decisions. This implies a careful consideration of the
costs and benefits of local programmes. Whenever local expenditure programmes
are financed from own-source revenues, there are natural incentives for respon-
sible fiscal behaviour: local politicians have a self-evident interest in managing
the funds properly, as raising revenues at the margin requires the consent of the
local electorate. Citizens, too, become more aware of the real resource costs and
the benefits of the programmes and are therefore in a better position to evaluate
political decisions. Thus, goods and services whose production costs are borne
by the local constituency are more likely to be provided cost-efficiently. This cor-
responds to the ownership argument raised by T (, p. ): ‘individuals
who are responsible for the results of their actions, and who thus have ownership
rights over the outcome, are likely to have stronger incentives to perform better’.
By contrast, reliance on transfers and grants from higher authorities destroys the
incentives for responsible local fiscal behaviour and creates fiscal illusion among
the citizens because there is little real cost associated with the decisions. This
provides an incentive to expand the levels of public services beyond the social
optimum, since the local community may bear only a negligible part of the costs.
This is particularly true in the presence of bailout grants.
. Local autonomy improves citizen participation and democratic control
Thanks to their proximity to citizens, local politicians are likely to have a better
understanding for electors’ wishes than national politicians are. At the same time,
electors have better opportunities to signal their needs and preferences and express
their approval of, or dissatisfaction with, local policy decisions. For J and
S (), local government is a means through which citizens can influence
and control the decisions that affect them collectively. A better democratic control
makes in turn local government more accountable, that is, more responsible for its
decisions that become more transparent in consequence (G, ).
As has been discussed in Section ., effective citizen participation and demo-
cratic control are conditional upon the genuine interest of citizens in local affairs
(in order to prohibit the dominance of specific interest groups) and a permis-
See also O (, p. ).
sive national legal framework that tolerates or even encourages the expression of
individual preferences in critical issues such as local tax policy and budgeting.
. Local autonomy can serve to tame the Leviathan
According to B and B (), the competition among decen-
tralised governments can limit the ability of the monopolistic central government,
the ‘Leviathan’, to control a too large share of the available resources in an economy.
In B’s words (), decentralisation constrains the opportunity of local
government to extract resources from an unwitting electorate, and this is primarily
due to the mobility of individuals: by means of their ‘exit’ option, voters can
penalise those local governments that unnecessarily inflate the size of the public
sector. Later empirical research (R et al., ) detected that the ‘taming the
Leviathan’ hypothesis was only true under the condition that local governments
rely primarily on own-source revenues; otherwise, local policymakers would have
an incentive to expand public programmes as far as possible. As a further condition,
one could add the effective democratic control of local government decisions by
the electorate.
. Local autonomy allows efficiency improvements through benchmarking
The local government may have a monopolistic position in the delivery of certain
public services at the local level, particularly in drinking water provision, sewage,
and other natural monopolies involving a large network infrastructure. However,
this does not exclude the possibility of cross-jurisdictional comparisons of the
quality of the delivered services as well as their tax price. The local electorate is
likely to question any deviation from the best practice (or at least from the average
price/performance ratio) and force the local executive to eliminate the unexplained
difference. Nevertheless, effective benchmarking is conditional upon a harmonised
accounting system that makes the collection and comparison of data neither too
costly nor time-consuming (D, ).
. Local autonomy promotes experimentation and innovation
Decentralised decision-making leads to the emergence of a variety of approaches in
any decentralised policy area. Experimentation and innovation on a small scale (in
a municipality or a region) allow policymakers to try out new policy strategies and
instruments without imposing undue risk on the rest of the society: in any case,
the central or federal government will normally not have to bear the cost of the
failure of a local experiment. In this so-called ‘laboratory federalism’ (O, ,
p.  ff.), all government units can learn from each other, as successful innovations
diffuse horizontally as well as vertically. Competitive pressure resulting from the
 multitude of jurisdictions (and thus public service providers) and the mobility
of individuals and businesses are likely to reinforce the laboratory effect as they
drive local governments toward more efficiency in experimentation and better
policies (O, , p.  f.). On the other hand, laboratory federalism also creates
information externalities: innovative local authorities that develop and adopt new
and successful policies generate valuable information to rival jurisdictions, thus
encouraging these latter to become free riders. Therefore, a highly decentralised
public sector might ultimately generate even less innovation than a centralised
system, unless specific grants are put in place in order to reward the experimenters
for assuming the risk of failure (O, ).
Reviewing the six benefits of decentralisation, local autonomy appears to lead to
enhanced allocative () and productive (;  and ) efficiency. Since decision-makers
are closer to the electorate, thus better informed about their needs and preferences
and also more easily controllable, they are likely to offer exactly those public services
that citizens need, at the lowest possible cost. Enhanced efficiency (compared to
centralised service provision) is the main argument for decentralisation. Even
the political arguments ( and ) indirectly serve the realisation of the efficiency
objective.
It does not follow, however, that decentralised service provision is the most
efficient solution under all circumstances. Local governments provide efficient
levels of public services only if the consumption of those services is limited to
their own constituency and there is no waste of resources. Furthermore, decen-
tralised service provision is likely to have adverse effects on both redistribution
and macroeconomic stability. For P’ (), all these impacts together
constitute the inherent contradiction of decentralisation.
The following four sections give an insight into possible trade-offs between local
autonomy and various other objectives.
.. Trade-off with economic
efficiency
Beside its efficiency-enhancing effect, local au-
tonomy also generates allocative and productive
inefficiencies. A part of the allocative inefficien-
cies occurs in form of externalities. Figure . provides an overview.
Externalities resulting from local autonomy can be structured along three types
of distinctions:
. Fiscal externalities vs expenditure externalities, according to whether they are
related to the tax policy or the expenditure policy of the local government;
. Direct vs indirect externalities, depending on whether they affect non-
Horizontal Vertical
Fiscal 
externalities
Direct Tax exporting (–)
Indirect Tax competition (+/–) Overlapping tax bases (–)
Expenditure 
externalities
Direct Benefit spillover (+)
Free-rider behaviour (–)
Congestion costs (–)
Indirect Expenditure competition (+/–) Expenditure interdependence (+)
Figure 2-4Figure 3.2: Positive and negative externalities arising from local autonomy
[Source: the author, based on Gilbert (1996)]
residents’ choices through a change in the price of consuming or producing
public and private goods (direct externality), or through the revenue and
expenditure policies of other jurisdictions (indirect externality);
. Indirect externalities can be distinguished according to whether the influence
is exerted upon other jurisdictions at the same level (horizontal externality),
or upon another level of government (vertical externality).
Direct externalities may take two different forms: tax exporting and benefit
spillovers.
On the revenue side, local fiscal autonomy may lead to tax exporting if the
local government excessively taxes those services that are to a large proportion
consumed by non-residents. While it is absolutely justified to ask non-residents
to pay for the part of the benefit they receive from the provider jurisdiction or for
the part of the costs they provoke at the margin, as soon as this balance is hurt,
tax exporting becomes a problem. Beside the fact that it breaks the link between
those who decide on local tax rates and those who bear the tax, it may also result in
excessive service levels in the taxing jurisdiction due to fiscal illusion, and incite the
local government to continue exploiting the ‘exportable’ tax bases. Tax exporting
is also the major reason why sales taxes and certain types of business taxes are
 not adapted for the local level. But it may also exist in the domain of benefit
taxes; here, the extent of tax exporting depends on the substitutability of the taxed
public good. If the local government taxes goods or services for which its ‘market
power’ is relatively weak, it must reckon with competition from the neighbouring
jurisdictions. If taxpayers are mobile enough, they will escape from tax exporting
by choosing another location. Thus, tax exporting and tax competition are two
sides of the same coin (G, , p. ).
On the expenditure side, while some non-residents might be required to pay
more than what would be proportional to the benefits they derive from local goods
in a jurisdiction (the case of tax exporting), others might benefit from certain public
goods (particularly infrastructures) provided by that same jurisdiction without
paying for them. The theory of public economics distinguishes between two types
of benefit spillover. A production spillover occurs when the public service provided
by one jurisdiction benefits the residents of one or several other jurisdictions;
mosquito control programmes belong to the classical examples. Consumption
spillover arises when non-residents travel to the provider jurisdiction in order to
benefit from a collective or mixed good such as a theatre or a park, without paying
the total unit price of service provision including investment costs. In both cases,
non-resident beneficiaries exhibit free rider behaviour and face no incentive to
reveal their true preferences with regard to the public good in question. Depending
on the actual capacity limits of the given service or infrastructure, the presence
of non-residents may also generate congestion costs that are ultimately borne by
residents and non-residents alike. Nevertheless, if the demand for the local public
good decreases with growing geographical distance from the provider jurisdiction
(which is the case with most local public goods), then the benefit spillover is
limited to the close-by areas. The effect may also be symmetrical or reciprocal
between jurisdictions, so that an intervention by a higher authority is not always
considered necessary. However, benefit spillovers are in any case inefficient insofar
as they destroy the link between beneficiaries and taxpayers and incite the local
government to provide the given service under the socially optimal level.
Indirect externalities exhibit greater variation. Tax and expenditure competition
occurs when modifications in the tax (spending) policy carried out in one juris-
diction affect the tax (spending) policy of another jurisdiction. For both tax and
expenditure competition, some competition is generally considered to be desirable
as it makes citizens’ preference patterns more transparent and encourages local
governments to improve their performance in terms of quantity and quality of the
provided local public services. Yet, local autonomy and the resulting competition
also produce allocative inefficiencies in that they induce fiscal disparities in terms
of tax capacities and expenditure needs, and hence differences in the net fiscal
benefit (NFB), across the jurisdictions. In reaction to these NFB differentials,
individuals and enterprises will tend to move to areas with a higher NFB. From an
efficiency point of view, this situation is undesirable because there will be more
production factors located in the high-NFB areas compared to what would be
rational regarding the long-term economic perspectives of the given area.
Although migration seem to benefit both the initial population of the jurisdic-
tion (because the fiscal burden will be divided among a larger number of taxpayers)
and the newcomers (because their NFB is higher than before), excessive competi-
tion is likely to be self-defeating. Tax competition imposes a downward pressure on
tax rates, as a result of which the tax revenues will not cover but a part of the initial
volume of local public services, while at the same time the higher concentration of
the population would call for a higher level of government spending. Briefly, local
tax rates are below the level that would be optimal for the satisfaction of the local
demand for public services.
According to G (, p.  f.), it is not the decrease in tax revenues
and public goods in itself that makes fiscal competition potentially harmful but
rather the resulting net effect. In order to judge to what extent a specific situation
of competition is harmful, the loss in terms of economic efficiency (suboptimal
allocation of production factors, possible waste of public money in a jurisdiction)
must be weighted against the beneficial effects of competition (e.g. decrease in the
costs of taxed economic activities).
Expenditure competition encourages the overprovision of those activities (par-
ticularly infrastructure investments and the provision of direct subsidies) with
which local governments can attract new individuals and enterprises to their juris-
diction. This type of competition may also become self-defeating and ineffective
if, as a result of the mimicking of expenditure strategies, taxpayers are offered
the same level of subsidies and very similar infrastructural advantages in every
jurisdiction.
Indirect externalities exist also in the vertical relationship between different
government tiers. A region may produce a vertical fiscal externality by increasing
the rate of a regional tax whose tax base is co-occupied by the central government.
While the region might raise more revenue through this measure, at the same time
it will cause the common tax base to shrink and thus indirectly reduce the tax yield
for the central government. This mechanism may work in the opposite direction
as well. The problem with overlapping tax bases is that one government level sets
its tax rates inefficiently high or low, ignoring the effect of its policy on the tax
revenues of another government level. This phenomenon occurs also when the
 local level cedes one of its competences to a higher level of government or when
the task becomes centralised by power of a law. The higher level taking over the
function will have less tax revenue to cover a unit of expenditure than before, while
the lower level will enjoy the benefit of the marginal tax revenue it could save for
other purposes. In order to avoid the vertical externality, the two tiers may make a
sort of exchange agreement: the lower level must decrease its tax rates in order to
allow an increase at the higher level. As a result, the original balance positions are
restored while the overall fiscal burden on the taxpayers remains the same.
Finally, local autonomy generates vertical expenditure externality, or expendi-
ture interdependence, when the expenditure decisions of decentralised authorities
affect the budget constraint of the central government and vice versa. With every
additional unit of resources spent by a lower-level government on productivity-
enhancing activities such as education, the centre can realise additional revenues
through the higher income (and hence, enhanced tax capacity) of educated individ-
uals. Not being compensated for this positive external effect, the lower authority is
not interested in providing such activities at the socially optimal level.
Other possible externalities include regulation externalities (regions impose
regulations that affect non-residents; B, ) and cost externalities (a
change in the local fiscal policy affects the resource costs that are critical for the
production of a public good in another jurisdiction; G, , p. ).
Apart from externalities, there are several other hurdles to allocative efficiency
in a decentralised framework of public service provision. Quoting the example of
developing countries, P’ () states that centralised service provision
(if sufficiently diversified) can potentially guarantee a better resource allocation
also for the following reasons:
– If the main interjurisdictional differences are not in needs or preferences but
in (household or tax) income, then the potential welfare gain from a better
match between demand and supply is not very large, as the needs are already
well known and thus need not be revealed.
– Locally elected mayors (i) may not have the necessary resources to satisfy
local preferences, or (ii) they may not be sufficiently motivated to do so
(if they do not run for re-election, or if re-election depends on personal
sympathy instead of performance), or (iii) they may have to work together
with a bureaucracy that does not follow their instructions.
Beside the obstacles to maximising allocative efficiency, local autonomy might
also be contrary to the objective of productive efficiency:
– Local public goods and services whose production is characterised by impor-
tant economies of scale are better provided in co-operation or by a higher-
level of government. Primary education might be an example; however, the
economies that a municipality can potentially realise from a higher scale of
production must always be weighted against the arguments of accountability
and geographical proximity (P’, ).
– Many more local public services are characterised by economies of scope.
Regional and national bureaucracies can work more efficiently as they have
the opportunity to apply the same technology, strategy, staff, etc. to a range
of different goods and services (P’, ).
– Another type of inefficiency arises from shared responsibilities: designing
a clear expenditure assignment system in which every tier has separate
functions is difficult and leads unavoidably to overlapping responsibilities.
Duplications may also occur horizontally: the major criticism pronounced
against the so-called laboratory federalism is that each local government
tries to ‘reinvent the wheel’ ( V, ).
O () himself recognised that his earlier Decentralisation Theorem, ac-
cording to which decentralised service provision is always more efficient than (or
at least as efficient as) central provision, does not hold in all circumstances. If the
centrally determined outcome might suffer from various kinds of inefficiencies, it
is also true that these inefficiencies must be weighted against the misallocations
occurring under a decentralised regime where local governments ignore the exter-
nal effects of their actions or other implicit assumptions of the economic model of
fiscal federalism are not met.
The trade-off between local autonomy and efficiency can be summarised as
follows: centralisation allows a better co-ordination of public policies and thus an
internalisation of spatial externalities and the exploitation of potential economies
of scale and scope, whereas decentralisation fosters political accountability and
innovation. How much local autonomy is desirable in a specific policy area depends
on the balance of these two effects.
 .. Trade-off with equity In the domain of equity, the discussion needs to be
conducted at two different levels, namely, interper-
sonal and interjurisdictional equity.
Much has been said in the classical theory of fiscal federalism about why inter-
personal redistribution policies should remain in central government hands. One
of the main arguments is that decentralised income redistribution is likely to be less
redistributive in the end than a centrally managed policy. While both reduce the
maximum/minimum ratio of individual income compared to the initial situation,
a more significant reduction can be achieved with central redistribution measures
because average incomes are higher in the rich regions than in the poor ones
(P’, ). The other, more compelling argument is that decentralised
interpersonal redistribution policies tend to be self-defeating: a local government
that pursues an active redistribution policy is likely to induce an emigration of
rich individuals and an immigration of the poor. With the decrease in the per
capita income of the local constituency, the local government will find it difficult
to sustain its redistribution policy (O, , p. ).
The question of interjurisdictional equity is quite a different one. It is not why
decentralised governments are little adapted to pursue interjurisdictional redistri-
bution (logically, none of them is rationally interested in designing such policies, if
not for the sake of solidarity), but rather how local autonomy and decentralised
service provision affect the distribution of welfare across the jurisdictions.
Today there is a consensus about the fact that fiscal decentralisation (and thus
granting financial autonomy to local governments) inevitably leads to economic
disparities between the jurisdictions. The early literature, however, was not undi-
vided about the issue.
According to B (, p. ), the core of the problem lies in the fact
that every government unit is operating in a geographically limited territory and
thus cannot withdraw more resources than those available in that territory. If
government units are obliged to finance independently some of their functions,
fiscal inequalities are not to be avoided unless fiscal capacities are equivalent across
jurisdictions. We are confronted with a vicious circle. Rich jurisdictions have
large tax bases that allow them to set their tax rates equal to the rates in other
jurisdictions and provide more (or better) public services, or, alternatively, to offer
Buchanan’s model ignores, of course, the possibility of tax exporting which is anyway not the ideal
answer of a local government to the problem of locally limited resources.
By ‘capacity’, B (, p. ) means simply income, but we could also add the endowment
of the jurisdiction in natural resources, labour, capital, and other factors that facilitate economic
development.
an identical level of services at a lower tax rate. Consequently, they can attract more
households and enterprises than other jurisdictions can, thus further enhancing
their tax base and the corresponding budgetary autonomy. As the size of the locally
available tax base continues to diverge across regions, the gap between rich and
poor jurisdictions becomes wider.
Fiscal inequalities as such do not constitute a problem: richer jurisdictions could
have higher government outlays than poorer ones, possibly financing a greater
volume of public services. The problem starts where the ‘social state’ intervenes
in order to provide a wide range of public services, either equally to all citizens or
upon the basis of individual need. Hence, the notion of fiscal justice has occupied
a prominent position in the societal value system for decades, demanding an ‘equal
treatment of equals’ not only within a jurisdiction but also across jurisdictions.
As for the meaning of equal treatment, rather than considering only the tax side
(equal tax burden for equals) as did the orthodox concept of fiscal justice, one
should take into account both taxes paid and benefits received. According to
B (, p.  f.), ‘[the] balance between the contribution made and the
value of public services returned to the individual should be the relevant figure.
This “fiscal residuum” can be negative or positive. The fiscal structure is equitable
in this primary sense only if the fiscal residua of similarly situated individuals
are equivalent.’ This equivalence should apply to the ‘combined fisc’ including
the taxes and benefits offered in each of the superposed government units (e.g.
municipality, region, and nation state) to which the citizen belongs.
In contrast to Buchanan who acknowledged interregional fiscal inequality as
a necessary consequence of decentralisation, T () regarded it as an
abnormal phenomenon that can arise only temporarily, notably when the economy
is hit by asymmetric shocks. Indeed, if the mobility assumption of the Tiebout
model were realistic, the migration of production factors would automatically
eliminate interregional disparities. Key to this mechanism is the variation of
fiscal pressure across regions. People in low capacity jurisdictions are subject to
greater fiscal pressure (i.e. higher taxation or fewer benefits from public services)
than people in high capacity areas are. The differential provides an incentive
for individuals and enterprises to move to the areas of least fiscal pressure, and
migration will continue until the point where fiscal pressure becomes identical
across all jurisdictions.
This mechanism works fine in the context of perfect and costless mobility, even
The term ‘fiscal pressure’ is closely related to the notions of ‘fiscal residuum’ and ‘net fiscal benefit’
(NFB): high fiscal pressure corresponds to a low or negative fiscal residuum or NFB (the latter is a
net burden) and vice versa.
 though it is likely to lead to distortions in the optimal allocation of resources and
hence produce an inefficient outcome. Just as differentials in the fiscal pressure (or
NFB) induce fiscal inefficiency, so they lead to fiscal inequity. However, as B
() puts it aptly, while NFB differentials cause inefficiency to the extent that
they induce the migration of people and capital, they cause fiscal inequity to the
extent that this migration does not occur. Hence, the principles of fiscal efficiency
and fiscal equity are intrinsically interrelated.
In reality, mobility is far from being perfect, which explains why virtually all
countries in the world struggle with substantial (and in some cases, growing)
interregional disparities. Besides, a poor region is usually not only poor in terms
of income but also in terms of natural resources, infrastructure, economic op-
portunities, agglomeration economies and other factors (P’, ).
Differences often have their origin in the history of the various regions (experience
with specialisation, industrialisation, etc.). Even if mobility were perfect, it is hard
to believe that it could eliminate the existing inequalities stemming from such a
variety of circumstances. The existence of horizontal fiscal disparities is thus a
natural and necessary consequence of fiscal decentralisation in a setting without
perfect mobility, and the role of the central government is to eliminate, as far as
possible, the inequitable part of these disparities.
The question of what counts as inequitable and needs to be corrected has been
studied with various approaches.
First, the principle of horizontal fiscal justice, i.e. the equal treatment of equals
across all jurisdictions, can be differentiated upon whether one envisages actual
or potential equality. According to the first interpretation of the principle, any
individual should have the assurance that in whichever region of the country he
may desire to live, the overall fiscal treatment he receives will be approximately
the same. The second, weaker interpretation relies on a practical compromise: the
equity objective is reached when all jurisdictions have the necessary resources to
implement policies that are horizontally comparable, though they may choose not
to do so.
The implications for local autonomy are different in the two cases. If local
governments are required to offer comparable net fiscal benefits, they need to har-
monise their policies with regard to taxes and expenditures, which implies a major
cutback on their autonomy. In the second case, they simply receive an opportunity
to achieve similar results as other jurisdictions, but it is up to them to decide
whether they wish to make use of this opportunity or not. Inequalities resulting
B () reserves the term ‘fiscal equity’ for this second interpretation of the principle.
from a non-use of the granted opportunity are not considered as inequitable and
hence do not need any further correction.
Second, as D and V () point out, one has to distinguish
between ‘natural’ inequalities that are related to the respective situations of local
governments and those inequalities that arise from their (management) choices.
Situational factors such as topographic and demographic conditions constrain
the ability of local governments to provide an attractive combination of taxes and
public goods; therefore, reducing situational inequalities is most often the first and
most important domain of national equalisation policies. By contrast, inequalities
resulting from a free choice need not be corrected by the centre..
Third, a similar distinction can be made with regard to the citizens’ choice of
location. The individuals’ choice of a region or city of residence mainly depends
on their private or professional situation (‘localisation subie’), but within an urban
agglomeration, they base their choice upon the relative performance of competing
municipalities in terms of taxes and public services (‘localisation choisie’). Ac-
cording to G (, p. ), fiscal equalisation policies should aim to correct
interurban inequalities but not intra-urban ones.
The three approaches partly contradict each other. For instance, a small munici-
pality in the periphery of a large urban area might be aﬄicted with a high rate of
unemployment and therefore obliged to spend a significant share of its budget on
social aid. This situational disadvantage makes the municipality unattractive to
potential in-migrants; yet, according to Gilbert’s proposal, the jurisdiction should
not benefit from any equalisation measure, since intra-urban migration decisions
are always discretional and not depending on exogenous factors.
In summary, owing to the imperfect mobility of production factors, decentrali-
sation (and hence local autonomy) fosters regional economic segregation. Local
autonomy and horizontal interjurisdictional equity are thus competing objectives
and normally none of them is unilaterally privileged in practice. How much in-
equity is tolerable and at what price (in terms of gain in local autonomy) depends
on the prevalent value judgments in the society.
See also G (, p.  f.) and D and M ()
 .. Trade-off with stability Just like the trade-off between local autonomy and
equity, the trade-off with stability can be analysed
from two perspectives: first, the capacity of local governments to pursue macroe-
conomic stabilisation policies, and second, the impact of local government action
on the stabilisation efforts of the centre.
The classical literature of fiscal federalism (see e.g. O, , p.  ff., or M-
 and M, , p.  f.) is mainly concerned with the question why
the macroeconomic stabilisation function should be centralised rather than decen-
tralised. As for the monetary policy, if each government unit were allowed to create
money, this would generate an incentive to rapid and irresponsible monetary ex-
pansion with serious consequences for macroeconomic stability. The other option,
stabilisation through decentralised fiscal policy, is doomed to failure because local
jurisdictions are typically small and open economies. The spending and taxing
measures of municipalities have a negligible impact on national global demand,
and even if they had an impact, it would be outside their jurisdiction. A local
authority pursuing a policy of macroeconomic stabilisation should bear the full
cost of its action while reaping only a small part of its benefits. For this reason, de-
centralised governments have no incentive to undertake any stabilisation measure,
so that this task must necessarily be assumed by the centre. Anyway, in order to
affect aggregate demand in an economy, the authority in charge of the stabilisation
policy needs to control a significant part of the total taxes and public sector outlays,
which is obviously not the case at the local level of government. These traditional
views have been partly challenged by K (, p.  ff.) who advocated a role
of local governments in shaping the national stabilisation policy. Views and pref-
erences related to the choice of a macroeconomic policy may vary from one area
to another. Taking them into consideration could cater variations in local tastes
concerning the rates of growth, inflation and unemployment that behave similarly
as public goods (characterised by non-rivalry and non-excludability).
What is more interesting in the context of local autonomy, however, is the second
aspect of the trade-off, namely, the impact of local autonomy (and decentralisation)
on the macroeconomic stability of the country. Here, four factors should retain
our attention:
. On the expenditure side of the local budget, overlapping responsibilities and
weak accountability may create an upward bias in local spending, with po-
tentially serious consequences for the position of the overall national budget
(OECD, , p.  f.). Massive open-ended grant programmes are likely to
reinforce this effect. However, not only the absolute growth of local govern-
ment outlays can jeopardise the national balance of payments but also the
changes in the composition of these outlays, even if the local budget remains
in balance. The structure of local expenditures could shift in favour of items
that have a substantial impact on aggregate demand (such as transfers to
individuals with a high marginal propensity to consume) or are particularly
sensitive to business cycles (such as unemployment benefits). For the sake
of macroeconomic stability, the centre should retain responsibility for such
functions (T-M, b, p. ).
. On the revenue side, if local governments rely heavily on grants and trans-
fers for financing their budget, this again can have a negative impact on
macroeconomic stability (O, ). Weak accountability, fiscal illusion
and the resulting expansion of local spending provide here for a lever effect.
Extensive borrowing and the accumulation of debt may be equally danger-
ous if the local operational budget is too thin to cover debt repayment and
interest costs.
. Both sides taken together, macroeconomic imbalances often find their origin
in unfunded mandates assigned to lower authorities. If local units are to
prevent deficits in their own accounts, they may choose between raising
additional taxes and cutting expenditures. When both options have been
exploited to the maximum and there is still a deficit, or when the local
government is reluctant to finance the mandate out of its own revenues, it is
likely to request a bailout from the higher authority.
. A decentralisation of the borrowing power to lower-level authorities may
also lead to macroeconomic imbalances, particularly if borrowing limits are
inexistent or ineffective and the budget responsibility of policymakers at
the local levels is weak. Again, heavily indebted local units can temporarily
solve their problems by requesting a bailout from the central government,
but the overall impact on the national economy can be devastating. A vast
literature has emerged from the s to deal with the issues of hard budget
constraints and the attitude of central governments towards bailout. The
details are not considered here, as they would bring us far away from the
question of local autonomy versus stabilisation.
Nevertheless, points  and  allow us to make an important point: the larger the
share of local spending financed by own-source revenues, the more a local authority
For a most recent overview combined with country experiences, see V ().
 in financial distress can be expected to make the necessary adjustments itself by
raising additional taxes. By contrast, where the local public sector depends heavily
on grants and transfers, the centre cannot credibly deny bailout, as otherwise
local governments would have to curtail some important local public services
 H and E (). A cross-national data analysis by R
() reveals that long-term balanced budgets among local authorities are found
either when the centre imposes borrowing restrictions or when the decentralised
governments have a high degree of both tax and borrowing autonomy. Large and
persistent deficits occur when municipalities are dependent on intergovernmental
transfers but, at the same time, free to borrow. This combination is found most
frequently in developing countries and post-socialist transition economies as well
as among the constituent units of some federations.
Another issue related to the trade-off between local autonomy and stability is
the co-ordination of national and local fiscal policies. In countries with explicit
balanced budget rules prohibiting a deficit (such as Switzerland or the USA), the
fiscal stance of decentralised governments can be inherently pro-cyclical. However,
in most other countries, local fiscal policy (if it exists) is rather counter-cyclical or
follows its own rhythm that does not necessarily correspond to the national cycles.
As long as the economy faces no serious imbalances, national stabilisation policy
can be more successful if the centre involves local authorities in macroeconomic
management and gives them a share of the responsibility for the achievement of
national macroeconomic objectives (T-M, b, p. ).
Another argument in favour of a broader co-operation among government levels
in macroeconomic stabilisation derives from the limited capacity of the central
government to act alone (A, ; D, , p.  ff.). Even if one
is willing to admit the central government’s prerogative of managing the overall
demand and recognise its full legal, institutional and managerial capacity to react
rapidly to cyclical movements, it is not sure that the centre alone would have the
necessary budget size to perform this task. Decentralisation may be such that the
centre commands only a small fraction of public revenues and expenditures or
these factors are too rigid and cannot be mobilised for macroeconomic purposes on
the short term, whereas municipalities control a substantial share of consumption
and public investment, but being small and open economies, they are not interested
in pursuing stabilisation because of the externalities that such an action would
produce. In such a setting, stabilisation policy requires consensus and co-operation
among the government tiers.
.. Trade-off with political
objectives
Even though two of the main arguments in favour
of decentralisation are to foster citizen participa-
tion and to improve democratic control over pub-
lic policies, under certain circumstances, local autonomy may compromise also
these political objectives. Two phenomena merit our attention here.
. Local elections and referenda tend to have lower turnout rates than regional
and national ballots, owing to the fact that complex national policy issues
with multiple consequences generally capture citizens’ attention more than
the small-scale problems of their own local community (see Section . and
 V, ). Hence, even though people can exert a greater influence
on local affairs due to their proximity to municipal decision-makers, the
‘interest effect’ may offset a part of this advantage.
. Especially the smallest local government units experience what the Swiss call
‘tacit elections’. Elections are tacit if there are more mandates (seats) to
be allocated than there are candidates, so that the local electoral committee
has to declare all persons named for the local council to be elected. This is
likely to occur when the municipality is so small that it is difficult to find a
sufficient number of suitable candidates for political functions. The frag-
mentation of the territorial structure of a country increases the likelihood
of tacit elections. Beside the absolute size of the village, two further factors
explain the difficulty to find motivated and skilled persons. First, the mayor’s
position that used to promise some social reputation a few years ago becomes
now less and less attractive because of the increasing personal responsibility,
the growing complexity of projects and political procedures, and the lack
of technical, human and financial resources available to the incumbents.
Second, as the size of the jurisdiction decreases, the local government’s ef-
fective room for manoeuvre is reduced; consequently, future mayors cannot
expect to provide a satisfactory level of local public services through the
independent management of local affairs. The outlook of losing a part of
their autonomy in the event of a co-operation with other municipalities is
not necessarily attractive. Yet in the end, tacit elections jeopardise the local
supply of public policies, so that such a situation cannot persist but for a
short period of time, after which the amalgamation with a neighbouring
municipality might seem to be the only viable option.
The term is originally used in the context of National Council elections (see the Federal Act on
Political Rights of .., status on .., no. ., art. ), but today it is increasingly used
to indicate similar problems at the local level (C  J, ).
 . The concept of local financial autonomy
.. Components and
constraints
We saw in Section .. that local autonomy cannot be
meaningful unless local authorities possess adequate
sources of financing. Whether a given competence is
delegated from a higher-level government or assumed
voluntarily by the local authority, it necessarily gives rise to certain expenditure
needs. In order to satisfy these needs at a given cost, local authorities must design
specific expenditure programmes for which they need financial resources. Finally,
they must have sufficient capacity and flexibility in budgeting so as to ensure a
match between the level of resources and the actual spending level.
Based on these interrelations, we may define local financial autonomy as the
combination of the following three elements:
. Local expenditure autonomy: the right and the ability to determine the
nature and size of overall local public expenditure and its breakdown in
various public goods and services in accordance with the demand of the local
constituency, as well as the right and the ability to manage local property;
. Local revenue autonomy: the right and the ability to determine the origin
and the amount of financial resources, the rate at which the various groups
of beneficiaries shall contribute to the common pool, as well as the way the
pool (or specific types or units of resources) are used;
. Local budgetary autonomy: the right and the ability to adjust revenue levels
to spending levels across the various domains of public intervention, both
within one generation of taxpayers (via taxes and fees) and between succes-
sive generations (inter-temporally, via debt). Budgetary autonomy is thus
the right and the ability to modulate the local budget constraint both stati-
cally and dynamically. Additionally, it requires local authorities to assume
(financial) responsibility for their decisions in front of their constituency.
This typology is adapted from an article published by G and U (, p.  ff.)
who drew inspiration from G (). Their definitions treating autonomy as a right are
completed here with the notion of ability in the spirit of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government. There are several other typologies in the literature as well, e.g.  S (,
p.  f.), D and P (, p.  ff.). In addition to the multitude of approaches to
classify local financial autonomy, there are also disagreements on the definition of key terms;
conversely, sometimes several different labels are attached to the same concept.
Decisions on the way financial resources are used pertain, from a theoretical point of view, to both
expenditure and revenue autonomy. In order to avoid duplications, we will treat them under
revenue autonomy.
In practice, not even in mature federal systems can perfect sovereignty in all three
domains ever be achieved; on the other hand, full dependence is also extremely
rare if it exists at all. With regard to each component of local financial autonomy,
local authorities are normally situated on a continuum between these two extreme
positions. Like local autonomy in general, local financial autonomy is not a
question of all or nothing but a question of degree.
The decisive factor that determines the actual position of a local government
unit in the spectrum (and thus its effective autonomy) is the totality of exogenous
constraints imposed on its revenue autonomy, expenditure autonomy, and bud-
getary autonomy. Exogenous constraints are limits imposed by factors or agents
from outside the local government unit. In order to capture their great diversity,
we propose two dimensions of classification.
According to their nature, exogenous constraints can be of
– legal nature, if they emanate from written legislation. Considering local
autonomy as the right and the ability to manage local affairs, the totality of
legal restrictions determines the first part of the definition, namely, the right.
– non-legal, e.g. geographic, demographic or socio-economic nature. Non-
legal constraints determine the second constitutive element of local auton-
omy, namely, ability.
According to their effect, exogenous constraints can be
– direct, if they apply to the local government unit itself;
– indirect, (a) if they apply to another government unit (either at the same
level or at a different level of government) directly but have an impact on the
autonomy of the local government itself; or (b) if they apply to one domain
of intergovernmental fiscal relations but have an indirect impact on the local
government policy in another domain.
An earlier draft of this thesis distinguished only between formal and informal constraints. It defined
formal constraints as those emanating from the design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions and
thus being anchored in the higher-level legislation (similarly to legal constraints in the present
draft). Informal constraints were defined as those having a more subtle (in any case, not formalised)
character. In that model, formal restrictions (‘deduced’ in some way from the state of perfect
sovereignty) determined the formal autonomy of a local government unit. Informal restrictions
imposed an additional limit that ultimately led to the effective autonomy. The approach was
perhaps closer to the concept of formal vs informal institutions elaborated by the adherents of the
New Institutional Economics (a constraint being also a sort of institution), but it did not allow a
distinction as to whether the constraint applies to local governments directly or indirectly.
 By definition, legal constraints are invariably exogenous, since they result from
higher-level legislative procedures. Citizens may be, but need not be, directly
involved in these procedures. However, even direct participation would not make
these constraints endogenous: if a decision is taken through regional or national
referendum, the influence of an individual voter and even that of a local community
is negligible. Citizen participation at the higher level is thus not a form of local
self-determination.
As for the non-legal constraints, the picture is more differentiated. While
topographic and climatic constraints cannot be but exogenous, the demographic
and socio-economic situation of a local community is (at least in part) a product
of former decisions taken by the same community. For instance, by pursuing an
innovative child and youth policy, a local government is likely to attract young
families into the jurisdiction, thus improving the demographic profile (and possibly
the socio-economic situation) of the latter.
If exogenous constraints are those that derive from outside the local government,
endogenous constraints emerge from inside, namely from the present and past
choices of decision-makers within the organisation. The latter include, by way
of example, spending commitments, horizontal yardstick competition (in tax
or expenditure policies) and go/no-go decisions concerning interjurisdictional
co-operation. To give a more tangible example, even if local governments are
permitted by law to introduce a certain category of tax with a rate of up to x per
cent, some of them will decide not to make use of this right in order stay attractive
in the interjurisdictional competition for mobile taxpayers. Hence, the economic
environment may be such that it encourages or discourages certain choices within
the framework of exogenous constraints. In this and the following chapters, we
will treat exogenous and endogenous of constraints differently. While exogenous
constraints will be investigated systematically, endogenous ones will merely be
illustrated with a non-exhaustive series of examples. There are two good reasons
for this methodological choice.
First, exogenous constraints may be numerous but they are never countless; in
addition, they can be clearly identified and, in some cases, even their effect can be
measured. By contrast, there is an infinite variety of endogenous restrictions on
the financial autonomy of local governments: there can be virtually as many of
them as there are particular decisions of particular local governments in response
to a particular situation or economic environment.
Second, the local community may well see its room for manoeuvre being reduced
by the consequences of decisions taken by either the incumbent local decision-
makers or their predecessors. However, these decisions are genuinely autonomous;
they have their origin in an act of sovereignty, even if the current incumbents
had no opportunity to participate in the decision-making. Therefore, we do not
consider them as veritable restrictions on local autonomy.
In the following sections, we are going to take a closer look at the exogenous and
endogenous constraints in each of the three domains of local financial autonomy.
.. Expenditure autonomy In very general terms, the sense of expenditure
autonomy is the right and the ability of local gov-
ernments to manage public property and funds in the interest of the local com-
munity. The latter term implies that public resources are to be spent on goods
and services in a way to meet the demand of the local constituency. Therefore,
first, local expenditure autonomy is equivalent with the freedom to decide which
goods and services shall be financed from the local public budget and how much
money shall be spent on each of them. Second, expenditure autonomy also in-
cludes the freedom to decide how these goods and services shall be produced or
delivered. With regard to both questions, autonomy also implies the ability of the
local government to implement the decisions.
The distinction between expenditure responsibility (what to provide) and ser-
vice delivery (how to provide) is an important one. The assignment of a public
expenditure function to a local government unit does not automatically mean
that the latter will carry out all related tasks on its own. In the modern public
sector, the production of goods and services is separated from the policy deci-
sions concerning the choice of public services to be provided. In their vision of a
catalytic government, O and G (, p.  ff.) see the local govern-
ment as the steering organisation that defines policy objectives and priorities on a
democratic basis and cares about the fundraising that allows their realisation. The
(physical) delivery of goods and services that serve these objectives and priorities
can be assumed by agents other than the municipality, such as public and private
enterprises, non-profit organisations, (a bureau or an enterprise of) another local
council or another level of government. These are called the rowing organisations.
As D (, p. ) observes, one of the major differences between the
markets of private and non-private (public or mixed) goods and services is that
in the former one, the functions of demand (‘fonction de demande’) and supply
(‘fonction d’offre’) meet directly, whereas in the latter one, they are most often
separated by a third function, namely service delivery (‘fonction de production’).
Figure . demonstrates the relationship between the three forms of decentralis-
ing public expenditure functions, on the one hand, and the dichotomy of steering
vs rowing, on the other.
 Form of 
decentralisation
Type of 
expenditure 
function
Steering organisation Rowing organisation
Deconcentration Mandatory 
functions
Central government Central government / prefect /
local agency of line ministry
(alternatively: subnational 
government)
Delegation Mandatory 
functions
Central government, 
subnational 
government
Subnational government
Demand-driven 
mandatory 
functions
Devolution Subnational 
government
Subnational government
Optional  
functions
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By means of deconcentration and delegation, the central government imposes
mandatory functions on local governments. There are, however, differences in both
steering and rowing. Deconcentrated tasks are managed by the central government
and executed (uniformly) by either a local agent of the central government or the
municipality itself which then usually employs its own administrative capacity.
In the delegated functions, the local government may decide to ‘buy’ the related
services from another provider, but it remains accountable to the higher level
government for meeting some pre-defined quality and quantity targets. For sure,
every municipality has the option to provide more and/or better services than the
compulsory minimum, but this alone does not turn a mandatory function into an
optional one. Optional functions can only be created through genuine devolution.
Their key characteristic is that municipalities are free to assume or abandon them
according their preferences (more precisely, according to the preferences of the
local constituency) and that there are no higher-level targets to respect with regard
to quantity or quality.
A specific expenditure category that we call ‘demand-driven mandatory func-
tions’ is situated on the borderline between delegation and devolution. The func-
tions belonging to this category are related to local public goods and services that
municipalities are not obliged to provide unless a certain share of the population
(as specified in the relevant national law) demands them explicitly. The fact that
Exogenous Endogenous 
(examples)
Legal Non-legal
Direct Statutory assignment 
of responsibilities 
(devolved vs delegated or 
deconcentrated functions)
Quality and quantity 
standards; other sector-
specific regulations on 
service delivery
Topographic, demo-
graphic, socio-economic, 
environmental etc. 
conditions
Small jurisdiction size in 
absence of a potential for 
efficient co-operation
Spending commitments 
resulting from past 
decisions
Interjurisdictional  
co-ope ration
Indirect Competence transfer Interjurisdictional yardstick 
competition
Spatial spillover effects
Figure 2-6Figure 3.4: Constraints on subnational expenditure autonomy
[Source: the author]
these responsibilities are in principle optional (devolved) but may become manda-
tory explains why they are on the borderline between delegation and devolution.
In Switzerland, for instance, day care for babies and toddlers falls into this category
of public goods.
In a decentralised system of government, both the steering (supply) and row-
ing (production/delivery) autonomy of local authorities are subject to certain
constraints. Figure . provides an overview.
Direct legal constraints on
expenditure autonomy
The autonomy of local authorities to manage the ex-
penditure side of their budget (steering) depends to a
critical part on the statutory assignment of responsibili-
ties among the different government tiers. In the domains assigned to higher levels
of government for reasons of efficiency or interregional equity, local authorities
can at best serve as executing agents of the higher authority. In this deconcentrated
part of public expenditures, both service supply (steering) and service delivery
(rowing) are determined by higher-level legislation. While local agents are involved
in the delivery of the given services and participate in their financing, they have
no power to influence the overall supply. In some cases, they do not participate
in the delivery but are obliged to contribute to the costs incurred by the higher
(executing) government.
 Local expenditure autonomy is also compromised, though to a lesser extent, in
the domain of delegated services. Clearly, the steering autonomy is reduced insofar
as the law obliges municipalities to provide these services regardless of the actual
preferences of the local constituency. At the same time, the rowing autonomy
is compromised, too, notably through quality and quantity standards and other
sector-specific regulations that define various service parameters of service delivery,
such as teacher selection and working conditions, or the maximum number of
pupils per class. Sector-specific regulations affect local expenditure autonomy
insofar as they do not allow the volume of spending on the given function to drop
under a certain minimum level. The rules may be so stringent that they leave
hardly any leeway to local governments (M, , p.  f.). Full autonomy
concerning the questions of whether to provide a particular service and if yes, how,
is realised only in the domain of genuinely devolved functions. Such functions,
however, are extremely limited in number. Correspondingly, only the share of
spending on devolved functions in total outlays can give a reliable indication of
local expenditure autonomy. As soon as delegated tasks are also considered, the
result will be biased.
Indirect legal constraints on
expenditure autonomy
Such a restriction could arise from a legal rule that
applies to one local government category but affects
another one, or from a rule that restricts local au-
tonomy in an expenditure domain other than the one in which the rule applies.
Chapter  will demonstrate the system of competence transfers, a specific rule ap-
plied in Hungary that allows municipalities to shift competences to, and take over
competences from, the counties, with significant consequences for the autonomy
of both tiers.
Direct non-legal constraints on
expenditure autonomy
Topographic, demographic, socio-economic, envi-
ronmental and other conditions exert an influence
on both the expenditure needs and the costs of
service provision, and hence on the nature and volume of local public expenditures.
For instance, villages situated directly along riverbanks need to spend more on
flood protection than others situated further inland. Towns coping with structural
economic problems need to spend a larger share of their resources on unemploy-
ment benefits and social services than municipalities without such difficulties.
Constructing roads and bridges in a mountainous area involves higher costs than
the same investment in a flat area. Sewage treatment is likely to be more expensive
in sensitive geographical areas. A village that, for historical reasons, happens to be
situated in a water protection area (an area declared as such by upper-level legisla-
tion) can hardly lobby at the ministry against its classification as a sensitive region,
and thus it sustains a loss in terms of expenditure autonomy for environmental
reasons. Since water protection is subject to national environmental regulation
in most countries, the direct non-legal (geographical) constraint in this case is
matched with a direct legal constraint.
Second, in policy areas characterised by growing economies of scale (e.g. primary
schools, sewage systems), small jurisdiction size imposes a natural limit on local
spending decisions: the above-average costs of service provision drain away useful
resources from other policies. One means of overcoming this natural limit is to
co-operate with the neighbouring jurisdiction(s), which is also the most reasonable
option as long as the costs of this action do not exceed the benefits (or the loss
suffered from non-action). Therefore, low economies of scale resulting from
small jurisdiction size become a hindrance to expenditure autonomy if, and only
if, topographic or other exogenous conditions prohibit the small community from
co-operating with its neighbours. A remote village at the back of a deep valley can
hardly be expected to run the primary school in collaboration with municipalities
that are situated in a parallel valley over the mountain: the cost of co-operation in
this case would most probably exceed the loss incurred through small-scale service
provision.
Selected endogenous constraints
on expenditure autonomy
Even if the law provides local authorities a cer-
tain degree of expenditure autonomy (and it usu-
ally does, otherwise decentralisation would be
hollow) and in the hypothetical case that this is not compromised by any demo-
graphic or socio-economic factor, a local government unit might decide not to
make use of certain elements of this autonomy for various reasons.
One such reason is a spending commitment made by the local legislative in an
earlier period that has an effect on the expenditure plan in the current period
(D and P, ). A mandatory outlay of this type restricts the
room for manoeuvre of the local executive insofar as the earmarked resources are
not available for alternative purposes. If, for instance, a local government decree
prescribes the categories of personnel that need to be engaged in the different
municipal institutions, then the salaries might be determined independently by
Here, we leave aside the question about the new constraints that a co-operation agreement can
possibly impose on the participating local authorities. As has been explained in Section ..,
normally it is up to the local governments to decide whether they wish to work together or not, and
the decision itself is an act of exercising local (political) autonomy.
 the incumbent local executive, but the payroll tax is a compulsory expenditure
item over which the executive has no control. The interest and repayment rates
related to debt incurred in an earlier period offer another example, as well as the
maintenance and operation expenses of the infrastructure that was financed with
the debt.
An example of a possible constraint emerging not from past but from current
decisions is the suboptimal jurisdiction size that prohibits certain local govern-
ments from providing local public services in an efficient and cost-saving manner.
Unless there are overriding political or cultural considerations or objective physical
(e.g. topographical) obstacles, small local communities could eliminate this kind
of constraint by seeking co-operation with other jurisdictions.
If insisting on self-sufficiency is likely to reduce the local government’s room for
manoeuvre, this does not mean, however, that interjurisdictional co-operation will
invariably increase it. A local authority that signs a co-operation agreement with
one or more neighbouring jurisdictions is expected to give up some of its autonomy
for the sake of the common interest. The quality and quantity of the supplied
public goods will be a result of negotiations in which the parties cannot enforce
their preferences to the same extent (D and P, ). In spite of
this fact, co-operation among municipalities and regions is relatively widespread in
some countries and strongly encouraged by central government in others because
of the positive impact of co-operation on the efficiency of local service provision
and even on local autonomy. The positive impact is manifested in an increasing
room for manoeuvre for the member municipalities due to greater economies
of scale, reduced competition among the partners (insofar as competition was
rather harmful than beneficial), and a possibly enhanced fiscal attractiveness of
the combined jurisdiction. Also the fiscal incentives provided by the centre may
partly compensate for the loss of autonomy incurred at the institutional level of
co-operation. It seems that whether the municipality co-operates or not, it will
lose part of its autonomy, but in the case of co-operation, the short-term loss of
direct (decisional) autonomy is likely to be compensated in the medium and long
run. This is why voluntary intermunicipal co-operation for G (, p. )
is a process of ‘creative destruction’ of local autonomy: by abandoning the quest
for individual sovereignty, municipalities develop and strengthen their common
room for manoeuvre within a larger territory.
Interjurisdictional yardstick competition in expenditure policies typically leads
The rare case of forced co-operation is not treated here, but logically, it would constitute a direct
legal constraint on local autonomy.
to situations where the participating local governments deliberately choose not to
exploit their formal spending powers in order to keep up with their competitors.
Municipality A may have little interest in offering a generous welfare policy to
its constituency if the surrounding jurisdictions B, C, and D are parsimonious in
this respect; otherwise, the needy would migrate from all directions to A, creating
there additional demand for these costly services. Even if A cannot influence
the behaviour of the neighbouring local governments, this type of constraint
is endogenous: the migration effect would not appear if the local governments
chose not to compete against each other (if, for instance, a higher-level authority
systematically compensated for the additional costs incurred by A). Doing less than
what is in one’s power is also a manifestation of autonomy.
Certain spatial spillover effects may also induce horizontal strategic interactions
in which the autonomous decision of one local government unit restrains the
freedom of the neighbouring jurisdictions with regard to the choice and volume
of local public expenditures. If, for example, municipality A manages to chase
away criminals through increasing local spending on police, this is likely to induce
the nearby municipalities B and C to increase police expenditures on their turn
in order to keep the migrating criminals off (E and F, ). The
expenditure autonomy of B and C is indirectly restricted insofar as they have fewer
resources left for other expenditure programmes. It is important to note, however,
that B and/or C could also decide not to increase spending on police, although
in this case, they could see the escalation of criminality in the subsequent years,
inducing further costs (that may exceed the costs of crime prevention) and possibly
negative externalities as well.
Yet, not every spillover effect reduces local expenditure autonomy. The air
pollution abatement undertaken in jurisdiction D creates a positive spillover effect
that allows the neighbouring jurisdictions E and F to spend less on the same
task than they would spend in the absence of the externality (B, ,
). In both cases, E and F could very well decide to spend more (hence their
expenditure autonomy is intact) but, understandably, they have no incentive to do
so.
 .. Revenue autonomy Revenue autonomy allows local governments to fi-
nance independently, and according to the local pref-
erences, the plan of voluntary and delegated expenditures approved by the voters.
Concerning the voluntary expenditures, revenue autonomy includes the freedom
to decide about the redistributive character of local taxes and fees as well as about
the way the revenues are used. The decision about the redistributional aspect
implies the choice between benefit principle and ability-to-pay principle with
regard to the form of taxation, as well as the design of rates and deduction rules that
ensure an efficient and equitable allocation of the fiscal burden among taxpayers
(D, , p. ). For the capital budget in particular, revenue autonomy
means the right to choose the funding source and, in case of debt financing, the
right to define an amortisation policy for each investment programme. Here again,
an autonomous local government is free to decide whether, and if yes, how to share
the financial burden of the investment among current and future generations of
taxpayers.
As for the delegated expenditures, the higher-level government that delegates the
task and retains ultimate responsibility for its execution normally offers some co-
financing to the lower level in the form of a grant. It is most likely to provide further
assistance in order to compensate for vertical fiscal imbalances possibly resulting
from the mismatch between the financial means and the expenditure needs of a
local government unit, as well as for the horizontal fiscal imbalance arising from the
inconsistency between revenue-raising ability and spending needs of authorities at
the same level. Revenue autonomy in the context of intergovernmental transfers
and grants means the influence of local governments on the size of the distributable
pool and the distribution formulae as well as their level of discretion with regard
to the use of transferred resources.
The origin and the amount of local revenues, the way of sharing the fiscal burden
within and among generations of taxpayers, as well as the use of specific revenue
categories and individual revenue units are again subject to a variety of constraints
(see Figure .).
For an overview of the instruments correcting vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance in the decen-
tralised budget, see e.g. B () or D and M ().

Exogenous Endogenous 
(examples)
Legal Non-legal
Direct Statutory assignment 
of resources (own vs. 
transferred revenues)
Statutory rules on local 
taxes and user charges
Conditions on grant 
eligibility and spending 
purpose
Fiscal equalisation
Ignorance of local 
government interests in 
higher-level negotiations 
about grant parameters
Low productive efficiency 
of own-source revenues
Demographic and socio-
economic conditions
Fear of loss of popularity 
as a consequence of 
increasing taxes / user 
charges
Indirect Frequent amendments 
to the legislation on local 
taxes and grants
Weak local tax effort due 
to penalising grant system
Weak local tax effort due 
to ‘fiscal crowding-out’
Overlapping tax bases
Low productive efficiency 
of revenues feeding the 
grant system
Interjurisdictional tax 
competition
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 Direct legal constraints on
revenue autonomy
Contrary to the statutory assignment of expenditure
responsibilities where local autonomy was unfettered
for the devolved functions and limited for the dele-
gated and deconcentrated functions, the statutory assignment of resources provides
only a preliminary and not truly reliable impression of local revenue autonomy.
The classical textbook theory pretends that, from the point of view of local auton-
omy, own-source revenues (local taxes, user charges, fines, revenues from leasing
and sale, loans, etc.) are always preferable to transferred ones. Practical experience
shows, however, that a well-designed transfer system can grant a higher level of
autonomy to local governments than an overly restrictive national legal framework
on local own-source revenues.
Statutory rules on specific parameters of local taxes and user charges (tax base
assessment, exemptions, deductions, rates, earmarking of user charge revenues,
etc.) impose a direct constraint on local revenue autonomy. The rules may be even
so stringent that local taxation hardly enhances revenue autonomy at all. National
or regional laws on local revenues may enumerate the admissible tax types, set
upper or lower limits to rates, define the rules of tax base assessment, or oblige
local governments to earmark revenues from user charges for the respective policy
area. In more extreme cases, tax or user charge regulations adopted by the local
legislative are subject to formal approval by higher authorities.
The degree of autonomy that intergovernmental transfers provide to municipali-
ties depends on the legal specifications concerning the size of the grant pool, eligibility,
and spending purpose. Grants are particularly supportive of local autonomy if the
eligibility criteria are determined in an objective way and the allocated amounts
are not earmarked for specific spending purposes. Likewise, a revenue sharing
arrangement (normally consisting of block grants) can give local governments an
almost complete control over their revenue flows if the sharing rule is laid down in
the constitution or another organic law and/or municipalities can negotiate the
size of the pool and the distribution formula (O and N, ).
Also a local surcharge on a regionally or nationally administered tax (the so-called
piggyback tax) can be regarded as a local own-source revenue if local governments
are free to determine the rate and to collect the tax on their own, or, in case it is
collected by the regional or national authority, if the redistribution of the revenues
to local governments follows the origin principle. By contrast, the power to vote
on the local tax rate, commonly considered as an essential attribute of local tax
autonomy, does not automatically ensure a sufficient amount of revenues to offer
a satisfactory level of public services (G and U, , p. ;
M-V et al., , p. ).
Does revenue structure matter for local autonomy? The classical literature is
divided about this question. King starts from the idea ‘that the authorities are in
receipt of grants to encourage them to take externalities into account when deciding
on their service levels, and, perhaps, some grants to enforce grantor preferences.
The question then arises of how they should finance the rest of their expenditure
requirements’ (K, , p. ; emphasis added). For financing this residual
amount of spending, he proposes five possible sources: revenue sharing, tax (base)
sharing, local taxes (accompanied by a system of equalisation grants), user charges,
and loans.
The more widespread reasoning goes the other way round. Based on the princi-
ple of fiscal equivalence (O, ) and the notion of budget responsibility, it
holds that ‘regional and local governments should ideally fulfil mainly allocational
functions by providing services that accrue primarily to the local population, ser-
vices whose costs the local constituency bears as far as possible’ (N, ,
p. , emphasis added).
As one of the basic principles of revenue assignment, B () postulates
that ‘“own-source” revenues should ideally be sufficient to enable at least the
richest local governments to finance from their own resources all locally provided
services primarily benefiting local residents’. According to this line of reasoning,
to the greatest extent possible, each government should finance both optional
and mandatory expenditures from its independent revenues. Fiscal transfers and
grants should merely serve as subsidiary funds to encourage the production of
specific public goods, to correct inherent inefficiencies in the resource allocation
(spillover and congestion effects), or to attenuate horizontal and vertical fiscal
imbalances. Correcting vertical fiscal imbalances is all the more important as the
independent revenue sources (mainly taxes and user charges) traditionally assigned
to local governments are often inadequate to the task of financing such major social
expenditures as health care, education, or social services (B, a, p. ).
Considering the variety of approaches to revenue assignment is important
because it allows us, to a certain extent, to detach the question of revenue structure
from the question of revenue autonomy. It appears that the origin of the funding
sources (own-source vs transferred) and their relative weight within the local
budget say just as little about the actual room for manoeuvre of the local authority
as, in the domain of expenditure autonomy, the number of expenditure functions
that the law assigns to the local tier. What counts in the end is the quality of the
revenue sources, notably their predictability, adequacy (in terms of amount) and
Whether the adequacy criterion is met depends also on the actual buoyancy of the revenues that,
 flexibility (in terms of use) with regard to the assigned expenditure responsibilities.
The notion of quality (and of different possible qualities) implies that the autonomy
of the recipient authority may be subject to a number of legal and non-legal, direct
and indirect constraints.
From the ‘user side’, an obvious direct legal restriction on the revenue autonomy
of grant recipients consists of the conditions on grant use. Intergovernmental
transfer systems usually contain a certain amount of earmarked (conditional)
grants, which sets a natural limit to the autonomy of the recipient governments.
Beside the conditions of use, the rules on whether the recipient municipality is
required to co-finance the grant (matching vs non-matching grants) and whether
the availability of funds is limited or not (closed-ended vs open-ended grants) have
a further impact on local revenue autonomy. The more generous the grant system
towards the beneficiaries (dominance of open-ended and non-matching grants),
the higher is the degree of revenue autonomy. Table . in Section .. will show a
taxonomy of grants that signalises the various levels of autonomy attached to each
grant type.
In countries or regions operating a vertical or horizontal fiscal equalisation
system, prosperous local governments lose control over a part of their revenues
insofar as they are obliged to cede it to poorer jurisdictions (directly, or by some
kind of a central allocative mechanism) in the name of interregional solidarity.
This implies not only a loss of influence on how these revenues are used but also
an absolute loss of revenues so that the net contributor municipality cannot realise
the same volume of public expenditures as it could in the absence of equalisation.
In the same measure as it reduces the revenue autonomy of rich municipalities,
fiscal equalisation increases the autonomy of beneficiary jurisdictions, so that the
overall impact on the local public sector is neutral.
Indirect legal constraints on
revenue autonomy
Perhaps the most powerful indirect legal constraint
that can be imposed on local autonomy is the right
of the national legislative to revise the laws on local
taxation and grants every year or even more frequently. In the field of transferred
revenues, frequent revision might occur when the rules related to pool size and
distribution of certain grants flowing to local governments are laid down in the an-
nual budget law instead of an organic law (whose amendment requires a qualified,
e.g. two-thirds, majority) or the national constitution. The adverse effect on local
however, cannot be influenced with formal rules (except that the centre should delegate revenue
sources that are at least potentially buoyant). The question of revenue buoyancy falls under the
indirect non-legal constraints of revenue autonomy.
autonomy is somewhat attenuated if local governments have an informal channel
and the necessary power for influencing the legislative procedure.
Frequent amendments especially to the rules on intergovernmental transfers
can make revenue flows so inconstant and fuzzy that they become a real hindrance
to multi-annual budget planning in the recipient local government units. This is
likely to induce and perpetuate vertical imbalance particularly in jurisdictions with
low financial capacity.
As for the own-source revenues, even if the national framework legislation on
local taxation is relatively liberal in the sense that it imposes few or no restrictions
on raising taxes, local governments may feel constrained in their fiscal autonomy
if other laws make it difficult for them to exploit their maximum tax potential.
The actual volume of tax collection and, hence, the effective revenue autonomy of
municipalities depends not only on direct formal rules on taxation but also on the
efforts made by the local government to find the optimal tax rate and base that,
together with other revenues, are likely to ensure the achievement of local spending
targets. A weak local tax effort and a corresponding low volume of tax collection
are notably observed in two cases.
First, penalising grant systems in which the available grant quotas are inversely
related to own revenue collections reduce the interest of municipalities in raising
taxes and fees. It is an indirect constraint because it works via another domain of
intergovernmental fiscal relations (namely the grant system) than the one that it
ultimately affects (taxation).
Second, the central government and the social security funds together may oc-
cupy too much tax room compared to the volume of their spending responsibilities.
In the event of what could be called a ‘fiscal crowding-out’ effect, local authorities
in their own competence will refrain from imposing a higher tax rate (even if this
is formally allowed) for fear of overtaxing the local constituency. Some of them
will not levy any tax at all. A mayor overtaxing the local constituency is likely to
face a loss of votes at the subsequent elections or an out-migration of taxpayers to
other jurisdictions. Whatever the reason behind the weak local tax effort, unused
taxing power represents an efficiency loss in the intergovernmental fiscal system,
Beside the choice of tax rates and base, tax effort also includes various measures of tax enforcement
such as the fight against tax evasion.
Clearly, the reasons of weak tax effort may also be endogenous, i.e. related to an autonomous
decision of the local council. A case in point is the engagement of a local government unit in
interjurisdictional tax competition (implying a race-to-the-bottom in local tax rates). Another
example is the consideration that the political costs of increasing taxes could exceed the marginal
financial benefit derived from such a measure.
 particularly if it contributes to the perpetuation of a vertical fiscal imbalance that
ultimately calls for an intervention by the centre.
Finally, overlapping tax bases can produce vertical fiscal externalities which,
under certain circumstances, reduce the room for manoeuvre of local governments.
This is notably the case where a higher-level government makes the shared tax base
shrink by taxing it at a higher rate than before. Municipalities that do not adjust
their rates will experience an immediate fall in tax collections. Those that adjust
their rates will only exacerbate the situation: in a response to the repeated rate
increase, local taxpayers will try to escape from the tax, so that the tax base (for all
levels of government) shrinks further.
Direct non-legal constraints on
revenue autonomy
Even if the legislation on revenue assignment in
general and local taxation and grants in particular,
is relatively stable over time, it is possible that
central government interests dominate the parliamentary debate during the design
of these systems and municipalities are too weak to defend their interests. The
probability that local government interests are ignored is higher if the size of the
transfer pool and the distribution formulae are determined on an ad-hoc basis,
implying either circumvention of the formal legislative procedure, or a frequent and
unilateral amendment of the written rules. In most countries, local governments
maintain some sort of an interest association in order to minimise their dependence
on such ad-hoc arrangements, but the strength with which they can enforce their
claims varies from one association to the other.
Second, the productive efficiency of certain categories of own-source revenues
assigned to local governments may be so poor that they hardly enhance revenue
autonomy. They might even reduce it if the central government is convinced
that, by delegating these resources to the lower levels, it has successfully met the
demand for a framework regulation on local taxation. The actual volume of tax
collections, however, is not only a function of the formal liberties such as setting
the rate and base of the taxes, but also a function of the quality of the assigned taxes.
Quality includes buoyancy (the yield can keep up with rising expenditure levels)
and administrative efficiency (the costs of assessment and collection are below the
level of the collected revenues). The volume of local tax revenues depends further
on taxpayers’ discipline (that the collecting authority can influence to a certain
extent) and the fluctuations of the local economy.
Socio-economic and demographic factors may also have a direct impact on the
revenue autonomy of decentralised authorities. Towns hit by a structural economic
crisis see their tax base shrink rapidly as businesses close down operations and
individuals go on unemployment benefit or choose early retirement. Under such
circumstances, a local government decision to increase tax rates or cut deductions
would probably only reinforce tax evasion and out-migration instead of boosting
the local revenues. Similarly, village A where seventy per cent of the residents
are retired cannot hope to collect as much tax revenue per capita as village B
with a more favourable age structure; consequently, A’s room for manoeuvre will
necessarily shrink.
Indirect non-legal constraints on
revenue autonomy
The productive efficiency of revenue sources
plays a role not only in the sphere of own rev-
enues but also in the sphere of grants and trans-
fers (including revenue sharing arrangements). The size of the distributable pool
depends on the volume of taxes and other revenues collected by the higher-level
authorities. Collection at these levels is again a function of several factors such
as buoyancy, productive efficiency, taxpayers’ discipline and the fluctuations of
the regional or national economy. Put it differently, the quality of public sector
revenues that feed the transfer system is decisive for the revenue autonomy of those
municipalities that benefit from the transfer system, but the impact is not as direct
as with own-source revenues. Since the revenues feeding the transfer system are
administered by the centre, local governments bear the consequences of all exoge-
nous circumstances that reduce the size of the distributable pool, without having
any control over these. Consequently, in a revenue sharing system, for instance,
even the constitutional guarantee of transferring a fix percentage of the national
tax yield from the centre to the municipalities does not automatically lead to a
given level of local revenue autonomy.
Returning to the initial discussion about the importance of own-source vs
transferred resources for local revenue autonomy, we can conclude that the decisive
factor is not whether a given amount of revenue is raised in the own jurisdiction
or received as a transfer from above, but it is the nature and importance of the
constraints attached to the revenue category. In terms of revenue autonomy, a
well-designed and not overly restrictive transfer system has just as much to offer as
a well-designed local tax system, and certainly more than what an ill-designed and
overly restrictive local tax system would ever be able to provide. The dominance of
transfers in local government finance is thus not necessarily harmful.
On the contrary, harmful transfer dependency, that is, when decentralised
governments live at the mercy of higher-level authorities over a longer period,
hinders local governments from meeting the preferences of their constituency, thus
nullifying an important efficiency advantage of decentralisation. It also represents
 a challenge for macroeconomic stabilisation, particularly when bailout grants
become a regular (structural) revenue source for local governments.
However, even in systems with perfectly predictable flows of unconditional (non-
earmarked) transfers, the ‘gift money’ can reduce the sense of accountability of local
policymakers towards their electorate (OECD, , p. ). If the decision about
the level of collected tax revenue and the responsibility for the tax administration
is detached from the decision on how to spend the tax revenue (because they are
taken at different levels of government), the fiscal illusion of the local constituency
may ultimately lead to an overprovision in public goods and services. Unfettered
revenue autonomy can thus compromise both the accountability and the efficiency
objective.
Selected endogenous constraints
on revenue autonomy
Particularly in the field of own-source revenues,
we can observe a great diversity in the way local
authorities make use of their formal revenue-
raising competences. If the law authorises, for instance, local property tax up to a
maximum rate of two per cent of the market value, then some jurisdictions will
still set a rate that is below the ceiling, and some others will even decide not to tax
property at all. This has mainly to do with the objective of a better positioning in
the competition for taxpayers. Depending on the degree of taxpayer mobility, the
municipality is likely to ignore or consider the tax rates applied in the neighbouring
jurisdictions. Yet, the outcome is the same.
If interjurisdictional mobility is limited but various parties or political groups
within the jurisdiction compete for a limited number of council seats, then the
incumbents might wish to keep the rate of the local tax(es) as low as possible in
order to be re-elected for the following term. The fear of political unpopularity
imposes a direct constraint on revenue autonomy. More precisely, the incumbents
will refrain from tax increases as long as the political cost of such a measure (in
terms of loss of votes) exceeds the expected marginal benefit (in terms of additional
tax revenues).
In regions where taxpayer mobility is significant, the local government is again
likely to keep local tax rates low, but this time in order to avoid an outflow of
taxpayers to the neighbouring jurisdictions; thus, the constraint works indirectly.
Yet, a race to the bottom with tax rates is reasonable only if the baskets of public
goods offered in the different jurisdictions are comparable: in the end, the com-
petitiveness of a jurisdiction depends not on the absolute or relative level of taxes
but on the level of the net fiscal benefit (NFB, public goods and services minus tax
price) that it is able to offer.
.. Budgetary autonomy Local budgetary autonomy is the power to act si-
multaneously on both the revenue and expenditure
side of the budget in order to avoid or correct vertical fiscal imbalances. By virtue
of the principle of budget responsibility, local budgetary autonomy is a direct
logical consequence of local expenditure and revenue autonomy. Local authorities
are expected to assume responsibility for their spending decisions as far as these are
voluntary (and not imposed by a higher authority); in other words, they cannot
carry out such expenditure programmes unless they have the necessary funding
(D and M, , p. ).
In periods of fiscal distress, local governments can operate on the revenue side of
their budget by raising taxes and user fees or soliciting additional grants from the
central budget. Alternatively, they might sell some of their assets within the limits
of legality and rationality. On the expenditure side, they may cut or postpone
planned current and capital expenditures. They might also consider signing short-
term loans in order to bridge the gap, as far as the legislation provides for such a
possibility. For financing new infrastructures, they may again make use of their tax
power, apply for investment grants, make savings on the recurrent expenditures,
or borrow.
As far as budgetary autonomy involves policy actions on the revenue and/or
expenditure side of the budget, the restrictions on revenue and expenditure au-
tonomy described in the previous sections will influence the degree of budgetary
autonomy as well. There is, however, another group of constraints that apply
specifically to budgetary autonomy. Figure . provides an overview.
Direct legal constraints on
budgetary autonomy
For the reasons explained in Section .., a lax local
budget policy can seriously compromise the stability
of the national economy. Since this impact is generally
estimated to override the benefits of decentralisation and local autonomy on the
level of society as a whole, local deficit and borrowing as well as bailout grants
are prohibited or at least subject to stringent regulations in most countries. These
so-called ‘fiscal rules’ are imposed either by the local authority itself or by a higher-
level government. Compliance with the deficit and debt rules imposed by the
Economic and Monetary Union is a further factor that puts local budgetary auton-
The privatisation of useful and otherwise well-functioning core assets is self-defeating, as it induces
only a one-time revenue increase and what is sold cannot be used for revenue generation in the
future (e.g. through rental).
For a typology of fiscal rules in OECD countries, see S et al. (b). For the practice of
controlling local borrowing and debt in Western and Eastern Europe, see D (a) and
S (b), respectively.
 Exogenous Endogenous 
(examples)
Legal Non-legal
Direct Statutory rules on deficit, 
borrowing and debt
Credible no-bailout policy
Poor access to borrowing
High cost of debt service
Political risk of 
indebtedness
Lack of capacity to 
manage debt
Small jurisdiction size
Indirect Fiscal imbalance resulting 
from a mismatch between 
mandated expenditures 
and grants
Poor reliability of 
resources completing debt
Low productive efficiency 
of revenues feeding the 
grant system
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omy under pressure particularly in those countries where the central government
involves the lower tiers into the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
(e.g. Austria and Italy).
The first group of direct legal constraints treated below consists of statutory rules
on local deficit, borrowing and debt imposed by a higher level of government, while
the second one consists of no-bailout rules.
For a classification of existing zero-deficit (balanced budget) rules according
to their stringency, D (, p.  ff.) laid down an algorithm with the
following elements:
. Is equilibrium required only for the budget or for the accounts as well?
. Is equilibrium required only for the current budget (and account) or for the
capital budget (and account) as well?
. Should the balanced current budget include the amortisation of the debt?
. Is it permitted to smooth the budget over the medium term?
. If yes, how is this medium term defined?
. Is non-compliance sanctioned in any way?
According to Daﬄon, rules that require a balance of the current budget over the
medium term without explicitly defining the beginning and length of the period,
as well as rules that fail to impose a penalty in the case of non-compliance, are
ineffective and allow local governments to pursue any budget policy. A balanced
budget is unlikely to occur except in local governments that voluntarily impose an
effective rule on themselves.
Local public sector accounting frameworks that do not distinguish between
current and capital budgets, view their raison d’être in the argument that a distinc-
tion would unnecessarily restrain the budgetary autonomy of local governments.
According to this argument, decentralised authorities are served best (and their
autonomy is maximised) if they are free to finance any expenditure item from
any resource at their disposition. However, the fungibility of current and capital
revenues is not beyond controversy. Even if a local authority were allowed to use
capital revenues (particularly debt) to fill the gap in the current budget, it should
better not do so, otherwise, it risks sacrificing intergenerational equity for the sake
of unrestricted local autonomy.
Concerning borrowing, P’ (, p. ) holds that ‘[in] addition to
the power to spend and the power to tax, other important attributes of sovereignty
are the power to borrow and the power to regulate. The power to contract, or the
power to change, or the power to own, can be seen as combinations of the four
basic attributes mentioned’. Whether the power to borrow is a boon or a bane has
long been discussed in the literature of fiscal federalism and decentralisation (for
an overview, see e.g. R and D, ). While pay-as-you-use finance
facilitates the funding of vital infrastructures at the local level, a poor management
of debt obligations inevitably contributes to macroeconomic difficulties at the
national level. It appears that there is not much to say against local borrowing as
long as the recurrent revenue flows are sufficiently abundant to cover both principal
and interests over the entire period of debt service. There are some normative
propositions trying to restrain the scope of borrowing to the sole purpose of
financing investments whose lifetime expands over several generations, and in
countries where the so-called ‘golden rule’ applies to the local level of government,
these propositions have become the norm (see D, a). Other countries
are more permissive, admitting local borrowing for bridging short-term fiscal
gaps as well, especially if such gaps arise temporarily as a result of economic
development efforts. In principle, borrowing becomes a problem only when it is
paired with irresponsible fiscal behaviour, notably when recurrent revenues fall
short of what is needed to cover the debt service. This tends to occur in countries
where the local public sector is overly dependent on intergovernmental grants.
 Whether there is a restriction on the borrowing purpose or not, borrowing is
an important means of budgetary adjustment. Yet, it cannot be considered as a
revenue source. The borrowed amount and the interests must be paid back to the
lender in due time, which is why borrowing never figures under the elements of
local revenue autonomy in the economic literature, in contrast to own revenues,
revenue sharing and grants.
Another direct legal constraint on local budgetary autonomy is the central
government’s declared commitment not to bail out insolvent local authorities. A
no-bailout policy represents an effective constraint only if it is credible and if there
are no exceptions from the rule. In some countries, central governments have not
yet been able to declare and pursue a full-fledged and credible no-bailout policy,
although some of them (e.g. in Hungary) chose to assist only those local authorities
that failed ‘through no fault of their own’ (with or without specifying what ‘own
fault’ means).
As long as bailout grants conserve their discretionary character and are provided
only in exceptional circumstances, the centre can still impose (though to a lesser
extent) its priorities concerning macroeconomic stability and thus constrain local
budgetary autonomy. An essential condition is, however, that bailout is not recog-
nised as a recurring revenue source. Municipalities normally should not be allowed
to count on it in advance or to include it into their budget for the following year. If
bailout is provided at all, it should be provided at the end of the fiscal year in order
to correct for that year’s deficit.
Empirical observations cited by  H (, p. ) suggest that bailouts
often follow an increase in unfunded (or poorly funded) mandates. However,
unfunded mandates are not the only reason for local authorities to expect a bailout.
The centre could even take full account of the costs of mandates and provide for
adequate resources in order to ensure a balance between revenues and expenditures
in the local budget; the demand for bailout grants would still persist. This kind of
penury has to do with expansionary spending policies and an accumulated debt
the costs of which the local government is unable to finance on its own. More
generally, the existence of bailouts is the sign of a soft budget constraint at the
local level that can become even softer if the centre cannot demonstrate a credible
commitment towards a no-bailout policy.
The question whether the balanced budget is achieved through the use of regular
revenues (taxes, recurring grants, etc.) or irregular revenues (loans and bailout),
has a crucial impact on the nature of local budgetary autonomy. Local authorities
that are allowed to borrow without any restrictions, those that are not subject to a
zero-deficit rule, and those that have a real chance to get bailed out when in crisis,
clearly enjoy a higher level of budgetary autonomy than those that are obliged
to tighten the belt in times of economic depression. But even in the absence of
top-down legal constraints, a municipality may decide to maintain strict budget
discipline and to abstain from borrowing and bailout, thus voluntarily accepting a
more restricted room for manoeuvre than those of its counterparts that are not
subject to any self-imposed fiscal rule.
While a high probability of being bailed out seems to enhance local autonomy
at first sight, P (, p.  ff.) reminds that bailout also involves some costs
for the beneficiary in terms of sovereignty. First, in the event of an intervention by
the centre, local economic activities are likely to be disrupted or reduced. Second,
bailed-out municipalities experience a loss of expenditure autonomy because the
centre takes control over local spending decisions. Furthermore, the intervention
induces a distortion in the composition and the inter-temporal distribution of
local expenditures. Nevertheless, when the bailout is generous enough and when
the shift of control over local spending to an outside agency is not too costly to
local residents, then the municipality is likely to demand for a bailout and ignore
the loss of efficiency that the society has to bear in consequence.
Indirect legal constraints on
budgetary autonomy
An intriguing question in connection with local bud-
getary autonomy concerns the correction of local
fiscal imbalances that result from a mismatch of man-
dated responsibilities and intergovernmental transfers. Some normative proposi-
tions start from the premise that, if a higher authority delegates a new expenditure
to a lower authority, it should also provide for the necessary funding in the form
of an intergovernmental transfer, whereas the primary function of own revenues is
to cover optional expenditures that reflect the specific preferences of the local con-
stituency. As the argument goes, such a solution would truly reflect the distinction
between the choice and agency functions of local governments and at the same
time conform to the principle of ‘he, who pays the piper, calls the tune’.
However, this expectation is somewhat quixotic. In line with the recommenda-
tion of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, national constitutions and
statutes in a number of decentralised countries stipulate that for any responsibility
delegated from a higher to a lower level of government, the higher authority must
ensure the necessary means of executing the related tasks. These means need not
be limited to grants and transfers but may also include a statutory increase in the
revenue raising powers of lower government tiers (e.g. an increase or removal of
the upper limits of tax rates, more freedom in tax base calculation, etc.). In the
presence of such autonomy-enhancing measures, it is perfectly conceivable and
 justifiable for the higher-level government to expect local governments to finance
part of their mandatory responsibilities from their own revenues. In this logic,
‘unfunded mandates’ would denote, not the volume of mandatory expenditures
that the grants fail to cover, but the volume of mandatory expenditures that the
sum of grants and own revenues fails to cover. Four problems arise, however:
. Increased formal revenue powers do not automatically enhance the effec-
tive local revenue capacity in the presence of non-legal or indirect legal
constraints (see Section ..).
. Not every category of own-source revenue can reasonably be employed
for financing unfunded (or co-financing poorly funded) mandates (see the
fungibility argument elaborated under the heading ‘Direct legal constraints
on budgetary autonomy’). Debt should particularly not be used for covering
the deficit of the current budget.
. There is a risk that some (or most) local governments will deliberately
refuse to co-finance the mandatory expenditures directly from their pocket,
expecting the higher-level government in a strategic game to finally cover
the deficit. This is particularly true if the intergovernmental fiscal system
provides for a formal bailout mechanism.
. The higher authority might demand municipalities to co-operate with each
other if they are otherwise unable to finance their mandatory tasks. However,
there is no objective measure of whether there is a potential for co-operation
(and if yes, how great) in a given geographic and/or policy area. This leaves
both the principal and the agents without any useful and reliable argument
in the negotiations about the appropriate level of subsidising public service
mandates.
Pointing to the difficulties that may possibly arise from the ‘mixed financing’ of
mandated responsibilities does not imply that we advocate full state funding of the
local mandatory responsibilities. If the national grant for a newly delegated func-
tion covers only, say,  per cent of the production costs, then some municipalities
will easily make up for the missing  per cent from their own budget while others
cannot even close the fiscal gap caused by the previously delegated responsibilities.
However, a well-designed system of intergovernmental transfers takes account of
the interjurisdictional disparities in terms of financial capacity.
Another indirect legal constraint is related to borrowing. Ideally, investment
programmes are financed exclusively from debt, although the scarcity of lenders or
the availability of other funding sources may prompt local governments to combine
debt with other revenue sources. These include for instance own-source revenues,
investment aid from the European Union, development grants from the central
government or private capital from an enterprise participating in a public-private
partnership. However, complementary resources may not be reliable on the medium
and long term which is the normal time horizon of an investment programme.
This is the case if business cycles cause strong fluctuation in local tax revenues and
shared revenues, if the national framework legislation on local taxation is amended
every year, if the eligibility criteria for central government grants or the size of
the available pool are subject to frequent modifications, or if private partners are
difficult to find or to keep. The poor predictability of future revenue flows makes
the entire investment funding plan uncertain, so that local governments cannot
credibly negotiate a medium or long-term loan and thus postpone borrowing.
Direct non-legal constraints on
budgetary autonomy
A first example of direct non-legal constraints
in the domain of local budgetary autonomy is
poor access to borrowing in some countries. The
difficulty to acquire additional funds through contracting loans and issuing bonds
may arise from the underdeveloped state of financial markets or the poor borrowing
capacity (credibility) of some or all local governments due to past insolvency crises.
Second, even if loans are easily accessible on the market, the financial costs of the
debt may be prohibitive. This occurs particularly in the event of inflation (which
devours current revenues rapidly) and soaring interest rates.
Selected endogenous constraints
on budgetary autonomy
Particularly in transition economies, the public
opinion still thinks negatively about municipal
borrowing. For some, it is a sign of financial
insecurity if the local government is unable to cover the costs of investments from
the available own and transferred revenues. For others, borrowing is a risky venture
that should better be controlled by higher authorities. Yet others disagree with
the idea to impose a burden on future generations of taxpayers without their
consent. Even if these arguments may be contested, they imply political risks
for the borrowing local executive, including the risk of not being re-elected. If
the estimated political risks are higher than the chance to convince the voters
and accomplish the planned investment programme with success, then the local
executive is likely to refrain from borrowing.
For the arguments in favour of debt as an optimal source of investment funding, see e.g. C
and J (, p.  ff.) or S (c, p.  ff.).
 Some municipalities lack indeed the capacity to manage debt. D and
B-T () investigate the components of responsible borrowing behaviour
at the local level. Favourable credit ratings and compliance with the fiscal rules
(legal norms on borrowing, deficit and debt) are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for municipalities to borrow. Successful financial management requires
a more proactive attitude in which local governments adjust their investment
policy to their financial capacity, assessing the costs and benefits of each investment
project.
Finally, there is a certain interest in the literature for the question as to whether
the territorial structure of the country and the size of jurisdictions have an influ-
ence on local budgetary autonomy (for a review, see e.g. P, ). Most au-
thors argue that small jurisdictions have limited opportunity to realise economies
of scale on the expenditure side and to raise taxes on the revenue side, which
tendentially leads to vertical fiscal imbalances. According to this reasoning, a
fragmented territorial structure combined with a high degree of budgetary auton-
omy is inefficient, which makes a strong case for interjurisdictional co-operation
and amalgamation. On the other hand, analysing the relationship between the
degree of local tax autonomy and the average population size of municipalities
in the fifteen member states of the European Union in the mid-s, G
() finds no significant correlation. Quoting the example of France, he argues
further that territorial fragmentation may even promote local autonomy. Indi-
viduals and enterprises have a wider range of baskets of public goods (and thus
of price/performance ratios) to choose from and can thus effectively ‘vote with
their feet’ as T () suggested. The resulting competition will reward the
most innovative, efficient and financially responsible local governments, beside
conveying useful information about the real preferences of citizens and businesses
with regard to taxes and local public services. Nevertheless, Gilbert admits that a
number of conditions must be met before the Tiebout-type mobility can make the
economy work more efficiently. Besides, territorial fragmentation will automati-
cally lead to an exacerbation of interjurisdictional disparities, which means that
local financial autonomy serves as a magnifying glass for the ‘natural’ differences
in terms of resources. However, the small size of a jurisdiction remains an endoge-
nous constraint on local budgetary autonomy as long as the local government has
a real opportunity to co-operate or amalgamate with other jurisdictions in order
to reduce spending levels (see Section ..).
Gilbert defines the degree of local tax autonomy as the ratio of local tax revenues to total local
revenues without borrowing. His results are similar to those found by D and P
() for a group of Swiss municipalities.
. Measuring local financial autonomy
.. General measures In an attempt to measure the relationship between fiscal
decentralisation and various macroeconomic or other
variables such as economic growth and public sector
size, economists in the mid-s started to search for an appropriate quantitative
indicator of local financial autonomy. Two and a half decades of intensive research,
however, have not been enough to develop an indicator (or a ‘troika’ of sub-
indicators of expenditure, revenue and budgetary autonomy) that would provide
an unbiased picture of the reality. None of the existing formulae goes further than
estimating the effect of direct legal constraints on autonomy, and the simple ones
cannot even estimate this effect in an appropriate and reliable manner.
Until around the year , nearly all studies used the Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund as a starting point for the
design of fiscal decentralisation measures. The dominant model compared the
volume of local expenditures (revenues) to general government expenditures (rev-
enues) or, alternatively, to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These simple
indicators are still in use, even though scholars have long identified their apparent
weaknesses (E and Y, ; M et al., ; T W B,
) which are the following:
– On the expenditure side, the GFS fail to distinguish between mandated and op-
tional expenditures of local governments. The outlays related to mandatory
functions appear under local expenditures, even though the decentralised
government units (acting merely as agents of the centre) have limited or no
authority over these functions. Moreover, in addition to direct functional
expenditures, the GFS data also include monetary transfers flowing from the
local level to higher levels of government.
– On the revenue side, the GFS do not distinguish between the different sources
of local revenue, although the nature and the degree of local autonomy may
The GFS were established in  and partly harmonised with the  System of National Accounts
( SNA). It is an integrated statistical framework whose role is to ‘enable policymakers and
analysts to study developments in the financial operations, financial position, and liquidity situation
of the general government sector or the public sector in a consistent and systematic manner.’ The
harmonised methods of data retrieval and presentation allow a better comparability of statistics
across different countries. For more details on the GFS, see IMF ().
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development systematically calculates local
revenues excluding transfers from other levels of government but including tax revenue sharing
OECD (, p. ).
See e.g. the World Bank database of ‘Fiscal Decentralization Indicators’ (T W B, ).
 be very different from one revenue source to another. In addition, the GFS
do not tell which percentage of the intergovernmental transfers is given for
general and specific purposes and whether their allocation follows objective
criteria or a discretionary measure.
Due to these inherent weaknesses, GFS-based indicators systematically overesti-
mate the degree of decentralisation and local financial autonomy.
The major challenges in measuring local financial autonomy are the identifi-
cation and quantification of the various exogenous constraints that are actually
imposed on local governments in a given decentralised system. As for the mea-
surement of local tax autonomy, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development brought a wind of change in  by starting to produce a series of
country surveys with a new data structure that was more adapted for subsequent
investigations on tax autonomy than the simple GFS data (see Section ..). A
similar development in the measurement of expenditure autonomy has not yet
taken place.
.. Measuring expenditure
autonomy
As we saw in the previous section, simple GFS-
based decentralisation ratios, such as local govern-
ment expenditure to general government outlays
or to GDP, lead to an overestimation of the expenditure autonomy of lower-level
authorities. For a correct measurement, we should be able to identify and, more im-
portantly, to quantify all those direct and indirect constraints (among the potential
constraints presented in Section ..) that actually reduce the room for manoeuvre
of a given authority on the expenditure side of the budget. Regrettably, however,
it is not even possible to give an exact measure of the direct legal constraints, let
alone the rest.
Identifying purely local expenditure functions and the related actual outlays is a
relatively simple exercise. The most common proxies used for estimating this kind
of autonomy have been presented in the previous section. Qualitative indicators
are used even more frequently (see T W B, ). These show which
level(s) of government is (are) responsible for which expenditure functions. The
delimitation and quantification of local, regional and national responsibilities
in the domains of shared competences (e.g. education) demands already more
circumspection and, more importantly, a well designed reporting and accounting
Here we disregard all those endogenous constraints that arise from some present or past autonomous
decisions of the local legislative or executive, e.g. decisions about the involvement of the municipality
in interjurisdictional co-operation or competition.
system. Especially countries with little experience in decentralised government
accounting lack the basic data that would be necessary for such calculations.
Another problem arises when we try to measure the impact of centrally imposed
regulations and minimum standards on the cost of local service provision. Both the
number and the nature of these norms vary across the functions. In the domain
of primary education, for instance, the freedom of local governments may be
constrained through rules on staff qualifications, wages and working conditions,
number of pupils per class, equipment and buildings, curricula, etc. (D,
, p.  f.). The norms in the domain of environmental protection for instance
are not only very different from these but also a lot more in number. T W
B () proposes to look at four universal dimensions of public service
provision—(i) setting the amount of spending, (ii) determining the structure, (iii)
executing and (iv) supervising the task—to see which government layer has control
over each of these dimensions. For sure, implementing such schemes in practice
will always require some mapping between these dimensions, on one hand, and
the prevailing account system (or expenditure classification) in the country, on the
other hand. However, the dimensions may also prove to be insufficient in number,
or imprecise in definition, for being used in practice.
B et al. () propose a more sophisticated typology for describing the
role of subnational governments in service provision (Table .). Thanks to the
clear description of the content of subnational autonomy in each of the six dimen-
sions of service provision, this model is better suited to practical implementation.
The authors attribute scores from  to  to the various degrees of subnational
expenditure autonomy that roughly correspond to devolution [A], delegation [B,
C] and deconcentration [D]. Together with a functional classification of public
expenditures (Table .), this provides a three-dimensional matrix that also allows
cross-country comparisons.
The idea of Bell and his colleagues is to analyse each public service sector and sub-
sector individually along the six dimensions of service provision and to evaluate
subnational autonomy in each of these dimensions by means of the scores A to D
(or  to ). Calculating the average of the individual (dimension-related) scores
in each sector provides an estimation of the level of subnational autonomy with
regard to the given sector on a scale from  (no autonomy) to  (full autonomy).
According to the authors, the final step would be to develop a weighting of the
various sectors that reflects the relative importance of each sector. This would
provide something like a final score of subnational autonomy and at the same
time resolve the question of large autonomy on ‘unimportant’ functions vs limited

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 autonomy on important functions. A municipality may indeed have full control
over spending on libraries, for instance, but a negligible influence on a far more
important sector such as health care.
Up to this date, the approach proposed by B et al. () has been certainly
the most powerful one for measuring subnational expenditure autonomy vis-a-vis
the central government. Nevertheless, four points merit some further reflection.
. Among the six factors influencing the degree of autonomy (column  of
Table .), the elements related to expenditure responsibility (steering) are
freely combined with those of service delivery (rowing), although a distinc-
tion would be crucial for the discussion of local expenditure autonomy for
the reasons explained in Section ... Only one out of the six factors is
related exclusively to expenditure responsibility (‘broad control over pol-
icy and budget’) and two exclusively to service delivery (‘civil service’ and
‘administration’). The remaining factors are mixed. ‘Standards setting and
regulation’ has a steering component in that it determines what exactly
subnational governments (SNGs) should provide. Within ‘service delivery’,
setting service priority is part of the steering function while the rest is purely
rowing. Finally, ‘monitoring and evaluation’ is an activity that ensures that
the output (or outcome) of service delivery corresponds to the previously
set expenditure objectives.
. The judgement about whether subnational government units in a given
decentralised system have a ‘high degree’ or just ‘some degree’ of autonomy
(i.e. the choice between scores B and C) is highly subjective. Within ‘civil
service’ for instance, control over the wages and working conditions appears
as a key component of autonomy (columns B to D). In reality, however, the
actual labour market conditions may limit the degree of control both for
the central government and the SNGs. Good local government officials are
tempted to quit the public sector if he latter provides poor remuneration,
which explains the convergence between the public and private sectors in
terms of salaries and employment conditions. Against this background,
the control over these policy instruments is not as crucial for subnational
autonomy as the matrix may suggest.
. The level of aggregation of the public expenditure categories as proposed in
Table . allows hardly anything more than a few generalised observations
about subnational autonomy. In order to obtain more reliable information,
every category has to be broken down into a set of subcategories. In the

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 case of primary education for example, these could be teachers’ qualifica-
tions, wages and employment conditions, education programmes, school
organisations, buildings and equipment, etc. (see D, , p.  f.).
. Finally, the idea of a weighting system that fits every country (in order
to ensure that final scores are comparable across the borders) might turn
out to be an illusion. Subnational influence on forest management for
instance might be irrelevant in the Netherlands while it is a crucial element
of subnational autonomy in Nepal.
The non-legal constraints on local spending autonomy are even more diffi-
cult to quantify than the legal constraints. To what extent special topographic,
demographic, socio-economic or environmental conditions influence the produc-
tion costs, and hence, actual expenditures, varies across public services as well as
jurisdictions and can only be calculated case by case. External pressure on the
local budget may also come from the development of new technologies (resulting
e.g. in a growing demand for costly interventions in health care) or the general
macroeconomic situation. Their impact on the local budget can only be captured
in terms of shifts in the spending structure, but again, this impact cannot be clearly
distinguished from other trends provoking similar shifts.
Furthermore, as has been suggested in Section .., jurisdiction A may happen
to be smaller than what would allow it to minimise the costs of certain mandatory
services, while at the same time, a co-operation agreement with the neighbouring
jurisdiction B is likely to generate more costs than benefits for A. In this case, the
only way to measure the loss of autonomy in A is by quantifying the additional
spending (on mandatory tasks) resulting from the missed opportunity of cost
savings via larger production scales.
To sum up, since most of its determinants are unquantifiable, it is difficult
to describe the extent of local expenditure autonomy in a specific country at a
given point in time, let alone to make comparisons over different periods, public
policy areas or countries. With the accumulation of statistical and factual infor-
mation on a growing number of countries over longer time series, cross-country
comparisons have become a very common instrument in public finance analysis;
however, their practical use is contested. It is risky to compare local expenditure
autonomy across different countries without taking into account the complexity of
intergovernmental relations in which local expenditures are embedded.
For the measures that are necessary for the implementation of such comparisons, see B et al.
().
To our knowledge, D and P () have been so far the only au-
thors to measure the extent to which local expenditures depend on decisions taken
by a higher government. In an analysis of the accounts of all  municipalities
of the Canton of Fribourg (Switzerland) for , they considered three particu-
lar expenditure items: (i) the financial contributions to the cantonal or federal
spending on regionalised or centralised tasks; (ii) the expenditures on services that
the municipality provides in co-operation with other jurisdictions; and (iii) the
interests paid and the prescribed minimum amounts of debt repayment related
to past investments. Adding up the expenditure volumes in these categories, they
took the result as a basis to determine the per-capita mandatory expenditure in
absolute monetary terms, as well as its share within the local revenues and within
the revenues from direct taxes. In principle, the approach could be applied to
further cantons and time periods to enable comparisons, but such an exercise
requires substantial effort that can only be made when all municipal accounts are
registered in a standardised electronic reporting system.
.. Measuring revenue
autonomy
Since the mid-s, both qualitative and quantitative
indicators of local revenue autonomy have undergone
a profound development. Virtually all approaches seek
to capture the most transparent and straightforward direct legal constraints on
revenue autonomy, namely the statutory rules of local taxation and the conditions
of eligibility and use of intergovernmental grants.
Qualitative indicators The earliest attempts to capture local revenue autonomy
placed the various revenue sources in the centre of the
analysis and characterised them from the perspective of the freedom of municipali-
ties to modify or influence them. Thus, O and N () started
by ranking and defining revenue sources by the degree of autonomy they ‘would
normally provide’ to decentralised government, admitting that even the highest-
ranking category, own taxes, are often subject to central government constraints
applying to rates and base. Table . presents this classification. In a following
The category of ‘shared taxes’ requires a short explanation. What is actually meant here is the
situation in which the central government collects certain types of taxes and then distributes all or
part of the yield among the subnational authorities. In order to distinguish this situation from the
preceding category of ‘overlapping taxes’ (also ‘tax surcharge’ or ‘piggyback taxation’), we propose
to refer to the former situation as ‘shared revenues’ (or ‘revenue sharing’) and to the latter one as
‘shared taxes’ (or ‘tax sharing’). Regrettably, these terms are often confused in the current literature.
Drawing a dividing line between shared revenues and intergovernmental grants is another critical
issue; for a first attempt, see B and K ().
 Table 3.3: Ranking of local revenue sources by Owens and Norregaard (1991)
1 Own taxes Base and rate under local control.
2 Overlapping taxes (tax surcharge) Nationwide tax base, but rates under local control.
3 Non-tax revenues Local government is able to determine the fee to be
charged, although central government may specify
whether such a charge can be levied.
4 Shared taxes Nationwide base and rates, but with local govern-
ment able to influence either the proportion of rev-
enues attributed to the local government sector or
the amount that each level of local government re-
ceives.
5 General purpose grants Local government share is fixed by central govern-
ment (usually with a redistributive element), but lo-
cal government is free to determine how the funds
should be spent.
6 Specific grants The amount of grant may be determined by central
government or may depend upon the spending de-
cisions of local government, but in either case cen-
tral government specifies how the funds should be
spent.
step, they analysed tax revenues (categories , , and ) and grants (–) with regard
to the degree of control local governments have over selected parameters of these
revenues (Tables . and .).
In connection with tax revenues (Table .), the authors specify that the tax
autonomy of the local level is independent of the question as to which level of
government administers the tax. Another assumption implicitly arising from the
table is that if local government is allowed to determine the tax base, it also enjoys
unlimited discretion with regard to the tax rates; hence the full control over tax
level, rate structure and tax yield in the first row of the table. The opposite is not
true: according to the matrix, unlimited tax rate discretion is not necessarily paired
with full control over the tax base and hence local influence on the tax yield can be
only partial.
Table . suggests that intergovernmental grants do not automatically reduce rev-
enue autonomy at the lower levels; the effect depends on the type of grant. Owens
and Norregaard add that capital grants usually provide less autonomy in spending
than current grants because they are linked to specific projects or economic sectors.
However, they do not consider the way in which grants are allocated, although
Table 3.4: Degree of subnational autonomy by type of tax revenue
[Source: the author, based on Owens and Norregaard (1991, p. 13)]
Assess­
ment
Collection Tax base Tax level Rate 
structure
Tax yield
Tax base discretion
choice of base none / full none / full full full full full
adjustment to 
central tax base
none / 
partial
none / 
partial
partial full full partial
Tax rate discretion
unlimited full unlimited unlimited partial
maximum none none / 
partial
none limited none partial
minimum / 
maximum
limited none partial
Tax surcharge none none none partial none partial
Centralised tax sharing none none none none none none / 
partial
Table 2-4
the objectivity of the procedure and the predictability of revenue flows can greatly
influence the autonomy of the grantees. Nevertheless, Owens and Norregaard
appear to be among the first authors in the literature to decompose local tax and
grant autonomy into structured sets of parameters.
Virtually all recent classifications of tax autonomy are derivations of this early
approach from . The most frequently cited classification is the one that the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs developed in . The novelty of the OECD
taxonomy (Box .) is that it views autonomy from the perspective of sub-central
governments (SCGs, following the OECD terminology), contrary to Owens and
Norregaard who organised their classification around tax types. This makes it
possible to identify, for an individual country or a group of countries, the relative
proportions of revenue (in percentages) over which SCGs have full, partial or no
control, and thus to explore the development of local taxing power.

Table 3.5: Degree of subnational autonomy by type of grant
[Source: Owens and Norregaard (1991, p. 15)]
Type of grant Ability to influence directly
The level of the grant How money is spent
General-purpose grant
effort-related
to tax yes yes
to needs limited yes
lump-sum no yes
Sector-specific grant
matching yes limited
lump-sum no limited
Project-specific grant
matching yes no
lump-sum no no
Box 3.2: The OECD taxonomy of the taxing power of sub-central authorities,
1999 [Source: OECD (1999, p. 11)]
a) SCG sets tax rate and tax base
b) SCG sets tax rate only
c) SCG sets tax base only
d) tax-sharing arrangements
d.1) SCG determines revenue-split
d.2) revenue-split can only be changed with consent of SCG
d.3) revenue-split fixed in legislation, may unilaterally be changed by central govern-
ment
d.4) revenue-split determined by central government as part of the annual budget
process
e) central government sets rate and base of SCG tax.
In the cases from a) to d.), the local level of government is said to have total or
a significant control over its taxes. In all the remaining cases, its tax autonomy is
limited or zero.
Based on a series of country studies carried out in Central and Eastern Europe
from the early s, the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of
Government refined and extended the initial framework in –, splitting the
categories a, b, c and introducing e and f (the latter represents non-allocable taxes)
in order to better capture reality (Box .).
Beside the shift in the perspective of analysis from the tax types to the decen-
tralised governments, the OECD taxonomy also contains new elements compared
to the classification set up by Owens and Norregaard in . A key novelty in the
 version is the set of indicators concerning the right and the procedures of
determining and modifying the distribution formula in the domain of revenue
sharing. The revised version of – further differentiates the discretion over
the tax base and introduces the parameter of consultation between national and
A later version (OECD, , p. ) includes an additional category: ‘SCG sets tax base for SCG and
central government tax(es)’. As this rarely occurs in practice, it was abandoned in the  review.

Box 3.3: The OECD taxonomy of the taxing power of sub-central authorities,
2006 [Source: Blöchliger and King (2006, p. 159)]
a.1 The recipient SCG sets the rate and any reliefs without needing to consult a higher
level government.
a.2 The recipient SCG sets the rate and any reliefs after consulting a higher level gov-
ernment.
b.1 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate, and a higher level government does not set
upper or lower limits on the rate chosen.
b.2 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate, and a higher level government does set upper
and/or lower limits on the rate chosen.
c.1 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs—but it sets tax allowances only.
c.2 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs—but it sets tax credits only.
c.3 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs—and it sets both tax allowances and tax credits.
d.1 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the SCGs determine the revenue split.
d.2 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be changed only
with the consent of SCGs.
d.3 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined in
legislation, and where it may be changed unilaterally by a higher level government,
but less frequently than once a year.
d.4 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined annu-
ally by a higher level government.
e. Other cases in which the central government sets the rate and base of the SCG
tax.
f. None of the above categories a, b, c, d or e applies.
local authorities for setting the tax base and the rates. The tax surcharge implicitly
reappears in the categories a. to b. in – (only b in ).
While the new classification gives the impression of being precise and exhaustive,
any attempt to apply it in the practice will forcibly run into problems:
. To a. and a.: It is not clear whether ‘consulting’ means a simple exchange
of ideas between lower and higher authority (e.g. with the purpose of inter-
jurisdictional co-ordination of tax rates) without any commitment on either
side, or whether it implies that the higher authority can overrule a decision
planned by the lower one.
. Categories b. and b. do not reckon with the existence of what we could call
a ‘deconcentrated tax’ in some countries, i.e. a tax that local governments are
obliged to collect in the exact form prescribed by legislation, but the revenues
from which accrue to the local governments themselves following the origin
principle. In fact, one could also treat it as a tax sharing arrangement
of type d., but the fact that the tax is collected by the local level and the
legally determined revenue split is  per cent in favour of that level (thus
it is ‘ceded’ rather than shared) places the ‘deconcentrated tax’ somewhere
between own taxes and revenue sharing.
. Categories c. to c. omit the possibility that a higher authority sets the
tax relief or imposes an upper or lower limit to tax reliefs for the lower
level. From the perspective of revenue autonomy, having full or only partial
control over the deductible amounts is likely to be of higher importance
than the question of which type of tax relief the SCG is allowed to set.
. Block d is overly complicated and yet incomplete. A number of other com-
binations are conceivable, such as a revenue sharing arrangement in which
the revenue split is determined in legislation and the Parliament is allowed
to change it but the higher-level government is not; or even the Parliament
can change it only with the consent of SCGs. The four questions as to (i)
who determines the revenue split, (ii) who is allowed to change it and (iii)
how often, and (iv) whether a consent of the SCGs is required, should be
treated as four subsets of variables that can be freely combined within rea-
sonable limits. This would make block d even more voluminous but at least
systematic and exhaustive.
The luxury tax in Hungary (see Section .) is one example.
Tax credits are deductions from the taxes due, while tax allowances are deductions from the taxable
income.
 . Furthermore, block d is silent about the SCGs’ control over the way the
overall revenue share is allocated among them, although this is an equally
important component of revenue autonomy that determines the disposable
revenue for each jurisdiction.
. Generally, the classification provides hardly any guidance on how to evaluate
the different degrees of SCG involvement in the determination of the revenue
split. Categories d. and d. can hardly be applied if the SCGs have no
national association that would adequately represent their interests, or if
there is disagreement among the existing lobby organisations. A revenue
split determined by the legislation is not much better than a revenue split
prescribed by the higher-level government if it is hard to find acceptance
for SCG interests in the Parliament, even if we admit that parliamentary
decisions are usually more democratic than those taken unilaterally by a
higher authority. Furthermore, laying down any kind of rule in legislation
does not automatically guarantee stability; it makes an enormous difference
whether the revenue split is anchored in the constitution (or another organic
law requiring qualified majority) or in the annual budget law.
In the revised version of –, a first attempt is made to draw a conceptual
dividing line between revenue sharing and grants (B and K, ,
p. ) and to set up a new taxonomy of grants (Figure .). With regard to the
latter, the most important innovation compared to the classification by Owens
and Norregaard is the distinction between mandatory and discretionary grants.
The former ones (also called ‘entitlements’) are rules-based grants for which both
the size of the grant and the conditions of availability are laid down in a law or
statute. Discretionary grants are distributed ad hoc and are often temporary in
nature (e.g. aid in case of a natural catastrophe). Discretionary grants increase
the room for manoeuvre for the grantee in a certain situation, but since they are
unpredictable, they do not enhance his fiscal autonomy from the outset. In the
group of not-earmarked grants, block grants provide less freedom than general-
purpose grants; even though they are not earmarked for a specific expenditure
programme, they are tied to a specific purpose and the output might be regulated
through centrally defined minimum standards.
In another strand of research, D () and D and P
Not-earmarked mandatory grants are what E and Y () and Meloche et al. () call
general grants whose allocation is based on objective criteria.
For a more detailed explanation on each category of the taxonomy, see B et al. (,
p.  ff.).

Grants
Not-earmarked
Earmarked
Mandatory
Discretionary
Mandatory
Discretionary
Block grant
General-purpose grant
Non-matching grant
Matching grant
Capital grant
Current grant
Figure 3.7: The OECD taxonomy of grants, 2006
[Source: Blöchliger and King (2006, p. 172)]
() limit their investigations to municipal tax autonomy and propose a frame-
work that is inherently different from those presented above. Starting from the
general formula
T D t  .B   D/  k (.)
where T denotes the tax yield, t the tax rate (or rate structure), B the tax base, D
the deductions, and k the annual tax coefficient, if municipalities are allowed to
surcharge higher-level taxes (piggybacking), they draw up a list of ‘elements of
fiscal sovereignty’ of municipal governments:
a) choice between tax or user charge in financing a specific local public service
b) items subject to tax or user charge (B   D)
c) group of individuals liable to the tax
d) method of calculating the tax or user charge
e) rate structure (t), including the maximum payable amount
f) annual tax coefficient (k)
g) method of collecting the tax or user charge
h) coordination of contentious issues.
 Local governments that have control over the elements from a to g enjoy what
the authors call ‘full fiscal sovereignty (or autonomy)’. The right to influence a
as well as some (but not all) parameters between b and e corresponds to ‘partial
(or limited) tax sovereignty’. If local authorities can control only f and g but have
no influence on the parameters from a to e, they enjoy ‘fiscal flexibility’. Finally,
local tax autonomy is zero if all parameters from a to f are exogenous (defined by a
higher-level government).
The model reflects the particularities of Swiss fiscal federalism. It breaks with
the distinction by Owens and Norregaard between rate structure and tax level but
reintroduces tax surcharge (piggyback taxation) as an explicit and distinct category.
This practice appears in the freedom to determine the annual tax coefficient (k).
Revenue-sharing arrangements do not appear directly among the elements of fiscal
sovereignty but nothing hinders the application of the method on this category
as well. The novelty of the Swiss approach is that it includes into taxing power
the liberty of choice between taxes and user charges (i.e. non-tax revenues) in
financing local expenditures and applies the same set of criteria to both sources of
revenue. Applied to a specific tax or user charge, the liberty of choice means the
freedom of not levying it at all.
An application of the model on the municipalities of the Canton of Fribourg
(D, , p. ) reveals that the degree of autonomy varies according to
revenue type and also according to tax types, yet sovereignty over b, c, and d goes
together for every kind of revenue: the municipality controls either all or none of
these variables. What makes a difference between the revenue types is whether local
governments are allowed to determine the rate structure (which occurs mainly in
those revenue categories for which b, c, and d are in local competence) or whether
they can merely (if at all) apply a piggyback rate to the cantonal or federal tax. Not
surprisingly, neither the choice of the funding source nor the collection method
shows any correlation with another element of fiscal sovereignty.
Table . provides a comparative overview of the four approaches based on the
parameters they include or ignore.
Any of these approaches offers a more reliable result than the simple GFS-based
decentralisation ratios presented in Section ... However, they all overestimate
the degree of local fiscal autonomy insofar as they do not take into account the
effective power (the productive efficiency) of the decentralised revenue sources and
their weight in the local budget in monetary terms. For instance, in most countries,
The authors admit that municipalities cannot have exclusive competence over the domain h, given
that in a democracy characterised by the separation of powers, the judiciary must retain the ultimate
authority over contentious issues.

Table 3.6: Comparative overview of the approaches to measuring subnational rev-
enue autonomy [Source: the author]
Parameters of autonomy Owens
and Nor-
regaard
(1991)
OECD
(1999)
Blöchliger
and King
(2005)
Dafflon
(1992);
Dafflon
and Per-
ritaz
(2000)
Taxes*
Choice between tax and user charge ×
Group of taxpayers ×
Base × × × ×
types of tax reliefs × ×
consultation with SCG ×
Rate (tax level) × × × ×
unlimited × ×
maximum × ×
minimum / maximum ×
consultation with SCG ×
Rate structure × ×
Tax surcharge × (×) (×) ×
Calculation method / assessment × ×
Collection × ×
Contentious issues ×
Revenue-sharing arrangements
Right to determine formula × ×
Right to modify formula × ×
Intergovernmental transfers and grants
Grant level ×
Spending target × ×
* For Dafflon (1992) and Dafflon and Perritaz (2000), this category includes user charges as well
 property tax is an exclusive competence of local authorities and it could therefore
be assumed to improve local autonomy considerably. The practice shows, however,
that property tax is not as powerful as the classical literature has stated (B, ).
As for user charges, many local public services are ill suited for being financed from
these sources (O and N, ). Besides, local governments seldom
have full sovereignty over them: the central government usually demands to set the
minimum rate at cost-recovery level or imposes a maximum rate. Hence, user
charges do not directly increase local autonomy, although indirectly they do, as they
liberate a corresponding amount of tax revenue that can thus be diverted into other
policy areas. Yet, if even such ‘classical’ own-source revenues tend to escape the
control of local governments, then any indicator of local revenue autonomy must
be handled with great care. Furthermore, the qualitative indicators presented above
ignore all the other legal and non-legal restrictions on local revenue autonomy that
were elaborated in Section ...
Quantitative indicators In contrast to the qualitative indicators of revenue au-
tonomy that show what kind of control local authorities
have over which type of revenue and to what extent these various types of revenues
contribute to the local budget, quantitative indicators try to capture the degree of
autonomy over the whole range of local revenues in percentage points.
As mentioned in Section .., the traditional GFS-based indicators (local gov-
ernment revenue over general government revenue or over GDP) soon turned out
to be inaccurate for the measurement of real revenue autonomy. It was not until
the early s, however, that the development of more sophisticated indicators
could take wings.
Drawing on a more detailed data set delivered by the OECD in a series of
country surveys from  (‘Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government’), several
researcher teams launched themselves in cross-country analyses of local fiscal
autonomy. They sought to construct a more reliable indicator of revenue autonomy
that would ultimately allow them to revise the results of earlier GFS-based analyses
on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and selected macroeconomic
variables. The survey results that served as row material for these post- studies
were a lot more detailed than any previous datasets and were arranged in the
following structure:
It might also require revenues to be strictly earmarked to the service domain in which they were
collected, but this belongs to the realm of expenditure autonomy, not revenue autonomy.
– Tax revenues
– own tax revenues, if local governments have full or significant control
over the tax base and rates;
– revenues from tax sharing, if local governments have little or no control
over the tax base and rates.
– Non-tax revenues include any income from business operations and property,
administrative fees and duties, and fines.
– Intergovernmental grants (allocation based on objective criteria or a discre-
tional measure)
– general purpose grants;
– specific (earmarked) grants
– conditional in their allocation across local governments
– unconditional: this type of specific grant gives more autonomy to
local governments.
By analysing the composition of local revenues, the researchers hoped to be able to
correct the misrepresentation of the level of revenue autonomy that results from the
use of simple GFS indicators. Notably, the OECD survey data demonstrate clearly
that the level of revenue autonomy estimated with such ratios will be different as
soon as one looks into the level of sovereignty over these revenues; besides, the two
variables do not correlate with each other. For example, municipalities in Lithuania
have a low degree of control over a large share of public revenues, which means
that the classical GFS ratio overestimates the level of local revenue autonomy. In
contrast, Slovakian local governments enjoy a very high degree of control over
a small proportion of aggregate government revenues, suggesting that a simple
decentralisation ratio would necessarily underestimate their autonomy. The survey
data reveal unambiguously that the term ‘degree of control’ is meant here exactly
in the sense of the OECD taxonomy of taxing power dating from  (see Box .),
namely, as a control over the main revenue parameters, namely tax rates, tax base
In the latter case (no control by local governments), the centre determines tax base, tax rates and the
revenue split. In fact, what the OECD calls ‘revenues from tax sharing’ has nothing to do with tax
sharing but corresponds rather to a system of revenue sharing (or shared revenues); see Footnote 
earlier in this chapter.
‘Conditional’ is probably meant here in the sense of ‘matching’: the amount of the grant depends on
how much of its own revenue the grantee spends on the public service concerned.
 (relief) and – in the domain of revenue sharing – the influence on the revenue split.
It does not imply the freedom to decide how to spend these revenues.
The main difference between the post- studies are in the choice of those
revenue items that constitute local own revenues (the numerator of the autonomy
indicator) and the broader category to which the sum of own revenues is compared
(the denominator). It is important to note at this point that none of the models
includes loans or bailout grants in the calculation, and rightly so. For the reasons
explained in Section .., debt and bailout cannot be handled on an equal footing
with regular revenue sources; they are relevant for budgetary autonomy but not
for revenue autonomy.
Out of the three models considered here, the first and the second one (E and
Y, ; M et al., ) commit immediately the error of misinter-
preting the notion of ‘degree of control’ over local revenues.
E and Y () propose a new ‘decentralisation variable’ that can be
illustrated with the formula
SRA D ORSNG
TRSNG
D

Tdiscr C NTdiscr C GGobj C SGuncond

SNG
T C NT C GGC SG
SNG
; (.)
where ‘Local Revenue Autonomy’ SRA is written as a quotient of own revenues
ORSNG and total revenues TRSNG of subnational governments. Tdiscr denotes the
tax revenues for which subnational governments have significant or full discretion
over rates and/or relief, NTdiscr are the non-tax revenues for which subnational
governments have significant or full discretion over rates and/or relief, GGobj are
the general-purpose grants allocated according to objective criteria, and SGuncond
denote unconditional specific grants.
As for the composition of subnational own revenues, the authors exclude the
allotments from revenue sharing but include those taxes over which decentralised
governments have policy control as well as the totality non-tax revenues. How-
ever, they also include non-conditional (i.e. non-matching) specific grants as well
as those general-purpose grants whose allocation is based on objective criteria,
thereby consciously risking an overestimation bias. Their argument is that ‘subna-
tional governments have at least expenditure autonomy over these grants’ (E
and Y, , p. ).
The authors do not state explicitly that they include the totality of non-tax revenues and not only
those over which local governments have significant or total discretion. This becomes visible only
through a comparison with primary OECD data or with M et al. (). Their choice is
arbitrary, though, since central governments in several countries impose limitations on user charges
and fees.
The problem with this approach is that it combines two different arguments to
construct a single category of subnational own revenues. The reason why Tdiscr and
NTdiscr are included is that decentralised authorities have partial or full discretion
over rates and relief, whereas GGobj and SGuncond are included because subnational
governments are free to decide how to spend these revenues. The freedom of
spending is actually true for Tdiscr and partly true for NTdiscr as well (as long as the
law does not oblige subnational authorities to earmark their user fee revenues), and
if the authors had been truly consistent in their reasoning, they should have also
included the allotments from revenue sharing. By contrast, it is hard to understand
how decentralised governments could have expenditure autonomy over any kind
of specific grants: these are per definitionem earmarked for a certain spending
purpose (regardless of whether matching is required or not), as opposed to general
grants that can be used freely.
Finally, GGobj and SGuncond should normally not feature under subnational own
revenues unless the national constitution or another statutory law guarantees the
size of the distributable pool so that it cannot be changed in the budgeting process
every year. The model lacks this important specification.
Even with their generous definition of subnational own revenues and the re-
sulting overestimation bias, the authors find that decentralised governments in a
selection of six Central and East European countries (including Lithuania but not
Slovakia) had far less control over their revenues in  than what the GFS-based
indicators had previously suggested.
Applying the same formula to four additional countries in the region (includ-
ing Slovakia), M et al. () confirm that simple GFS ratios provide an
imperfect measure of revenue autonomy. On the other hand, they criticise the
decentralisation variable developed by Ebel and Yilmaz on the grounds that it ig-
nores the size of the subnational government sector. They claim that Formula (.)
is still not able to capture the difference between Lithuania and Slovakia in terms
of the contents of their subnational revenue autonomy. Indeed, the value of the
SRA indicator is . per cent for Slovakia and . per cent for Lithuania, but the
SRA says nothing about the importance of these figures within the entire inter-
governmental revenue system. In order to resolve this problem, M et al.
propose to make a change in the denominator. The new indicator that they call
‘Own Revenue Ratio’ is given by
ORR D ORSNG
TRSNG C TRCG D

Tdiscr C NTdiscr C GGobj C SGuncond

SNG
T C NT C GGC SG
SNG
C TRCG
; (.)
 where TRSNG are the total revenues of subnational governments and TRCG the total
revenues of the central government.
For the sake of exhaustiveness, they develop an opposite indicator as well, the
‘Dependent Revenue Ratio’
DRR D DRSNG
TRSNG C TRCG
D

.T   Tdiscr/C .NT   NTdiscr/C .GG   GGobj/C .SG   SGuncond/

SNG
T C NT C GGC SG
SNG
C TRCG
(.)
measuring local dependency from the central government. The variable DRSNG
stands for the dependent revenues of subnational governments.
In the denominator of both formulae, (.) and (.), total subnational revenue
is replaced with the total revenues of general government (the aggregate revenue
of all government tiers). The innovation consists thus in the combination of the
SRA indicator and the GFS indicator. Calculating the ORR values for Slovakia
and Lithuania, we get . per cent and . per cent respectively, which suggests
that the level of subnational revenue autonomy is comparable in both countries
if one considers not only the degree of subnational control over specific revenue
parameters but also the share of decentralised governments within the aggregate
public revenues. ORR and DRR appear therefore to be more suitable for cross-
country comparisons than the SRA. Nevertheless, by leaving the numerator of the
SRA intact, the authors simply ignore the methodological error committed by Ebel
and Yilmaz and thus cannot escape the overestimation bias.
B and K (, p. ) are the first authors who do not fall into
the trap of overestimation as their predecessors did. Instead of overloading the
numerator with a variety of revenue categories that could potentially be considered
as ‘own’ revenues for one reason or another, they reduce the scope of analysis
to the single domain of taxation and propose to calculate the autonomous tax
revenue of subcentral governments over general government tax revenue. They
define autonomous tax revenue as the yield of those taxes for which subcentral
governments are free to determine either the tax rates, or the tax base, or both. The
motive behind constructing yet another indicator is similar to that of the previous
studies, namely the recognition that subcentral authorities in some countries have
wide discretion over a small proportion of tax revenues while their counterparts in
other countries have little autonomy over a large share of tax revenues. According
to the authors, their indicator comes closest to what could be called a ‘composite
indicator of fiscal autonomy’
CISRA D ATSCG
TSCG C TCG D

Tdiscr

SCG
TSCG C TCG ; (.)
as it combines the share of subcentral tax revenues with the autonomy over those
taxes. In the above formula, ATSCG denotes the autonomous tax revenues of
subcentral governments and

Tdiscr

SCG
the tax revenues for which subcentral
governments have significant or total discretion over rates and relief.
Processing revenue data from twenty-one OECD countries, Blöchliger and King
come to the conclusion that the share of subcentral tax revenue over general
government tax revenue is hardly related to their autonomy over these taxes. The
data suggest that in , the subcentral levels in Australia controlled only three
per cent of the total tax revenues but had full discretion over the rates and relief for
the totality of these revenues. By contrast, decentralised authorities in Germany
had a tax share of seven per cent but could not freely determine rates and relief
for almost half of these revenues. Not surprisingly, the value of the composite
indicator is similar in both countries: . and . per cent, respectively, since the
denominator takes account of the importance of autonomous tax revenues over
the totality of government tax revenues. However, the quality of fiscal autonomy
is entirely different. The finding is similar to that described by M et al.
() with regard to the broader category of subnational own revenues (the case
of Slovakia vs Lithuania). The difference is that the calculation by Blöchliger and
King does not contain the overestimation bias that could arise if unconditional
grants and transfers were also included into the formula.
Summing up the insights from the three models, four conclusions can be made.
First, any of these models provide a better estimation of subnational revenue
autonomy than the simple GFS ratios. Second, any indicator featuring general
government revenues or its respective subcategory in the denominator provides a
holistic (and therefore more reliable) picture of subnational revenue autonomy,
contrary to other indicators that compare own-source revenues (taxes) to total local
revenues (taxes) of the subnational levels. The holistic indicators are also more
suitable for cross-country comparisons than the partial ones. Third, two countries
in which such a holistic indicator produces identical values do not necessarily
provide the same quality (or content) of revenue autonomy to their decentralised
units. Fourth, with a careful composition of the numerator that considers only the
discretion over revenue parameters (and not over revenue use), one can eliminate
an important overestimation bias.
 With all due respect, we need to note here, however, that none of the three
approaches can eliminate another overestimation bias, namely the one that results
from the ignorance of other (not or not easily quantifiable) constraints on subna-
tional revenue autonomy. These are the indirect legal constraints as well as all the
non-legal constraints that were presented in Section ...
.. Measuring budgetary
autonomy
We saw in Section .. that the main levers of local
budgetary adjustment were revenue and expendi-
ture policies. Borrowing and the outlook for a pos-
sible bailout may also create the impression of an enlarged room for manoeuvre
but they cannot be considered as regular instruments for budgetary adjustment.
Loans are temporary resources that must be paid back in due time, while bailout
is a discretionary grant provided at the end of the year and as such it cannot be
planned upon in advance. The threat they pose on the macroeconomic stability
has led national legislations to impose strict rules or an outright ban on local
borrowing and bailout. These obviously affect what decentralised governments
perceive to be part of their budgetary autonomy.
Even though there is obviously much more to budgetary autonomy than the
simple freedom to make a deficit or to borrow, the only aspect that scholars
have tried to measure so far is the strictness of formal fiscal rules. The series of
modern indices started with the ACIR index for strictness of balanced budget rules
developed by the US Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations in
 that is constructed from two scores. The first one is based on whether the
rule is self-imposed or imposed by (or agreed with) a higher level of government,
while the second one evaluates the strictness of the balanced budget requirement.
Ten years later, the Inter-American Development Bank presented the so-called
IADB index of borrowing autonomy composed of a variable that examines the
explicit restrictions on borrowing and another variable assessing the extent to
which ownership of public enterprises or banks may increase local borrowing
autonomy (S et al., a).
In an attempt to assess how fiscal rules in a given country can contribute to
restraining the size of the public sector, S et al. (b) developed a
composite indicator constructed from a two-level hierarchy of sub-indices. Recog-
nising that the relative importance attached to different rule characteristics may
vary both across countries and across time, they decided to adopt the random
weights technique. The application of the sub-indices on a set of OECD country
data reveals that local governments subject to strict balanced budget rules are also
likely to face stringent controls on debt and in most cases rigorous accountability
rules. A further application of this work is found in B and K ()
who create an indicator of budget and deficit autonomy as well as an indicator
of borrowing autonomy through a simple linear transformation of the indices
developed by Sutherland and his fellow authors; although it is not clear to which
indices they are referring.
. The principle of subsidiarity
.. Decentralisation—
autonomy—subsidiarity
At the end of Section .., we saw that in any govern-
ment system, some public sector functions are more
decentralised than others are, and the degree of mu-
nicipal autonomy is in a linear relationship with the
degree of decentralisation. To put it differently, in terms of their mode of provi-
sion, public services are situated on an axis between full centralisation and full
devolution, with deconcentration and delegation being two intermediate forms on
the continuum that points towards a maximum degree of decentralisation, namely,
devolution. Each point on the decentralisation axis (representing various public
services) corresponds then to a certain degree of local autonomy that ranges from
zero autonomy (for centralised functions) through partial dependency (deconcen-
trated and delegated functions) to perfect sovereignty (devolved functions). It is
important to emphasise that the decentralisation axis consists of continuous rather
than discrete values and hence autonomy, too, can be visualised as a continuous
function of decentralisation.
Where exactly a given public task is situated on the decentralisation axis, i.e.
to what extent it is centralised or decentralised, is a function of the actual assign-
ment of responsibilities within the given government system and the underlying
principles and value judgments. The first authors to pronounce themselves on the
assignment of functions in decentralised systems, M () and O
(, ), propose to keep stabilisation and redistribution functions of the state
at the central level and to decentralise a part of the allocation branch, notably the
provision of public services with regional or local scope, to lower tiers of govern-
ment. According to Oates, the optimal size of government to perform a specific
function depends, among other criteria, on economic factors such as the hetero-
geneity of preferences, the costs of information and decision, the potential for
realising economies of scale, and the spatial distribution of the benefits provided
by the service (the importance of spillover effects). However, taking account of
Oates does not deny the importance of the political dimensions of the question about the optimal
 all these factors would result in a territorial organisation with as many different
sizes of authorities as there are public services.
In practice, expenditure assignment follows a more pragmatic approach based
not only on economic but also on political, historical, ideological and on other
criteria. A widely used criterion of expenditure assignment, at least in Europe, is
the principle of subsidiarity. Put it simply, this principle holds that in a multi-level
government system, every task belongs to the lowest competent level.
There are obvious links between subsidiarity and federalism. S ()
views federal systems as pyramids that can only be sound if their base is broad, that
is, if the organisations at the base are left to do everything they can do. Higher
authorities intervene only if the lower ones withdraw. The bodies closest to the
base of the pyramid are also the ones closest to citizens. For such a pyramid to be
realised, it is important that the residual clause of the expenditure assignment rule
be in favour of the local or intermediate level of government.
For Santer, subsidiarity is thus a condition for sound bottom-up federalism.
G () joins this view affirming that subsidiarity represents a
bottom-up approach in that it always empowers the respective lowest compe-
tent level. Indeed, in case of top-down decentralisation, the link with subsidiarity
is less strong. According to F (, p. ), ‘decentralisation does not re-
quest that the State is organised according to the principle of subsidiarity, but [. . . ]
subsidiarity is a principle which could well inspire any decentralisation exercise.’
.. The origins of the
principle of subsidiarity
The origin of the notion of subsidiarity (‘subsidium’
= aid) is still an object of debate among scholars of
different backgrounds (see S, ). Yet there is
consensus about the fact that the point of departure for all modern interpretations
of the concept dates back to Pope Pius XI who made subsidiarity to a cornerstone
of Catholic social teaching in . In his Encyclical on the Reconstruction of Social
Order, Quadragesimo Anno, he wrote:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their
own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice
and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater
and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every
social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body
social, and never destroy and absorb them. (Quadragesimo Anno, para. )
size of government, yet he limits the discussion deliberately to the economic aspects O (,
p. ). For a good overview of the economic criteria discussed by Musgrave and Oates, see D
().
Sixty years later, Pope John Paul II confirmed the idea of Pius XI with the
following words:
A community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a commu-
nity of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support
it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of
society, always with a view to the common good. (Centesimus Annus, para. )
These texts contain already all those constitutive elements of the notion of
subsidiarity that gave rise to so many different interpretations in the subsequent
decades.
. According to most of the current interpretations, the higher authority may
intervene in the affairs of lower organisations but only to the extent to which
the lower authority or the individual ‘has shown or proved its incapacity’
(C  E, , p. ) or ‘is not able to fulfil a task on its own’
(S, ). Here, subsidiary is interpreted in the sense of ‘secondary’
or ‘of lesser importance’. All interventions must be auxiliary in scope and
scale. We cannot be convinced, however, that allowing the higher authority
to intervene at all corresponds to the original intention of the papal encycli-
cals. These stress, ‘it is gravely wrong to take from. . . ’ and ‘a community of
higher order should not interfere. . . ’ (emphasis added), which could equally
suggest that the primary rule for the state is not to intervene. The semantic
difference between the assertion ‘the higher authority may intervene if. . . ’
and ‘the higher authority may not intervene unless. . . ’ cannot be overseen.
The wording of the encyclicals is perfectly neutral, and one can only won-
der whether or not the biased interpretation proposed by the Council of
Europe and picked up by various authors might be an instrument serving to
legitimate the intervention of the higher tier in today’s practice.
. The term subsidiary evokes also the idea of aid or rescue (‘subsidium’ = ‘help’)
and has the connotation of intervention. According to Jacques D (,
p. ), ‘subsidiarity is not simply a limit to intervention by a higher authority
vis-a-vis a person or a community in position to act itself, it is also an
obligation for this authority to act vis-a-vis this person or this group to
see that it is given the means to achieve its ends.’ The C  E
(, p. ) uses a less precise language: ‘Here it is a question of assessing,
not if the authority has the right to intervene, but if it has the duty to
do so.’ This interpretation is confusing because it ignores the difference
between two types of intervention that the encyclicals (and also Delors)
 clearly distinguish; namely, between ‘destroy’ / ‘absorb’ / ‘interfere’ on the
one hand, and ‘support’ / ‘(furnish) help’ on the other. The encouraging
type of intervention, which is indeed the duty of the higher authority, must
be clearly distinguished from interference that is not a question of duty but
one of right.
. All members of society have to acknowledge the common good. Here,
subsidiarity is more than a presumption of competence in favour of the
lower level. ‘Society is based on mutual assistance and every part has to take
responsibility for the common good. In this sense, not individual freedom
but societal bonding is to be maximised [. . . ]’ (S, ). Transposed
to the level of communities, this message suggests that subsidiarity is not
an argument in favour of a minimal state and a corresponding maximum
autonomy for lower-level communities. Rather, it is an argument in favour of
a well-functioning society in which the level of local autonomy is optimised
‘with a view to the common good’, whatever this common good may mean
(see below). Unfortunately, this important element of the original concept is
rarely mentioned in the discussions on subsidiarity.
While the encyclical letters clearly indicate the general trend to be followed, they
also leave two questions unanswered.
What kind of incapacity calls for
which type of intervention?
First of all, the encyclicals do not draw a clear
dividing line between those situations (or types
of incapacity) that call for support by the higher
organisation and those that necessitate the withdrawal of a competence. In reality,
virtually all kinds of incapacity can be addressed in one way or another without
necessarily requiring a re-assignment of the function to a higher level. Managerial
and administrative capacity problems can be corrected with an increase in the
jurisdiction size (via co-operation or amalgamation of the authorities concerned)
or through specific measures for capacity building. Reforming the territorial struc-
ture may also be a remedy for financial incapacity, although the usual short- and
medium-term solution to this latter problem is a system of block grants (possibly in
the framework of an equalisation scheme) or the re-assignment of revenue sources
among government tiers. For D (, p. ), for example, financial inca-
pacity can never be the reason for the re-centralisation of a competence: the only
argument that justifies a transfer to higher levels is when the inherent (technologi-
cal) dimension of the task exceeds the natural capacity of a small government unit.
As a matter of example, expecting a village to operate a highly specialised clinic
with advanced technology is not realistic.
Who has the right to declare
incapacity?
As has been mentioned above, the original texts
released by Pius XI and John Paul II do not elucidate
the question as to whose verdict should matter in
this regard. One could very well assume that it is up to the lower authority to make
a sign when it is no longer capable of exercising its responsibility and no other
person or authority has any legitimacy to decide in this matter, even though this
approach might be criticised for being too federalist and restrictive. On the other
hand, the C  E (, p. ) proposes that ‘if the intervention of the
higher authority is necessary, the lower authority must be consulted “in so far as
possible, in due time and in an appropriate way”’, in line with art.  para.  of the
European Charter of Local Self-Government. This suggests that the verdict about
the incapacity may also come from the higher authority, though no intervention is
admitted without prior consultation of the lower authority concerned.
These questions are important because they remind of the double interpretation
of intervention, once as a duty (to furnish help) and then as a right (to transfer the
competence to a higher level). In the spirit of the encyclicals, we could attempt
to conclude that the withdrawal of a competence from the lower authority is
legitimate if and only if the following three conditions are met simultaneously:
– Within the limits of its competence and capacity, the higher authority has
offered all reasonable assistance to the lower authority in order to address
the (managerial, administrative, financial, etc.) incapacity of the latter;
– The lower authority has already exploited every opportunity within its
competence in order to regain capacity or it is unwilling to search for an
autonomous solution;
– Either the demand for a re-assignment of the competence comes from the
lower authority or, if it comes from the higher authority, it is consulted with
the lower organisation before any action is undertaken.
Swiss scholars tend to understand subsidiarity in this restrictive sense, but indeed few (if any) other
nations seem to share this interpretation. It is true that the ‘federalist approach’ is inspired by the
particular (bottom-up) institutional system of Switzerland rather than by any principle of political
theory. In Switzerland, no public function can ever be transferred from a municipality to the canton
or the federal state without a vote in which the constituency of the lower authority give their consent
to the proposed change.
 This threefold condition may give the impression of being exhaustive. Yet,
when applied in practice it gives rise to further questions. What does ‘reasonable
assistance’ mean? Where are the capacity limits of the higher authority? The central
government may refuse to provide grant-in-aid to a local authority and prefer
withdrawing the competence, arguing that a capacity enhancement is impossible
due to general budget restrictions. Is this an acceptable reaction or would we rather
expect the central government to revise its budget or to re-assign functions and
resources among the government tiers? Here, the vision of the ‘common good’
may be of some help, but it is not likely that all stakeholders have the same opinion
about what is the best for society (more autonomy or more centralism). And what
sort of effort can we realistically expect from the lower authority? Further, what
exactly does ‘consultation’ mean? Does it need to result in a commonly agreed
solution or should one of the authorities have the final word?
.. Subsidiarity in Europe Subsidiarity as a legal and political concept ap-
peared in the European Communities in  and
it was introduced in the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union in . In
order to avoid that the European project give birth to a centralising super-state, the
so-called Spinelli Draft proposed the following:
The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more
effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular
those whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or
effects extend beyond national frontiers. (Draft Treaty Establishing the European
Union, art.  para. )
Although the Draft has never been passed and has thus no legal validity, the way
this paragraph is formulated may leave the reader puzzled about what precisely
was meant here by the term ‘effectively’ (the supra-national dimension or effect of
the task appears to be only one particular factor) and who should decide in this
matter. The return of the same principle in the Treaty of Maastricht of  (the
first document in which subsidiarity as a general principle was mentioned for the
first time officially and explicitly) only adds to the confusion:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action,
be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. (Treaty establishing
the European Community, as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht; art. b)
‘Effectively’ (undertaken tasks) are replaced here with ‘sufficiently’ (achieved
objectives) without any clarification about the content of this criterion. Besides,
the Treaty of Maastricht is already more restrictive concerning the range of compe-
tences suitable for decentralisation: the ‘exclusive competences’ of the Community
are excluded from the outset. This approach clearly departs from the original sense
of subsidiarity as interpreted in the Catholic social teaching.
It would be unjust to ignore the attempt that G (, p. ) made
to elucidate the meaning of effectiveness in the context of the Draft Treaty of .
According to his view, the criteria offered by the economic theory of federalism for
the determination of the optimal size of jurisdictions, notably economies of scale
and spillover effects ‘can be interpreted as means to specify the analytical black
space in the definition of subsidiarity, i.e. which level of authority is able to perform
the task adequately.’ Since both concepts are closely related to economic efficiency,
‘adequate’ or ‘effective’ performance for Gretschmann is one that is economically
efficient. Even though his view could be criticised for being too narrow (other
criteria such as proximity, control, equal access, room for experimentation, etc.
could also substitute for ‘adequate’), it goes nevertheless a step further than the
encyclicals because it combines capacity with economic efficiency. It is at the same
time more restrictive than the papal letters: the lower authority must not only be
capable of executing the task but also be capable of executing it in an economically
efficient way.
In , the European Commission developed the notion of efficiency into a ‘test
of comparative efficiency’ that takes into account, beside the traditional economic
efficiency arguments, criteria such as the cost of failure to act, the need to maintain
a reasonably coherent policy, the limits of individual national action, and need to
observe the rules of competition.
While the European Communities and the European Union employ subsidiar-
ity as a guiding principle for the relations between the supranational European
organisation and the member states, the definition proposed by the Council of
Europe in  is specifically adapted to the relations between national and sub-
national governments within the ratifying states. The European Charter of Local
Self-Government introduces four criteria that help decide to which level of author-
ity a competence should be assigned; these are the extent and the nature of the
task (objective criteria, according to C  E, , p. ), as well as
efficiency and economy (subjective criteria).
 Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities
which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority
should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and
economy. (European Charter of Local Self-Government, art.  para. )
The Explanatory Report attached to the Charter suggests that not only the size
and nature of the task but also the size and nature of the executing local authority is
relevant. The principle of subsidiarity ‘does not imply [. . . ] a requirement system-
atically to decentralise functions to such local authorities which, because of their
nature and size, can only accomplish limited tasks’ (C  E, b,
p. ). On the other hand, the Report says: ‘[. . . ] unless the size or nature of a task
is such that it requires to be treated within a larger territorial area [. . . ]’ (emphasis
added). The reference to a larger territorial area instead of a higher authority
suggests that, before transferring a task to a higher authority, increasing the size of
local authorities through association or amalgamation may be a possible solution
D (, p. ). In fact, if we adhere to one of the earliest interpretations
of ‘subsidium’ as a duty to help, then such a solution is not only possible but also
preferable to the re-assignment of the task to a higher level.
The first major review of the definition and limits of the principle of subsidiarity
in light of the practices of member states took place in the mid es. A study
prepared for the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy revealed
that the rather vague term ‘generally’ in art.  para.  of the Charter refers to the
principle of subsidiarity as ‘a standard of general scope’ (C  E,
, p. ), while ‘in preference’ marks a political choice. It also took in a rela-
tively prudent position on the terms ‘economy’ and ‘efficiency’ (without actually
explaining the difference between them) to suggest that decentralised management
and closeness to citizens are not forcibly efficient. The questions as to what is
efficient and who has the right to determine if something is (in)efficient were not
further considered. With regard to the ‘nature’ of the task, D (, p. )
noted later that, in whatever sense ‘nature’ is understood, it cannot be limited to
economic parameters only, since the latter are the ones to which the nature of the
task shall be opposed.
An important development in the understanding of the principle of subsidiarity
is the attempt of the study to establish a link between the principle itself and art. 
concerning the financial resources of local authorities. The authors emphasise that
‘state intervention is necessary but to enable each authority to acquire the means
to exercise its own will’ (C  E, , p. ). Hence, in case of need,
the higher authority should offer grants and other financial equalisation measures
without diminishing the discretion lower authorities may exercise within their own
jurisdiction. It should also consult the lower authority, ‘in an appropriate manner,
on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them’ (European
Charter of Local Self-Government, art.  para. ).
The study also concludes that the application of the principle of subsidiarity
should take into account the existence of other principles that govern the organisa-
tion and functioning of the state, such as:
– unity of action (avoiding the duplication of effort);
– efficiency in the widest sense;
– unity of application (reconciling equality with subsidiarity);
– solidarity (balancing out resources among different authorities).
A year later, the Committee of Ministers of the member states transformed
these insights into a set of recommendations (C  E, ). This
document marks a return to the idea of a ‘common good’ insofar as it stipulates
that ‘[. . . ] the principle of subsidiarity should be implemented in conjunction with
other organising and operating principles of the state, such as the principles of
coherence and unity of application of public policies for the benefit of all citizens,
of co-ordination and of territorial solidarity.’ (C  E, , p. )
In this spirit, it recognises that not all local authorities of the same level are
necessarily capable of meeting the same responsibilities and hence, member states
should adopt a pragmatic and flexible approach. It reaffirms the importance of
financial equalisation policies in favour of the financially weaker local authorities
and encourages the central governments to implement principles of expenditure
assignment that are designed to match powers with the characteristics (resources,
size, geographical location, etc.) of the lower authorities.
Owing to the countless ambiguities around the core idea of subsidiarity and its
components, the principle has remained only a recommendation, a rule without
normative character (G, ), or ‘a mode of argumentation’ (S-
, ), a trend. ‘Rather than defining a norm, the principle of subsidiarity
indicates a trend. It leaves open the concrete conditions of its application and these
can therefore vary according to the circumstances of time and place’ (C 
E, , p. ). G (, p. ) points to another advantage of
the diverging practical interpretations of subsidiarity: ‘consensus on a programme
of institutional reform can be reached more easily if the key concept is not too
cutting and precise.’ On the other hand, he criticises the principle of subsidiarity
 for starting from the assumption of exclusive powers to be assigned to different
levels whereas the political reality is marked by interdependencies, complexities
and overlapping responsibilities.
In spite of its apparent weaknesses, the principle of subsidiarity has served as a
standard in the decentralisation process of East European transition economies
and it continues to feed the debate about the renewal of existing decentralised and
federal systems.
.. Subsidiarity and local
(financial) autonomy
The above investigations on the principle of sub-
sidiarity are relevant to the study of local (finan-
cial) autonomy, but the relationship is not entirely
straightforward. One thing seems to be sure: subsidiarity is not synonymous to
local autonomy.
It is true that the underlying socio-philosophical idea of subsidiarity is autonomy
(for G, ‘sovereignty’; , p. ): the autonomy of an individual, a
community, an organisation, or an authority. The spirit of both encyclical letters
suggests that these smallest units of society should be allowed to preserve their
autonomy as long as they do not feel constrained by their incapacity (in whatever
way this is defined) to call for an intervention by higher organisations.
If an intervention reveals to be necessary, it should be of a kind that encourages
and strengthens local autonomy instead of destroying it, and that ‘enable[s] each
authority to acquire the means to exercise its own will’ (C  E, ,
p. ). Here, the principle of subsidiarity refers indirectly to the double definition
of local autonomy, first as a right and then as an ability (‘capacité effective’), as
presented in Section ...
The principle of subsidiarity finds its limits in the respect of the ‘common good’:
it is not a presumption of competence in favour of the lower organisations. Instead
of being maximised, the autonomy of the lower level should be optimised with
a view to the global interest of society. The notion of ‘common good’ entails a
multitude of criteria beside local autonomy, such as economic efficiency (minimis-
ing spillovers, maximising economies of scale), nature and size of the task, nature
and size of the executing authority, costs of non-intervention, coherence, unity
of application, or solidarity. What actually count are the relative weights of these
criteria in the value system of the society, which are then (in an ideal case) reflected
in the political programmes at all levels of government.
Finally, the question as to who is allowed to determine what exactly is meant
by ‘efficient’ (‘effective’, ‘sufficient’, ‘adequate’, ‘capable’, etc.) is crucial for the
autonomy. Only those local authorities that have the exclusive right to declare
their incapacity and those that are consulted upon their incapacity (inefficiency,
etc.) and may co-operate with the higher government in the search for an optimal
solution can be sure that their autonomy is respected. On the contrary, if the
centralisation of competences results from a unilateral decision of the higher
authority, then local autonomy is violated.
For the local application of the universal principle of subsidiarity, two elements
of the discussion above may provide a fruitful basis:
. the conditions of legitimate withdrawal of a competence from the lower
authority (Section ..);
. the meaning of key terms such as ‘reasonable assistance’, ‘consultation’, ‘inca-
pacity’, ‘efficiency’, etc.
If both the central government and the subnational units accept the validity
of the principle of subsidiarity , then they are implicitly ready to elaborate a
consensus or a compromise about the key terms . The results of their negotiations
would then place the principle of subsidiarity into the relevant national context,
whereas the conditions and key terms under  and  remain universal.

PART II
Local Financial Autonomy in Practice:
The Case of Hungary

CHAPTER 
Legal and Institutional Framework
Chapter  suggested that no study of the practice of multi-level finance could do 
without a profound understanding of the underlying constitution and the network
of legal and political institutions. We simply cannot start from the premise that
fiscal decentralisation in any country would pursue the sole objective of economic
efficiency as the early textbook theories suggested. Any reform of the intergovern-
mental fiscal relations must build upon the existing institutions (tradition, norms
and legislation) even if the reform will eventually modify these institutions.
Section . will familiarise the reader with the constitutional and legal founda-
tions of the multi-level system of elected governments established in Hungary in
the late s as well as the major motives behind the reform. Section . show
the measures with which the national legislative attempted to reconcile equality
and asymmetry of subnational governments in line with the recommendations of
the European Charter of Local Self-Government, with the aim to make the system
politically acceptable and workable at the same time. The importance of the decon-
centrated public sector and thus of the policy decisions that are outside the scope
of subnational autonomy is discussed in Section .. Finally, Section . shows
how citizen participation at the local and the national level affects the financial
autonomy of decentralised governments.
 . Constitutional and legal foundations of the decentralised
public sector
The wave of fundamental institutional reforms starting at the end of the s was
marked by a strong desire to break with the fully centralised government system
that characterised the country under the totalitarian regime. Already during that
era, the government system consisted of three to four layers, the central state,
counties, districts (from  to ) and municipalities, but the dominant power
resided with the ruling socialist labour party and its various organs. The steering
councils (‘soviets’) of the intermediate levels, the  counties and the  to 
districts, were merely deconcentrated agencies of the central state. The Council
of Ministers (the executive organ of the ruling party) appointed the members
of the county councils and empowered them to exert a tight control over the
, municipal councils that had no separate legal identity. The authorities of
the three subcentral tiers had little own-source revenues (for the limited array of
‘independent’ resources such as tourist fees, stamp duties or licence fees, the centre
set the rates) and only a few independent expenditure functions (B et al., c,
p. ). Deprived of their political and financial autonomy, they obviously could
not be held accountable for their actions, thus they faced a soft budget constraint.
Public goods and services were provided by state-owned companies that had little
interest in matching the diverse preferences of individual local communities. Both
public service provision and administration were characterised by low levels of
efficiency and a permanent backwardness in the application of modern methods
and techniques.
The first step in the reform of the government system was the creation of a
new legal and institutional framework consisting of democratically elected and
accountable subnational governments (SNGs). With the legal and institutional
reform, the Parliament explicitly sought
– to lend democratic legitimacy to all levels of administration;
Both counties and districts existed already in the Middle Ages. The district authorities acted as
executive agents of the self-governing counties in an early system of territorial deconcentration.
Coming into power at the end of the s, the Communists reduced the number of districts from
 to . Further consolidations made this number shrink to  by the end of the district system
in . By contrast, the number of counties has remained stable since ; however, they lost their
democratically elected institutions.
Throughout this study, the term ‘subnational government’ (SNG) refers to the freely elected, self-
governing authorities of municipalities and counties; the self-governing bodies of national and
ethnic minorities are excluded.
– to create safeguards against political and financial re-centralisation;
– to provide equal rights to all self-governing units;
– to accommodate the interests of selected communities such as the capital
and its districts, large towns, and national and ethnic minorities (L,
; C, ).
These objectives spurred the national legislative to redesign the entire gov-
ernment system through a global revision of the national Constitution and the
elaboration of specific laws. During the revision of the Constitution (Act XX of
 on the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary) in , the leg-
islators added an additional chapter to lay down the foundations of the system
of democratically elected SNGs. The second major legislative measure in this
direction was the adoption of the Act LXV of  on Local Governments (ALG).
Boxes . and . cite some of the most fundamental provisions of these laws.
Box 4.1: Excerpts from the revised National Constitution [Source: ICL (2003)]
Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary
(including amendments before 31.12.2003)
[. . . ]
Chapter IX
Local Governments
Article 41 [Administrative units]
(1) The territory of the Republic of Hungary is divided into the following administrative
units: the capital, the counties, the cities and communities.
(2) The capital is divided into districts. Districts may be formed in cities as well.
Article 42 [Right to local government]
Eligible voters of the communities, cities, the capital and its districts, and the counties,
have the right to local government. Local government refers to the independent and
democratic management of local affairs and the exercise of local public authority in the
interests of the local population.
In the rest of the study, we will deliberately deviate from the terminology applied in the unofficial
translation of the Constitution (ICL, ), replacing the term ‘city’ with ‘town’ (which sounds
more plausible, given the relatively modest size of the average urban settlement in Hungary), and
the term ‘community’ with ‘village’.

Article 43 [Fundamental rights of local governments]
(1) The fundamental rights of all local governments (see Article 44A) are equal. The
duties of local governments may differ.
(2) The rights and duties of local governments shall be determined by law. The lawful
exercise of the powers of local government is afforded the legal protection of the
courts and any local government may appeal to the Constitutional Court for the
protection of its rights.
Article 44 [Exercise of the right to local government]
(1) Eligible voters exercise the right to local government through the representative body
that they elect and by way of local referendum.
(2) With the exception of mid-term elections, the mayor and the members of local repre-
sentative bodies shall be elected in the month of October in the fourth year following
the previous general elections.
(3) The mandate of the representative body shall expire on the day of the general local
government elections. If no elections are held due to the lack of nominees, the
mandate of the representative body shall extend to the day of the mid-term elections.
The mandate of the mayor shall expire upon the election of the new mayor.
(4) A representative body may declare its dissolution prior to the expiration of its mandate
and in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the law on local governments.
Upon dissolution of the body [Article 19, Paragraph (3), Point (l)] the mandate of the
Mayor also ends.
Article 44A [Representative body]
(1) The local representative body –
a) shall independently regulate and manage the affairs of local government and its
decisions may only be reviewed upon their legality;
b) shall exercise the rights of ownership in the assets of local government, may in-
dependently manage local government revenues, and may undertake business
activities at its own liability;
c) shall be entitled to its own revenues for attending to the duties of local govern-
ment as prescribed by law, and shall furthermore be entitled to state support
commensurate to the scope of such duties;
d) shall determine the types and rates of local taxes in accordance with the frame-
work established by law;

e) shall independently establish its own organisation and rules of procedure in accor-
dance with the framework established by law;
f) may develop symbols and emblems of government, and establish local honours
and titles;
g) may present proposals to the authorities responsible for decisions that affect the
local population;
h) may freely merge with other local representative bodies and create associations
of local government for the representation of their interests; may co-operate with
the local governments of other countries and may be a member of international
associations of local governments.
(2) Local representative bodies may issue decrees, which may not conflict with legal
statutes of a superior order.
Article 44B [Mayor]
(1) The Mayor is the chairman of the local representative body. The representative body
may elect committees and create offices.
(2) In exceptional cases the Mayor may attend to state administrative duties and authori-
ties in addition to his responsibilities of local government, in accordance with the law
or a government decree authorized by law.
(3) State administrative duties and authority may be assigned to the Clerk of local rep-
resentative bodies and in exceptional cases to the Director of the Office of Local
Government.
Article 44C [Law on local governments]
A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present is required to
pass the law on local governments. The fundamental rights of local governments may be
restricted by a law which also requires a two-thirds majority.
The explicit reference to the European Charter of Local Self-Government (here-
inafter: the Charter) in the preamble of the ALG attests the importance that the
Hungarian Parliament attaches to the recommendations issued by the Council
of Europe. As has already been quoted in Chapter , the Charter defines local
self-government as ‘the right and ability of local authorities, within the limits of the
law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own
responsibility and in the interests of the local population’ (C  E,
a, art.  para. ). Both art.  of the Constitution and the preamble and art. 
para.  of the ALG scrupulously respect this definition. Regardless of their size
 Box 4.2: Excerpts from the Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments
[Translation by the author]
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments
(including amendments before 31.12.2007)
Preamble
Following the progressive local government traditions of our country as well as the basic
requirements of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, the National Assembly
recognises and protects the rights of the local communities to self-government.
Local self-government makes it possible for the local community of electors to manage,
directly and/or through their elected local government, the public affairs of local interest
in an independent and democratic way.
Supporting the self-organising autonomy of local communities, the National Assembly
assists in creating the conditions that are necessary for self-government and promotes the
democratic decentralisation of public authority.
In order to realise these goals, the National Assembly enacts the following Act:
Chapter I
General Rules of Local Self-Government
Local government rights
Article 1
(1) The local government of the village, the town, the capital city and its districts, and
the county (hereinafter: local government), acts independently in those public affairs
of local interest that belong to the sphere of its tasks and jurisdictional competence
(hereinafter: local public affair).
(2) Local public affairs are related to providing public services to the local constituency
and exercising public authority in an autonomous way, as well as to ensuring the
organisational, personal and material conditions of both activities within the local
jurisdiction.
(3) Within the limits of the law, the local government may regulate autonomously and, in
individual cases, manage freely, all local public affairs coming within its sphere of tasks
and jurisdictional competence. The Constitutional Court or the respective territorial
court can overrule only those decisions that violate the law.
(4) Through decision by the elected local body of representatives or by local referendum,
the local government may voluntarily undertake the independent management of
any local public affair that the law does not refer to the jurisdiction of another organ.
In the sphere of voluntary local public affairs, the local government may do anything

that does not infringe the law. The management of voluntary local public affairs
must not endanger the execution of mandatory tasks and jurisdictional competences
imposed by law.
(5) The law may also impose mandatory tasks and jurisdictional competences on the
local government. Simultaneously with the definition of mandatory tasks and compe-
tences, the National Assembly shall ensure the material conditions of their execution;
in addition, it shall make a decision on the size and type of contribution from the
public budget.
(6) Within the limits of the law, the local government –
a) may autonomously define its organisational and operational rules and create local
symbols, distinctions and awards;
b) has autonomous control over its property, manages its revenues independently,
and ensures the execution of voluntary and mandatory tasks by means of its uni-
fied budget. It may pursue any entrepreneurial activity at its own risk. Municipal
local governments that come into difficulties through no fault of their own are
entitled to additional support from the state;
c) may freely create or join local government associations [for joint service provision]
as well as territorial and national interest groups for the representation and pro-
tection of its interests; within its sphere of tasks and jurisdictional competences,
it may co-operate with local governments abroad and join international organisa-
tions of local governments.
Article 2
(1) The local government implements the principle of people’s sovereignty; in the sphere
of local public affairs, it expresses and accomplishes the local public will in a demo-
cratic and transparent way.
(2) Local government decisions may be taken by the elected local body of representa-
tives (or, under its authorisation, its committee, the body of representatives of its
sub-government, the body of representatives of the local minority government, the
local government association or the mayor), as well as through local referenda. Excep-
tionally, the law may assign local government tasks and jurisdictional competences to
the mayor, the lord mayor, or the chairman of the general assembly of the county.
(3) The local government may express its opinion and launch initiatives in matters that
are outside its sphere of tasks and jurisdictional competences but concern the local
community. The deciding authority is obliged to provide a substantive response to
the local government within the deadline set by law.

Article 3
The Constitutional Court and the respective territorial court protect the rights of local gov-
ernment and the lawful exercise of its jurisdictional competences.
Article 4
The rights of self-government laid down in Articles 1 to 3 are equal for each local govern-
ment.
Article 5
The rights of local government are granted to the community of residents with a lo-
cal voting right (hereinafter: voters). The voters exercise their collective rights of self-
government via their elected representatives and their participation at local referenda.
and scope, all subnational administrative units have the right of self-government
and are uniformly called ‘local governments’. This terminological particularity is
meaningful for the legal status of subnational units that will be further elaborated
in Section .. In addition to the territorial administrative units, art.  of the
Constitution also recognises the national and ethnic minorities as parts of the state
and provides them the right of self-government at both national and subnational
levels.
Despite their general and accordingly imprecise wording, the provisions of
the Constitution and the ALG contain already a mass of information about the
financial autonomy of subnational authorities.
With regard to expenditure autonomy, both laws stipulate the freedom of elected
SNGs to manage local public affairs independently and their freedom from the
supervising power of higher-level authorities. They allow SNGs to accumulate
and manage property and to undertake entrepreneurial activities at their own
risk. In addition, the ALG grants subnational authorities the power of general
competence, i.e. the right to undertake, in the local public interest, any activity
that is not specifically forbidden or delegated to other authorities. The law may
also impose mandatory responsibilities on the SNGs. In the order of performing
public service activities, mandatory responsibilities must always take priority over
the voluntarily assumed functions.
Revenue autonomy finds expression in the right of SNGs to ensure the material
conditions of exercising their powers and to manage their revenues independently.
Concerning budgetary autonomy, the Constitution and Chapter  of the ALG
See art. A of the Act XX of  on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and art.  of the
ALG.
stipulate merely the right of SNGs to central government funding in proportion
with the volume of delegated responsibilities. The following chapters of the ALG
contain further provisions on all three aspects of subnational financial autonomy.
These will be discussed in Chapters  to  of the present study.
From the early s, the Parliament adopted and amended a number of laws
regulating particular issues of local self-government. The most important ones are
the following:
– Act LXIV of  on the Election of Local Government Representatives and
Mayors;
– Act C of  on Local Taxes;
– Act XX of  on the Tasks and Competences of Local Governments and
their Bodies, the Commissioners of the Republic and Selected Deconcen-
trated Authorities;
– Act XXXIII of  on the Transfer of State Property to Local Governments;
– Act XXXVIII of  on Public Finance;
– Act LXXVII of  on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.
The Constitution, the ALG and the complementary laws provide a relatively
solid basis for decentralisation inasmuch as they formally suggest the political,
administrative and financial independence of elected SNGs. Several foreign ob-
servers have praised Hungary for its particularly modern and detailed legislation
on decentralisation compared to some other countries in Central and Eastern
Europe (B et al., b, p. ). Criticism has surged, however, with regard to
the lack of clarity in expenditure assignment and the vague definition of the role
of the counties. Partly due to these deficiencies and partly because much of the
subnational government finance is regulated via laws whose amendment does
not require a qualified majority, the financial autonomy of SNGs is not entirely
guaranteed in practice.
In order to minimise the risk of a full re-centralisation of state powers, the
legislative provided for a series of specific arrangements. These include the attri-
bution of basic constitutional rights to SNGs such as the democratic election of
representatives, the independent management of local public affairs, the ownership
rights over local assets, or the reduction of the external control of SNG decisions to
the sole aspect of legal compatibility. Further guarantees against re-centralisation
include the legal protection of the self-government rights by the courts as well as
the constitutional provision that turns the ALG into an organic law.
 . Equality and asymmetry
.. Territorial
administrative organisation
The enumeration of the types of administrative
units in the revised national Constitution is not
new: already the original version (dating from
) divided the national territory into counties,
districts, towns and villages. The Council of Ministers had the exclusive right
to revise the political boundaries of the jurisdictions. During the global revision
of the Constitution in , this rule was abolished so that it became easier for
subnational entities to split up and create their own local governments. As a result,
the number of municipalities soared from , in  to , in , to reach
, by the end of  (data from the Ministry of Finance). Table . illustrates
the resulting territorial fragmentation of the country.
According to the figures, above  per cent of all municipalities counted less
than , inhabitants at the end of . At the same time, the data suggest a
relative concentration of the population in towns and large villages: . per cent
of the total population lives in municipalities with more than , inhabitants.
Budapest alone counts more than . million residents that account for . per
cent of the national population. The average size of municipalities is ,, which is
still higher than the averages found in the Czech Republic Slovakia, France, Greece,
or Switzerland, but lower than that of most OECD countries in Europe.
A large-scale territorial reform has been on the agenda since the mid-s. To
one part, it has been motivated by the efficiency problems related to the fragmented
territorial structure and by the recognition that the counties are not strong enough
to ensure the co-ordination and planning of public policies on a regional scale. To
another part, soon after transition, Hungary started negotiations with the European
Union about the future membership. Although the Community legislation does
not interfere with the territorial organisation of the member states, it became clear
very soon that adapting the Hungarian territorial organisation to the Nomenclature
of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is of key importance for a successful
participation in the development grant programmes of the European Union. The
principle of resource concentration declared by the European Commission called
for the creation of large benefit areas that allow the co-ordination and realisation
of large-scale projects via well-developed institutions that have sufficient skills in
project management. The counties could not fulfil these conditions (T, ).
Art.  para.  of the Act XX of  (prior to the amendment of ). This did not explicitly
mention the capital city and its districts but allowed the establishment of sub-units in major towns.
Table 4.1: The municipal structure of Hungary, as of 31.12.2003
[Source: Balázs (2005)]Table 3-1
Number of 
inhabitants
Number of 
municipalities
Share within 
total nb of 
municipalities 
(%)
Share of national 
population 
(%)
less than 500 1,014 32.2 2.7
500–999 694 22.1 5.0
1,000–1,999 652 20.7 9.2
2,000–4,999 505 16.1 14.9
5,000–9,999 138 4.4 9.4
10,000–19,999 79 2.5 10.8
20,000–49,999 42 1.3 11.9
50,000–99,999 12 0.4 7.5
over 100,000 9 0.3 28.6
Total 3,145 100.0 100.0
From , the Parliament introduced thus two further layers into the decen-
tralised government system. With the Act XXI of  on Regional Development
and Land Use Planning, it organised the nineteen counties and the capital city
into seven so-called statistical planning regions of a nearly equal size, without
abolishing the counties, however. Three years later, the Parliament ordered the
establishment of seven Regional Development Councils.
By adopting the Act CVII of  on the Multi-purpose Micro-regional As-
sociations of Municipal Governments, the Parliament introduced a new tier of
administration consisting of  micro-regions situated (not hierarchically, but
with respect to their functions) between the municipalities and the counties.
Like the network of the regions, that of micro-regions was designed in a way to
cover the entire territory of the country without any overlapping. The goal was to
create a legal framework for increased co-operation among the municipalities in
order to promote efficiency in the provision of public goods and services, spatial
planning, and the deconcentrated execution of uniform public administration pro-
Art.  of the Act XCII of  on the Amendment of the Act XXI of .
The predecessors of the  micro-regions were those  (from : ) statistical districts that the
Hungarian Central Statistical Office had created artificially (for data collection purposes) in .
 cedures. In a bid to ensure that the framework is filled with real content, the central
government provides financial incentives to the establishment and operation of
multi-purpose associations.
Up to the end of the period under review (–), every political initiative
aimed at transforming the regions and/or the micro-regions into democratically
elected territorial governments has failed. In this sense, none of these entities is
self-governing, even if they enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy in the man-
agement of their daily affairs. Both the Regional Development Councils and the
micro-regional management boards are collegial bodies with members delegated
by the governments of the participating jurisdictions. Neither the municipalities
nor the counties are free to choose their partners: the only authority that is allowed
to define and modify the political boundaries (and hence the composition) of
regions and micro-regions is the Parliament. The law also determines (by enu-
meration) the range of tasks and responsibilities that regions and micro-regions
may assume and defines their financial resources. For regions, these consist of
central government grants only, whereas micro-regions are primarily financed by
the participating municipalities and co-financed by the centre via fiscal incentives.
For the government system as a whole, the combination of the existing constitu-
tional provisions and the ongoing reforms gives a relatively complex organisational
structure. Table . shows the relative position of the three self-governing levels
(shaded rows) and two administrative levels (white rows) within the NUTS system
of the European Union.
The reader might be surprised by the sudden comeback of the term ‘level’ in
the discussion: the new Constitution explicitly avoids this and any other term that
could hint at some kind of a hierarchy between the territorial administrative units.
Counties and municipalities are situated at the same (local) level of government but
their status is different. In Figure ., we attempt to illustrate the government system
under these conditions. The shapes filled in grey represent the existing structure
of democratically elected authorities: this consists of the central government, the
local governments, as well as the minority self-governments at both levels. The rest
of the shapes contain other territorial unit categories constituted and governed
upon delegation or another basis. The micro-regions and the regions are results
of the latest territorial reforms, whereas the so-called ‘natural’ regions indicate
The latest and most serious proposal to introduce self-governing regions in the Constitution was
rejected by the Parliament in July . The bill did not receive the two-thirds majority that would
have been necessary for an amendment of the Constitution: only  members of Parliament were
in favour of the change instead of the minimally required , while  voted against it and one MP
abstained.

Table 4.2: Administrative units of the Republic of Hungary, as of 31.12.2006
[Source: European Communities (2003), European Commission and Eu-
rostat (2004), Dobos and Szelényi (2004, p. 939), Hungarian Office for
Territorial and Regional Development, Hungarian Central Statistical Of-
fice]
European Union Hungary
NUTS* 
category
NUTS  
population 
limits
Effective 
population 
per unit
Type of territorial unit Type of government
(former 
NUTS-1)
> 10.1 
million
1 nation democratically elected 
central government (4-year 
term)
+ 13 democratically elected 
national minority self-
governments (4-year term)
NUTS-1 3 – 7 million – – –
NUTS-2 800,000 –  
3 million
990,000 – 
2.8 million
7 statistical planning 
regions
collegial government
NUTS-3 150,000 – 
800,000
220,000 – 
1.1 million
19 counties
1 capital city with 23 
districts
democratically elected 
government (4-year term)
+ 57 democratically elected 
territorial minority self-
governments (4-year term)
LAU-1**
(former 
NUTS-4)
< 150,000 20,000 – 
200,000
168 micro-regions collegial government 
composed of the members 
of the participating 
municipal councils 
LAU-2** 
(former 
NUTS-5)
< 150,000 20 – 
200,000
3,151 municipalities, of 
which:
– 23 towns with county 
rights (excl. Budapest)
– 265 towns without 
county rights
– 2,863 villages
democratically elected 
municipal governments  
(4-year term)
+ 1849 democratically 
elected local minority self-
governments (4-year term)
* NUTS = Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics; ** LAU = Local Administrative Units.
Table 3-2
 a territorial organisation that is adapted to the needs of specific public policy
areas (e.g. water management organisations follow the natural division of the
country into catchment basins). The following sections will explain the elements
of Figure . in more detail.
.. Categories of
subnational governments
Already in its initial form of , the ALG contained
distinct chapters on the municipal governments (in-
cluding rural communities, towns, the capital and its
districts in general, Chapter II), the towns with county rights (Chapter VI), the
capital city (Chapter VII), and the counties (Chapter VIII). In the subsequent years,
the Parliament adopted further legislative acts in order to better accommodate the
specific interests of Budapest and its districts, as well as those of the national and
ethnic minorities. These legislative acts were integrated (with slight modifications)
in a new version of the ALG in , which resulted in a considerable increase in
the volume of Chapter VII on the capital city and its districts and the introduction
of a new chapter on local minority governments (Chapter X/A).
The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the various categories
of self-governing units and, at the same time, an insight into the inequality and
asymmetry that are inherent to the multi-unit government system of Hungary.
Counties
These historically grown territorial entities (megye) enjoyed vast self-governing
rights during various periods in the last few centuries. During the socialist regime,
they were granted special powers to supervise the municipalities in their juris-
diction. In order to break with the past and allow free rein to the newly elected
municipal governments, the new Constitution and the following laws on decentral-
isation deliberately weakened the powers of the  counties and their position in
the multi-level government system. With limited freedom to compile and manage
their expenditure portfolio and practically zero financial autonomy, they constitute
today the least powerful segment of the intergovernmental system. The deterio-
ration of their position resembles a vicious circle: the less they are powerful, the
more vehement the efforts in certain political circles (in the executive as well as in
the legislative) to replace them with seven self-governing regions.
The capital city and its twenty-three districts
With a population of more than . million, Budapest is the largest urban munic-
ipality in Hungary. Although it is also the seat of Pest County, the law does not
Act XXIV of  on the Local Government of the Capital City and its Districts; Act LXXVII of 
on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.

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1,849 LOCAL
MINORITY
SELF-
GOVERN-
MENTS
(1990)
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7 regional development
councils (1999)
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REGIONS (1996)
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1990)
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Figure 4.1: The multi-level government system in Hungary, as of 31.12.2006
[Source: the author, based upon data from the Hungarian Central Sta-
tistical Office and the National Election Office]
 treat it as a town with county right but grants it a unique status. The capital city is
also one of the  micro-regions and one of the seven statistical planning regions
(forming one entity with Pest County). The legislation on the capital city and its
districts occupies a distinct chapter in the ALG, and sector-specific laws that assign
new competences or resources to the subnational public sector invariably address
them separately from other types of administrative units.
Budapest has a double-tier administration consisting of the city and twenty-
three districts. The residents elect their mayor and council members at both tiers
directly. Although the Constitution explicitly allows other large towns to divide
their territory into self-governing districts, none of them has made use of this right
so far.
Political and fiscal relations between the city and its districts have always had
substantial influence on the performance of the public and private sector of the
Budapest agglomeration that is still the strongest driving force of the Hungarian
economy (E and S, ) and the greatest net contributor in the system of
fiscal equalisation.
Already under the socialist regime, Budapest played a primordial role in the
economic development of the country and participated directly in the economic
planning process driven by the central authorities (E et al., ). Its growing
population, robust economy and well-developed infrastructure allowed Budapest
to keep its leading position after transition. Since , the rate of growth of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Budapest (. per cent in real values) has
systematically exceeded the pace of development of the national economy. Today,
the capital alone produces one-third of the GDP. Together with the agglomeration,
its contribution is nearly  per cent. About  per cent of all enterprises and
 per cent of the foreign enterprises are seated in the capital city. It is by far
the most important centre of the economic, political and cultural life and offers
the most buoyant market for the third sector of the economy (especially banking
and insurance, real estates and tourism). Its primordial position allows Budapest
to defend its particular interests and to hold a strong position in Parliament.
Nevertheless, this is not the main reason why the capital received specific legislation
in the ALG and the Act CXIV of  on the Revenue Sharing between the Capital
City and the Districts. Rather, the goal of the legislative was to clarify the procedures
of decision-making and the sharing of expenditures and revenues between the
capital and its districts, all of which are independent local government units
without any hierarchical relationship between them. From a federalist perspective,
Data from the municipal council of Budapest, April .
it appears perhaps unusual that such internal affairs are regulated in the national
law rather than in the local legislation. For lack of other experience, however, it
is not easy to judge whether internal rules elaborated in a bilateral negotiation
would perform better in resolving the political conflicts that characterise the daily
relationship between the capital city and the districts (E and S, ).
Towns with county rights
According to the law, all county seats enjoy the same rights as counties do. The
Parliament may grant the same status to any town that has a population of above
,, upon the explicit demand of the latter. Despite being the seat of Pest
County and a regular member of the Association of Towns with County Rights
(MJVSZ), neither the legislation nor the practice regards Budapest as a part of
this category but as a distinct administrative unit with a unique status. Excluding
Budapest, eighteen county seats and five other towns enjoyed county rights at the
end of .
While the law speaks about ‘county rights’, in fact these are county competences
and duties. In addition to their own functions, towns with county rights are free
to assume any of those public expenditure functions that are normally assigned
to counties, such as land use regulation or the maintenance of secondary schools,
museums and hospitals. The underlying idea is to assign larger municipalities
the role of regional centres in public service provision. If the town and the county
agree upon sharing a specific function, they are obliged to set up a joint committee
for planning and co-ordination. Because of their considerable economic, political
and weight (compared to other municipalities and the counties), the towns with
county rights regard themselves as powerful players between the counties and the
central government.
The separate treatment of  towns among a total number of  is thus a clear
sign of asymmetry that affects primarily the assignment of responsibilities. How-
ever, the ‘privilege’ offered by Chapter VI of the ALG is mitigated by the rest of
the legislation. Notably, the ALG does not forbid municipalities without a county
status to assume county competences. Chapter VIII on County Governments ex-
plicitly allows any municipality to take over the management of a public institution
from the county, provided that the majority of the users or beneficiaries reside
in the municipality. Since it is not reciprocal—the county may not initiate any
takeover of competences and is thus a passive partner of the municipality—, this
Art.  para.  ALG.
Chapter VI of the ALG.
Art.  para.  ALG.
 privilege brings another type of asymmetry into the intergovernmental relations.
Moreover, it derogates the fundamental right of county governments to assume
any local function that has not been assigned by law to another authority. The
problem of the implicit dominance of municipalities over the counties will be
further analysed in Section ..
Other towns
The term ‘town’ (város) in the Constitution designates those urban or semi-
urban settlements that, irrespective of their size, assume the role of a regional
centre providing a range of public services to the surrounding jurisdictions. Under
specific conditions laid down in the law, any village may apply for a town status.
Although the equal footing principle of the Constitution excludes any hierarchical
distinction between urban and rural settlements, the town status has an important
prestige value largely because of the century-long tradition of urban-rural divide in
Hungary. The town status does not necessarily imply higher amounts of transfers
from the central budget compared to what other municipalities receive, especially
if the town is a net contributor to the fiscal equalisation policy. Yet, it makes
the municipality more attractive in the eyes of potential investors. Due to these
apparent advantages and the dilution of the conditions of acquiring the town
status, the s and s saw an explosion in the number of towns: while it
grew by merely  between  and , another  municipalities received the
town label in the following two decades. Today there are  towns in Hungary
(including  towns with county rights; excluding the capital city), but most of
them still have a semi-rural character with relatively poor infrastructure and few
public service facilities with a micro-regional function.
Villages
The , villages of Hungary are rural communities with a relatively low level of
infrastructure and public services. Following a historic tradition, it is common to
distinguish between the , small and the  large rural communities (község and
nagyközség, respectively) upon whether they reach the limit of , inhabitants or
not. However, this distinction becomes hardly ever relevant for the assignment of
new functions or resources.
The translation by ICL () features the term ‘city’ instead of ‘town’, but considering the small
average size of these entities (none of them has more than , inhabitants and  per cent have
less than ,), ‘town’ seems to be a more appropriate term (see also Footnote  earlier in this
chapter).
Minority self-governments (MSGs)
Contrary to the legal practice of most other countries of the world, the revised Con-
stitution provides the right of self-government to national and ethnic minorities as
well. Thirteen legally acknowledged ethnic and national minorities are represented
today by democratically elected bodies at the central and municipal levels. Since
, minorities have also been allowed to elected their representatives in the
counties. In , the citizens elected , minority governments in the munici-
palities (in , out of , jurisdictions),  in the counties,  in the capital city,
and  at the national level. The Act LXXVII of  on the Rights of National and
Ethnic Minorities, the Act LXIV of  on the Election of Local Representatives
and Mayors, and the ALG (following an amendment in ), define the rules of
establishing and operating MSGs. Every MSG is an independent legal person and
has identical rights and duties.
Although the institution of MSG was conceived to become the vehicle of personal
federalism in Hungary, the system has not fully met the expectations so far.
MSGs are highly dependent on local governments in terms of both political power
and financial resources. For most of the local policy issues, MSGs work closely
together with the local executive council of the municipality, but the intensity of co-
operation usually depends on the lobbying power of the minority representatives
and on the extent to which the majority representatives are willing to co-operate.
Generally, the level of minority participation in local policy-making is relatively
low, and minority representatives have to compete hard in order to receive a fair
share from the local budget. For the rest of their funding, they are dependent on
central government grants.
Act CXIV  concerning the Amendment of the Law on the Election of Minority Self-Government
Representatives and Other Laws on National and Ethnic Minorities.
Data from the National Election Office.
A. N. Messarra was the first scholar to apply the term ‘personal federalism’ (‘fédéralisme intégré’) in a
case study on Lebanon in . Personal federalism is a federal or decentralised state structure under
which decision-making power rests with the cultural entities or their representatives, irrespective of
their geographical location. By contrast, ‘territorial federalism’ is usually chosen when minorities
are settled down in a definable geographical area (F and B F, , p.  f.).
For a careful treatment of the problems related to minority self-governments in Hungary, see C
and P K (), S (), K (), E and K (), and
K ().
 .. Equal rights—different
duties
Language is never innocent: it reflects political
and ideological values or worldviews. Hence, when
the Constitution and the ALG stipulate that ter-
ritorial administrative units, irrespective of their size or status, have the right to
‘local self-government’ (helyi önkormányzás) and hence the villages, the towns, the
capital city and its districts, and the counties, are uniformly called ‘local govern-
ments’ (helyi önkormányzat), they give an unmistakable sign of equality among
subnational governments.
The lack of a clear terminological distinction between counties and municipali-
ties as two distinct levels of government is thus neither a result of the simplicity
of the Hungarian language nor a sign of poor rhetoric skills on the side of the
legislators, but it is a deliberate choice. This choice is based on the collective
perception of recent history and reflects the collective ambition of a people to
break with their past. Terms such as ‘level’ or ‘tier’ would only evoke the notion of
hierarchy. Instead of levels or tiers, the territory of Hungary is therefore divided
into ‘administrative units’. Following the legislators’ intention, a flat government
structure should lead to a more balanced relationship among the different types of
administrative units. Central authorities should not be allowed to exert any influ-
ence upon counties and municipalities, and the latter two types of jurisdictions
should be on equal footing with regard to each other.
A major amendment of the ALG in  introduced the distinction between ‘mu-
nicipal government’ (települési önkormányzat) and ‘territorial government’ (területi
önkormányzat) but continued to use ‘local government’ (helyi önkormányzat) as a
collective term to address both forms. The correction affected purely the termi-
nology but not the constitutional equality of subnational governments. Non-legal
texts such as policy reports or academic studies nevertheless recognise the existence
of two distinct levels (counties and municipalities) in the subnational public sector.
The same ideological considerations gave rise to one of the most pivotal princi-
ples of the Hungarian intergovernmental system. Art.  para.  of the Constitution
stipulates that the fundamental rights of local governments (i.e. SNGs) are equal;
differences may only exist in terms of duties. The subsequent chapters of the
ALG and the sector-specific laws define further (not fundamental) rights and
duties. It must be noted here that both the Constitution and the ALG address
the rights and duties to the different ‘administrative units’ and not to local (or
municipal / territorial) governments in general. This is an important detail as it
suggests the intention of the legislative to differentiate among the types, rather
Similar legal provisions apply in Denmark and France as well.
than tiers, of administrative units, in the moment of assigning a new mandatory
responsibility. Although there is a great deal of overlapping between the unit-based
and level-based territorial division of the country, not every type of administra-
tive unit constitutes a distinct level of government and, conversely, some types of
administrative units belong simultaneously to two different levels.
Even if hierarchy is unknown to the Hungarian multi-level government system,
some differences do exist among the various types of subnational jurisdictions,
primarily in terms of autonomy. This manifests itself not only in the constitutional
principle of equal fundamental rights and different duties. The law also stipulates
that the administrative units (villages, towns, the capital and its districts, and
counties) act independently ‘in those public affairs of local interest that belong to
the sphere of its tasks and jurisdictional competence’. What actually constitutes a
local public affair (i.e. the rights and duties of local government) is ‘determined by
law’. Local governments may exercise their various fundamental rights ‘within
the limits of the law’. The best synthesis of the equal but limited autonomy is
given in art.  para.  of the ALG: ‘Within the limits of the law, the local government
may regulate autonomously and, in individual cases, manage freely, all local public
affairs coming within its sphere of tasks and jurisdictional competence.’
These investigations show the principles of autonomy and equality in a different
light. Local governments are certainly autonomous and equal in the sense that one
unit cannot review the decision of another unit (there is no hierarchy among them).
By contrast, with regard to the rights and duties, they are neither autonomous nor
equal. They are autonomous, and their autonomy is equal, only in the management
of those local public affairs that the law delegates to them or allows them to
assume voluntarily. Since the range of local public affairs varies across the types
of administrative units, local governments are in practice everything but equal.
In other words, each local government is entirely free to do what the law actually
allows it to do, and in this freedom, they are perfectly equal.
This latter paraphrase might sound provocative but in fact, it should not surprise
at all. Given the multiple interdependences among government units that are
inherent in every decentralised system, it would be an illusion to expect every
subnational government unit to enjoy unfettered autonomy in all possible spheres
of activity. Autonomy and equality can and must be constrained if they are to be
reconciled with other objectives that the society considers equally important.
An important implication of the principle of ‘autonomy and equality within
Art.  para.  ALG; similar wording in art.  of the Constitution.
Art.  para.  of the Constitution.
Art. /A para.  of the Constitution, art.  para.  and  ALG.
 the limits of the law’ is that local governments are free to do anything that is not
explicitly prohibited by law. Beyond the range of tasks and competences specified
in the law, they are completely sovereign and equal.
The conclusion of all these arguments is that the principles of equality and
autonomy should not be overemphasised in the discussion of intergovernmental
relations in Hungary. Insisting on the constitutional guarantee of perfect equality
and sovereignty for all subnational units is neither credible, nor is it necessary for
the success of decentralisation. Formal limits on autonomy, as well as a certain
degree of inequality and even asymmetry, are acceptable and even desirable.
While the limitation of autonomy and equality of SNGs is mainly justified with
the pursuit of competing objectives such as equity or efficiency, asymmetry draws
its legitimacy from the will of the legislator to accommodate specific interests of
selected constituent units.
To sum up, the complementary legislation on specific types of administrative
units partially compensates for the levelling effect of the constitutional provision of
equal rights. Some degree of inequality and asymmetry among government units
is certainly justified from the perspective of equity, efficiency and other objectives.
Insisting on the equal rights principle is anyway deceptive: when it comes to the
implementation in practice, it turns out that all local governments are equal but
some are ‘more equal than others’, just as in Orwell’s famous utopian vision.
Furthermore, the equal rights principle is treacherous because it misleads us
about the fact that even if the rights of all subnational governments are equal,
their chances are not. A great number of jurisdictions cannot fully exploit their
fundamental rights because of shortages in financial, technical or human resources,
lack of valuable assets or local investors. To what extent the fundamental rights
are constitutive for effective local autonomy depends on exogenous factors that
are largely identical with those mentioned in Chapter  on local autonomy. Both
the institutional and legal framework (of which the equal rights principle is only
one element) and socio-economic, demographic, etc. variables are decisive in
this respect. The problem that we could call ‘equal rights—different chances’ also
raises the question about the responsibility of the central government and the
legislative in the creation of truly equal conditions for the operation of all types of
government units L (, p. ).
In the context of federalism and decentralisation, inequality is not equivalent to asymmetry. Inequal-
ity means a different treatment of different types (or levels) of constituent units, while asymmetry
implies a different treatment of constituent units that belong to the same category (or are situated
at the same level of government).
. Control and co-ordination by the centre
Despite the general trend of devolving powers and competences to the democrati-
cally elected subnational authorities, the central government continues to play a key
role in public service provision and administration by means of its deconcentrated
branches in the subnational units.
Deconcentrated authorities existed already during the socialist era and even
before. Their survival in the post-transition period has much to do with the asym-
metry of the newly designed intergovernmental system. As has been noted before,
the decentralisation in  brought about a fundamental change in the status quo
between municipalities and counties: the municipalities became the dominant
players of the decentralised government system in both political and economic
terms. Between the territorially fragmented municipal structure and the artificially
weakened counties, a substantial amount of tasks with a regional scope was left
derelict. The central public administration filled this vacuum with a plethora of
deconcentrated agencies and authorities. The result is a dual system of decen-
tralised public administration, consisting of democratically elected governments
from the bottom up, and deconcentrated agencies with appointed head officers
from the top down (S, b, p. , G, , p. ). Since the
Constitution has never envisaged such an arrangement, there is currently no strong
rule in place that could limit the expansion of central government authorities at
the subnational level. From , a series of administrative reforms led to the
restructuring and integration of several territorial office categories, reducing their
number from  to some  within two years. These measures made the system
more rational but did not essentially change the extent or the content of the influ-
ence of central government on the local tier. Since , the number of territorial
offices has been again on a rise. Currently, four major types of deconcentrated
authorities are operating in Hungary (see Figure .).
Public administration offices (PAOs)
The public administration offices operating in each of the nineteen counties and
the capital city are successors of the Commissioners of the Republic introduced
by the ALG in . Based on the amendment of the ALG in  and comple-
mentary legislation, they control the lawfulness of local government decisions
and coordinate the activities of local governments and deconcentrated authorities.
Act LXIII of  concerning the Amendment of the Act LXV of  on Local Governments, art. –
; Government Decree no. / ( December) on the Public Administration Offices of the
Capital City and the Counties.
 They also provide professional assistance to local governments (training, IT, etc.)
and execute further administrative tasks within their competence. The head of
the Prime Minister’s Office and the Minister of the Interior together appoint and
supervise the general director of each PAO.
Deconcentrated units of ministries and other public authorities (DUMs)
DUMs cover a large number of public policy areas such as land registration, police,
public health, employment, tax administration, consumer protection, or statistics,
with various competences ranging from the execution of administrative proce-
dures to the monitoring and control of the implementation of national norms and
directives. In the early s, the jurisdiction of competence of DUMs followed
the political boundaries of the counties, except for those (specialised on water
management, the maintenance of national parks, etc.) whose scope of activity
required an adaptation to natural boundaries. In recent years, several ministries
and other public authorities have reorganised their territorial offices in greater ‘re-
gional’ units, without actually agreeing on a common definition of ‘regional’. Since
they enjoy full sovereignty in the management of their sub-units, the spontaneous
wave of restructuring resulted in a wide variety of institutional designs. In ,
more than  DUMs were operating in the country.
County directorates of the social security funds
The two major social security funds operate their territorial offices in the nineteen
counties and the capital city. The directorates of the National Health Insurance
Fund manage the relationship with local public, non-profit and private providers
of health services. The offices of the National Pension Fund are responsible, among
others, for the maintenance of the databases related to wages and length of service
and the calculation of retirement pensions.
County directorates of the Hungarian State Treasury
Established by the Act XXXVIII of  on Public Finance, the branch offices of the
Hungarian State Treasury in the counties and the capital city are directly subordi-
nated to the head office and constitute an operational link between the central and
local tiers of government in terms of budgeting and account management. Their
major tasks include the management of the government financial information
system and the controlling of the use of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
Wherever the nature of the public service requires proximity to the beneficia-
ries (as is the case e.g. with employment offices, public health or land registry),
deconcentrated authorities have additional agencies at the micro-regional (LAU-)
level, each of which serves about  to  municipalities. Centrally harmonised
administrative procedures with a similar scope such as guardianship services or the
issue of building permits are delegated to the notaries. A notary may be in charge of
one or more municipal governments. Together with the mayor, he or she controls
the hierarchy of norms, countersigns all municipal decisions and informs the PAO
in case of an illegal resolution. In comparison with other European countries, the
scope of competence of notaries in Hungary is almost unparalleled B (,
p. ). In practice, however, many of them find it difficult to take independent
decisions, as they are recruited and paid by the municipal council.
In most of the counties, the contacts among deconcentrated authorities as well
as between these and the elected local government councils are characterised by
partnership and mutual understanding. Nevertheless, the current system of decon-
centrated public administration is admittedly chaotic. County-based territorial
offices are run parallel with ad-hoc regional authorities of various territorial scope.
The efforts to reduce the number of authorities are doomed to failure, as the sector
ministries prefer setting up their own territorial organisations rather than ceding
some of their competences to the PAOs. Although a new regulation following
the reform in  prohibited the establishment of new branch offices outside
the network of PAOs, the period between  and  saw the rise of ten new
categories of deconcentrated authorities B (, p. ). The circumvention
of PAOs is also visible in the fact that even the central government refrains from
delegating new co-ordination competences to these institutions, although the need
for co-ordination is the principal raison d’être of PAOs, at least according to the law.
While there is scope for further harmonisation and simplification of the territorial
organisation of deconcentrated authorities (F, ; B, ; S,
a), little work has been done in this direction except for the regionalisation
of the PAOs, as there is no consensus in the central government about how to
proceed.
. Citizen participation
The growing transparency of national and local policymaking and the direct in-
volvement of local citizens in the decision-making procedure are among the greatest
achievements of the post-socialist transition. Under the socialist regime, soviet-
type councils executed mandates from above without ever consulting their local
constituency. Not only the involvement of citizens into the decision-making, but
also their information on local policy matters, were considered as a threat to the
 realisation of the rationally designed plans of the omniscient state authorities (S
and K, , p. ). Breaking with this practice was one of the first priorities
of the intergovernmental reform. As a reflection of this, in  the entire local
government system was founded on the concept of ‘self-government’.
Recent empirical analyses on the quality of local democracy in Hungary dis-
tinguish several categories of citizen involvement at the local level. Local en-
trepreneurs, firms, business associations, civil associations, foundations, trade
unions, churches, local branches of political parties, print and electronic media,
and citizens may all have some influence on the decision-making (P, ).
Concerning the subject matter, S and K () distinguish between
budgeting (publication and open discussion of the budget prior to council vote)
on one hand and other policy issues on the other. As for the tools of participation,
referendum and initiative (petition) constitute only a minor part. Other instru-
ments include public hearings and forums, direct meetings between local officials
and citizens, proposals or requests by civil organisations, participation at public
demonstrations, and appeals to local government decisions in a court of law or
another higher administrative authority (P, ).
Four of these instruments, namely referendum, initiative, general assembly
and public hearing, have their legal foundation in art.  to  of the ALG. How-
ever, the legally admitted scope of direct citizen participation is relatively narrow.
Consequently, direct participation in Hungary (alike in the majority of European
countries) plays only a subsidiary role within democratic decision-making (N
and T, ).
The following themes are subject to obligatory referendum in municipalities
and (where applicable) counties:
. the amalgamation with, and separation from, another jurisdiction;
. the foundation of a new jurisdiction;
. the establishment of a joint council as part of the cooperation with another
SNG;
. the transfer and exchange of populated territories to another jurisdiction;
. other matters determined in the legislation of the municipality or county.
Other issues are subject to optional referendum that can be held either in the
forefront of a planned decision of the local (or county) council, or as a reaction to a
decision that has been already taken. The only exceptions are issues concerning the
budget of the SNG, the types and parameters of local taxes, as well as organisational
and personal issues residing in the local (county) council’s sphere of competence:
citizens are not allowed to vote on any of these subjects. The referendum may be
initiated by the local council upon request of the committee or at least one-fourth
of the council members, by a local civil organisation, or by  to  per cent of local
voters (with the threshold being set in a local government decree). In villages with
less than  inhabitants, the local council may decide to replace the referendum
by a vote in the general assembly.
The referendum (the vote in the general assembly) is valid if the turnout rate
reaches  per cent plus one. If at least  per cent of the votes plus one are identical,
then the result of the referendum (vote in the general assembly) is binding for the
local council. If the referendum (vote in the general assembly) is invalid or brings
no result, the council is free to decide on the issue without any further consultation
of the electorate.
The right to local initiative in both counties and municipalities allows the voters
to put forward any policy issue or proposal to the municipal (county) council,
although proposals concerning financial, organisational and personal issues have
no chance to become validated by the local council because they are excluded from
the legal scope of the referendum. Here again, the required number of signatures
( to  per cent of the voters) is laid down in the relevant local government decree.
If the initiative meets the formal requirements, the council is obliged to discuss the
issue in meeting and take a stance on it.
Finally, municipal and county councils have to organise at least one public
hearing every year. At such meetings, local citizens may directly address their
questions and proposals to the elected members of the council. The latter are
obliged to answer all inquiries and motions and to decide whether to put them on
the policy agenda or not.
As the first empirical studies on the use of direct democracy instruments point
out, the initial disinterest of citizens in local politics began to disappear at the
end of s, although there is scope for further improvement. In their analysis
of the  local referenda held between  and  in Hungary, N and
T () show that territorial reorganisation, new industrial investments,
Art.  para.  ALG. A similar prohibition exists for the national referenda: budget laws, national taxes
and stamp duties as well as national conditions for local taxes cannot be submitted to referendum
(art.  of the Act XVII of  on Referendum and Popular Initiative).
The second threshold is twice as high as the one that applies to national referenda. The latter was
lowered in the forefront of the national referendum about Hungary’s accession to the North-Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (Article  of the Act LIX of  about the Amendment of the Constitution of
the Republic of Hungary).
 environmental projects (landfills, waste incinerators, etc.) and public services
(maintenance of schools and health care institutions) are the predominant issues.
Most of the referenda are reactive in the sense that they are oriented at ruling out
possible negative effects of local council decisions instead of acquiring new benefits.
Participation rates vary widely, with the issues of intermunicipal amalgamation,
separation and cooperation having the most important mobilising effect. However,
the double threshold of  per cent plus one results in a relatively high rate of failure:
in the period under review,  out of  referenda were invalid and many of the rest
did not bring about any clear and binding result. While little can be said about the
frequency of general assemblies and popular initiatives for lack of relevant statistics,
it is proven that public hearing is a rather formal element of direct democracy. In
a sample of , nearly two-thirds of all municipalities provided only one forum
a year, thus barely complying with the required minimum (LGS, ; S and
K, ). The local budget is seldom open to public discussion, with only
one-third of the surveyed municipalities involving their constituency in this issue
prior to the final vote in the council. As for the involvement of other participants in
local issues (including the budget), less than half of the  municipalities declared
to have involved civil organisations in the decision-making process in , while
the local media are more frequently consulted, with more than  per cent of the
local governments having occasional or regular contact with them. As for the
political participation of citizens, the most frequent forms are addressing proposals
or requests to the members of the local council (in  per cent of the surveyed
municipalities) and direct meetings between local officials and (groups of) citizens
( per cent) (LGS, ).
According to all empirical studies, the intensity of citizen participation in Hun-
gary correlates positively with the density of civil organisations and the munici-
pality’s socio-economic development. The relationship between the municipality
size (in terms of population) and effective citizen participation, however, is more
ambiguous. The low number of existing empirical analyses does not allow us
to draw any clear conclusion, particularly as it is difficult to say to what extent
the variables used by the different authors are comparable. N and T
() examine the different types of municipalities (that are largely correlated
with size) and the number of referenda held in each of these, and find a negative
relationship between the two variables. The studies based on the Local Government
Survey (LGS, ), however, look at the relationship between municipality size
and citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local policies (which is measured with a
The worldwide theoretical literature of the subject shows similarly great ambiguities, see P ().
composite indicator integrating subjective evaluations on the influence of different
stakeholders) and suggest a moderately to strong positive relationship (S and
K, ; P, ). The argument of D and T (), according
to which larger municipalities experience a certain alienation of citizens from
policymakers but have a better institutional capacity to facilitate participation, is
confirmed by P () for three CEE countries including Hungary.
Looking only at the ‘demand and supply sides’ of direct democracy in Hungary,
we can conclude that at least two elements in the current institutional system
constrain effective citizen participation. First, the double threshold of  per cent
plus one for local referenda (one for the turnout rate and one for the result of the
vote) is unduly strict compared to the corresponding regulation for the national
level. Citizens’ activism in this domain could possibly increase if the threshold
was lowered, although it is true that those issues that citizens generally consider
important are able to attract even  to  per cent of the voters (N and T,
, p. ). Second, the exclusion of local budget and taxation issues from the
scope of local referenda makes participation in local politics far less interesting
than it could be. Between two elections, taxpayers can hardly influence how their
money is used. Moreover, it deprives the decentralised fiscal system of its potential
advantage of making elected representatives more accountable for their decisions.
Surprisingly, in the Hungarian literature on local referenda, this is discussed neither
as an actual problem nor as a potential one.
However, it would be premature to conclude that, by lowering the minimum
threshold or introducing more meaningful issues in local referenda, one could
automatically increase citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local policies. The qual-
ity of local democracy depends not only on the choice and character of available
instruments and the extent to which citizens make use of them. Any measure
targeted at these variables will remain fruitless if it is not matched with sufficient
flexibility of the existing system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In other
words, the incentive structure of democratic participation necessarily includes
the system’s capacity to respond to citizens’ requests and provide incentives for
participation. P (, p. ) measures this capacity (more precisely, the lack
of capacity) by ‘expenditure rigidity’ that is, in his understanding, ‘the percentage
of own revenues in the total budget of the municipalities as reported by the local
officials’. While defining expenditure rigidity as a percentage of own revenues is
not entirely straightforward, the underlying idea is clear. The larger the proportion
of mandatory functions and/or transfers and grants in the local budget, the weaker
the potential influence of citizens on local policymaking. This definition is still
unduly generous because it leaves open the question about the local government’s
 freedom to adjust tax rates and bases and to use the transferred revenues according
to the preferences of the local constituency. As we saw in Section .., under
certain circumstances, grants can provide a higher degree of autonomy to local
governments than own-source revenues do.
Pop’s investigations revealed that the degree of expenditure and revenue rigidity
in Hungary is relatively high and thus the effectiveness of citizens in influencing
local matters is low. Concerning expenditures, dozens of mandated functions limit
the autonomy of municipalities. In the hope of acquiring additional funds and thus
a larger room for manoeuvre in finances, hundreds of local governments assume a
number of optional functions, thus fully exploiting (or even going beyond) their
financial capacity. Local revenue autonomy is limited, too, as central government
transfers constitute half to two-thirds of the local budget, even though their share
decreased from two-thirds to one half between  and  and a growing part of
them is unconditional. Concerning the capacity to raise own-source revenues, there
are significant disparities across regions, depending on their degree of economic
development. Owing to several factors that will be explained in Section ., local tax
levels in Hungary are generally low and make thus the revenue system rather rigid.
However, rigidity increases with decreasing jurisdiction size, as small municipalities
are more likely to be dependent on central government transfers than large ones.
Both participation rates and citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local affairs tend
to be higher in large municipalities than in smaller ones.
Pop’s message is that citizen participation is crucial for local self-government,
but at the same time, the extent of self-government itself determines the incen-
tives for participation. Based upon our earlier investigations, we can add here
another remark on the relationship between citizen participation and local auton-
omy. Rigidity is the opposite of flexibility and thus it is inherently connected to
the notion of autonomy. The more stringent are the exogenous restrictions on
revenue and expenditure autonomy, the higher the degree of rigidity. The capacity
of the system to respond to citizens’ initiatives depends thus also on the constraints
imposed on local financial autonomy. As we saw in Section .., citizens could
theoretically have some influence at least on the nature and strength of legal con-
straints, notably through their participation in higher-level legislative procedures.
Yet, since the preference of the regional or national constituency on a given issue
does not forcibly coincide with that of the voters of an individual municipality,
democratic participation at higher levels does not automatically soften the legal
constraints on local autonomy. Anyway, even if the preferences of the two groups
This is also true for the democratic participation at the local level; e.g. the majority of the local
were identical, the Hungarian law prohibits the direct participation of citizens in
budgetary and financial decisions at both the central and the local level of gov-
ernment. In this situation, there are two ways left to soften the centrally imposed
legal constraints on local revenue and expenditure autonomy. First, counties and
regions can play the role of coordinator and disseminator of local government
interests. At present, neither the counties nor the statistical planning regions are
powerful enough to assume this role. Second, local governments can organise
themselves in a lobby group in order to defend their interests in the legislative
procedures. In , however, seven associations operated simultaneously, rep-
resenting different (though partly overlapping) circles of SNGs. The intensity
of co-operation among them usually depends on the importance of the issue at
stake. Because of their incapacity to coordinate their interests on a regular basis,
the central government has never regarded them as strong partners. Municipal
and county interests most often appear in national policymaking through mayors
and heads of county councils who are also members of Parliament, but whether
these initiatives receive any attention in the legislative depends on the political side
(government or opposition) from which they emerge.
Following its crushing defeat at the local elections of October , the so-
cialist party (MSZP) that constitutes the bigger part of the ruling government
coalition recognised that it was impossible to carry through any reasonable policy
programme without the consent of SNGs. For the first time since , an interest
conciliation board was set up in December , regrouping five ministers and the
presidents of the seven local government lobby organisations.
population may vote for more strictness in the management of the municipal budget. Since the
resulting constraint is purely endogenous, it will be not treated in this study.
National Association of County General Assemblies (MÖOSZ), Hungarian National Association of
Local Authorities (TÖOSZ), Association of Hungarian Local Governments (MÖSZ), Association
of Towns with County Rights (MJVSZ), Hungarian National Association of Self-Governments of
Small Towns, Hungarian Association of Villages, and National Association of Rural Communities
(KÖSZ).

CHAPTER 
Expenditure Autonomy
As has been shown in Chapter , the legal and institutional framework of inter- 
governmental finance in Hungary grants a comparably wide autonomy to SNGs
and most particularly to municipalities. It also stipulates that there is no hierarchy
of any kind between the municipalities and the counties, nor between the capital
city and its districts. All SNGs enjoy equal rights, the most important one being
the independent management of local public affairs. Yet, the law also admits of
differences between SNGs in terms of their mandatory responsibilities, and of
specific regulations on service delivery in the various policy areas. At the same
time, the geographical, demographical and socio-economic environment in which
local public sector activities unfold is not the same for all SNGs. All these factors
result in considerable disparities across jurisdictions concerning the degree and
quality of their expenditure autonomy.
Chapters  to  focus on the autonomy of municipalities. This subcategory of
municipalities consists of the capital city and its  districts, the  towns with
county rights, the  towns without county rights, and the , villages. The
autonomy of counties and micro-regions (that usually also appear in the statistics
of the local government sector) will not be analysed systematically. Wherever
the term local government is applied, it refers to the municipal sector, except if
otherwise indicated.
The present chapter will discuss the extent of, and some major constraints on,
local expenditure autonomy in Hungary. Section . provides an introduction
on the national legal framework in which local expenditure decisions can take
place. Section . analyses the statutory assignment of expenditures that ultimately
 determines much of the autonomy of local governments with regard to expenditure
policy and management (steering). Inter-municipal co-operation is just as much
an issue of steering as it is one of rowing. Therefore, its advantages and drawbacks
in terms of local expenditure autonomy will be discussed in Section . situated in
the middle of the chapter. Finally, Section . investigates local autonomy in the
organisation of service delivery (rowing).
. Expenditure autonomy: an overview
.. The legal framework of
expenditure autonomy
Throughout the socialist period, the freedom of
municipal councils in spending decisions was lim-
ited. Expenditure plans were subject to prior ap-
proval by the central planning bureau that then
matched the spending need with a corresponding amount of monetary transfers.
From the end of the s, the constraints on local spending targets and amounts
were continuously eased and the proportion of locally controlled own revenues
within total local revenues increased gradually. Nonetheless, the system remained
strongly centralised and particularly the recurring expenditures of the municipali-
ties were rigidly controlled from above. The influence of citizens on the choice and
the quality of public goods and services was negligible.
Bringing expenditure decisions closer to the local constituency became therefore
one of the major objectives of fiscal decentralisation from the early s. By
increasing the autonomy of local communities in the choice of their spending
patterns, the legislative expected to enhance the power of citizens to control local
policymaking, thereby making local policymakers more accountable for their
decisions. On the other hand, the central government also wished to define a
minimum range of functions that democratically elected local governments would
be obliged to assume in the interest of citizens. This double endeavour became
translated into a system of optional and mandatory functions that was first laid
down in the ALG and further specified in the Act XX of  on the Tasks and
Competences of Local Governments and their Bodies, the Commissioners of
the Republic and Selected Deconcentrated Authorities (ATC). This latter was
conceived as a transitional law in the sense that subsequent sector-specific laws (on
social services, public education, waste management, etc.) would repeal each of
its chapters in turn. These laws would contain a more detailed regulation on each
The commissioners of the Republic are the predecessors of the current county-level public adminis-
tration offices. This system was in force between  and .
public policy area and the role of SNGs in the supply of the related public services.
Consequently, between  and , the Parliament passed twenty sector-specific
laws (some of which were amendments of previously existing laws) and several
dozens of related acts treating more specific policy areas within the sectors. Today,
only a few clauses of the ATC are still in force.
According to the ALG, any law can define new mandatory tasks for SNGs. In
this context, P K (, p. ) points to the unclear legal relationship
between SNG tasks set forth by the ALG that requires a two-thirds majority to
be approved, and the responsibilities defined by various sector-specific laws that
necessitate only a simple majority. The relative simplicity of pushing a new sector-
specific law (or an amendment) through Parliament explains in part how such laws
and, correspondingly, SNG tasks could proliferate so greatly in the past decades.
The same paragraph of the ALG also implies that SNG tasks can have no other
origin than the law. Notwithstanding this rule, several lower-level legal sources
such as ministerial decrees (requiring no parliamentary approval) have introduced
new SNG tasks in the form of various sector-specific minimum standards. The
semantic frontier between minimum standards and new tasks is somewhat blurred,
which adds to the legal uncertainty and makes SNGs defenceless against excessive
intrusion into their local affairs.
In Section .., we defined local expenditure autonomy as the right and the
ability of local governments to spend their public budget on goods and services
in a way to meet the demand of the local constituency. This implies decisions
about what to provide and how. In O and G’s () vision of a
‘catalytic government’, the question of what to provide (expenditure policy design)
is the essence of the steering function of the government, while the question of how
(service delivery) determines the rowing function. As we saw in Section .., the
exercise of both functions underlies a number of constraints. In the following, we
are going to estimate the extent and the nature of municipal expenditure autonomy
in Hungary with respect to these constraints.
Art.  para.  ALG.
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 .. The dynamics of local
expenditures
Table . shows the development of municipal ex-
penditures between  and  at constant prices
(base year: ). While aggregate data for the en-
tire subnational government sector are available from , specific data on the
various SNG categories (notably with a separation between municipalities and
counties) could not be retrieved for the first five years.
Total GFS expenditures in real terms (calculated according to the methodology
of the Government Finance Statistics  of the International Monetary Fund)
had to recover from the dampening impact of the Bokros austerity package of 
before they could take off again. After a first increase in  (election year) they
grew steadily from the early s.
Centrally dictated salary increases of public employees led to an explosion of
the wage bill in  and ; payroll taxes followed suit. Apart from these
items, operational expenditures remained relatively stable (or grew only slightly)
over the period. By contrast, capital expenditures are less determined by sector-
specific norms and thus more sensitive to political cycles S (, p. ),
which explains the peaks registered in the election years , , and .
Figure . indicates no significant dynamics in the structure of local expenditures.
Wages, salaries, and social contributions add up to  per cent of total expenditures.
Together with other running costs of public service facilities, VAT and interest
payments, they account for approximately three-fourth of the budget. Around
 per cent of the expenditures is related to capital development, including own
investments and grants to various organisations involved in the development of
public infrastructure. Subsidies and grants to cover the running costs of external
public service providers add up to nearly  per cent of the local budget.
. The statutory assignment of responsibilities
.. Mandatory and optional
functions: an overview
According to a proposition in Section .., the
major determinant factor of local expenditure
autonomy from the steering side is the way the
various public expenditure responsibilities are
shared among the government tiers.
In the category of ‘municipalities’, we took into consideration the following administrative units:
the capital city and its  districts, the  towns with county rights, the  towns (without county
rights), and the , villages; thus , units in total. Counties and micro-regions were left out of
consideration.

43.6 43.1 41.6 40.6 41.6 40.9 41.2 42.5
48.9 47.4 46.2 44.2
29.2 30.3 28.6 27.5 29.1 28.4 26.2 25.1
24.1 25.3 23.9 24.1
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Wages and social contributions (2, 3) Other operational expenditure (4)
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Loan disbursement (16)
Figure 5.1: The expenditure structure of municipalities 1995–2006
[Source: the author, based on Table 5.1]
A quick glance over Table . suggests that the range of subnational responsibili-
ties (taking mandatory and optional functions together) is largely comparable to
that in other decentralised unitary countries in Europe. Two distinctive features
of the Hungarian system, however, are the dominant role of municipalities in
public service provision (compared to that of the counties) and the relatively high
proportion of mandatory functions within the overall volume of functions. This
fits more into the Nordic than into the Southern model of expenditure assignment.
With regard to the excessively fragmented territorial structure, however, Hungary
is closer to the Southern model (B and S, ; K et al., ,
p. ).
As has been pointed out in Chapter , the constitutional provision on equal
rights and different duties and the subsequent regulations in the ALG, the ATC and
In order to ensure international comparability and to avoid describing each function in detail,
we chose to apply the GFS (Government Finance Statistics) Functional Classification of Outlays
elaborated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, , Appendix ). This job implied the
thorough review of all sector-specific laws existing on  January  to see which of them contains
a rule on SNG involvement. In a second step, we had to identify the nature of the SNG involvement.
Because of the multitude of sector-specific laws and their various amendments, this job took several
days.

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the various sector-specific laws resulted in a vast and complex system of subnational
competences. Since the ALG stipulates that the legislative can assign local affairs to
a higher government tier only exceptionally, there is a potential in the system to
become even more complex.
The direct application of the principle of subsidiarity obviously strengthened the
sense of liberty of local governments with regard to the management of their affairs.
Nothing could illustrate this better than the Hungarian term hatáskör that can be
translated as competence, authority, power, or function. For a central concept, it is
somewhat dangerous because it blurs the distinction between rights and duties;
indeed, it appears invariably in the very different contexts of deconcentration,
delegation and devolution. As D et al. (, p. ) observe, local governments
in Hungary are inclined to regard their hatáskör as an instrument for exercising
power and property rights. This interpretation is obviously hard to reconcile with
the notions of serving, or being accountable to, the local community. The insistence
on local competences has a particular implication on both steering and rowing: it
incites local government councils, even those with poor capacity, to assume new
responsibilities and keep existing ones, and to rely on their own facilities for service
delivery rather than considering the option of contracting another provider.
Table . gives an idea about the volume and shares of current expenditure
by function in the various categories of municipalities. Although the data are
relatively old, they reflect the actual proportions more or less appropriately. The
management of real estate and community amenities account for the largest part
of total current expenditures, followed (not surprisingly) by education and health
care. Education expenditures occupy a remarkably high share in the budgets of
towns and villages, which is a direct consequence of the assignment of functions
but may just as well signalise low efficiency in service delivery due to territorially
fragmented school structures.
ALG, art.  para. .
A recent report mandated by the Council of Europe provides an interesting overview about the
semantic differences of the term ‘competence’ in Europe (M, , p.  ff.).
Regrettably, the structure of the data provided by the Ministry of the Interior does not allow us to
apply the same GFS classification as in Table ..
 .. The predominant role of
mandatory functions
In Figure . (Section ..), we distinguished
mandatory and optional local government func-
tions as well as an intermediate category that we
called demand-driven mandatory functions. The latter category is inexistent in
Hungary: to our knowledge, there is no law that would oblige local governments
to provide a certain public service on condition that a pre-defined proportion of
the population in their jurisdiction express a demand for it.
Municipalities in Hungary acquire most of their mandatory functions through
deconcentration and delegation, but a clear distinction between these two forms
in practice is virtually impossible. Recalling Section .., one major difference is
that in the case of deconcentration, the higher-level authority retains full financial
responsibility for the given task, whereas with delegation, top-down funding may
be either full or partial. In Hungary, however, it is impossible to say whether,
and if yes, to what extent, central government funding contributes to the costs of
providing a given local public service. This is due to the principle of the unified
budget that allows SNGs to use any revenue item, with the exception of earmarked
grants, for covering the costs of any expenditure item (see Section ..). Yet, full
coverage of local service costs is rare, and it results most often from a fortunate
coincidence of circumstances rather than from an explicit policy of the centre.
The central government in Hungary transfers not only financial but also political
responsibility for the delegated services. Local governments become accountable
to both the central government and the citizens. If citizens are dissatisfied with the
public service provided by the local government, they will complain, not to the
central government or the Parliament, but to their elected local officials. Similarly,
the risk of losing elections because of having performed poorly in the management
of local affairs threatens primarily local politicians and not the members of Parlia-
ment. The responsibility of the centre is at best limited to the provision of adequate
revenue powers that allow the local tier to execute their mandatory functions.
Another theoretical difference between deconcentration and delegation is in
the liberty of action that the service-providing entity enjoys. Table . does not
tell in which functions local governments act as simple territorial agents of the
central government (deconcentration) and in which functions they have a certain
room for manoeuvre (delegation). This piece of information would require an
in-depth analysis of several dozens of sector-specific laws, and chances are good
that we find a coexistence of both forms within one law. One of the few categories
of local public services that are explicitly deconcentrated, and not delegated, is the
management of administrative procedures. Here, equity considerations call for an
identical treatment of citizens whose preferences are homogeneous with regard to
Table 5.3: Current expenditures of municipalities by function, 2002
[Source: the author, based on Ministry of the Interior (2003)]
Function Capital city4 Towns Villages Total
In million HUF (at current prices)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 3,259 6,288 2,052 11,599
Construction, maintenance and 
renovation of buildings1
648 1,128 1,145 2,921
Transport and telecommunication 5,779 6,294 2,113 14,186
Real estate management,  
community amenities2 
220,392 233,171 131,223 584,786
Other economic affairs3 13,545 46,567 20,712 80,823
Education 79,246 204,664 105,459 389,369
Health care 69,930 113,853 24,019 207,802
Social protection 30,456 47,102 14,215 91,773
Sewage and waste management,  
cleaning of public spaces
5,498 11,909 10,237 27,644
Recreation, culture and sports 16,176 29,824 7,898 53,899
Total 444,929 700,799 319,072 1,464,800
As a share of total current expenditures (%)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8
Construction, maintenance and 
renovation of buildings1
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2
Transport and telecommunication 1.3 0.9 0.7 1.0
Real estate management,  
community amenities2 
49.5 33.3 41.1 39.9
Other economic affairs3 3.0 6.6 6.5 5.5
Education 17.8 29.2 33.1 26.6
Health care 15.7 16.2 7.5 14.2
Social protection 6.8 6.7 4.5 6.3
Sewage and waste management,  
cleaning of public spaces
1.2 1.7 3.2 1.9
Recreation, culture and sports 3.6 4.3 2.5 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1 Houses, gas pipelines, public roads, etc.
2 General administration, water supply, public lighting, cemeteries, etc.
3 Publishing, provision of student accommodation, etc.
4 Including capital districts
 the related service. An identical treatment necessitates control and coordination of
local operations by the central authorities.
Finally, one could also argue that the provision of local public goods to which
every citizen has a basic right according to the Constitution (e.g. primary educa-
tion, basic health care and social care) calls for deconcentration. By contrast, the
provision of other public goods that represent national priorities but no funda-
mental citizen rights and are provided by ‘a dominant cluster of local governments’,
as P K () proposes (e.g. secondary education, specialised health
care), should rather be delegated and encouraged (or compensated) with specific
grants. In Hungary, however, most sector-specific laws start with a normative
statement about the right of access of citizens in general, or the relevant target
group in particular (e.g. pupils, the disabled, the insured), to the products and
services related to the given policy area, and employ this statement as an argument
for legitimating the mandatory character of the assignment. It seems thus as if all
these functions were deconcentrated.
The logic pursued by the Hungarian legislator is in certain aspects similar to
the one behind the so-called merit goods (or ‘merit wants’, a term coined by M-
, , p.  ff.) such as education or basic health care. There, consumers
underestimate the benefits they can potentially derive from, but also the positive ex-
ternalities that they produce by consuming, those goods and services (e.g. primary
education or certain vaccines). Under normal market conditions, this situation
would lead to suboptimal provision and consumption levels. In order to adjust
these levels to the social optimum, the state intervenes.
In the Hungarian case, the legislator appears to find that some local governments
could possibly undervalue the importance of certain public goods and services.
By providing less than the ‘social optimum’ defined in the law, they could violate
certain fundamental citizen rights. The state intervenes, not by providing these
goods and services on its own, but by delegating their provision to the municipal
tier and by defining certain standards with respect to quality and quantity. Local
governments are allowed to provide more, but not less, than this compulsory
minimum. If we consider the etymology of the term ‘merit goods’, we may indeed
think of goods that (are considered so important that) every member of the society
should have access to them (‘to merit’, ‘to deserve’); here, the reference to funda-
mental citizen (or consumer) rights comes very close to Musgrave’s interpretation
of the term.
Delegation as a rule is not surprising in the domains of public order and safety,
primary education, basic health care, or waste management. Access to these
services helps citizens exercise their fundamental and universal right to a safe and
supportive living environment irrespective of the jurisdiction in which they live.
However, the range of merit goods in the Hungarian law is substantially wider
than that and includes libraries and sports facilities, cultural programmes, the
protection of children and youth, or the daily meal service for homebound people.
In other countries, many of these goods and services feature in the category of
devolved functions; local governments are free to decide whether to provide them
or not. In Hungary, they are simply mandatory. We do not know whether this
practice has to do anything with a possible ambition of the central government
to preserve the social, educational and other achievements of four decades of
socialism. The mandates concerning children and youth policy or the services to
the homebound may just as well derive from the objective of protecting minority
interests. In any case, the elimination of the local supply-demand mechanism
in such a wide range of public services involves costs: it reduces the expenditure
autonomy of local governments and imposes a burden on the centre to ensure
equal access by providing targeted assistance to the less wealthy jurisdictions.
.. Mandatory functions
and the insistence on
self-sufficiency
The ongoing discussion about the pressure on local
governments and the claims of these latter about
their lack of capacity and the related difficulty to
meet mandatory responsibilities reveal that there is
still considerable confusion among local policymakers about the difference between
steering and rowing.
In the view of academics and practitioners dealing with fiscal decentralisation in
Hungary, one of the most important weaknesses of the current scheme of responsi-
bility assignment is the lack of respect for disparities in the size of municipalities
and their level of economic development. Several authors identified this as a
serious problem (OECD, , p. ; F et al., ; H et al., ;
K N, , p. ). They argue that the constitutional provision
that provides the possibility to assign different competences to different categories
of self-governing administrative units (see Section .) also implies a potential for
a differentiation among municipalities according to their size or status. Yet, the
Parliament has hardly ever made use of this provision so far. Social care (with
the exception of the daily meal service for the homebound) and the maintenance
of sewage systems are two of the rare examples where the scope of responsibility
depends on the size of the municipality. For the overwhelming majority of man-
dated functions, local governments are treated homogeneously, or differentiation
is made along other, less plausible criteria.
Experts tend to overemphasise the problem particularly against the background
 of a fragmented territorial structure that allows neither the realisation of scale
economies nor the development of sufficient technical and administrative capaci-
ties within the municipality. However, this line of reasoning neglects the possibility
of joint service provision. In fact, the problem is not the lack of differentiation in
the assignment of responsibilities (steering). In most of the federal and decentralised
systems (except for a few such as Spain and France), the national constitution treats
all units of the same government tier as equals, regardless of size or any other char-
acteristics, for the assignment of revenue and expenditure competences. The fact
that the Hungarian Constitution distinguishes several categories of administrative
units at the same (municipal) level makes therefore possible but not necessary for
the legislative to pursue a differentiated assignment of responsibilities.
In this context, the conceptual difference between the responsibility for, and
the delivery of, public services (steering vs rowing) becomes particularly relevant.
What the Hungarian legislative presumably meant by the term ‘responsibility’ is
an obligation to organise, or provide access to, the service, which corresponds to
steering. Whether the local government meets this obligation by using its own
production capacities, by purchasing the service from outside, or by delivering it
in co-operation with other municipalities (all these are various modes of rowing),
is normally left to the discretion of the local executive and/or the voters. If a
local government has not enough administrative, personal or technical capacity
to deliver the service independently, it may (and should, logically) search for a
partnership in order to fulfil its duties imposed by the law. Such a choice is not
going to reduce its expenditure autonomy by any means. The opposite is true: local
autonomy would be hurt if the legislative decided to centralise the competence or
to delegate it to a higher level of government.
It is true, however, that the wording of the law is ambiguous. The terms biztosít
(‘ensure’) and nyújt (‘provide’) occurring in combination with the name of an
institution that can be interpreted in both physical and abstract sense (e.g. day
care), give little information about the necessary degree of local government in-
volvement in service delivery. Two other factors contribute to the confusion about
the meaning of responsibility. First, there is a sense of ‘local pride’ among local
policymakers that converts the notion of duty into the notion of right (see the
A number of Hungarian policymakers have already recognised this problem but their voices went
unheard. During the parliamentary debate of the Act CXXXV of  on Municipal Associations and
Inter-municipal Co-operation, a centre-right politician said that the problem was not the number
of local government entities but the number of local government offices that execute virtually the
same range of functions (Archives of the Hungarian Parliament, debate of .., contribution
no. ).
discussion of the term ‘competence’, hatáskör, in Section ..); the result is a bias in
favour of autonomous solutions and self-sufficiency in every aspect of local public
administration. Second, this sense of ‘local pride’ has been matched, at least until
the end of the s, with an intergovernmental legal and financial system that
provided stronger incentives for the separation and self-sustaining development of
municipalities than for interjurisdictional co-operation and the rationalisation of
service delivery.
Following these arguments, it can be argued that local expenditure autonomy
is reduced, not by the lack of differentiation in the assignment of responsibilities
and the subsequent ‘overloading’ of small jurisdictions, but by the poor flexibility
of several municipalities to adapt the service delivery function to the statutory
assignment of expenditures. This incapacity imposes an endogenous constraint on
expenditure autonomy. At the same time, the responsibility of the legislative for
creating the necessary conditions for a smooth adjustment is not to be overlooked.
In the following section, we temporarily digress from the topic of local expenditure
autonomy to discuss what we consider a major flaw in the current assignment
scheme. Namely, wherever the legislative allows for some kind of a differentiation
in the assignment, the applied criteria are manifold and have little economic
foundation.
.. Differentiated
assignment and the logic
behind it
When combing through the sector-specific laws to
find instances of differentiation in the assignment of
responsibilities to municipalities, one can observe that
differentiation is primarily made along two dimen-
sions. The first one may be called the object of responsibility. Some laws oblige
a selected category (or categories) of local governments to provide access to a
particular service (i.e., to steer). Others oblige them not only to provide access
but also to maintain and operate the facilities related to the given service (i.e., to
row). The second dimension is what we call the subject of responsibility: this is
the category (or categories) of municipalities to which the obligation of steering
and/or rowing applies. This distinction allows us to place the existing assignment
patterns into a two-dimensional matrix (Figure .).
While the most typical assignment pattern is A (no differentiation), the law con-
tains also several examples of the patterns B to H. Since differentiated assignment
is more an exception than the rule, the variety of the differentiation criteria is not
worrying. Nevertheless, it raises questions about the logic of differentiation and its
impact on intergovernmental relations.
Concerning the differentiation in the object of responsibility, the obligation to

Every 
municipality
Selected 
categories
Only if 
population 
exceeds 
threshold
Only those 
with facilities
Other criteria
Obliged to provide access to 
the service (steer)
A B C D E
Obliged to maintain and 
operate own facilities related 
to the service (steer and row)
– F G H –
Examples
A All municipalities are obliged to provide access to:
– drinking water provision (Act LXV of 1990, art. 8 para. 4) 
– day care, kindergarten and primary education (Act LXXIX of 1993, art. 86 para. 1)
– basic health care and primary school health services (Act CLIV of 1997, art. 152 para. 1)
– home nursing, meals for the disabled (Act III of 1993, art. 86 para. 1)
– library services, cultural programmes and sports (Act CXL of 1997, art. 64 and 76–77;  
Act I of 2004, art. 55)
– maintenance of local public roads and public cemeteries (Act LXV of 1990, art. 8 para. 4), etc.
B Towns with county rights are obliged to provide basic social services, temporary accommodation of all sorts, 
nursing homes for the elderly, and assume two other items from the list of mandatory tasks of the counties, 
according to local preferences (Act III of 1993, art. 90 para. 2).
C Municipalities are obliged to provide basic social services according to the following criteria (Act III of 1993,  
art. 86 para. 2):
(a) if pop. > 2,000: assistance to families
(b) if pop. > 3,000: (a) + social day care facility for the elderly
(c) if pop. > 10,000: (a) + (b) + home nursing in medical alert system, social day care facility open to all,  
(until 31.12.2008:) support services and community centres for addicts and psychiatric individuals
(d) if pop. > 30,000: (a) + (b) + (c) + temporary accommodation of all sorts
(e) if pop. > 50,000: (a) + (b) + (c) + (d) + street workers
D Municipalities are obliged to maintain and operate the hospitals and specialised outpatient care facilities in 
their ownership or usage  (Act CLIV of 1997, art. 152 para. 3). Municipalities having no such facilities in their 
jurisdiction are not obliged to provide access to the related service.
E Municipalities belonging to so-called ‘sewage agglomerations’ characterised by a wastewater emission of 
higher than 2‘000 population equivalents are obliged to organise the collection and secondary treatment of 
wastewater and construct the necessary infrastructure in collaboration with the rest of the agglomeration  
(Act LVII of 1995, art. 4 para. 2).
F Towns with county rights and other towns are obliged to establish and maintain own cultural facilities  
(Act CXL of 1997, art. 76).
Towns with county rights are obliged to maintain a child welfare centre, regardless of population size  
(Act XXXI of 1997, art. 94 para. 4).
G Municipalities are obliged to maintain various facilities for children and youth protection according to the 
following criteria (Act XXXI of 1997, art. 94 para. 3):
(a) if pop. > 10,000: day care (for children of 0–3 years)
(b) if pop. > 20,000: (a) + temporary accommodation for children
(c) if pop. > 30,000: (a) + (b) + temporary accommodation for families
(d) if pop. > 40,000: (a) + (b) + (c) + child welfare centre
H Fire fighting and rescue services belong to the mandatory responsibilities of those local governments that 
are operating a public or voluntary fire brigade (Act XXXI of 1996, art. 2 para. 2). Municipalities are obliged 
to maintain and operate the sports facilities in their ownership (Act I of 2004, art. 55 para. 1). Municipalities 
having no such facilities are not obliged to establish any; nonetheless they are obliged to provide access to the 
related services through outsourcing, inter-municipal co-operation etc.
Figure 5.2: Assignment criteria for the mandatory tasks of municipalities, as of
31.12.2006 [Source: the author]
maintain and/or operate service-related facilities is objectionable insofar as one
of the declared goals of the central government is to grant local governments the
greatest possible freedom with regard to the parameters of service delivery. Rowing
autonomy is indeed provided for the great majority of public services and there
appears to be no economic or other argument in support of maintaining these few
exceptional arrangements.
As for the differentiation in the subject of responsibility, the underlying motive
is clearly to impose a proportionally heavier burden on municipalities with greater
fiscal capacity. Large towns, especially those owning and running several service
facilities, tend to be financially strong. However, it is hard to find an argument
for the conditionality of specialised health care provision upon the availability
of related facilities in the jurisdiction (pattern D). The approach suggests that
municipalities owning such facilities are in some way better suited to provide
the related services than those that would first need to establish the necessary
infrastructure. Similarly, it is not clear either why population size is a relevant
criterion for the differentiation in the assignment of social service responsibilities
(patterns C and G); in fact, as we will see below, particularly in the domain of social
care, this approach is highly counterproductive.
Beyond the fact that its logical foundation is at least arguable, the assignment
rule for specialised health services also represents an important hindrance to local
autonomy as well as to local economic development. Box . provides some
background information about the functioning of the multi-level health sector.
Box 5.1: Health care: assignment rules and financing
The Act XXXIII of 1991 on the Transfer of State Property to Local Authorities transferred
the ownership right related to former state property to those SNGs that were actually
providing the related public service. In practice, this meant that SNGs inherited all facilities
that were situated in their jurisdictions. In consequence, municipalities hold now the
majority of primary health care, outpatient and basic inpatient care facilities, while the
central government (ministries and universities) and the counties provide more specialised
out- and inpatient care in large hospitals. Art. 152 para. 3 of the Act CLIV of 1997
The Act CXXXII of  on the Development of the Health Care System that entered into force on
.. restricts the scope of this rule to the owners of those few hospitals that have been selected
to participate in the network of key facilities funded by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).
The smallest local governments are not among these. Nevertheless, since our period of analysis
is – and the reason behind the current reform is not the poor logical link between the
availability and the successful operation of facilities, we discuss here the original assignment rule.
For an overview of the health sector, see e.g. O and B () and F et al. ().

on Health Care obliges decentralised authorities at both municipal and county levels to
guarantee the continuous operation of the outpatient and inpatient health care facilities
in their ownership or usage.
According to the Act LXVIII of 1996 on the Territorial Supply of Health Services and Re-
gional Capacity Norms and the Act XXXIV of 2001 on the Territorial Supply of Specialised
Health Services and the Amendment of Various Laws related to Health Care, the territorial
competence of a facility (the area from which it is obliged to receive patients) is defined in
a so-called capacity agreement between the managers and the owners of the facility and
the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).
Since April 1998, the reimbursement of operational expenditures has followed the so-
called fee-for-service system in which, the overall budget being closed-ended, the value of
a service unit (or ‘performance point’) depends on the aggregate number of service units
provided throughout the country in a given period. It is up to the management to ensure
that they stay within the limits of their budget and continue to satisfy the demand for
health services within their territorial competence. In July 2006, the central government
decided to freeze the maximum amount of annual cost reimbursement from the NHIF at
a level of 95 per cent of the actual outlays of the penultimate year (Government Decree
132/2006 concerning the Amendment of Government Decree 43/1999 on the Detailed
Rules of Financing Health Services from the Health Insurance Fund).
Beneficiary jurisdictions are not obliged to offer any contribution to the outlays incurred
by the provider jurisdiction, but hospitals are allowed to refuse patients coming from out-
side their territory (as laid down in the capacity agreement) or, alternatively, to apply price
discrimination to patients according to where they live. A recent study of the National
Health Insurance Fund (Danó, 2006) shows that one-fifth of the patients choose a hos-
pital outside the competence area to which they officially belong. The hospitals in Pest
County (not including those of Budapest) treat altogether only 43 per cent of the citi-
zens belonging to their competence area (57 per cent migrate elsewhere); while in Heves
County this rate is 70 per cent. While migration towards Budapest may be explained with
the better infrastructure, the reasons for other cross-country migration flows are unclear
and the trend contradicts the experience of other countries. However, new admission
rules recently adopted in a few hospitals suggest that the announced budgetary restric-
tions may effectively reduce patient migration.
In order to compensate provider jurisdictions for the benefit spillover they produce, the
central government offers them a grant supplement which, however, is not adjusted to
the marginal costs of treating external beneficiaries. Moreover, while current expenses are
reimbursed on a regular basis, grants for capital investments are provided case by case.
As K (, p. ) observes, the exclusive assignment of health care
functions to jurisdictions running health care facilities imposes on selected SNGs
(municipalities and counties) a responsibility that goes beyond the scope of their
local affairs. Namely, it obliges them to continue providing outpatient and hospital
services to the inhabitants of the surrounding (or constituting) municipalities even
if these latter have never empowered (contracted) the provider. Simultaneously, the
rule reduces the chances that the surrounding (or constituting) municipalities will
search another way of organising service delivery (special service district, contract
with private providers, etc.) Therefore, the current assignment rule imposes a
direct and an indirect legal constraint on the expenditure autonomy of the provider
and beneficiary jurisdictions, respectively.
Particularly small municipalities with low financial capacity consider this incon-
venience largely compensated by the fact that no legal rule obliges them to pay the
full price of using the facilities in the provider jurisdiction. Simultaneously, the
facility owner (and thus the provider jurisdiction) is probably not interested in de-
manding a cost contribution, if serving patients from the beneficiary jurisdictions
permits a better exploitation of the capacities and the realisation of economies of
scale. In this case, the increment in the received reimbursement (NHIF fees and
grant supplement from the central government) is likely to exceed the marginal
costs of enhanced service provision. However, this phenomenon does not diminish
what we will call the problem of asymmetric responsibility: the risk of a deficit
in the health care budget and the burden of correcting this deficit are distributed
unevenly among SNGs. Those running one or more health care facilities are sup-
posed to bear the financial consequences of (i) possible decreases in the value of
the NHIF performance point, (ii) sudden cuts in the cost reimbursement rates
(like the one introduced in July , see Box .), and (iii) the limited availability
of grant supplements and financial aid for investment.
Bound by the capacity agreements that define the groups of population to be
served, providers cannot adjust the expenditure side of their budget to decreases in
the reimbursement level, except if they find a potential for improving cost efficiency.
On the revenue side, the situation varies from one government tier to another. For
municipalities, the pressure on those taxpayers who reside in a provider jurisdiction
will thus rise, while those living in beneficiary jurisdictions will at worst experience
some deterioration in overall service quality, but no direct budgetary consequences.
In contrast to municipalities, counties have even less room for manoeuvre because
the law does not grant them any taxing power. Counties hold . per cent of
all hospitals and . per cent of all hospital beds in the country (NHIF, ),
representing the highest and most cost-intensive level of specialised health care
and serving vast territories.
The migration of patients towards jurisdictions with highly specialised (or just
better equipped) hospitals imposes a great pressure on Budapest and other cities as
 well. The only way they can fend off the ‘invasion’ of patients coming from outside
their territory is by setting higher fees or refusing admission.
Because of the lack of interest on the beneficiary side and sometimes even
on the provider side (depending on the relationship between the marginal costs
and benefits of service extension), interjurisdictional compensation schemes are
not likely to arise spontaneously. If municipalities with specialised health care
facilities were not obliged to continue operations, they would probably provide a
lower service level than what is optimal from the point of view of the society, as
Courchene and his fellow authors suggest: ‘Leaving the supply of public services
with wider benefit areas to smaller units of government is likely to result in the
inefficient underprovision of services, with taxpayers unwilling to pay for services
provided to others. An example is a tertiary public hospital providing regional
services that is financed solely by a single municipality (C et al., ,
p. ).’
Against this background, the supplement grant provided by the central govern-
ment is a meaningful measure to compensate (at least partially) for the benefit
spillover produced by the provider jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it perpetuates the
unsatisfactory status quo insofar as it boosts the budgets of provider jurisdictions
and possibly holds them back from demanding a higher fee from external patients.
Furthermore, spillover effects normally decrease as distance grows so that they ben-
efit the neighbouring jurisdictions only. This calls for horizontal transfers between
the provider jurisdiction and the beneficiaries. There is no apparent reason why the
centre should intervene with a vertical transfer financed by taxpayers throughout
the entire society (D and M, , p. ).
To sum up, provider municipalities are forced to charge local taxpayers (and
counties are forced to cut other expenditures) in order to offer a regional service
with a sizeable infrastructure that perhaps does not even satisfy the needs of
beneficiaries in the end. Even if the initial territorial distribution of hospitals and
specialised outpatient facilities took account of the size and shape of the related
benefit areas (suppose that the central planning in the s was correct), shifts are
possible over time, so that today the inheritors of state assets find themselves in a
trap. From the point of view of both allocative efficiency and equity, the situation
is suboptimal.
Interestingly, and much to the relief of several provider jurisdictions, the rule on
the mandatory maintenance and operation of existing facilities is not as stringent
as the law might suggest. Namely, provider municipalities can escape from the
trap by transferring their facility to the county (see Section ..) that is obliged
to take it according to the ALG. The decrease in the NHIF cost reimbursement
levels is likely to prompt some of the municipalities to transfer their loss-making
hospitals (or at least the management function) to the county governments, which
will further deteriorate the financial situation of the latter. Another exit option has
emerged with the health care reform package of  that releases facility owner
SNGs under certain conditions from their duty to maintain existing service levels
(see Section ..). From the allocation perspective, however, it would perhaps be
more reasonable to amend the Act CLIV of  on Health Care in a way to make
SNGs accountable for the health of their citizens rather than for the maintenance
and operation of facilities, as has already been suggested by K (, p. ).
The assignment of welfare and social services (Box .) is marked by a similar
asymmetry. SNGs running a facility are not allowed refuse non-residents coming
from a jurisdiction without such facility, if the latter made use of the service before
the Act III of  on Social Administration and Social Services entered into force.
The underlying principle is that vested rights (here: the access to social services)
should not be affected by legislation modifying the previous status quo. This would
be a reasonable argument if the rights were vested in the beneficiaries as individuals.
In this case, ideally, the central government would assume the duty to pay the costs
of social care for those individuals who are concerned by the change of legal rules.
The duty of the central government would then expire with the decease of the
last beneficiary concerned. However, in the actual system, the rights are vested in
jurisdictions instead of individuals. Hence, the law perpetuates the existing status
quo by obliging provider jurisdictions to continue offering social services to new
generations of beneficiaries as long as similar infrastructure remains unavailable
in their home jurisdiction. This arrangement is asymmetrical, as it requires only
those SNGs that inherited former state property, or created new infrastructure
before the adoption of the law, to carry the burden of previous legal regulations.
Another problem with the assignment of welfare and social services is in the
assignment criterion itself. Recent studies on social policy in the seven development
regions of Hungary (NIFSP, ) revealed that the delegation of responsibilities
based on population size is too rigid and the resulting territorial distribution of
social service facilities hardly corresponds to citizens’ needs. Given the fact that
municipalities with less than , inhabitants are obliged to provide only home
nursing and meal service for disabled persons, access to care in the excessively
fragmented rural areas is scarce, although the needs are acute. In the Central
Art.  para. /b ALG.
Act CXXXII of  on the Development of the Health Care System.
 Transdanubian region, for instance,  per cent of the municipalities have less than
, inhabitants and many of them provide not even the legally defined minimum
level of social services; yet, for lack of systematic control by higher authorities,
their incompliance remains mostly hidden. The entire scale of services is available
only in those six towns that fall into the highest population category (larger than
,). The observed mismatch between delegated expenditures and actual needs
has also been confirmed by the State Audit Office (SAO, b). This latter survey
involving  municipalities also points to the growing horizontal disparities in the
access to basic social services.
Alike in the domain of health care, beneficiary jurisdictions contribute little, if
anything, to the social expenditures incurred by the provider jurisdiction. Whether
the provider jurisdiction requires external beneficiaries to pay a higher fee for the
services depends on its potential to realise economies of scale by accepting those
beneficiaries.
Villages in rural areas increasingly recognise the need for inter-municipal co-
operation that enables them to offer at least a basic level of social services to their
constituency. The number of single- and multi-purpose districts for social services
(with formal cost sharing agreements) is on the rise. Yet, there are still some traces
of resistance against this form of service provision. According to T (,
p. ), several villages are afraid of losing control over their social policies once
they engage in an association with a dominant core municipality. This concern
is justified insofar as most of these villages lack the professional capacity that is
necessary for gaining an overview of the complex service agreements. At the same
time, the terms of service provision and financial compensation emerge from
a negotiation process in which all members of the associations can assert their
interests. A cross-regional study revealed a phenomenon more worrying than the
loss of influence of individual SNGs: the quality of the services provided in the
framework of an inter-municipal association tends to deteriorate as the number of
participating SNGs (and beneficiaries) increases. The dysfunctional character of
large associations has been observed in the northern and western regions of the
country (NIFSP, ).
As it is particularly difficult to convince the smallest and most remote villages
about the advantages of co-operation, residents of many of these jurisdictions are
still totally excluded from the benefits of basic social care, despite of their enhanced
need for assistance.
The scarcity of primary social services (such as family assistance) in rural areas
drives villagers towards the more costly secondary level of social services, especially
to institutions that provide shelter or inpatient clinical care K (, p. ).

Box 5.2: Welfare and social services: assignment rules and financing
In contrast to health care, the responsibility of providing welfare and social services de-
pends not on the availability of the related infrastructure but on population size (see
Figure 5.2). As a general rule (art. 89 of the Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and
Social Services), SNGs are not obliged to provide social services beyond the geographical
boundaries of their jurisdiction, except if a valid service contract or inter-municipal agree-
ment provides otherwise. However, SNGs running a social service facility are not allowed
to refuse non-residents coming from a jurisdiction without such facility, if the latter had
been using the facility before the law entered into force. This rule applies even if the
beneficiary jurisdiction does not contribute to the costs of service provision (art. 90 para.
3 of the Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Services; art. 94 para. 7 of the
Act XXXI of 1997 on the Protection of Children and Guardianship Administration).
Capacity-based (so-called normative) grants cover a part of the social service outlays
of SNGs, although there is no obligation to use these funds for social policy purposes. In
fact, several SNGs divert them towards other spending purposes, even if there is a visible
need for improvement in the level of social services. Therefore, while statistics are explicit
about the amount of grants provided to SNGs for social policy purposes, it is impossible
to calculate how much SNGs effectively spend on this domain. The amount of these
capacity-based grants is subject of political bargaining and varies thus from one year to
another, while its value has been decreasing in real terms since the beginning of the 1990s
(Krémer et al., 2002, p. 108). Further resources in the service of social policy include the
personal income tax share, various investment grants as well as local taxes.
Benefit spillovers produced by large municipalities are compensated from the central
budget only insofar as they are reflected in the difference in capacities (e.g. the number
of beds in a shelter for the homeless). No legal rule exists that would oblige benefi-
ciary jurisdictions to contribute to the costs incurred by the provider jurisdiction. Cost
sharing agreements arise therefore almost exclusively in the framework of inter-municipal
co-operation where they constitute a compulsory element of the service contract.
 This leads in these facilities to an overutilisation of existing capacities and long
waiting lists, causing administrative and financial bottlenecks on the provider’s
side.
In summary, the current assignment of social service responsibilities might take
some account of the financial capacity of jurisdictions inasmuch as we can assume
a positive relationship between this measure and population size. Arguments like
economic rationality or proportionality may then very well justify this assignment
rule. However, the outcome is not flawless from the perspective of interpersonal
equity. It is not clear why the smallest villages, registering the highest demand for
most categories of social assistance, should be exempted from the obligation to
provide access to (i.e., steer) the related services.
The diversity and incoherence of the assignment criteria may also be observed
with regard to the competences of the capital city and the counties. Essentially, we
can distinguish three patterns:
. The county government (the capital city) must provide for those services
that do not belong to the mandatory responsibilities of municipalities (cap-
ital districts), unless these latter are ready to assume them on a voluntary
basis. Examples: secondary and vocational education, student hostels, adult
education, elementary art schools, speech therapy for children; foster homes,
nursing homes, rehabilitation centres, social day care facilities, and tempo-
rary accommodations of all sorts.
. The county government (the capital city, the capital district) is obliged
to maintain and operate the facilities in its ownership (and usage) and
provide the related public services. Examples: hospitals and specialised
outpatient facilities, sports facilities and fire stations. In practice, such
facilities are available in every county and every capital district, which makes
a differentiation similar to the one between patterns D and H (see Figure .)
useless.
. The capital city (the capital district) is obliged to provide the service unless
an agreement between the capital city and the capital districts provides
otherwise. According this rule, the capital city is responsible for providing
night shelter and temporary accommodation for the homeless, while capital
districts must run elementary art schools, primary schools for adults, speech
therapy for children, pedagogical assistance to kindergartens and primary
schools, and temporary nursing of children.
The regulation on the provision of hospitals and specialised outpatient care by
the capital city and the counties is more complicated than what would seem to be
reasonable from an economic point of view. According to the Act CLIV of 
on Health Care, SNGs in both categories are obliged to maintain and operate the
facilities situated in their jurisdictions. The complementary rule laid down in the
ALG in  and in its major amendment of , however, is not the same for
the two categories. For the capital city, hospital and specialised outpatient care is
part of the mandatory public services with a spillover character (services benefiting
two or more capital districts, the entire capital city or the agglomeration). By
contrast, counties are not obliged to assume this competence unless the lower-level
government (municipality) has refused it. The competence in this case will be
transferred from the municipality to the county, with important consequences for
both authorities. This particular manifestation of the subsidiary role of counties
will be the subject of the following section with which we return already to our
original subject, namely, subnational expenditure autonomy.
.. Competence transfer
between municipalities and
counties
Beside the improvement in local accountability and
the equal access to basic public services, the legisla-
tive in the early s also sought to ensure that
the supply of local public goods and services are
tailored to the needs of the local population to the greatest possible extent. For
this reason, the ALG grants the power of general competence to all SNGs (they are
allowed to assume any competence that has not been assigned to another level of
government) as well as a number of asymmetric rights to the municipalities.
First, the ALG authorises local governments to reclaim any competence otherwise
delegated to local governments with a larger population, as well as county seats
and inter-municipal associations to reclaim any competence otherwise delegated
to the counties. Concerning this latter provision, counties are obliged to cede the
function to the requesting local government for a period of at least three years if,
in the preceding four years, more than fifty per cent of beneficiaries were residents
of the municipality.
G (, p. ) finds that this rule is in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity because ‘the county governments cannot refuse to pass the responsi-
bility for service provision to the municipalities if the latter are willing to accept it’.
Art. /A para. n ALG.
Art.  para. /b ALG.
Art.  para.  ALG
Art.  para. b; art.  para. ; art.  para. – ALG.
 Although subsidiarity in a narrow sense means something else (see Section .),
Gaál’s argumentation is in line with the broad interpretation of the principle that
the Council of Europe published ten years after the elaboration of the European
Charter of Local Self-Government. In this document, the Committee of Ministers
recommends that the governments of the member states
– implement principles of organisation of powers designed to match powers
with the characteristics (resources, size, geographical location, etc.) of the local
and regional authorities;
– adopt experimental legislative and administrative measures to this effect (for
example possibility for local authorities to give up certain powers and transfer
them to a higher level, or, conversely, possibility for certain local authorities—
in particular those of medium and large cities—to amass powers belonging to
different levels of local and regional authorities; [. . . ] (C  E,
, p. ).
This type of competence transfer, from the county to the municipality, is most char-
acteristic for secondary education and education-related services such as student
hostels. If the extraterritorial responsibility of the service-providing municipality
derives from a previous county competence, the municipality receives the amount
of central government grant that would otherwise accrue to the county. It cannot,
however, reclaim any additional support neither from the county nor from the
central government, nor refuse the demand of beneficiaries coming from outside
its jurisdiction. This clause of the ALG implies that monetary transfer flows are
always vertical and that the beneficiary jurisdictions do not need to pay for the
services offered by the providing jurisdiction. A formal agreement between the
provider and the beneficiaries is not necessary either.
Second, the law also allows municipalities to shift to the county any mandatory
function they are unable to meet for whatever reason. If, according to the ALG
or the relevant sector-specific law, the county has a subsidiary (complementary)
responsibility for the function in question, then it is obliged to take over the
function. The central government grant is then transferred to the county instead
of the municipality. Examples of this type of competence transfer, from the
municipality to the county, include the maintenance and operation of hospitals,
specialised outpatient health care facilities, secondary schools, vocational schools
and student hostels, as well as public order and safety.
Art.  para.  ALG.
Art.  para. a–b ALG
Figure . shows the variety of possible attitudes of municipalities towards their
mandatory and optional expenditure functions as well as the impact of these
attitudes on the counties.
In the domains of mandatory responsibilities, the municipality will normally
make an effort to comply with the law but might not succeed for a variety of
reasons (scarceness of resources, ill-designed budget, a sudden rise in demand,
etc.). As for the optional responsibilities, the municipality is free to decide whether
to assume or to ignore these. Thus, with regard to both mandatory and optional
responsibilities, there are two possible outcomes: providing or not providing the
service.
Theoretical thinking would suggest that either the law or fiscal disincentives,
or at least the local electorate, would sanction those local executives that neglect
their mandatory functions. The latter type of sanction should also be effective with
regard to optional functions, i.e. when the local executive decides not to provide a
service for which, however, there is an apparent local demand. In practice, however,
these sanctions are mostly ineffective.
Legal sanctions are virtually inexistent, since the enforcement of sector-specific
quality standards (if there is any) is usually weak, the implementation of the
regulations on local government tasks is not monitored, and counties or central
authorities control the output only sporadically (H, ; T, ;
P K, ).
Fiscal sanctions exist but follow with a year’s delay. The majority of operational
grants are unconditional, and although they are allocated upon the basis of sector-
specific measures of capacity or need, nothing hinders local governments from
using the amount for a completely different purpose. Thus, grants received in
proportion to the number of beneficiaries in the homes for the elderly can very
well serve the purpose of financing teachers’ salaries in primary schools. Given
the fact that legal sanctions for the non-compliance with mandatory responsi-
bilities are weak, such intra-budget reallocations bear practically no risk. The
sanction comes only in the following fiscal year: the norms-based grant is then
shortened proportionally to the decline in the activities of day care centres. If
own-source revenue is scarce and public services are predominantly financed out
of central government grants, the absence or weakness of sanctions makes that
local governments systematically ignore policy areas that they consider irrelevant
for the local economic development, or where citizens’ interests are not sufficiently
In the domain of public education, an important step towards regular quality control was the
foundation of the National Public Education Evaluation and Examination Centre (OKÉV), a central
government authority, in September .
 M U N I C I P A L I T Y
MANDATORY 
FUNCTIONS
OPTIONAL 
FUNCTIONS
Obliged to 
maintain own 
facility (obliged to 
steer and to row)
Obliged to 
provide access to 
the service but 
free to choose 
how (obliged to 
steer, free to row)
Maintain existing facility
Establish new facility
Free to choose 
whether to 
provide a service 
and if yes, how 
(free to steer and 
to row) 
Close facility
Do without facility
Shift facility to county
Provide via own facility, 
service contract, PPP 
etc.
Shift demand to county
Shift function to county
Provide via own facility, 
service contract, PPP 
etc.
Not provide
Municipality may take over county functions
if these serve mainly the local population
Ignore the function
 comply
 not comply
 not comply 
 comply 
Figure 5.3: Mechanisms of competence transfer [Source: the author]
C O U N T Y
MANDATORY 
FUNCTIONS
OPTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
TRANSFERRED 
FUNCTIONS
Exit / voice
No legal or fiscal sanction
Exit / voice
No legal or fiscal sanction
County must take over the function
in domains of subsidiary responsibility
Wrong utilisation of county facilities
Exit / voice
County must assume the function
in domains of subsidiary responsibility
County must take over the facility
in domains of subsidiary responsibility
under limitations
 well-organised. Therefore, the latest amendments of the Act III of  on Social
Administration and Social Services oblige local governments to contract out the
service or to create municipal associations if they are unable to deliver the service
on their own, and to cede the corresponding part of their grant revenue to the
organisation that actually delivers the service.
As for the sanctioning by voters, in Figure . we borrowed the terms ‘exit’ and
‘voice’ from H’s () political model. These indicate that voters might
not re-elect the mayor (‘voice’) or even quit the jurisdiction (‘exit’, fiscally induced
migration) if they are unsatisfied with the net benefit resulting as the difference
between the actual level of public services and the local tax bill. ‘Voice’ is usually an
effective way of sanctioning local policymakers, yet statistics show that at every local
government election in Hungary, at least two thirds of the mayors are re-elected
(although their share is decreasing: : %, : %, : %). According
to the results of a recent investigation about this phenomenon (B, ),
small municipalities tend to re-elect their mayors because the number of potential
candidates in their jurisdiction is limited (see ‘tacit elections’ in Section ..), while
in large municipalities re-election is more motivated by the local customs and the
personal qualities of the mayor. Remarkably, the income situation of the local
constituency and the level of economic development do not seem to influence the
election results. The weak impact of the local economic situation is also true for
the ‘exit’ option. In comparison to Western Europe and the United States, Hungary
has been recording relatively low rates of taxpayer mobility due to the traditional
rootedness of people, the underdeveloped state of the real estate market (especially
the rent market) and the comparably high costs of relocation. Depending on the
nature of their business activity, enterprises can relocate more easily, yet there have
been few examples of such moves so far.
The weakness of sanctions makes the ignorance of mandatory expenditures
(i.e. non-compliance) a valid option. Despite this fact, most local governments
choose to stay within the bounds of law and simply shake off the responsibility
for the function. This is represented by the continuous arrows in Figure .. In
principle, one could argue that shaking off the responsibility is also a valid decision
in the framework of steering and, from the point of satisfying citizens’ needs,
it is undoubtedly better than simple ignorance. The figure demonstrates that
See art.  of the Act LXXIX of , and art.  of the Act IV of .
According to a recent study (D, ), the volume of internal migration sunk drastically in
the early s and recovered only around . Due to a brain drain towards Western Hungary,
the eastern and southern regions of the country face the challenge of an ageing population and
growing social problems.
when a municipal government declares itself to be unable to meet its mandated
responsibility (be it steering or rowing) or is passive with regard to voluntary
expenditure functions, then the county is obliged to stand in, provided that it has
subsidiary responsibility for the given function. Depending on the nature of the
mandate, the county then has to take over the maintenance and operation of the
service facility, the overall responsibility for the service, or both. If the county
has no subsidiary responsibility, then it is free to accept or refuse the demand of
the municipality. Any service provision by the county is then regulated through
either a service contract (which obliges the municipality to pay for the service) or a
reorientation of the corresponding share of central government grants from the
beneficiary jurisdiction (municipality) towards the provider jurisdiction (county).
Another repercussion of municipal choices on the counties is the potential over-
utilisation and/or wrong utilisation of existing county facilities. This occurs when
the existing local demand is not satisfied by the municipality but is rolled over to the
county. Particularly in the domain of social services, the existing primary facilities
and services at the municipal level (social day care, daily nursing for old people,
etc.) are often not sufficient in number, or not sufficiently developed, to fulfil
their gatekeeper function. Consequently, national and county-owned facilities that
provide accommodation are overcrowded with beneficiaries who could otherwise
be treated in simple day care facilities. This not only forces beneficiaries to quit
their community of origin in order to use the service but, more importantly, it
increases the costs of service provision and the risk of vertical fiscal imbalance in
the counties (NIFSP, ).
The staggered arrows in Figure . indicate competence transfers in the opposite
direction. Municipalities can pick from all three groups of county competences
(mandatory, transferred and optional functions) with little or no limitation. They
also may choose to take over the responsibility for the maintenance and operation
of certain infrastructures (school or hospital buildings, etc.) without assuming the
responsibility for the related services. In either case, however, the responsibility of
the municipality for the function and/or the asset expires as soon as it returns them
to the county. The county government lacks this kind of flexibility in compiling
its range of competences as well as the freedom to raise taxes in order to cover the
marginal costs of service provision resulting from the competence transfer. On the
other hand, every time a town decides to take over a function or asset, the budget
of the county is somewhat relaxed.
In its recent takeover bid for the Szent György County Hospital in August , one of the motives
of the county seat Székesfehérvár was to ease the fiscal tension that Veszprém county had been
experiencing (HVG O, ).
 Figure . reveals two basic properties of the scheme of expenditure assignment
in Hungary:
. Circularity: municipalities may shift certain competences to, and take over
other competences from, the county.
. Asymmetry: only municipalities are entitled to initiate a competence transfer,
whereas counties must adapt themselves flexibly to municipal decisions (at
least in the domains of subsidiary responsibility).
Although both types of competence transfer (i.e. to and from the counties) are
subject to specific legal conditions and always followed by a redirection of inter-
governmental grants towards the jurisdiction that ultimately assumes the function,
the resulting situation is worrying for several reasons K N (,
p. ):
. In the years following the adoption of the law, county seats, other large
and/or rich towns and well-performing municipal associations have rapidly
seized upon the most attractive public service functions initially assigned to
the counties.
. In policy areas where counties have a subsidiary responsibility, municipalities
coping with vertical fiscal imbalances successfully abandoned some of their
costly and capital-intensive functions (often loaded with depleted assets)
by passing them to the counties. However, counties are not necessarily
better-off or better equipped to ensure an acceptable service level.
. The transfer of a competence is seldom accompanied by the transfer of the
ownership rights of the related assets.
Ad  and 
The real financial and institutional impact of competence transfers is difficult to es-
timate because the annual stock figures on the volume of property of municipalities
and counties (the only statistics currently available) do not allow any conclusion
on the transactions taking place between counties and municipalities. In the two
most important subnational policy areas, education and health care, up to  per
cent of the facilities are in the hands of SNGs (M  E, ;
B et al., ). Recent press reports on selected cases and partial analyses
(e.g. B, ) suggest that in the domain of primary and secondary educa-
tion, municipalities rarely cede the function to the county, as they recognise that
schools play a primordial role in local economic development insofar as they attract
businesses and help keep local population in place. By contrast, in policy areas
considered less crucial for local economic development (e.g. social policy, health
care, and environment), the more an activity is loss-making and the related assets
depleted, the more municipalities are inclined to shift it to the counties, retaining
only the less costly functions for themselves. In other words, the legal obligation of
SNGs authorities to maintain and operate facilities located in their jurisdictions
applies rigorously to counties but not to municipalities. The notion of ‘inability to
provide’ that gives the municipality the green light for the upward shifting, is not
defined in the law, which creates uncertainty for the budgeting in the counties.
The amendment of the ALG in  imposed some more stringent conditions,
prohibiting local governments from shifting competences back and forth every
year. While this measure has improved the predictability of competence transfers
and brought thus some stability into the expenditure system, the dependence of
counties on the behaviour of municipalities remains a major problem. The entire
mechanism of competence shifting is driven and controlled exclusively by the
municipalities. Counties have scarcely any chance to fend off such actions; in
most of the cases, they adapt themselves to the new situation and suffer from the
consequences. It must be noted, however, that sixteen years after transition, local
authorities still consider self-governance and autonomy as a privilege and thus do
not cede any competence unless it is absolutely necessary.
Ad 
A classical example of the separation of ownership rights from management com-
petences is the network of student hostels. For municipalities, this is an optional
expenditure function, but if they are not ready to assume it despite an apparent
demand for student accommodation among the population, then the county must
stand in (subsidiary responsibility). Municipalities hold around  per cent of the
facilities while  per cent are in county property. Churches, non-governmental
organisations and the private sector own the rest (M  E, ,
p. ). Since, by their nature, student hostels primarily benefit the residents of
other jurisdictions, municipalities have little interest in maintaining and operating
them H (, p. ); on the other hand, ceding them to the county could
potentially hurt the attractiveness of the jurisdiction. Counties have a subsidiary
responsibility for the service because of the related spillover effect, yet they cannot
effectively intervene in the management of those  per cent of the facilities that
The notion of ‘inability to provide’ and its possible interpretations were already discussed in Sec-
tion ...
 are in municipal hands. One possible way to remedy this situation is by transfer-
ring the property rights to the counties. Alternatively, a cost contribution scheme
imposed on the beneficiary jurisdictions (or on the beneficiaries directly) could
make municipalities more interested in maintaining and operating facilities that
produce spillover benefits. Interjurisdictional cost-sharing is still in its infancy in
Hungary, as we will see in Section ..
. The costs and benefits of inter-municipal co-operation
For most of the functions delegated or devolved to the subnational tiers, the
ALG and the various sector specific laws allow local governments to choose their
preferred mode of service delivery. The latter can thus decide whether to meet
their responsibilities
. individually or in co-operation with other local government units;
. through internal or external providers (non-governmental organisation,
church, private enterprise);
. if through internal providers: whether through the municipal administration
or an own enterprise.
All these modes of service delivery imply a certain number of challenges for
subnational expenditure autonomy. In the following, we limit the discussion to ,
whereas Section . will deal with  and  together.
While all local governments offer a certain range of public policies, many of
them delegate the steering function to other local governments, retaining only the
ultimate responsibility for the task. The capital city as well as most towns and
large villages in rural areas play the role of (micro-)regional centres and produce a
large range of local public services not only for their own constituency but also for
residents of neighbouring jurisdictions.
As we saw in Section .., a part of this activity (e.g. in the domains of specialised
health care and social services) is induced by sector-specific laws that oblige the
larger jurisdictions to execute the task for the smaller ones in their neighbourhood.
In these instances, the law normally defines the territorial scope of responsibility
of the provider jurisdiction as well as the cost sharing mechanism, or at least it
obliges the involved parties to elaborate a formal agreement. Sector-specific laws
Art.  para.  ALG.
show vast differences in their degree of precision with regard to the definition of
the terms and conditions of co-operation.
The present section deals, not with this model, but with the spontaneous and
voluntary co-operation between municipalities. The choice to co-operate or not
to co-operate is an endogenous one: it results from the autonomy of the local
government units. Hence, many of the constraints on local autonomy that result
from this choice are also endogenous. Nevertheless, the national legal and insti-
tutional framework of inter-municipal co-operation with its various incentives,
restrictions and loopholes also affects the autonomy of local governments and their
attitude towards co-operation. Notably, the legal provisions about cost sharing and
available grants are likely to influence the attractiveness of co-operation.
A balanced relationship between provider and beneficiary jurisdictions calls
for clarity with regard to the terms of service provision and the corresponding
monetary compensation. If the beneficiary jurisdictions take the initiative and
explicitly ask the provider jurisdiction to produce a given service for them, then
the terms and conditions of co-operation will emerge from negotiations between
the parties. Such explicit contracts contain clear performance indicators (targets)
and provisions about the cost sharing between provider and beneficiary jurisdic-
tions. Implicit (or tacit) agreements lack these parameters. Here, the jurisdiction
providing a specific public service (e.g. primary education) decides voluntarily to
extend the benefit area to cover the neighbouring jurisdictions as well, but it does
not necessarily ask (or expect) the latter to contribute to the costs. In exchange, if
the beneficiary jurisdictions do not pay their fair share, they can hardly influence
the parameters of service delivery and the quality and quantity of the output.
Such implicit agreements in Hungary are observed mainly in the domains of pre-
primary, primary and secondary education. About two thirds of the municipalities
maintain some kind of facility on their own, while the rest make use of the services
of a nearby local government H (, p. ). The law itself does not oblige
kindergartens and schools to accept pupils from other jurisdictions; however, once
the municipal council has defined the geographical boundaries of the kindergarten
or school districts, no pupil living within the district can be refused. Depending
on their capacity, the institutions can accept pupils coming from outside the district
as well.
In order to ensure the financial basis of service provision, the central government
withdraws the respective amount of basic norm-based grant from the beneficiary
municipality (whether it is inside or outside the school district) and transfers it to
Art.  para. , art.  para. , art.  para.  of the Act LXXIX of  on Public Education.
 the provider municipality. In addition, the centre offers another type of uncondi-
tional norm-based grant to the provider municipality, the so-called commuter grant,
in order to take account of the commuters who come over from other jurisdictions
and generate additional costs in the provider jurisdiction.
At the same time, however, intergovernmental fiscal arrangements are such
that even the smallest municipalities are encouraged to maintain and manage
their own primary school. There are two types of incentives in this category. The
fact that the quality and quantity of educational services are not systematically
controlled and sanctions against poor performance are virtually inexistent (see
Section ..) acts as a passive incentive. An active incentive is the so-called grant
supplement, an unconditional transfer offered to the smallest municipalities in
the annual budget law, whose amount is based on the number of pupils in the
jurisdiction and which helps tiny village schools survive regardless of their perfor-
mance. The coexistence of the commuter grant for large municipalities and the
grant supplement for small municipalities reflects the lack of coherence that has
characterised the central government policy on village primary schools until most
recently (see Box .). Although small jurisdiction size and the resulting constraint
on expenditure autonomy (see Section ..) could have worked as an automatic
incentive for co-operation, the grant supplement softened this effect and made
villages believe that ‘small is beautiful’. Luckily, the new fiscal incentives available
for inter-municipal co-operation are apparently more attractive than the sum of
the commuter grant and the grant supplement. At least this is what the growing
number of independent school districts (inter-municipal associations specialised
on school maintenance or educational services) suggests.
Box 5.3: Primary schools in villages: is small beautiful?
The present territorial distribution of schools results from two conflictive developments.
On one hand, with the Act XXXIII of 1991 on the Transfer of State Property to Local
Authorities, municipalities running a public school in their jurisdiction became owners of
the school regardless of where the pupils actually came from. On the other hand, the
ALG granted all territorial units the right to manage local affairs independently. Eager to
make use of this new competence, hundreds of municipalities that had no school on their
territory before 1990 established one. The number of primary schools rose rapidly, from
3’526 in the school year 1988/89 to 3,814 in 1994/95, while the number of pupils in
primary school age declined from about 1.24 million to 0.98 million (see Figure 5.4).
By the mid-1990s, vast territorial disparities emerged in terms of access to schools
and the quality of education, due to the naturally unequal distribution of pupils across
jurisdictions (which was directly reflected in the grant allocation) and the inequalities in

the potential of local governments to raise additional funds (Balázs and Hermann, 2002,
p. 68 f.). The lack of organisational capacity and well-qualified staff for the drafting and
implementation of education plans led to an unsustainable situation, particularly in rural
areas. A growing number of villages started to recognise that they were unable to meet
their mandatory responsibilities. The mid-1990s saw therefore the emergence of the first
independent school districts. By 2001, more than 32 per cent of the municipalities (partic-
ularly villages) participated in an association for facility management and another 17 per
cent were co-operating in other specific tasks related to primary education (Imre, 2004).
At the same time, a number of villages felt impelled to close their primary school. By
2004/05, the number of schools declined to 3,293, which is way below the initial level of
1985/86.
The spontaneous process of concentration in primary education is progressing at a
varying pace, depending on the actual policy of the central government. Since 2004,
associations have been eligible for a specific norm-based grant. Halász (2000, p. 43)
observes for the majority of local governments that access to this grant is the major motive
for creating an association; further potential benefits from co-operation, such as quality
or efficiency improvement, are rarely exploited. Although several mayors still consider
primary schools as the cornerstone of local autonomy and a sine qua non of local economic
development, municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants (maintaining more than a
half of the 8-, 10- or 12-grade primary schools) are particularly sensitive to variations
in the demographic trend and the central government grant system (Balogh and Halász,
2003, p. 105).
The policies of primary education funding pursued by the consecutive government
coalitions from 1990 have been fairly controversial. While all cabinets emphasised the
importance of intermunicipal co-operation in primary education, they continued assisting
small villages in the maintenance of their schools (Hermann, 2004). Understandably, this
has reduced the willingness of the villages to work together. Since more recently, the
conflict between the objectives of operational efficiency and social justice (and hence
the conflict between government and opposition) seem to be resolved in a compromise
solution. In September 2005, the central government proposed that villages continue
to run grades 1 to 4 on an individual basis (with additional subsidies, if necessary), but
collaborate for a joint provision of auxiliary tasks such as administration or didactic services
as well as for the education in the last four (or more) grades.
For any additional expenditure not covered by the basic allowance and the
commuter grant together, it is up to the partner municipalities to set up a fair cost-
sharing scheme. The provider jurisdiction may claim the entire cost differential
from the beneficiary municipality. However, as B () observes for the
domain of secondary education, very few of them ever claim any contribution,
knowing about the precarious financial situation of the beneficiary jurisdiction(s)
and the consequent low chance of getting ever paid.

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Figure 5.4: The number of primary schools and pupils between 1985 and 2005
[Source: Halász and Lannert (1998); Ministry of Education (2005)]
The provider jurisdiction is unlikely to be interested in requiring a contribution
from the beneficiary if it expects the amount of transfers (basic norm-based grant,
commuter grant, investment grant, etc.), that is, the marginal revenue resulting
from the adoption of pupils from neighbouring jurisdictions, to be equal or higher
than the marginal expenditure incurred through extended service provision. An
earlier empirical study seems to corroborate this hypothesis. H et al. ()
estimated the average expenditure function in local public education and found
a significant negative correlation between the rate of non-resident pupils and
the average operational expenditures of a municipality on secondary education.
Two mechanisms are at work here. On one hand, accepting pupils from the
neighbouring jurisdiction B imposes an additional financial burden on the provider
jurisdiction A, since the central government grant sinks below the average (per
pupil) expenditure level. Consequently, A has a smaller per capita amount of
revenues to allocate among the different public services including education (unless
it can raise additional revenues through taxation, for instance). On the other hand,
the commuter grant received from the central budget may exceed the marginal cost
of service provision if the extension of the service area allows for a better utilisation
of the existing educational capacities in A.
The potential for a municipality to realise economies of scale in its public
education function and thus realise a gain from the takeover depends on the shape
of the average (per pupil) cost curve and on the exact position of the municipality
on the curve. The shape and the position of the average (per capita or per pupil)
operational expenditure function of municipalities have been explored through
various regression models and empirical tests; however, about the characteristics
of the cost function, no comparable study is available. Analysing micro-data of the
year , H (, p.  ff.) finds that the effect of school size (in terms of
number of pupils) on the average (per pupil) operational expenditure level is the
strongest in villages and minor towns. The potential marginal economies deriving
from a larger school size are continuously decreasing, with the expenditure per
pupil curve reaching its minimum at about  pupils and then slightly increasing
again. The estimated per pupil expenditure function for secondary education
behaves somewhat differently (see Figure .). A more recent study comparing
the average expenditures of village schools (different sizes) and town schools has
confirmed these trends for  (H, ).
In , central budget grants covered about  per cent of public education expenditures realised at
the decentralised levels (B and H, , p. ).

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Figure 5.5: Estimated average operational expenditures as a function of school
size (thousand HUF) [Source: Hermann (2001, 2005)]
However tempting it may be, it is imprudent to assume that the corresponding
average cost curves would follow the same pattern. Depending on the bundle of
education services offered, the revenue situation of the municipality and potentially
existing X-inefficiency in service provision, the course of the cost function may
be different from that of the expenditure function. Nevertheless, we have good
reason to assume that the smallest villages bear the greatest potential to realise
economies of scale in primary education, while larger municipalities typically
acting as providers have less opportunity for cost saving.
This brief excursion into the nature of local educational expenditure and cost
functions shows that under certain circumstances, the provider municipality may
be interested in taking over pupils from neighbouring jurisdictions even if it cannot
realistically expect any direct compensation from the latter. The interference of the
central government with horizontal financial relations among municipalities as
well as the interplay between marginal and average expenditures explain why the
culture of horizontal compensations in service provision is still in its infancy in
Hungary. The recent case of Magyargencs and the surrounding villages (Box .)
illustrates that small local governments prefer relying on external funding of their
services (tax revenue of the partner municipality and/or grants from the central
government), to negotiating an intermunicipal service contract with a formal cost
sharing scheme.
The financial impact of implicit agreements on the provider municipality de-
pends thus on the capacity of the latter to realise economies of scale, as well as
on the relationship between the marginal revenues (commuter grant from the
central budget, cost contribution from the beneficiaries) received and the marginal
costs incurred. If the local government is constrained to produce beyond the
limits of its capacity in order to serve other jurisdictions, the marginal costs of
extending the service area will be higher than the marginal revenue. It is up to the
taxpayers of the provider jurisdiction to pay the difference, unless the beneficiary
jurisdictions compensate the provider spontaneously (remember that there is no
legally enforceable compensation scheme). If, by contrast, the provider jurisdiction
can improve capacity utilisation and reduce unit costs thanks to the inflow of
new pupils, then the marginal revenue from extending the service area exceeds
Adapting L’s () definition to the public sector, X-inefficiency is the gap between
the efficient behaviour of public service providers implied by economic theory and their observed
behaviour in practice.
The marginal cost of service provision appears even if the provider jurisdiction does not enlarge its
capacity; it is then manifested in overcrowded classrooms and the deteriorating quality of teaching,
as the teacher-per-pupil ratio sinks.

Box 5.4: The case of Magyargencs
The village of Magyargencs in West Hungary hosts a 300-year-old elementary school.
Once the largest school in the district, today it counts merely 66 pupils, due to a local
economic downturn in the post-socialist transition that triggered a major decrease in the
population figures (618 inhabitants in 2001). For lack of employment opportunities, the
local government has difficulty keeping the young generations in place. From the early
1990s, Magyargencs has worked together with the neighbouring village to operate the
primary school, but in 2005, Kemenesho˝gyész decided to terminate the agreement, leav-
ing Magyargencs alone with a facility that consumes almost half of the local government
budget every year. Out of the total annual spending of HUF 40 million on primary ed-
ucation in Magyargencs, 25 million are covered by central government grants. Prior to
2005, the rest was shared between the co-operating municipalities, which demanded con-
stant sacrifice from both, as little money was left for financing other public services and
investments.
Caught in the crossfire of the battle about the future of the primary school, the munic-
ipal executive of Magyargencs has recently started looking for another local government
that is ready to take over the 66 pupils. Its declared aim is to find a partner municipal-
ity that does not require any remuneration for the service. The municipality of Mezo˝lak
(1,076 inhabitants) is ready to take over the Magyargencs pupils without compensation,
on condition that other villages join the association as well. According to their calcula-
tion, if the number of pupils in the Mezo˝lak primary school rises by at least 80, then the
marginal increase in norm-based grants (accruing to Mezo˝lak) will allow financing the en-
larged primary school to 100 per cent out of grants, that is, without any contribution from
either the provider or the beneficiary municipalities (Cseri, 2006).
the marginal costs. With the commuter grant provided from the central budget,
however, taxpayers from the entire country pay for a service that benefits only the
provider jurisdictions and the neighbouring area. In both cases, O’s ()
principle of fiscal equivalence is hurt.
Beyond the fact that the groups of decision-makers, beneficiaries and taxpayers
do not overlap, implicit co-operation agreements present several other problems.
. According to H et al. (), production spillovers have an implicit
equalising effect in that the related financial burden is normally borne by
the wealthier municipalities. In our understanding, however, if the resulting
redistribution of income is not part of an explicit fiscal equalisation pro-
gramme, then the situation is likely to reproduce itself, and there is little
hope for a long-term improvement in inter-municipal fiscal relations. More-
over, implicit equalisation as a policy instrument is unsatisfactory because it
reacts only to differences in cost structures of SNGs rather than creating a
solid link between financial capacity and expenditure needs.
. If the provider jurisdiction is so much satisfied with the vertical grant that
it is not interested in a contribution from the beneficiary jurisdiction, the
marginal benefit realised this way serves only to finance the marginal output
that is offered free of charge to the external users. If the user-pay-principle
was respected instead, all (internal and external) users could benefit from
the decrease in the average cost level realised through scale economies.
. Whatever the impact of the extended service provision on their financial
position, provider jurisdictions are bound to cover not only the costs of
the actually produced service units but also the stand-by charges related
to the given service infrastructure. At any point of time, they are expected
to be ready to receive new clients from the neighbouring area. While ben-
eficiary jurisdictions do sometimes contribute to the costs of the actually
received service units, they virtually never participate in financing the stand-
by charges. The same holds for the costs of the maintenance of related
infrastructures. These additional cost items are visible in the oversized ca-
pacities and the related expenditures (interests and amortisation, wages and
social contributions).
. The beneficiary jurisdictions receive ‘free lunch’ every time they are allowed
to use public services offered by a neighbouring jurisdiction without at least
a partial compensation. This leads to an illusion about the real costs of
 public services, which hinders the development of cost sensitivity and leads
to an increased demand for the public services in question.
Compared to implicit co-operation agreements, explicit agreements represent a
cleaner solution to the problem of cost sharing and improve allocative efficiency,
as they force the partners to take into account the true cost of service delivery. Ac-
cording to the legal regulations in force, every inter-municipal association (special
district) agreement must contain a compensation scheme. Due to the promotion of
horizontal co-operation through numerous fiscal incentives from , the number
of associations in the domain of public education rose. While in –, only
 per cent of the municipalities chose to collaborate, their share rose to  per
cent by  (H and L, ). The popularity of co-operation as a
solution to the difficulty of establishing and running public schools is particularly
high in rural areas with scattered population and a low potential for economies of
scale. In ,  school associations were registered, involving more than ,
of the , local governments. These operated , facilities. A representative
survey prepared by I () suggests that in almost  per cent of all school as-
sociations, operational expenditures are shared according to the number of pupils
sent by the participating municipalities. For funding investments in the service
infrastructure, the formula is most often ( per cent) based on the distribution
of ownership rights. Less than one-fourth of the surveyed associations opt for a
pupil-based cost-sharing scheme.
Until now, we have dealt with the financial consequences of co-operation for
the provider jurisdiction and, in case of an explicit agreement, for the beneficiary
jurisdiction(s). However, co-operation has further costs in terms of a weakening
democratic control over the decision-making process and reduced possibility for
the participating municipalities to impose their own preferences on the association.
Since these challenges are not different from those observed in most other European
countries, we will not go into detail on these issues.
The dynamics of inter-municipal co-operation throughout the past ten years is difficult to describe
because the available statistics are not suitable for comparison. The four latest triannual reports of
the National Institute for Public Education (H and L, , , , ) differ
in their approach of measuring the development of intermunicipal co-operation in education.
Data for the number of school maintenance associations are available for , , , and
 (though the comparison reveals a drop from  to the s, which does not seem to be
realistic). The indicator selected for – is the number of multifunctional associations with
an educational component. Finally, the period – is described with the number of local
governments acting as seats of school maintenance associations. Data are unavailable for  and
.
Similarly, the decision not to co-operate with neighbours may also involve some
costs for a municipality in terms of local expenditure autonomy, particularly if its
population is below the critical limit that would allow an efficient operation of
the public service in question. Here too, primary education provides a classical
example. Small rural villages in Hungary that insist on maintaining their primary
school in spite of the deteriorating efficiency and quality of the education suffer
from the outflow of pupils to neighbouring (larger) municipalities. Together with
the fragmented territorial structure, the principle of free school choice anchored in
the law has led to the segregation of pupils according to their school performance.
The homogeneous classes of less talented pupils in the smallest villages present an
important hindrance to local economic development and are likely to tie the hands
of the municipal executive on the medium and long term.
. Autonomy in the delivery of local public services
.. Sector-specific
regulations on service delivery
As we saw in Section .., minimum standards
imposed by legislation to influence the organ-
isation of service delivery and the quality and
quantity of the public service output constitute
the most fundamental constraint on the rowing side of subnational autonomy.
In Hungary, a part of the minimum standards emanate from sector-specific laws
that define new tasks for local governments (beyond those set out in the ALG).
Another part emerges from decrees published by the central government and line
ministries. A fundamental difference between laws and decrees, as mentioned
in Section ., is that the latter escape parliamentary scrutiny while they may
substantially modify the rules of service delivery.
Sector-specific regulations are manifold. Only in the domain of primary ed-
ucation, there are a few hundreds of indicators defining the contents of service
delivery. Since the amounts of the so-called norm-based grants (the most impor-
tant pillar of local government finance) are directly linked with these indicators,
local governments have obviously little interest in rationalising service delivery
(P K, , p.  f.).
Apart from this disincentive, a detailed regulation remains more or less accept-
able in those policy domains that call for deconcentration because the Constitution
or another statutory law stipulates the citizens’ equal rights of access to the service.
Primary education is undoubtedly one of these domains, as are basic health care
and social services. Here, the centre retains the ultimate responsibility (including
 financial responsibility) for the task and edits rules in order to ensure an equal
treatment of all individuals regardless of their jurisdiction of residence. However,
many of these policy areas suffer from overregulation, and the rules focus more
on the inputs than on the outputs of service delivery, as T (, p. ) ob-
serves for the domain of social policy. Indeed, the Decree I/ ( January) of
the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs describes in painstaking detail the tasks
and operational requirements of social service facilities from the minimum size
of a home and the number of bathrooms, through the provision of patients with
clothes and bath towels, to the types of daytime activities to be organised. The great
variety of facility and patient categories and their combinations turn the decree
into a respectable document consisting of  paragraphs and  appendices.
Detailed regulation makes less sense (and may be perceived as less legitimate) in
domains of services that are simply delegated to lower levels of government and in
which the centre does not retain full responsibility in the sense of guaranteeing full
coverage of the costs of service provision. Nonetheless, a bulk of these delegated
tasks is currently overregulated and the rules go often beyond their original mission
to enforce nationwide standards and priorities or setting the general framework
of service provision (K et al., , p. ). By way of example, the Act CXL
of  on Museums, Public Libraries and General Education contains a long list
of operational requirements for public libraries (access, staff, rooms, free services,
statistical data supply) further provisions on the mandatory tasks of libraries, on
user fees and free services, as well as general management rules. According to
K et al. (, p. ), overwhelming regulation may undermine effective
decentralisation by breaking the link between decision-making authority and the
locally available financial resources. In consequence, it tends to make SNGs more
dependent on norm-based grants and less responsible for their decisions and
performance.
.. The involvement of
external service delivery
agents
Surveying state and local governments across the United
States, O and G (, p.  ff.,  ff.)
identified no less than thirty-six alternatives to the so-
called standard service delivery that occurs through
either the local government administration or a public enterprise. In Hungary
where experience with decentralised service provision is still modest, local govern-
ments cannot boast with such a multitude of practices. Nevertheless, the s and
the early s witnessed momentous changes in the field.
The range of service delivery options and their relative shares in the total supply
vary from one policy sector to another. A survey conducted by P ()
suggests that local governments contract external service delivery agents mainly
in the domains of cable television services ( per cent of the municipalities work
with external providers, mainly private entrepreneurs and enterprises), primary
health care ( per cent) and dental care ( per cent). One-tenth of the local
governments rely on non-profit organisations for the operation of primary schools,
kindergartens, outpatient clinics and social accommodation facilities.
Sector-specific laws regulating the tasks of local governments generally distin-
guish between facility owner (‘tulajdonos’, ‘fenntartó’), and service delivery agent
(‘szolgáltató’, ‘mu˝ködteto˝’). The ultimate responsibility for the task rests with the
facility owner who is most often a subnational government unit, another public
body (ministry, national authority), a private or non-profit organisation, or a
church. For any public service facility, the two functions (ownership and service
delivery) may partially or fully overlap, or be distinct from each other. A local gov-
ernment may keep ultimate responsibility for running a home for elderly people
in its own buildings and with own equipment, while and a charity organisation
provides for -hour nursing care, meals, and leisure programmes.
The volume and form of public funding available to a given facility depends
upon whether the owner is an SNG unit, another public body (e.g. ministry, other
national authority), a private or non-profit organisation, or a church. As the
pivotal actor in this structure, the owner assumes overall responsibility for the
operation of the facility, it selects an adequate service delivery agent and may decide
to sell the assets.
Most sector-specific laws distinguish between public and non-public owners.
Local governments, municipal enterprises and public non-profit companies acting
as facility owners are automatically entitled to grants and subsidies from the
central government budget. Non-public owners include churches, foundations,
so-called public charities, non-governmental organisations, and private enterprises
or entrepreneurs. The simultaneous engagement of public and non-public actors
is also admitted and leads to various forms of mixed delivery. Service delivery
The Act XXXIII of  on the Transfer of State Property to Local Governments introduced the
word ‘fenntartó’ in the sense of a local government (actually, a soviet-type council) running or
managing (‘fenntart’) a certain state-owned public service facility during the socialist regime. Since
running a facility was not detached from the delivery of the related public services (outsourcing
being virtually unknown in those times), the semantic overlapping between manager (‘fenntartó’)
and service delivery agent (‘szolgáltató’, ‘mu˝ködteto˝’) was not confusing. By virtue of the same piece
of legislation, however, the democratically elected new local governments inherited the assets; this
is how they turned from managers (‘fenntartó’) into actual owners (‘tulajdonos’). Notwithstanding
its initially narrower content, the term ‘fenntartó’ still prevails and is used synonymously to
‘tulajdonos’.
According to Art. /G of the Civil Code (Act IV of ), public charities are foundations established
 by enterprises in mixed (public and private) ownership, the so-called ‘functional
privatisation’ of hospitals (see below), or public-private partnerships in large
infrastructure projects are examples of this category.
Non-public facility owners may not only participate in the provision of manda-
tory and optional local public services but also provide additional supply (in terms
of quantity and quality) in response to the preferences of the local population.
Service delivery via own organisation (or in collaboration with other local
governments) is still common in the domain of primary education, with municipal
property accounting for almost  per cent of total assets. Table . shows that
five per cent of all primary schools in Hungary are in church property, while
about three per cent belong to other non-public providers. These actors are even
more active at the secondary and tertiary levels of education, together holding
almost one-fifth of all secondary schools and more than half of the universities and
colleges. The participation of the non-public sector in public education dates back
to the early s and responds to three legal incentives: (i) the freedom the ALG
provides SNGs to decide about the way of service delivery; (ii) the restitution of
church property in ; (iii) since , non-public service providers have been
eligible to norm-based grants.
The emergence of church-based and non-profit educational institutions brought
more diversity into public education in terms of curricula, non-school services and
organisational solutions. At the same time, however, it contributed to the overall
expansion of the secondary education sector from the mid-s and a widening
gap between the number of pupils (determined by the demographic decline) and
the available classroom capacities.
Some authors (e.g. S, ) deplore the fact that SNGs as owners are in-
creasingly cut off from the decision-making process concerning the objectives and
contents of education provided in their institutions. The service delivery organisa-
tion (with teachers as the most influential stakeholder group) and the Ministry of
Education, both characterised by the predominance of educationalists, determine
jointly these parameters. With their almost insatiable demand for more and better
services, parents are the third most important stakeholder group, whereas local
governments are expected to pay the bill in the end. Further investigations are
necessary to find out more about the determinants of local government power in
the stakeholder relations and the question whether other owners such as churches
or foundations are facing similar problems.
by the Parliament, the central government, or the council of a subnational or minority government,
with the aim of executing a task belonging to national or subnational competence.
Act XXXII of  on the Settlement of Properties Formerly Belonging to the Churches.
Table 5.4: Education facilities by type of owner (‘fenntartó’) in 2004–05 [Source:
Ministry of Education (2005)]
Type of facility Public (%) Other (%) Total 
(%)
Total 
number 
of unitsCentral 
gov.
County Local 
gov.
NGO, 
Indi vi­
duals
Church Other
Kindergartens, pre-schools 1.3 3.0 86.7 4.5 3.1 1.4 100 3,405
Primary schools 1.6 5.6 84.8 2.1 5.0 0.9 100 3,293
Elementary art schools 0.6 3.7 61.6 19.1 3.1 11.9 100 810
Secondary schools 3.6 27.3 45.4 12.5 6.7 4.5 100 2,009
Student hostels 4.2 34.4 40.9 5.2 13.0 2.3 100 599
Universities and colleges 44.9 0.0 0.0 17.4 37.7 0.0 100 69
Total 2.3 10.5 72.7 6.6 5.2 2.7 100 10,185
Table 3-6
Non-public providers (churches, social organisations, foundations, public foun-
dations, national minority governments, public non-profit companies, private
business entities and individual entrepreneurs) assume a growing role also in the
domain of social care, with their degree of involvement varying across the different
categories of services. The Act III of  on Social Administration and Social
Services allows SNGs to decide how they wish to meet their responsibilities. Beside
delivery via own organisation or in collaboration with other local authorities, they
are also allowed to contract out certain services. Notwithstanding these liberties,
more than  per cent of the homes for the elderly were still in municipal hands
in . Municipalities and counties taken together owned . and . per cent
of all facilities providing temporary and long-term accommodation, respectively,
while much of the rest was in the property of churches, foundations and other
organisations. Similar proportions are observed in terms of bed capacity. The
sector-specific laws also allow contracting private organisations, but the statistics
about this area are deficient (T, ).
Since , non-public providers of social services have been eligible for grants
from the central budget, although the conditions of eligibility vary across the types
 of providers, with churches enjoying the most favourable treatment and private
enterprises receiving only limited support.
The recent boom of the non-profit and private markets of social services has
also some negative side effects.
First, several local governments reportedly use contracting as a trick to escape
from financing the entire demand for social services. For lack of a regular and
exhaustive legal control over the effective service provision, a mayor can very well
comply with the law by contracting another municipality and buying only two
places in a temporary home for children, even if he is aware of the fact that the two
places will not solve the problem (K et al., , p. ).
Second, there are strong indices (although no reliable figures) that show an in-
creasing presence of the private sector in those domains where there is an outlook
for profit, thus for example in constructing homes for elderly people. This trend,
as well as the spontaneous emergence of non-public providers in some regions
and/or service categories and their absence in others, has led to massive interjuris-
dictional disparities in the access to, and quality of, services. More important than
horizontal disparities is the apparent geographical mismatch between demand and
supply. What makes the situation in the area of social policy even more acute is the
incapacity of many beneficiaries to travel from their domicile to the places where
social assistance is offered.
In order to remedy this situation and to improve the efficiency with which
public funds are spent, the central government incorporated a new measure in
its strategic reform – of social protection and cohesion. From January
, the disbursement of norm-based grants to non-public providers (except
churches) for any new service or capacity unit is subject to prior approval by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. The central government has recently laid
down the criteria of approval, hereby creating the so-called Managed Regional
Equalisation System for social services and the protection of children. New services
and capacities are generally accepted for public funding if they satisfy an existing
demand, meet the legal quality requirements and are cost-efficient. A further
condition is that the cost and revenue plan submitted by the provider is sound and
reasonable.
Art. – of the Act LXXIX of ; art.  of the Act IV of  on the Amendment of Selected Acts
Concerning Social Affairs.
Art.  para.  and art.  d of the Act CLIII of  on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary in
Year . For its decisions, the Ministry relies on the advice of a participative committee.
Government Decree no. / ( November) on the Managed Territorial Equalisation System of
social services, child welfare and child protection in year .
From a policy analysis perspective, the prior administrative control of newly
offered service units is likely to slow down the pace at which regional disparities are
growing. It may also ensure a better match between marginal supply and demand
in the future. However, it is not likely to alleviate the existing inequalities and the
problems of accessibility, as previously financed services will continue to be funded
without any examination of their usefulness. Nevertheless, the ministry has already
suggested that in a later stage of the reform, the same procedure could apply to all
currently funded services and capacities. The goal is to ensure ‘sector neutrality’
among the providers. Such a policy could then effectively repair the territorial link
between supply and demand and provide for higher allocational efficiency in the
use of public resources.
Compared to public education and social care, the role of non-public providers
is more important in health care. At the primary level, about  per cent of
all general practitioners (family doctors) and dentists exercise their profession as
independent private providers in contract with the municipality that owns the
surgery K (, p. ). The Hungarian terminology calls this ‘functional
privatisation’, suggesting that only the function (the service) is transferred to
private agents but not the assets. The term is somewhat unfortunate because it
creates the impression that functional privatisation should be ideally followed by a
‘real’ privatisation meaning the transfer of municipal property (M, ).
According to the opponents of such a ‘purely functional’ privatisation, the only
thing that goes into private hands is the right to service provision that, however,
has never actually belonged to the state. Nevertheless, the classical encyclopaedia
definition of privatisation includes transferring both the assets and the activities
to the private sector (see e.g. N et al., , p. ). Since primary medical
care is a public sector task, the transfer of such activities to private or other agents
is similar to contracting. The object of privatisation here is not the ownership but
the decision-making power.
Functional privatisation is also increasingly popular at higher levels of the health
care system. Particularly the more lucrative advanced diagnostic services (e.g.
magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography), dialysis stations, and labo-
ratories have undergone such transformation. Nevertheless, service contracts in
the domain of health care are loaded with conflicts between local governments (as
owners and principals) and service providers (as agents). On one hand, providers
have difficulty convincing the owner about the need to invest more into the surgery
For an excellent overview of the health care delivery system in Hungary, see G () or F
et al. ().
 infrastructure, although it must be noted that the current revenues of most local
governments are definitely too short to cover such investments, while the access
to alternative funding sources is difficult. On the other hand, local governments
claim that medical entrepreneurs skim off the most profitable businesses, leaving
to the public sector those services that are underfinanced by the NHIF and thus
involve losses K (, p. ).
The widespread practice of functional privatisation implies by no means that
the only thing local governments may privatise is service delivery. Since the early
transition, the law has allowed the privatisation of healthcare-related property as
well. Medical surgeries, hospitals and clinics belong in most municipalities to the
category of partially marketable core assets. Private medical companies, churches,
and NGOs took over several hospitals from local governments or opened new ones
so that their aggregate property share in the entire sector of inpatient care is now
close to one-fifth. However, the instability of the regulatory system, the current
overcapacity in inpatient facilities and the limited chance to introduce explicit
service fees above the legal minimum (citizens are accustomed to make informal
out-of-pocket payments) act as barriers to entering this market. It is also true
that the more specialised the service, the more important the ownership function
Art.  para. b of the Act CLIV of  on Health Care explicitly stipulates the responsibility of the
owner for the maintenance of infrastructures. However, voters appear to be too weak to enforce
accountability. According to M (), strengthening the oversight function of National
Public Health and Medical Officer Service (ÁNTSZ) could remedy this problem.
According to art. – of the ALG, every local government is obliged to draft a decree in which
it classifies its property into core and non-core categories. Core assets (in French: patrimoine
administratif ) are those that directly serve the execution of mandatory tasks or the exercise of public
administration powers. They are either non-marketable (roads, bridges, parks, waters, dams, etc.)
or partially marketable (public utilities, public buildings and institutions, monuments, protected
nature areas, etc.) Non-core assets (in French: patrimoine financier) are always marketable and may
be used in business ventures (apartments, offices, shares, etc.)
In , non-governmental organisations individuals held . per cent of all hospitals and clinics,
while another . per cent were in the property of churches and . per cent in the hands of private
entrepreneurs (data from the NHIF). Private capital was first employed in  in the Siklós Town
Hospital where the enterprise Mega-Logistic Rt. got hold of  per cent of the assets, while the town
kept  per cent and the rest was divided between the surrounding local governments of Harkány,
Villány, and Beremend.
In order to enhance the citizens’ cost sensitivity in health care, an amendment of the Act LXXXIII of
 on Mandatory Health Insurance obliged all patients in publicly financed health care facilities
from .. to pay a unit fee of  HUF per visit (or per day, in clinics and hospitals). Health
care providers had no influence on the level of copayment but were entitled to keep the revenues they
collected. Due to a number of exemptions, about  million people ( per cent of the population)
did not have to pay anything. Nonetheless, at a national referendum in March , . per cent of
the participating voters expressed their will to cancel the copayment.
of national institutions such as ministries, state universities and national public
utilities.
Understandably, the decentralisation of health care decisions and the emergence
of a diversified ownership structure also triggered a competition among facilities.
In terms of staff, medical equipment and buildings, private clinics and some
national hospitals are better equipped than the rest. The resulting horizontal
disparities in the quality of health services induce patients to migrate. Budapest
has a dominant role in the provision of health care, just as in several other public
service domains. The continuing strong demand for specialised hospital services in
the capital city attracts private and public investments with the promise of a high
return. New investments create better conditions for quality improvements in the
service provision, which results in a further increase in patient demand. In terms
of development potential and the quality of inpatient services, there is a deepening
gap between Budapest and the rest of the country. Small towns that have difficulty
attracting investors will be unable to maintain an acceptable level of health care
services in the long term.
At the same time, the Hungarian health care system suffers from an oversized
hospital network that is a legacy from the socialist planned economy and presents
both efficiency and equity problems. The network has an extremely high propor-
tion of acute and long-term treatment capacities,  to  per cent of which are not
used even though the hospitalisation rates in Hungary are substantially higher than
the European average. Despite the explosion of the aggregate number of available
beds, citizens in remote rural areas suffer from a lack of capacity in both the out-
and inpatient care. From , the central government introduced several reforms
in order to cut the excess capacity and improve the distribution of hospital beds
across the country. Yet, since , the average number of beds has remained
stable at around eight per thousand inhabitants G (, p. ). With the latest
reform package of the central government that resulted in the adoption of the Act
CXXXII of  on the Development of the Health Care System, another attempt
is being made to streamline the system. The jury is still out on the success of this
reform in which the municipal and county governments were hardly involved and
which now imposes a four-level hierarchy of facilities, an  per cent cut in the
number of NHIF-financed hospital beds, a major restructuring between acute and
chronic care capacities as well as new rules for their territorial allocation.
Aware of the precarious situation of many small hospitals and the long-term
Act LXVIII of  on the Territorial Supply of Health Services and Regional Capacity Norms; Act
XXXIV of  on the Territorial Supply of Specialised Health Services and the Amendment of
Various Laws Concerning Health Care.
 effects that funding oversized capacities may have on local budgets, the legislators
decided to restrict the responsibility of SNGs in the domain of ambulatory and
hospital care. As mentioned in Section .., the previous regulation required mu-
nicipalities and counties to ensure the operation of all out- and inpatient facilities
in their property. From  January  when the Act CXXXII of  entered
into force, this obligation applies only the owners of those  main hospitals, 
district hospitals and ambulatory surgeries that have been selected for funding by
the NHIF.
The role of health care facility owners is a difficult one. Formally, they are
responsible for the maintenance and renewal of hospital buildings and medical
equipment. However, employing NHIF funds for investment purposes is strictly
forbidden. A limited amount of central budget grants for capital development are
available through competitive tenders. This is only a modest step forward from the
pre-transition model in which investment funds used to be allocated on a residual
basis (i.e. only if there was some money left) through bargaining and discretional
mechanisms K (, p. ).
Alternative service delivery options are the most common in the domain of public
utilities, notably environmental infrastructure, water management, energy, trans-
ports, and telecommunications. Public procurement mechanisms are widespread
here, although local governments have contested the applicability of the law on
several occasions, arguing that expenditures that are ultimately charged to the
consumers in form of user fees do not count as public expenditures (B, ,
p.  ff.). The reasoning is fallacious because it takes user fees as an argument
for avoiding open competition among suppliers, whereas in reality, the optimum
amount of user fee can be determined only if there is perfect transparency about
the costs and benefits of a public service.
Concession agreements are signed for the construction and maintenance of
roads and telecommunication networks. Municipal service contracts with other
local governments, private or non-profit providers are widespread in the domains
of waste collection and disposal, maintenance of public parks and streets, as well
as sewage systems. According to B (), the number of local government
service contracts in Hungary is likely to rise in the future, due to the growing
need for infrastructure investments. Additionally, the existing regulations create
economic incentives for contracting out. First, private firms can employ labour
far more cheaply than public entities, due to the existing minimum wage regula-
tions for public sector employees. Second, they are free to work with independent
Art.  para.  of the Act CLIV of  on Health Care.
subcontractors and are therefore more flexible in their decisions concerning the
termination of the contract and the payment of social security contributions; in
addition, unlike public entities, private enterprises may get their value added tax
payments refunded. These advantages for the private provider are ultimately re-
flected in the lower costs of service provision for the local government as principal.
The same study also reveals a number of flaws in the legal framework as well
as in the practice of contracting. First, although the legal standards concerning
public access are relatively strict, local officials do not seem to be conscious about
their duty to make public service contracts accessible at least upon request by the
citizen. Other local officials claim that citizens have never asked for copies of such
documents. In addition, local assemblies seldom receive sufficient information
that would allow them to make informed decisions on the price setting. Second,
most of the contracts are poorly designed. Local governments still tend to see
contracts as a pure formality rather than as a tool that allows them to influence
the production function in the interest of the local constituency. Third, long-term
contracts may be attractive for the principal who seeks to secure long-term resource
flows (particularly for capital investments) but fail to compel private providers
to make improvements in service quality or to pass through the cost savings to
consumers.
Public-private partnerships (PPP)—the more recent version for concessions—
have the reputation of being the most cost-efficient technique of implementing
public infrastructure investments. Projects mobilising private capital are usually
subject to stricter time limits and budget constraints. Moreover, since the construc-
tor, the bank lender and the maintenance company are all members of the same
consortium, planning is done from the very beginning in a way to minimise future
operating expenditures. Key to success is the ability to long-term ( to  years)
planning and a thoughtful preparation of the project including the analysis of the
legal and macroeconomic environment and the estimation of the long-term costs
and benefits related to the asset.
Although in Hungary a number of highway tracks, prisons, and sports facilities,
have been or are being constructed in PPP, no law exists so far that would regulate
this form of service delivery. For each project, the agreement between the partners
is laid down in a central government decree. For any issue not specified by the
Because of the tough price competition for public mandates, subcontractor-entrepreneurs can hardly
ever include social security contributions and liabilities into their price offer.
Art.  of the Constitution; art. – of the Act LXIII of  on the Protection of Personal Data and
Accessibility of Data of Public Interest; Act XC of  on the Freedom of Information by Electronic
Means.
 decree, the norms of the Civil Code apply. Since this solution is generally recognised
to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of risk minimisation, discussions are
under way about possibly drafting a law on PPP.
Up to this date, local governments have made very little use of PPP. Since ,
local authorities constructing sports facilities, gyms or school swimming pools in
PPP have been eligible for central government grants to cover a part of the leasing
fee. However, several municipalities have calculated that the grant would not
make the project necessarily cheaper. Another frequent reason to opt against a
PPP solution is the lack of skilled professionals who would be able to draw up and
strategically manage such complex projects.
.. In-house provision via
own organisation or
enterprise
A frequent alternative to local government service
contracts is service provision via own organisation
or municipal enterprises. Public utilities and the
services related to community amenities provide a
good example. The majority of local governments continue to keep the mainte-
nance of parks, cleaning of public spaces, and housing in their hands, while they
have contracted out waste collection and disposal, district heating, sewage, and the
operation of public baths. Table .) provides more detail.
Municipal enterprises are more or less autonomous legal entities in partial or
full local government ownership. In the first half of the s, municipal share-
holdings rose sharply from zero to around  billion HUF and remained relatively
stable afterwards (K and H, ). Today, they play a substantial
role in the national economy in terms of output (contributing . to . per cent
to GDP throughout the last decade), employment and investments. However,
local governments are relatively weak in exercising their ownership rights. Local
property decrees are often missing or have a merely formal character. In several
local governments, the economic committees that should exercise property rights
are nothing more than passive watchdogs. Although public utilities must submit
a proposal for rate setting every year, the municipality has often no insight into
the feasibility of these proposals, so that decisions about approval or rejection are
based more on political than on economic considerations. Municipal enterprises
Sport XXI Programme for Facility Development, launched by the Government Decree no.  of
 ( June).
In the French terminology, contracting out public services to such entities is called ‘autonomisation’.
For an excellent overview of the challenges related to service provision via municipal enterprises,
see K and H ().

Table 5.5: Share of municipalities providing communal services via own organisa-
tion or enterprise [Source: Source: Péteri (2007)]Table 3-7
Service category 1994 2006
Cleaning of public spaces 78.0 76.3
Maintenance of parks and green spaces 77.0 73.3
Housing and community development 79.0 62.1
Maintenance of public cemeteries n.a. 51.6
Sewage systems and wastewater treatment 21.0 13.9
Water supply 8.0 13.8
Collection of communal refuse 28.0 11.4
Funeral services 20.0 11.1
Baths 42.0 9.7
Refuse disposal 44.0 9.7
District heating services 33.0 5.9
Local public transport 4.0 1.7
Cleaning of chimneys 3.0 1.7
 are seldom controlled upon the realisation of their budgets, nor is there an effective
price control.
Another problem with municipal companies is the lack of entrepreneurial expe-
rience. Particularly in small rural settlements that lack adequately qualified staff,
business activities are risky and/or poorly designed. For the most fundamental
public services, local governments tend to disregard the profitability requirement
or do not expect to receive any profit from their enterprises at all. Their price
policy is often influenced by the conditions of availability of central government
grants. In many instances, local governments set prices just below the limit under
which they become entitled to a price subsidy from the central budget, instead of
considering the level of cost recovery. In general, user fees hardly ever reach the
cost recovery level and fail to cover the depreciation of the assets. This behaviour
signalises that local governments make a wrong use of their autonomy.
CHAPTER 
Revenue Autonomy
Chapter  on local financial autonomy stipulated that an important condition for 
the potential gains from decentralisation to be realised is that local governments
receive genuine decision-making authority with regard to local affairs and the pro-
vision of local public goods and services. However, if this expenditure autonomy is
to be meaningful, decentralised units also need to have sufficient financial resources
at their disposal. In other words, expenditure autonomy is not conceivable without
a certain degree of revenue autonomy.
Revenue autonomy implies the freedom to decide about the source and volume
of resources that finance local public goods and services, about the way these are
distributed among the various spending purposes, and about the way in which
the fiscal burden is shared among taxpayers. However, central governments and
legislatures in decentralised countries usually curtail these liberties in one way or
another in order to reconcile local autonomy with other concurrent objectives
such as equity or macroeconomic stability. The aim of this part of the thesis is to
explore the degree of revenue autonomy of local authorities in Hungary, taking
into consideration the various liberties and constraints applying to specific revenue
categories.
Section . explains the transition from expenditure-oriented to revenue-oriented
revenue regulation, a pivotal change in the central government’s perspective of
local government finance from . It also provides an overview about the legal
framework of revenue decentralisation and provides data about local government
revenues between  and .
The rest of the chapter deals with the major revenue categories. Section .
 is dedicated to the achievements and challenges in local taxation. The other
categories of current own-source revenues including user charges, fines, revenues
from entrepreneurial activities, leasing and rental, are examined in Section ..
Revenues from fixed assets, intangible assets and shares (including the proceeds
from privatisation) are the subject of Section ..
Transferred revenues dominate the discussion in the last three sections of the
chapter. Shared revenues (Section .), intergovernmental grants (Section .)
and flow-through transfers (Section .) are analysed from the perspective of local
revenue autonomy.
. Revenue regulation in past and present
.. The end of the
expenditure-oriented revenue
regulation
Between  and , in a system that the post-
transition literature called expenditure-oriented
model of revenue regulation, the yearly expen-
diture need declared by each municipal, district
and county council was subject to formal ap-
proval by the central planning bureau of the monolithic state (K N,
, p.  ff.). After deduction of the expected amount of tax collections and
transferred revenues, the centre transferred the missing amount to the given juris-
diction mainly in the form of conditional grants. At the lower levels of the public
administration hierarchy, money arrived not directly from the centre but through
the intermediary of the county and (until ) district councils in a cascade
mechanism, which caused bargaining and arbitrary decisions to become everyday
practice in intergovernmental relations. The availability of ‘free’ resources from
the centre killed the incentive of local governments to increase own revenues or to
cut inefficient spending programmes. Although various policy reforms emerged
from the s with the aim to enhance local revenue autonomy, the top-down
allocation mechanism remained dominant and municipal councils continued to
operate under the thumb of higher-level authorities, their role being limited to the
justification of local expenditure needs.
The system was relatively successful in financing the basic infrastructure and
elementary public services at subnational levels. However, the quantity and quality
of the available goods and services were far below the West European average of
that time in almost all public policy areas and particularly in those with substantial
infrastructure requirements.
The district system was abolished in .
Two other, more serious problems outstripped penury. First, despite the careful
planning of local needs and costs by the central authorities, the actual revenue
allocation was heavily dependent on intergovernmental bargaining and arbitrary
decision-making mechanisms. Second, the system offered limited possibilities and
even less incentives to local authorities to satisfy demand that went beyond the
elemental needs of their constituency.
The complete revision of the national Constitution (Act XX of ) in  and
the subsequent adoption of the Act LXV of  on Local Governments (ALG)
brought a completely new pattern of expenditure assignment, putting an end to the
era of expenditure-oriented revenue assignment that had become unsustainable
for at least two reasons.
First, the ALG allowed for the first time the preferences of local constituencies
to play a role in local spending choices. While a number of functions were still
deconcentrated or delegated from above, the law allowed local governments to
assume any responsibility in addition to those explicitly enumerated. Under these
circumstances, the idea to control all revenue flows not only became illusory but
would also have contradicted the very meaning of decentralisation. Hence, the cen-
tral government replaced the micro-level regulation of vertical revenue flows with
a transparent and solid legal framework of revenue assignment that would provide
decentralised authorities ample freedom to finance their budget according to their
preferences. In the expenditure-oriented model of revenue regulation, the revenue
allotments to local authorities were adjusted to their calculated expenditure (needs)
level. By contrast, the so-called resource-oriented model of revenue regulation
takes as an independent variable the sum of revenues a local government unit can
secure in a year from taxation and grants to determine the upper ceiling for local
spending. Having remained intact since , the principle of resource orientation
continues to govern intergovernmental fiscal relations in Hungary. Section ..
will present and discuss the model in more detail.
Second, as the revised Constitution of  leaves considerable room for the
spontaneous development of subnational entities, the territorial structure of the
country became increasingly fragmented, while the lowest (municipal) tier received,
and in part voluntarily assumed, a wide range of expenditure responsibilities.
Compared to the period before , interjurisdictional disparities in the level
of available public goods and services grew significantly. In order to ensure a
minimum endowment in financial resources for every local government unit,
the parliament proposed a mixed funding scheme combining local own-source
revenues, shared revenues, grants and transfers. While it resembles the previous
revenue assignment scheme insofar as both consist of a mixture of own revenues
 and transfers, there is a substantial difference between the two systems. Before
, central budget contributions could fill up to hundred per cent of the vertical
fiscal gap in a municipality—that is, together with the own revenues, the grants
allowed to cover the totality of the expenditure needs, provided that the mayor
was a talented negotiator. In the new system, the amount of so-called norms-
based grants (accounting for around one-fourth of total local revenues) is based
on objective capacity indicators (the so-called ‘norms’) and is thus no longer
adapted to the actual expenditure need. In other words, the central government
seeks to attenuate the disparities without attempting to satisfy the totality of local
expenditure needs.
As the centre no longer fills the vertical fiscal gap automatically, local gov-
ernments are interested in the exploration of new revenue sources and a better
exploitation of the existing ones, but also in rationalising service provision in order
to reduce cost levels.
Despite its undeniably progressive character, the resource-oriented model of
revenue regulation has also several flaws. Some of them relate to the design of
the model as a whole; we will briefly discuss these in the following section. Other
deficiencies are inherent in the individual elements of the model. These will be
examined in Section ..
.. The design of the
resource-oriented model of
revenue regulation
Figure . compares the expenditure-oriented and
resource-oriented models of revenue regulation, re-
producing the original models presented by K-
 N (, p.  ff.).
The first remarkable feature of the resource-oriented model is that, alike the
former expenditure-oriented model, it distinguishes neither between current and
capital expenditures nor between mandated and optional expenditures of local
governments. In the theory of public finance, there are some normative propo-
sitions (e.g. M, , p. ) suggesting that for intergenerational equity
reasons, capital expenditures should be financed from loans and credits instead
of current tax revenues, as the benefits of capital development spread over several
generations of taxpayers. Likewise, there are arguments in favour of funding most
or all of the mandatory expenditures of decentralised governments via intergovern-
mental grants. One of them is allocative efficiency: local public services of national
interest (e.g. research) tend to be underprovided if the related spillover benefits are
not compensated. Another one is interregional equity: the pure reliance on local
taxes for financing mandatory local expenditures is likely to result in intolerable
disparities in terms of access to, and quality of, public services. A third argument

Expenditure-oriented model (1949–1989)
Step 1: The centre approves or modifies the ex-
penditure need declared by the local
government.
E (determined by the central planning
agency)
Step 2: In a discretionary or bargaining mecha-
nism, the centre provides the local gov-
ernment an entitlement in own and
shared revenues and grants equivalent
to the size of the expenditure need.
G D E  .T C NT/
Resource-oriented model (from 1990)
Step 1: The local government calculates its ex-
penditure need without formal approval
by the centre. In addition to own rev-
enues, it can also count on a certain
amount of norms-based grants and di-
rect transfers at the beginning of the fis-
cal year.
Possible outcomes:
E  T C NT C G
E > T C NT C G
Step 2: If E > TCNTCG, then the local gov-
ernment seeks for a solution to close the
fiscal gap.
E  .TCNTCG/ D TCNTCO
where
E total expenditure of the local government
T tax revenues of the local government including revenue sharing (from 1955)
NT non-tax revenues of the local government including user charges, administration fees,
fines, rents, etc. (from 1955)
G intergovernmental grants and transfers without revenue sharing and bailout
O other local revenues including loans, revenues from financial operations, bailout, etc.
Figure 6.1: Models of revenue regulation in Hungary before and after 1990
[Source: the author, based on Kusztosné Nyitrai (2004, pp. 256 and
269)]
 has to do with the idea of ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’: if the law or a
national authority imposes a minimum standard regarding the quantity or quality
of a local public service, it should also provide the necessary means of financing it
(B, ).
Against these normative propositions that are shared by some (but not all)
economists, the Hungarian legislative decided deliberately to disregard the classical
distinctions and created the notion of a unified budget in which more or less any
revenue item (except for the earmarked grants) can serve as funding source for any
expenditure item. The underlying idea was to provide decentralised authorities a
maximum of autonomy with regard to the management of their budget.
A more worrying element in the resource-oriented model is the residual category
of ‘other local revenues’ (O). The model as described in K N (,
p. ) explicitly mentions loans, bailout grants and revenues from transactions
in financial assets as elements of this category, but every other revenue excluded
from the categories T, NT, and G, can be presumed to be part of it implicitly (e.g.
revenues from privatisation).
The problem with handling loans, bailout, revenues from financial transactions
and sales of property on equal footing with taxes, user charges, rents and transfers
is that the former are not structural (recurrent) revenues at the free disposal of
local governments. The borrower must pay back the money to the lender (the
bank or another organisation), so that loans can at best serve as a temporary
source for financing capital projects or covering a one-time operational deficit
and cannot (or should not) become a structural element of the revenue side of
the budget. The same considerations apply to the bailout: it is (or at least should
be, per definitionem) a non-recurrent source of funding. Considering bailout as a
regular means for stabilisation gives a false signal that such ‘life buoys’ can become
an integral part of the local budget throughout a longer period.
The original equation as described by K N () is not explicit
but the specification of the model altogether leaves no doubt about the fact that
revenues from the sale of local government assets could also enter the category O
(other) and thus participate in the funding of recurrent expenditures. This is again
not recommendable: privatisation yields one-off revenue and contributes to the
depletion of the local capital stock. Hence, local governments cannot count upon
revenues from privatisation as recurrent items in their budget.
The mixed category O is in itself coherent with the underlying philosophy of a
unified local budget. However, some revenue sources are more adapted to financing
some particular expenditure items rather than others and the nature of the various
resources in terms of reliability and long-term exploitability can be very different.
Obviously, local authorities may also attain a balanced budget via cost contain-
ment or a reduction in the volume of local expenditure programmes, even if the
model is not explicit about it because of its restricted focus on the revenue side of
the budget. The various options of local governments in Hungary for adjusting the
local budget will be subject of Chapter .
.. The legal basis of
revenue autonomy
The revised national Constitution of , the Act LXV
of  on Local Government, the Act C of  on Local
Taxes and the annual national Budget Acts constitute
today the legal basis of revenue assignment in Hungary.
The Constitution stipulates that local governments are free to manage their
resources and are entitled to own revenues as well as to a proportionally cor-
responding contribution from the central budget so that they can meet their
mandatory responsibilities. The ALG refines this latter passage, appointing the
national legislative to be the responsible instance for ensuring ‘adequate financial
conditions’ for the provision of mandatory local public services. The different
categories of own-source revenues, transferred revenues and grants are laid down
in articles  to  of the ALG. The Act C of  specifies the rules of local taxation,
while the Act LXXXIX of  introduces a system of earmarked and targeted
grants. The legal source of norm-based grants as the most important component
of subnational revenues is the annual Budget Act.
Art.  of the Act XXXVIII of  on Public Finance confirms that the bud-
gets of local governments (including those of the counties) and local minority
governments (including those of the county-level minority governments, see Sec-
tion ..) together constitute the local (de facto municipal and county-) level of
public finance. All these entities as well as all multifunctional inter-municipal
associations, the so-called micro-regions established by the Act CVII of , are
free to manage their budgets according to their preferences, within the legal limits
imposed on budgeting procedure and fund management. The deconcentrated
agencies of the Hungarian State Treasury (HST) are responsible for the manage-
ment of intergovernmental revenue flows; subnational entities, on their turn, are
obliged to deliver financial data to the HST.
In contrast to municipalities, micro-regions and counties have no taxing powers.
Micro-regions rely on the financial contributions of the participating local gov-
ernments as well as on grants from the central budget. Counties rely to two-thirds
of their budget on intergovernmental grants and transfers, even if their share of
Art. /A para. /c of the Act XX of .
Art.  para.  ALG.

Table 6.1: Available revenue sources at the subnational levels, as of 01.05.2007)
[Source: the author]
municipalities micro-regions counties
Own 
revenues
Taxes ×
User charges, administrative fees × ×
Rental fees, concession fees, 
dividends
× ×
Revenues from privatisation × ×
Shared 
revenues
Personal income tax share × ×
Vehicle tax share ×
Tax on land leasing ×
Luxury tax ×
Grants and 
transfers
Norm-based unconditional grants × × ×
Norm-based conditional grants × × ×
Conditional grants from specific 
budgetary funds
× ×
Earmarked and targeted grants 
for capital development
× × ×
Infrastructure grants (allocated by 
the counties)
× ×
Transfers from other SNGs ×
Transfers from the National 
Health Insurance Fund
× ×
Transfers from extra-budgetary 
funds
× ×
Transfers from central budget 
authorities (ministries etc.)
× ×
Deficit grants (önhiki) ×
Interest rate reduction for 
insolvent SNGs
× ×
Table 3-8
the centrally collected personal income tax revenues is smaller than that attributed
to municipalities and they are excluded from a part of the development grant
programmes. The rest is composed of administrative fees, user charges, fines,
rents and revenues from the sale of assets. Table . provides an overview of the
revenue sources assigned to municipalities, municipal associations and counties.
The figures make it clear that among all categories of SNG, municipalities have by
far the widest choice of revenues. Given the expanding scope of responsibilities
that municipalities delegate to their associations (the micro-regions), the discus-
sion has started about the possibilities of assigning autonomous revenue sources
(particularly taxing power) to this category of SNG as well (P, ).
.. The dynamics of local
revenues between  and

Table . provides an overview of the development
of municipal revenues from  to  at con-
stant prices. For the same reason as in the case of
expenditures (Section ..), data on the municipal
sector are not available for the years before –.
Deflating the time series to base year  makes obviously little sense in revenue
categories that appear on the municipal accounts only later than that year, such
as tax on land rent, luxury tax, or transfers from the European Union. Luckily,
given the relatively small proportion of these revenues in the overall budget of the
local government sector, the provoked distortion is not too serious. Leaving the
figures at current prices instead would suggest a revenue explosion at the local level,
which did definitely not take place if we take account of the inflation. Rather, as the
figures suggest, the overall volume of GFS revenues (calculated according to the
methodology of the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary
Fund) displayed slightly any dynamism in the second half of the s before it
took an upward turn and continued to increase monotonously towards the mid
s.
However, an important shift took place within GFS revenues. Figure . high-
lights the changes in the revenue structure of local governments during the period
under review. The most striking feature is the expansion of own-source revenues
and the simultaneous decline in transferred revenues (particularly intergovernmen-
tal grants and transfers) within the overall budget until the mid-s, followed by
a more stable period that ultimately turned out to be the typical revenue structure
of local governments in Hungary. Within the broad category of transferred rev-
enues, grants for various equalisation purposes increased by  per cent in nominal
terms between  and , whereas the total volume of grants grew only half

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Figure 6.2: The revenue structure of local governments 1995–2006
[Source: the author, based on Table 6.2]
as much (D and P, a, p. ). Sections . to . will analyse these
trends in more detail.
. Local taxes
.. Overview With the entry into force of the Act C of  on Local Taxes on
 January , the central government transferred a part of its
taxing powers to the newly elected local governments. At the
same time, in order to protect taxpayers and ensure conformity with the legislation
of the European Union K N (, p. ), the law also imposes
a number of restrictions on local tax autonomy insofar as it withdraws from the
competence of municipalities the right of autonomous regulation of a number
of tax parameters. Table . provides an overview of the legal framework of local
taxation.
Municipalities are free to decide whether to introduce any tax in their jurisdiction
and choose one or more from the tax categories laid down in the law. They may
define and modify tax rates, tax base and other tax parameters within the statutory
limits. However, amendments to local tax decrees must be made in a way to avoid
an increase in the fiscal burden on taxpayers in that same year.
While the property taxes on land and buildings as well as the tourism tax on
holiday accommodation facilities belong to the broader category of wealth taxes,
the tourism tax collected upon the basis of the duration of stay of individuals is a
sort of income tax imposed on hotelkeepers and providers of other accommodation
facilities. Because of the regular practice of these enterprises shifting the tax forward
to their clients, this latter type of tax is also considered as a consumption tax.
The communal tax on businesses is a tax on employment (not a payroll tax, as it
does not relate to earned income), while the one imposed on private individuals is
a somewhere on the verge between a wealth tax and a poll tax: here, a lump-sum
tax is applied on individual property. Finally, the local business tax is a classical
multi-stage turnover tax.
Subject to certain constraints, the municipality may introduce tax reliefs (i.e. tax
credits, tax allowances and exemptions) in addition to those prescribed explicitly
by the law. During the s, a large number of local governments successfully
attracted new investors by exempting them from the tax for a limited or unlimited
period, often on condition that they create a certain number of jobs. Due to
a conflict with the European competition law, however, an amendment to the
local tax law in  obliged municipalities to cancel all unlimited tax reliefs or
transform them into limited ones before  March . The last tax reliefs given
for a limited period expired at the end of . The statistics of the coming years
will reveal whether the end of the era of tax reliefs induced a massive outflow of
capital from the previously attractive jurisdictions or whether other advantages
such as skilled labour or good infrastructures were able to compensate for the loss
of a preferential tax treatment.
In order to avoid an accumulation of tax liabilities (e.g. holiday homes are subject
to the building tax, the communal tax on private individuals and the tourism tax
simultaneously), the law stipulates that if several types of tax are levied on the
same object, the taxpayer is liable only to one tax. This rule does not exclude the
operation of several tax types on the same type of object, but then the local tax
decree must specify which tax is applicable to which category of taxpayers.
Since its amendment of , the law has provided a ‘conditionally exempted’ sta-
tus to civil organisations, churches, foundations, public bodies, public companies,
certain public utilities, voluntary mutual pension funds, private pension funds,
Art. – of the Act L of  on the Amendment of Selected Financial Acts.
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 government institutions and private schools that had no corporate tax liability or
transfer liability vis-a-vis the central budget in the preceding year.
Formal taxing powers constitute an important factor of revenue autonomy, but
the extent to which these powers are used in practice is even more decisive.
Between  and , local governments in Hungary made increasing use of
their local taxing powers. While tax revenues collected by local authorities (row
 in Table .) accounted for . per cent of the aggregate budget of the local
government sector in , this proportion rose to . per cent by . During the
same period, the number of municipalities levying some sort of tax increased from
 to , (Table .). This is a clear signal of the growing need for independent
local resources, but it is also a result of a new regulation in  according to which
local governments not levying any local tax are excluded from the bailout grant
system (the so-called önhiki, see Section ..).
While the spatial pattern of local fiscal policies shows considerable disparities,
researchers have found no clear relationship so far between the economic situation
of municipalities and their tax policy decisions. Several villages with small tax
bases and weak development potential, but also medium-size towns in the role
of regional centres, apply the maximum rate in every tax category, particularly
if the grants from the central government fail to cover the costs of mandatory
public services. Other municipalities decided to abolish certain local taxes or to
provide generous tax reliefs (as long as this was allowed) in order to keep those few
taxpayers in place (Box .).
.. Local business tax The most popular tax category among local govern-
ments is the local business tax (iparu˝zési adó, IPA): in
, only  local governments out of , did not collect this type of tax. Those
jurisdictions that introduced it gained on average . percent of their local tax
yield and . per cent of their total GFS revenues from this source (Table . and
Figure .).
While taxes on property and income (the latter via piggybacking or revenue
sharing) dominate local taxation in most countries of the world, the IPA belongs
to none of these categories. It is a traditional turnover tax levied on gross receipts
minus deductions at all stages of production (S, ). The pyramiding
(cascade) effect that had characterised the tax in its early years has gradually
disappeared. Today it resembles more a value-added tax, with the costs of goods,
materials and subcontractors being deductible from the gross sales figure. However,
Art.  of the Act CIX of .

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Box 6.1: Local strategies for a successful fiscal policy
As from January 1, 2007, the village of Tenk (1,262 inhabitants) in Northern Hungary
abolished the local business tax (IPA), taking a loss of HUF 6 to 7 billion in tax revenues a
year. The local council argued that the central government’s New Equilibrium Programme
aimed at the reduction of the general government deficit by 7 per cent between 2006
and 2008 significantly increased the fiscal burden on businesses. The insolvency of the
few local enterprises would not only deprive Tenk of IPA revenues but it could potentially
provoke a cutback in personnel or even a complete shutdown of business operations. In
2006, the two main enterprises in Tenk provided jobs to 1/3 of the active population.
Csomád (866 inhabitants), situated 32 km to the north of Budapest, is another example
of a municipality without IPA. The liberal fiscal policy has allowed the local government not
only to keep local enterprises in place but also to attract new investors. The businesses
now regularly contribute to the development of the municipal infrastructure (including
schools) on a voluntary basis and the sum of these contributions largely exceeds the tax
revenue of previous years.
Experience suggests that it is mainly the small and geographically isolated villages that
refrain from local taxation. Lacking adequate roads and public transport facilities, they
can hardly hope to defeat the nearby towns in the competition for taxpayers, so that
fiscal policy remains their only weapon. Several villages that had introduced a tax now
have to write off large amounts of irrecoverable debt incurred by enterprises that went
bankrupt.
With its unique success story, Györe (769 inhabitants) in Southern Hungary provides
an astounding example of self-management. The village is flourishing despite the fact
that it does not collect any taxes, it has never signed a loan or sold any of its assets. Half
of the local population is employed by the two sewing factories and the syrup factory that
rent land and buildings from the local government against a symbolic fee, while the rest
live on subsistence farming. Thanks to the citizens’ commitment towards the common
good (which is surprising in a situation that would normally create fiscal illusion) and the
rigorous management of local finances, Györe can save much on the expenditure side
of the budget and still boast with a fully developed public infrastructure that is entirely fi-
nanced via tax revenue sharing and norms-based grants. According to the mayor, the only
problem with this strategy is that it produces excellent scores in the development rankings
and consequently excludes the municipality from most of the capital grant programmes of
the central government. For an economist, of course, this argumentation is questionable.
From the perspective of local accountability and efficiency, it would be more appropriate
to finance the total current expenditure via local taxes and the total capital expenditure
via debt, as this would ensure a better match between decision-makers, taxpayers and
beneficiaries. Besides, it would liberate useful resources in the national budget for other
purposes.

26
70
80 80
83 82 84
85 86 84 85 85 84 85 84 85
6
19
14 14 13
14 13 12 12 14 13 13 14 14 15 14
67 10 6 6
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Business tax Property taxes Other taxes*
* The business tax corresponds to the IPA. Property taxes equal the sum of the taxes on residential and
non-residential buildings, the land tax, the communal tax on individuals as well as the tourism tax on
buildings (holiday estates).
Figure 6.3: The changing composition of local tax revenues [Source: the author,
based on Table 6.5]
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 enterprises using predominantly services that are produced ‘in-house’ (and that
cannot thus be expensed) still suffer from the cascade effect.
Consecutive amendments of the law ordered an increase in the applicable maxi-
mum rate and a simultaneous narrowing of the scope of the tax base according to
the schedule in Table .. The final impact of these interventions on local revenues
may be positive or negative. However, the curious feature of this system is that
the central government keeps changing the rules for a tax that it had previously
delegated into local competence. It does so presumably in order to protect taxpay-
ers from possible encroachments by local authorities, but in a well-functioning
economy with sufficient mobility, taxpayers need no tutelage: they can simply
choose the jurisdiction that best meets their preferences in terms of taxes and
benefits.
In ,  per cent of all municipalities levying an IPA applied a rate of above
. per cent and  per cent collected the maximal rate of . per cent. The
average rate was . per cent (M  F, ). Notwithstanding
these regional differences, in his empirical study involving municipalities with
more than , inhabitants, S () found no evidence of a veritable
tax competition, apart from some signs of strategic interactions between local
governments. Capital mobility in Hungary seems to be too limited to induce
interjurisdictional competition. Another finding in the study corroborates this
assumption: municipalities with stronger tax bases tend to apply higher tax rates
because they do not fear the out-migration of capital. The stronger tax base is
meant here in terms of a few successful enterprises and not in terms of a large
population; indeed, a higher number of inhabitants tends to lower the average tax
rate, reflecting the reduced expenditure need in the presence of economies of scale.
The only area where capital is relatively mobile is the Budapest agglomeration.
Here, the municipalities situated closer to the core of the agglomeration tend to
apply lower tax rates than those in the periphery (Box .).
The dependence on the IPA makes local budgets vulnerable to changes in the
local economic structure. Several towns boasting with a prosperous industry
Direct business taxes (on corporate income or sales) at the regional or local level exist in three
other European countries outside Hungary: Italy (imposta regionale sulle attività produttive, IRAP),
Germany (Gewerbesteuer) and Ukraine. A number of other countries (such as Austria, Denmark,
Finland, and Ireland) impose non-residential property, which can be regarded as another form
of local business taxation. With its taxe professionnelle, France originally imposed payroll and
fixed assets, whereby the payroll component has been gradually removed from the tax base. The
number of employees is the basis of local business taxation in Belgium and Portugal, similarly to
the Hungarian communal tax on businesses. For more detail, see B ().

T a
bl
e
6.
6:
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
to
th
e
IP
A
sy
st
em
be
tw
ee
n
19
90
an
d
20
06
[S
ou
rc
e:
th
e
au
th
or
]
Ye
ar
Ta
x
ba
se
*
M
ax
.r
at
e*
*
Le
ga
ls
ou
rc
e
19
90
–1
99
2
N
S
3.
0
‰
A
ct
C
of
19
90
19
93
–1
99
5
N
S
C
i 
.g
C
s/
8.
0
‰
A
ct
LX
X
V
Io
f
19
92
19
96
–1
99
7
N
S
C
i 
.g
C
s/
1.
2
%
A
ct
X
C
V
III
of
19
95
19
98
N
S
C
i 
.g
C
s
C
0
:3
3
m
/
1.
4
%
A
ct
C
IX
of
19
97
19
99
N
S
C
i 
.g
C
s
C
0
:6
6
m
/
1.
7
%
A
ct
C
IX
of
19
97
01
.2
00
0–
09
.2
00
5
N
S
C
i 
.g
C
s
C
m
/
2.
0
%
A
ct
C
IX
of
19
97
10
.2
00
5–
12
.2
00
5
N
S
C
0
:5
i 
.g
C
s
C
m
/
 
.x
C
r
C
e
C
c/
2.
0
%
A
ct
LX
X
X
II
of
20
05
fr
om
20
06
N
S
 
.g
C
s
C
m
/
 
.y
C
x
C
r
C
e
C
c/
2.
0
%
A
ct
LX
X
X
II
of
20
05
w
he
re
N
S
ne
t
sa
le
s;
i.e
.g
ro
ss
re
ce
ip
ts
m
in
us
re
tu
rn
s,
di
sc
ou
nt
s,
al
lo
w
an
ce
s,
V
AT
,a
nd
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
ta
xe
s
i
in
te
re
st
s
re
ce
iv
ed
g
co
st
s
of
go
od
s
us
ed
in
pr
od
uc
tio
n
s
va
lu
e
of
su
bc
on
tr
ac
to
rs
’s
er
vi
ce
s
m
co
st
s
of
m
at
er
ia
ls
us
ed
in
pr
od
uc
tio
n
x
ex
ci
se
ta
x
pa
id
r
ca
r
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
ta
x
pa
id
e
en
er
gy
ta
x
pa
id
c
co
ve
r
ch
ar
ge
re
ce
iv
ed
(in
re
st
au
ra
nt
s)
y
ro
ya
lti
es
re
ce
iv
ed
*
Fr
om
19
95
,s
pe
ci
fic
ru
le
s
ap
pl
y
to
fin
an
ci
al
se
rv
ic
es
an
d
in
su
ra
nc
e
co
m
pa
ni
es
,g
ov
er
nm
en
t
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
,c
hu
rc
he
s
an
d
ci
vi
lo
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
.
**
Th
e
m
ax
im
um
ra
te
s
ap
pl
y
to
re
gu
la
r
(i.
e.
no
t
te
m
po
ra
ry
)
bu
si
ne
ss
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
 Box 6.2: Underselling the big neighbour: the case of Budaörs
An illustrious example of the core-periphery phenomenon in taxation is the town of Bu-
daörs (25,725 inhabitants, 11 km from Budapest) that has deliberately kept its local busi-
ness tax rate at 1.7 to 1.8 per cent of the adjusted net sales ever since the introduction of
the tax in 1995. This is 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points lower than the rate applied by the
city council of Budapest. Together with the numerous tax reliefs provided until the end of
2007, this smart fiscal strategy has led to a spectacular local economic boom in Budaörs
characterised by the settlement of hypermarkets and about a hundred small innovative
enterprises and the corresponding rapid improvement in the public infrastructure and col-
lective goods and services in the jurisdiction. In 2007, about half of the municipal budget
(7.5 billion out of 15 billion forints) consisted of IPA revenues, which implies a 10 per
cent increase from the previous year. Within the current revenues, the share of the IPA
amounted to 70 per cent (Ön-Kor-Kép, 2007).
It might somewhat surprise that the very core of the Budapest agglomeration, the
capital city itself, applies an IPA rate of 2.0 per cent. One possible reason is that, contrary
to the surrounding municipalities that experience a tough competition, Budapest does not
need to fear an outflow of capital, thanks to the highly developed infrastructure and the
abundance of skilled labour.
during the socialist era and hoping for buoyant revenues from the IPA had to
experience a painful decline shortly after transition. Box . provides an example.
Business cycles, too, have a direct influence on corporate turnover figures and
thus on the IPA revenues. This influence, however, cannot be clearly separated in
the time series from other effects, notably the effects of tax base, tax rates, and the
number of local governments levying a tax. On one hand, as Table . showed, a
series of amendments to the local tax law gradually reduced the scope of the formal
(legally defined) tax base of the IPA. The effective tax base was even smaller, due to
the multitude of exemptions and deductions granted to major investors particularly
in the s, even though the additional IPA paid by the suppliers of these investors
and the firms providing the accompanying infrastructure (roads, landfills, etc.)
could partly neutralise this effect. On the other hand, the number of municipalities
introducing the IPA and the legally defined maximum rate continuously increased
during the period under review, and those municipalities pursuing an attractive
fiscal strategy could experience a boom in IPA revenues once the preferential
tax agreements had expired. Even if it is virtually impossible to separate from
each other the components of the long-term IPA revenue trend of a municipality,
Box 6.3: Dependency on IPA and changing economic structures:
the case of Balatonfu˝zfo˝
The Nitrokémia chemical company in Balatonfu˝zfo˝ (4,311 inhabitants) used to provide
employment to some 6,000 people. Unable to cope with the financial hardship resulting
from the post-socialist transition, the factory gradually decreased its production before
closing down operations in 1994. Local tax revenues, particularly the IPA, dropped so
dramatically that the municipality is unable to raise the necessary funding to participate in
central government matching grant programmes. Currently, the only way of developing
the local infrastructure is via privatisation and borrowing, to the extent that lenders accept
the risk related to a low level of recurrent revenues. The new biotechnological complex to
be set up by a group of investors on the same spot in the coming years could put an end
to the penury.
Box . shows how this part of the public budget in a major industrial town can
become a function of economic cycles in the national and global markets.
The strong reliance of local governments on the IPA is all the more remarkable as,
in general, there are not many valid arguments in favour of taxing businesses locally
(B, ). The IPA in particular lends itself to tax exportation resulting in poor
accountability of public expenditure decisions, but not to any of the other efficiency
problems cited in the literature (distortion of choices, fiscal competition—except
for some sporadic examples such as Budaörs, see Box .). However, political and
economic actors deplore its effects on equity and economic growth. As for the latter,
the IPA imposes substantial costs and barriers to the expansion of enterprises, thus
hampering job creation and investments. The equity effects are far more complex.
Beside the selective cascade effect hitting the service industry, the IPA is criticised
because the enterprise has to pay invariably, regardless of whether it makes a profit
or a loss. Moreover, while local enterprises provide – per cent of the local
tax revenues through the IPA, they use only a small fraction of the communal
infrastructure P (, p. ). The rest of the taxpayers contribute much less
to the common budget, particularly as in several municipalities, private individuals
are fully exempted from any kind of tax, which means that they benefit from a
At the same time, the idea of replacing the IPA with a ‘more equitable’ local corporate income tax
(see later in this section) has been attacked from several sides because it hits only the profit-making
enterprises although they are not the only ones to use the local infrastructure. Both of these
(seemingly contradicting) equity arguments are justifiable, but on different grounds: one relies on
the ability-to-pay principle while the other one makes use of the benefit principle.
 Box 6.4: Tatabánya: continuing dependence despite successful economic restruc-
turing [Source: the author, based on Antalóczy (2004)]
The town of Tatabánya (70,541 inhabitants), a major stronghold of the Hungarian heavy
industry during the Soviet rule, experienced a similar shock when the demand for mining
products collapsed. However, the successful privatisation of the related enterprises trig-
gered an inflow of further direct (mainly foreign green field) investments particularly in
the domains of engineering and process industries that could partly benefit from local tax
abatements and exemptions from the mid-1990s. The integration of local enterprises into
the world economy and their dependence on the global business cycles are most visible in
the development of exports from the late 1990s (see Figure 6.4).
Since its introduction in 1995, the IPA has always been the decisive component within
local tax revenues but its share fluctuated between 69 and 82 per cent (Figure 6.5).
The tax exemptions granted to the first major investors expired in the early 2000s.
The entry of these mainly foreign enterprises as new taxpayers into the local government
accounts coincided with a recession in the world economy, which explains why the share
of IPA revenues of Tatabánya fell so abruptly in 2002 (even though the yield continued to
grow in absolute terms), dragging down the total volume of municipal tax revenues. The
business cycle effect is mitigated to a certain extent by the distribution of the tax burden
across a large number of enterprises in different sectors. The hundred most important
taxpayers account for only 55 per cent of total tax revenues.
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[Source: Antalóczy (2004)]
range of local public services without ever paying for them. Finally, interregional
equity is hurt as well, since business activities are randomly distributed across the
jurisdictions. If there are spatial trends, they only exacerbate the existing disparities,
as industrial clusters normally benefit from favourable self-reinforcing processes
affecting employment, innovation and growth. In ,  per cent of the total own
tax revenues of the local government sector (dominated by the IPA to . per cent)
were collected in towns and cities (of which the half in Budapest) that, however,
represent merely  per cent of all municipalities. Only  per cent of the total tax
revenue accrued to the villages that account for  per cent of local governments
(L et al., , p. ). According to OECD data, per capita IPA revenues are
 times higher in the capital than in villages, and  to  times higher than in towns
B (, p. ). Nevertheless, the village of Kékkút with only  inhabitants
registered the highest per capita IPA revenue in the country (about HUF  million
in , or . times as high as that in Budapest; C et al., ), thanks to
the presence of a prosperous mineral water company.
In order to verify that firms in Hungary pay too much compared to the benefits they derive from
local public services, one should be able to estimate the ‘business share’ of local public expenditures,
as has been done for Canada and the United States in different empirical studies during the s
(references in Bird : ).
 Since , the central government has made considerable effort to reduce these
disparities by considering the revenue raising potential of municipalities in the
distribution of norm-based grants (see Section ..).
Because of the adverse effects of the IPA particularly on equity and economic
growth, its potential elimination has been on the political agenda since early .
Until mid-, it seemed as if the European Court of Justice could ban it on
the grounds that no member state of the European Union is allowed to have two
VAT-type levies. However, the legal inquiries finally revealed that the IPA was
different from a VAT and found no valid argument against this type of sales tax at
the local level of government. Regardless of this outcome, the Parliament might
decide to abolish the IPA on the medium term as soon as a fair compensation
is found for the ensuing revenue loss of HUF  billion at the municipal level.
The type of revenue to replace the IPA will necessarily have an influence on the
financial autonomy of local governments. The quest for a solution is embedded
into a general reform of the local tax system that will be briefly discussed at the
end of this section.
.. Taxes on property The second most important source of local own rev-
enue is the property tax. These are primarily levied on
buildings and land, but also the communal tax on individuals and the tourism tax
levied on holiday estates are property taxes in the economic sense.
The inequality of distribution of the fiscal burden between businesses and
households in connection with the IPA is further exacerbated by the practice
of building taxation. In ,  local governments imposed a levy on non-
residential buildings, while only  taxed residential buildings. Regrettably, the
statistics give no clue about the extent of overlapping between these two groups
(i.e. the number of municipalities taxing both items), nor about how much of the
overall yield of HUF , million was collected from the owners of residential
buildings (thus private individuals) in .
Although local governments can choose to assess the tax upon the fair value
of the asset, only five municipalities made use of this possibility in . The
rest simply took the useful floor area as the basis of calculation, even though
empirical studies suggest that there is only a weak correlation between property
size and the taxpayer’s ability to pay, just as well as between property size and the
benefits derived from local public services (S and T, , p. ). By
contrast, there seems to have a positive relationship between property value and
ability-to-pay (B and K, , p. ).
From the perspective of local autonomy, however, the determinant factor is
not fiscal equity but the buoyancy of revenues. B and K (, p. )
note that while both value-based and area-based property taxation may provide
a strong revenue basis for local governments, the yield of the value-based tax
grows together with inflation, while the real value of the yield of area-based taxes
decreases with inflation. In order to resolve this problem, the Parliament has
recently amended the Act C of  on Local Taxation by adjusting the maximum
tax level for yearly inflation in every tax category that involves the number or size
of tax objects instead of their value (see Table .). The amendment does not
permit to make any retrospective adjustment for the period –, but the
first experience suggests that there is no demand for it anyway: in , only a few
local governments made use of their right to apply the new maximum rates that
keep up with the inflation (M  F, ).
While value-based local property taxation has a genuine potential in Hungary,
several administrative and political hurdles in both the time and the space dimen-
sions are blocking the change. As for the spatial limits, local tax administrations
do not have enough experts to assess the value of all properties in the jurisdic-
tion; moreover, because of confidentiality provisions the central authorities do not
provide them sufficient information to make these assessments. On the time axis,
re-evaluation on a yearly basis is virtually impossible for lack of tax assessment
capacity, and any sort of indexation is necessarily arbitrary and seldom reflects the
market value. However, even if a regular assessment of every object were feasible,
it is not sure that value-based property taxes could bring in significantly more
revenue than the present area-based taxes. On one hand, B (b, p. ) argues
that ‘valuation is an art, not a science, and there is much room for discretion and
argument with respect to the determination of the base of the tax’. Value-based
property taxes are also costly to administer in a rapidly changing environment
(typical to developing and transition countries) and it is difficult to adjust revenues
from this source to the growing expenditure needs of local governments. Hence,
even if a local government operates an efficient value-based property tax, it is an
illusion to assume that this source is able to cover anything more than the costs
of property-related public services (D and P, a). On the other
hand, based on a survey involving six towns, B and K (, p. )
find that in each of these towns, a single value-based property tax applied with the
maximum rate could produce more revenue than the currently collected local taxes
altogether. At present, however, local governments do not make sufficient use of
The last increase of the legal maximum levels of the area-based building and land tax took effect on
.. (see art. – of the Act XCVIII of  on the Amendment of the Act on Local Taxes and
the Act on Vehicle Tax).
 their taxing power even with regard to area-based taxation. Instead of applying the
legal maximum rate to wealthy taxpayers and granting reductions or exemptions
to the needy, they apply a generally narrow tax base and low tax rates in order to
avoid political and social tensions among the electorate.
The communal tax on private individuals is second on the list of the most
commonly applied tax categories:  per cent of the local governments collected
it in . Even though several municipalities apply different rates according to
the geographical situation and/or the actual use of the real estate, the tax is simple
to administer. In addition, due to the fact that in , only  municipalities
applied a rate of HUF , or above per taxable item (M  F,
), it does not impose too heavy a burden on local residents. On the other hand,
the same low rates make the communal tax on private individuals a weak revenue
source contributing on average less than two per cent to total tax revenues and
. per cent to the overall local budget.
The fourth type of property tax, the tourism tax on holiday homes and other
buildings that may be used for accommodation, may be a primordial source of
revenue in major tourist destinations but totally negligible in other municipalities.
With the growing dominance of other tax categories, the share of this tax within
overall local tax revenues declined from . per cent in  to . per cent in .
All four categories of property taxes taken together, we find that property owners
contribute . per cent to local tax revenues and around . per cent to overall
local revenues. How much they receive from the benefits generated by local public
goods and services is not clear. In any case, it is plausible to assume that natural
persons and most of the public sector organisations holding properties generate
and consume a higher amount of local government spending than their actual
contribution to the budget. Natural persons have often no other liability than the
property tax, while many public sector organisations are exempted from the tax
on buildings and land. In contrast, private companies that are owners of land
and buildings and additionally subject to IPA realise a negative net fiscal benefit,
contributing more to the budget than what they receive out of it in terms of public
services. However, for lack of analytical data, the hypothesis cannot be verified.
.. Other taxes The last category includes the former council taxes (in force
until the end of ), the communal tax on enterprises, and
the tourism tax levied on non-residents based of the duration of their stay in the
jurisdiction.
The council taxes were no genuine local taxes, as the central planning authority
dictated rates, base and all other parameters. Yet, they counted as the most im-
portant source of local own revenues in the first years of transition when the new
system of local taxes was not yet fully operational.
Upon their introduction, both the communal tax on enterprises and the tourism
tax on non-residents became moderately important revenue sources, together
contributing  to  per cent to the overall local tax revenues every year between
 and . By , however, their share dropped to . and . per cent
respectively, as they gave way to more productive taxes on business turnover and
property. This trend is not necessarily deplorable. Enterprises pay the communal
tax in function of the size of their staff, which discourages the creation of new jobs.
As for the tourism tax, the spatial distribution of the tax base is uneven and local
governments can do hardly anything to improve their potential with regard to this
revenue category.
.. Some major constraints
on local tax autonomy
Speaking in terms of constraints as proposed in
Section .., we can observe relatively wide for-
mal tax autonomy at the local level (the number
and scope of direct legal constraints being limited), paired with a low effective
autonomy due to various factors.
. Subnational revenue effort is comparably weak for three reasons. First, the
central government and the social security funds receive the major part of
public revenues and leave little room for the decentralised governments to
levy additional taxes in their jurisdiction (this is what we called the ‘fiscal
crowding-out’ effect in Section ..). Table . shows the relative shares of
tax resources attributed to the various sub-sectors of general government
in  in a selection of unitary countries in Europe. The figures presented
in the column ‘subcentral government’ also include the relevant parts from
revenue sharing between levels of government, which suggests that the
proportion of own taxes, i.e. the part over which SNGs have power to vary
the rate or base, is even smaller. With only . per cent of the general
government tax revenues attributed to SNGs, Hungary is far below the
average of the sample and fits into the range of the most centralised countries
 such as Ireland, Greece, or Portugal. Second, as the share of own revenues in
the local budget is small, even a substantial relative increase in the share of
local taxes within general government taxes has only a moderate effect on
the revenue situation of the municipality. For local policymakers, there is no
point in assuming the political consequences of a tax increase if it can only
moderately contribute to the planned improvements in service provision
(F, ). Third, local governments fear (not without any reason) that
the central government would reduce the volume of grants and transfers in
response to an increase of local tax levels (F, ). A particular case in
point is the fear of losing eligibility for the deficit grant.
. Most of the taxes assigned to the local level are not sufficiently productive.
In , three out of five taxes (the land tax, the communal taxes and
the tourism tax) contributed each less than . per cent to the total GFS
revenues, while the building tax and the IPA brought in . and . per cent,
respectively (data from the Ministry of Finance).
. A third reason for a low level of effective tax autonomy in Hungary is the poor
demographic and socio-economic situation of several local communities.
D and P (b, p.  f.) find that the current level of local taxation
in Hungary is unsatisfactory for both fiscal and accountability reasons. As the fiscal
argument goes, local governments have been long time subject to a fiscal squeeze
(notably during the s) and it is time for them to exploit their full tax potential
as well as for the central government to grant them additional formal taxing powers.
According to the accountability argument, local authorities do not feel committed
to raising the revenues they spend. Both the quality and the efficiency of local
financial management could be improved if local decision-makers were forced to
take tough decisions on revenue generation and assume responsibility vis-a-vis the
taxpayers. The accountability argument does not call for an increase in the overall
level of taxation but rather a shift in the relative shares of tax room occupied by
the centre and the local governments.

Table 6.7: Attribution of tax revenues to sub-sectors of general government as
percentage of total tax revenue, 2005 [Source: OECD (2007b, p. 28)]
Supranational 
organisations
Central 
government
Subcentral 
government
Social Security 
Funds
Czech Republic 0.5 41.5 15.1 42.9
Denmark 0.4 64.4 33.0 2.2
Finland 0.2 53.9 20.7 25.2
France 0.6 40.1 11.5 47.9
Greece 0.9 63.8 0.8 34.5
Hungary 0.3 62.9 6.3 30.5
Ireland 0.4 84.9 2.1 12.6
Italy 0.3 52.3 16.6 30.8
Luxembourg 0.5 67.7 4.5 27.3
Netherlands 1.1 61.1 3.9 33.9
Poland 0.0 48.6 11.4 39.7
Portugal 0.0 60.1 6.2e 33.7
Slovak Republic 0.4 49.3 11.3 39.1
Spain 0.4 36.5 30.2 32.8
Sweden 0.6 56.4 32.2 11.2
Turkey 0.0 69.9 7.6 22.4
United Kingdom 1.0 75.4 4.8 18.8
Unweighted average 0.4 58.2 12.8 28.6
e estimated by the OECD Secretariat.
Table 3-14
 .. Attempts to improve the
system of local taxes
Having recognised the immanent weaknesses of
the system of local government taxes, the cen-
tral government has been considering various
reform options since . Some of these aim to neutralise the adverse effects of
certain taxes without too much attention to how this would affect local revenue
autonomy. The proposed introduction of an additional compulsory IPA allowance
for durable increases in workforce, as a measure to encourage employment, is but
one example. Other proposals intend explicitly to enhance local revenue autonomy,
such as the elimination of the tax rate ceilings or the right to deviate + per cent
from the upper ceiling. While there are no systematic and readily accessible data
on the tax categories, deductions and rates applied by the individual municipali-
ties in the period under review, sporadic information suggests that many local
governments have not yet exploited the maximum potential in local taxation.
This might be a reason why the more recent wave of discussions focuses more
on the possible abolition of the economically harmful IPA and the optimal com-
pensation mechanism. Given the dominance of the IPA in most local government
budgets, the way this revenue source is compensated will have a crucial impact
on the fiscal autonomy of municipalities. Increasing the local revenue share from
the centrally collected personal income tax or the withholding tax, as proposed
by the Tax Reform Committee of the Ministry of Finance in spring , could
provide municipalities with additional block grants but reduce their influence
on the volume of revenues. However, it is not yet clear whether the new rule on
revenue sharing would be anchored in the ALG or another statutory law or merely
in the annual Budget Act. Local surcharge on any of the centralised income taxes
has been proposed as another solution to compensate the lost IPA; however, such a
surcharge would possibly be even more sensitive to business cycles than the current
IPA (B, , p. ). Finally, an independent local tax on corporate income
or wealth would not resolve the problem of interjurisdictional disparities, and the
profit tax in particular would not be immune to equity problems (see footnote 
on page ). A full deductibility of the IPA from the national corporate income
tax has been so far the only proposal that could have neutralised the adverse effects
on investment and employment while leaving local revenue autonomy intact, but
in the end it has not been elaborated.
The Convergence Programme – (G   R 
H, ) envisages the introduction of a compulsory value-based local
property tax on residential buildings, offices and land from . The aim is to
See e.g. M  F ().
promote investment and job creation and to replace a part of the IPA as well as the
totality of the area-based taxes on buildings and land and the so-called communal
taxes. The reform idea has been softened in the meantime: the value-based taxation
would be optional and not start before .
The share of local tax revenue to general government tax revenue in Hungary is
far below the average of the sample of unitary countries ( per cent in Hungary,
compared to  per cent in the OECD sample; see OECD, a, p. ). Yet,
enhancing local taxing powers does not seem to be the most important objective
of the reform of local taxation, perhaps because the formal powers are already
wide enough. The cause of the low level of effective taxation is related to the way
municipalities make use of their formal taxing powers. Indeed, most of them seem
to make use of their room for manoeuvre by setting tax rates lower and tax reliefs
higher than the respective limits fixed by the law. Yet, while the upper limits on tax
rates are reasonable insofar as they permit to minimise disparities, the lower limits
on tax reliefs and their frequent amendments are an unnecessary encroachment
upon local autonomy. Moreover, regarding the subnational sector as a whole, the
reason why counties are prohibited from raising any taxes in spite of their growing
expenditure responsibilities is unclear.
. Non-tax revenues
.. Overview Subnational governments in Hungary are allowed to collect the
following types of non-tax revenues:
– revenues from the operation of public service facilities (user charges, ad-
ministrative fees, sales of products and services, etc.; administrative fees
correspond to row  in Table .);
– interests received (row  in Table .);
– VAT returned;
– revenues from entrepreneurial activities (profit, dividends, etc.);
– rental fees, leasing and concession fees;
– fines (related to the protection of the environment, monuments, traffic, etc.);
– donations (especially to schools and social service facilities).
 In , municipalities earned . per cent of their total GFS revenues from
non-tax revenues, while the same sources accounted for . and . per cent of the
respective aggregate budget of micro-regions and counties (data from the Ministry
of Finance). As counties latter have no taxing powers, non-tax revenues are their
only source of current own revenues. The actual collections are significantly higher
in both categories of local governments, but the massive outsourcing of local
public services to the private and non-profit sectors makes that much of the non-
tax revenue (particularly user charges) collected in a jurisdiction is landing on the
accounts of service providers. Currently, there are only vague estimations about
the overall amount of such off-budget revenues (Hegedu˝s ). Official statistics
are silent about the amount of user charges collected by local governments, which
is also a reason why they do not appear on a separate row in Table ..
.. User charges Depending on the type of non-tax revenue, the autonomy
of local governments is subject to various constraints. With
regard to user charges, the legal constraints apply directly to the service provider
that may also be the local government itself. In public education, health care and
social services, the level of user charges is mainly determined in the corresponding
sector-specific law and line ministry decrees (based on the Act LXXXVII of  on
Price Setting). In other policy areas such as drinking water supply, sewage and waste
management, the law describes in detail how providers should calculate the level of
user charges. In the case of outsourcing, the municipal executive is free to approve
or reject the providers’ calculations, but it seldom has sufficient capacity to check
these for correctness, so that the level of the user charge is ultimately determined
through political negotiations characterised by asymmetric information in favour
of the provider. Mayors who find that the proposed price is politically unacceptable
are sometimes ready to pay the difference out of the municipal budget instead of
continuing the negotiations, as is typical of the domain of public transport. In yet
other policy areas (use of public space, parking regulations, etc.), price setting is at
the full discretion of the provider although he is obliged to consult the municipal
executive (H, ).
Officially, the central government justifies its intervention in the field of user
charges with equity arguments, but in reality, the underlying reason has more
to do with efficiency than with equity. Recent observations show that despite of
the existing legal regulations on price setting, there are remarkable interregional
disparities in the levels of user charges in some policy areas. A part of these
In the terminology of the IMF Government Finance Statistics, this term corresponds to ‘revenues
from quasi-governmental operations’.
disparities are due to the geographical differentiation entailed in the relevant legal
acts, another part may be explained with variations in the operational efficiency
of network infrastructures, while a third part is due to differences among local
governments in the extent to which they exploit their autonomy. The difference in
the price of one cubic metre of drinking water between the lowest and the highest
charging jurisdiction is about sevenfold. The variance of sewage charges is even
higher (H, ). Taxpayers can do nothing about the fact that the soil
is more sensitive, or water purification is more expensive, in a geographical area
than elsewhere. For such ‘equity’ considerations, the central government decided
in July  to harmonise the method of price calculation across providers in the
drinking water and sewage sectors. In fact, however, the harmonised calculation
method allows citizens to compare the prices across the various jurisdictions, and
hence it facilitates a horizontal benchmarking between service providers, which
ultimately promotes efficiency in service provision.
Local authorities could certainly make a better use of their formal powers and in-
crease their revenues from user charges if they revised the actual rates and improved
collections. D and P (a, p. ) argue that such measures would have
no impact on the financial situation of municipalities, since the marginal revenue
would flow (in the case of outsourcing) into the budget of the service provider
instead of the municipal budget. This argumentation might seem plausible at first
sight but it is hard to defend in the context of a holistic budget. While it is true
that the additional user charges collected on outsourced services accrue directly to
the service provider and not to the municipality, they allow the latter to reduce the
volume of subsidies paid to the provider in order to help balance his budget (with
drinking water prices kept artificially low, hardly any waterworks can break even).
Moreover, since the amount of user charges should correspond exactly to the costs
of service provision (wherever the law prescribes cost recovery levels and prohibits
profit making), it is anyway an illusion to expect user charges to produce a revenue
surplus.
Even if adjusting user fees to cost recovery level would make sense from an
economic point of view, political and strategic considerations work in the oppo-
site direction and impose serious endogenous constraints on revenue autonomy.
Unlike service providers, local governments assume ultimate responsibility for
the user charge levels by virtue of their right to approve or reject the providers’
proposals. Several municipalities keep user charges below the cost recovery level
in order to avoid confrontation with the local electorate. In order to compensate
the provider for the revenue loss resulting from such policy, they often subsidise
the entrepreneurial activities (those unrelated to the public service) pursued by
 the latter. By doing so, they sometimes engage themselves in risky ventures that
jeopardise the balance of the public budget.
Local governments also tend to charge lower prices to households than to busi-
nesses, which is fully in line with the providers’ interest, since it is easier to collect
fees from organisations than from individuals. Moreover, strategic horizontal
interactions have been observed among holiday resorts situated around the Lake
Balaton. Many of them have stopped charging entrance fees in public open-air
baths and have even granted clients free use of the surrounding parking places
and bicycle racks. The underlying idea is to attract tourists in order to boost
the turnover of nearby hotels, restaurants and shops that would in turn pay a
higher amount of business tax to the municipality while reinforcing their own
market position against competitors in other holiday resorts. Whatever smart
this tactics might appear, it is questionable from the perspective of allocational
efficiency because it implies a shift of the tax burden from the beneficiaries of a
public service to the entrepreneurial sector. This is against the spirit of the fiscal
equivalence principle according to which the groups of taxpayers, beneficiaries
and decision-makers should overlap as far as possible. From the point of view of
autonomy, the only concern is about the vicious circle of fiscal competition: the
more a municipality engages in the race to the bottom, the more limited its room
for manoeuvre with regard to the realisation of local expenditure programmes.
.. Revenues from
entrepreneurial activities,
rental, leasing and concession
Local governments may also raise revenues through
entrepreneurial activities (profit, dividend) as
well as through renting public assets (e.g. leasing
and concession fees). According to art.  para.
/b of the ALG, these are part of the own revenues of local governments and are not
subject to any legal restriction. However, because much of this revenue is raised
and managed by off-budget entities contracted for service delivery, only a fragment
of it appears on the accounts of municipalities (row  in Table .). Between 
and , local governments took over, established, or invested in, about ,
limited or joint-stock companies providing fee-based or market services (e.g. in
manufacturing and agricultural production), and set up another  off-budget
entities offering non-profit services such as public libraries, social services, road
and park maintenance (K and H, , p.  f.). In several
municipalities, the amount of off-budget revenues may even exceed that of the
on-budget revenues. Moving activities back and forth between the two categories
has become a key policy instrument (H, , p. ). Since business enti-
ties are not part of the general government, their operations do not appear in the
government finance statistics. In , on-budget revenues from dividends and
concession fees (and possibly other categories of entrepreneurial revenue that the
statistics do not mention explicitly) amounted to HUF . million for the entire
local government sector, which corresponds to . per cent of the aggregate GFS
revenues realised at the local level in that same year (M   I,
).
One risk factor concerning the role of the local government as entrepreneur is
the fact that enterprises may go bankrupt, with potentially grave consequences for
the local government as a public entity charged with responsibility for the welfare
of the local community. While several large towns may internally have elaborated
a rating system to assess the risk of such ventures as well as a set of measures
to address bankruptcy situations, the overwhelming majority of municipalities
presumably lack these sorts of rating instruments and emergency plans.
.. Fines Local governments may impose fines on private and legal persons
as a penalty for minor offences against the law in all those cases that
have not been explicitly delegated to another public authority. These are regulated
in the Act LXXIX of  on Offences and the Government Decree no.  of 
( December) on Specific Offences. Data on fines are not collected systematically
for the aggregate local government sector. Therefore, this revenue item does not
appear on a separate row in Table .; it is nevertheless included in the current
own-source revenues in row . According to the data of the Ministry of the Interior
for , local governments imposed a fine in , cases, whereby towns resorted
to this measure about four times as often as rural settlements did, probably because
there is a similar difference in the number of the offences. This proportion is also
reflected in the resulting revenues: while villages collected ‘only’ about  million
forints in fines, towns realised more than  million (corresponding to less than
. per cent of the respective total amounts of GFS revenues). There is no significant
difference in the average amount of fine, however: this was , forints in rural
settlements, , forints in urban areas, whereas art.  para.  of the Act LXXIX
of  allows a maximum of , forints for breaches explicitly regulated in a
local government decree. Already in , the Ministry of the Interior deplored the
overly indulgent behaviour of local governments towards breaches against the law.
In , the average fine amounted to roughly , forints (compared to the legal
maximum that was , forints at that time), and one-third of the procedures
were cancelled (Ö-K-K, ). While setting fines within the legal limits is a
genuine local affair, low penalties have implications not only for social justice but
 also for the overall local budget, since a part of the local revenue potential remains
unused.
. Revenues from property
The last category of local own-source revenues consists of capital revenues resulting
from the sales of tangible and intangible assets, shares and public enterprises, as
well as certain compensation payments from within and outside the central budget.
In , revenues from property (row  in Table .) amounted to , mil-
lion forints at current prices, or . per cent of the total GFS revenues of the overall
local government sector (data from the Ministry of Finance; see also Figure .).
There are remarkable differences in the revenue potential of the various categories
of local government. Throughout the s, capital revenues accounted for  to
 per cent of the budgets of capital districts, while they were a much less reliable
source for the capital city where their budget share fluctuated between . and
. per cent. Towns and villages could ensure about  to  per cent of their budgets
from this source on a yearly average.
While revenues from the sale of land, tangible and intangible assets (row  in
Table .) as well as compensation payments from outside the state budget (row
) were relatively stable throughout the period under review, the other categories
showed more dynamics. The privatisation of former state-owned assets (sale
of shares and enterprises, rows  and ) yielded abundantly during the s
and permitted the realisation of many an investment programme (and in some
cases also the reduction of the operational deficit), but revenues from this source
declined rapidly once the most valuable items had been sold (see Figure .). The
increase in the volume of compensation payments from the central budget (row
) has two reasons. First, as a compensation for the gas distribution companies
that the central government had privatised on its own initiative between  and
, about  local governments received shares of public companies at a total
face value of  billion forints. Second, local governments were compensated in a
similar form in  for the value of urban lands used by privatised enterprises.
The available data (sale of shares in  and , row ) suggest that they sold
the shares almost immediately in order to finance some planned investments, or at
least they transformed them into other financial assets.
Finally, the grants for infrastructure development from Brussels (row ) ap-
peared simultaneously with Hungary’s accession to the European Union (EU) and
rose rapidly in the subsequent years. Classifying the EU development grants under

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 capital revenues (instead of intergovernmental grants; row  in Table .), was a
deliberate choice of the central government.
While capital expenditures accounted for  to  per cent of the total expendi-
tures of municipalities between  and , capital revenues contributed merely
 to  per cent to the overall budget. As Figure . shows for the municipal sector
as a whole, revenues from property grow at a slower pace than capital expenditures
do, which exacerbates the initial imbalance of the local ‘capital budget’. This phe-
nomenon could be worrying if the decentralised finance system did not follow the
principle of a unified budget presented in Section ... However, thank to this
principle, local governments may freely combine recurrent revenues with capital
revenues to finance any type of expenditure item. Indeed, the explanatory report
to Act CXXVIII of  on the Implementation of the Budget of the Year 
of the Republic of Hungary confirms that local governments increasingly rely on
current revenues for financing their investment programmes.
Figure . shows also how the importance of privatisation revenues decreased
over the years as municipalities sold out of their most valuable assets. After the
sale of municipal enterprises (which local governments did mainly in the hope
to improve service quality, not to generate additional revenues), the only type of
asset that remains to be sold is real estates. These are, however, limited. B and
H (, p.  f.) warn that with the sale of real estates, local authorities
could lose those assets that they use mainly as collaterals for loans, which may be a
hindrance to future borrowing.
. Shared revenues
.. Overview Having started with only one tax category (personal income
tax) and one favoured level of subnational government (mu-
nicipalities) in , the legislative continuously enlarged and
refined the system of revenue sharing during the subsequent years in order to
accommodate various policy interests and to adapt revenue flows to the needs
of the different groups of SNGs. In , shared revenues (row  in Table .)
accounted for . per cent of the municipal budget (total GFS revenues) already,
compared to . per cent in  and . per cent in  (data from the Ministry
of Finance).
Efforts to improve the system made the distribution formulae increasingly
complex throughout the years. Administrative simplicity and predictability were
sacrificed for more equity. Table . shows the development of revenue sharing
from  to . Columns  to  contain effective rates calculated by the au-
thor in order to render the sophisticated legal rules operational and comparable
throughout the period.
Table . shows the importance of revenue sharing for the municipal level in
monetary terms. The four tax categories—personal income tax, motor vehicle
tax, tax on agricultural land rent, and luxury tax—taken together, shared revenues
account for about one-sixth of the overall budget of the local public sector. Their
importance grew from . per cent in  to . per cent in  and slightly
decreased in the following two years. Together with grants and transfers (row  in
Table .), they provide about  to  per cent of local GFS revenues (data from
the Ministry of Finance).
.. Share of the personal
income tax
In , at the introduction of the resource-oriented
model of revenue assignment, the entire revenue
from the personal income tax (PIT) was returned
to the municipalities on a derivation basis. For this reason, the PIT originally
figured among the own-source revenues in the local government accounts. In
the following four years, the total subnational share of PIT declined gradually to
 per cent before it took an upward turn in  to reach  per cent by .
Regardless of the upward trend in the overall share, the percentage returned to
the municipalities on derivation basis started to sink simultaneously and never
reached the level of  ( per cent) again (row  in Table .).
The exclusively derivation-based revenue sharing was undoubtedly cost-efficient
but, together with another buoyant revenue source, the IPA, it produced serious
horizontal fiscal disparities during its five-year regime. Besides, the enactment
of pre-primary and primary education and social care as mandatory tasks of
local governments necessitated a major increase in the level of norm-based grants
(see Section ..); this was financed through a decrease of the derivation-based
A numerical example may be helpful at this point. According to art.  of the Act CXXXIII of 
on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary for the Year , SNGs together are entitled to  per
cent, or , million forints, of the personal income tax (PIT) collected in . This amount is
redistributed as follows: () every municipality receives back  per cent of the PIT that the national
tax authority collected in its jurisdiction (derivation-based distribution); this adds up to HUF ,
million. () Another . per cent of the national PIT collections, or HUF , million, are
redistributed in the so-called ‘normative’ way. This means: (.) HUF , million are transferred
to the counties as PIT revenue share (Annex , point , of the Budget Act); and (.) HUF ,
million are redistributed among all SNGs in the framework of the system of norm-based grants
(Annex ; Annex , points I–IV). Finally, (), . per cent, or HUF , million, serve to feed the
system of municipal revenue equalisation (Annex , point ). Minor changes in the effective figures
(at year-end) are possible.

Ta
bl
e
6.
8:
Th
e
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
of
th
e
re
ve
nu
e
sh
ar
in
g
sy
st
em
be
tw
ee
n
19
90
an
d
20
07
[S
ou
rc
e:
th
e
au
th
or
,
ba
se
d
on
th
e
na
ti
on
al
B
ud
ge
t
A
ct
s
of
th
e
pe
ri
od
19
90
–2
00
6]
Ye
ar
Pe
rs
on
al
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x1
M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
 
ta
x
Ta
x 
on
 a
gr
.  
   
   
 
la
nd
 r
en
t
Lu
xu
ry
 t
ax
O
ve
ra
ll 
SN
G
 
sh
ar
e 
(%
)
of
 w
hi
ch
Sh
ar
e 
re
tu
rn
ed
 t
o 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
on
 a
 d
er
iv
at
io
n 
ba
si
s 
(%
)4
re
tu
rn
ed
 t
o 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
on
 a
 d
er
iv
a­
ti
on
 b
as
is
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
“n
or
m
s”
se
rv
in
g 
re
ve
nu
e 
eq
ua
lis
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s3
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
am
on
g 
co
un
ti
es
 o
n 
a 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ba
si
s
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
am
on
g 
al
l 
SN
G
s 
as
 n
or
m
­
ba
se
d 
gr
an
ts
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
90
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
–
–
–
–
–
–
19
91
50
.0
50
.0
–
–
–
–
–
–
19
92
50
.0
50
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
93
30
.0
30
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
94
30
.0
30
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
95
35
.0
29
.8
0.
3
4.
4
0.
5
50
+
–
–
19
96
36
.0
25
.0
1.
0
6.
5
3.
5
50
+
–
–
19
97
38
.0
22
.0
1.
8
8.
8
5.
3
50
+
–
–
19
98
40
.0
20
.0
2.
1
10
.4
7.
5
50
+
10
0
–
19
99
40
.0
15
.0
2.
3
15
.1
7.
6
50
+
10
0
–
20
00
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
25
.8
7.
2
50
+
10
0
–
20
01
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
26
.0
7.
0
50
+
10
0
–
20
02
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
26
.5
6.
6
50
+
10
0
–
20
03
40
.0
10
.0
2.
3
19
.8
7.
9
10
0
10
0
–
20
04
40
.0
10
.0
2.
1
20
.0
7.
9
10
0
10
0
–
20
05
40
.0
10
.0
1.
7
20
.0
8.
3
10
0
10
0
–
20
06
40
.0
10
.0
1.
9
19
.7
8.
5
10
0
10
0
10
0
20
07
40
.0
8.
0
1.
0
22
.8
8.
3
10
0
10
0
10
0
1  
A
ny
 d
is
cr
ep
an
ci
es
 in
 t
he
 t
ot
al
s 
ar
e 
fr
om
 r
ou
nd
in
g 
fig
ur
es
 t
o 
th
e 
ne
ar
es
t 
w
ho
le
 n
um
be
r.
2  
Fr
om
 1
99
7,
 fi
gu
re
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
gr
an
ts
 f
or
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 la
gg
in
g 
be
hi
nd
.
3  
Fr
om
 1
99
0 
to
 1
99
4,
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 w
ith
 a
 lo
w
 (
de
riv
at
io
n-
ba
se
d)
 P
IT
 s
ha
re
 w
er
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 a
 s
o-
ca
lle
d 
PI
T 
su
pp
le
m
en
t 
fin
an
ce
d 
fr
om
 o
ut
si
de
 t
he
 P
IT
 r
ev
en
ue
 
po
ol
. 1
99
5:
 m
ix
ed
 fi
na
nc
in
g.
 1
99
6-
19
98
: P
IT
 s
up
pl
em
en
ts
 a
re
 fi
na
nc
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 P
IT
 r
ev
en
ue
 p
oo
l. 
19
99
: P
IT
 s
up
pl
em
en
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
la
ce
d 
by
 in
di
re
ct
 r
ev
en
ue
 
eq
ua
lis
at
io
n.
4  
Fr
om
 1
99
0 
to
 2
00
2,
 t
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
 t
ax
 a
m
ou
nt
ed
 t
o 
50
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 t
he
 m
in
im
um
 t
ax
 r
ec
ei
pt
 (
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
lo
w
es
t 
po
ss
ib
le
 r
at
e)
 p
lu
s 
10
0%
 
of
 a
ny
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 t
ax
 r
ec
ei
pt
 a
cc
ru
in
g 
to
 t
he
 lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
fr
om
 t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
ra
te
.

Ye
ar
Pe
rs
on
al
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x1
M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
 
ta
x
Ta
x 
on
 a
gr
.  
   
   
 
la
nd
 r
en
t
Lu
xu
ry
 t
ax
O
ve
ra
ll 
SN
G
 
sh
ar
e 
(%
)
of
 w
hi
ch
Sh
ar
e 
re
tu
rn
ed
 t
o 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
on
 a
 d
er
iv
at
io
n 
ba
si
s 
(%
)4
re
tu
rn
ed
 t
o 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
on
 a
 d
er
iv
a­
ti
on
 b
as
is
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
“n
or
m
s”
se
rv
in
g 
re
ve
nu
e 
eq
ua
lis
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s3
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
am
on
g 
co
un
ti
es
 o
n 
a 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ba
si
s
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
am
on
g 
al
l 
SN
G
s 
as
 n
or
m
­
ba
se
d 
gr
an
ts
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
90
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
–
–
–
–
–
–
19
91
50
.0
50
.0
–
–
–
–
–
–
19
92
50
.0
50
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
93
30
.0
30
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
94
30
.0
30
.0
–
–
–
50
+
–
–
19
95
35
.0
29
.8
0.
3
4.
4
0.
5
50
+
–
–
19
96
36
.0
25
.0
1.
0
6.
5
3.
5
50
+
–
–
19
97
38
.0
22
.0
1.
8
8.
8
5.
3
50
+
–
–
19
98
40
.0
20
.0
2.
1
10
.4
7.
5
50
+
10
0
–
19
99
40
.0
15
.0
2.
3
15
.1
7.
6
50
+
10
0
–
20
00
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
25
.8
7.
2
50
+
10
0
–
20
01
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
26
.0
7.
0
50
+
10
0
–
20
02
40
.0
5.
0
2.
0
26
.5
6.
6
50
+
10
0
–
20
03
40
.0
10
.0
2.
3
19
.8
7.
9
10
0
10
0
–
20
04
40
.0
10
.0
2.
1
20
.0
7.
9
10
0
10
0
–
20
05
40
.0
10
.0
1.
7
20
.0
8.
3
10
0
10
0
–
20
06
40
.0
10
.0
1.
9
19
.7
8.
5
10
0
10
0
10
0
20
07
40
.0
8.
0
1.
0
22
.8
8.
3
10
0
10
0
10
0
1  
A
ny
 d
is
cr
ep
an
ci
es
 in
 t
he
 t
ot
al
s 
ar
e 
fr
om
 r
ou
nd
in
g 
fig
ur
es
 t
o 
th
e 
ne
ar
es
t 
w
ho
le
 n
um
be
r.
2  
Fr
om
 1
99
7,
 fi
gu
re
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
gr
an
ts
 f
or
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 la
gg
in
g 
be
hi
nd
.
3  
Fr
om
 1
99
0 
to
 1
99
4,
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 w
ith
 a
 lo
w
 (
de
riv
at
io
n-
ba
se
d)
 P
IT
 s
ha
re
 w
er
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 a
 s
o-
ca
lle
d 
PI
T 
su
pp
le
m
en
t 
fin
an
ce
d 
fr
om
 o
ut
si
de
 t
he
 P
IT
 r
ev
en
ue
 
po
ol
. 1
99
5:
 m
ix
ed
 fi
na
nc
in
g.
 1
99
6-
19
98
: P
IT
 s
up
pl
em
en
ts
 a
re
 fi
na
nc
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 P
IT
 r
ev
en
ue
 p
oo
l. 
19
99
: P
IT
 s
up
pl
em
en
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
la
ce
d 
by
 in
di
re
ct
 r
ev
en
ue
 
eq
ua
lis
at
io
n.
4  
Fr
om
 1
99
0 
to
 2
00
2,
 t
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
 t
ax
 a
m
ou
nt
ed
 t
o 
50
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 t
he
 m
in
im
um
 t
ax
 r
ec
ei
pt
 (
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
lo
w
es
t 
po
ss
ib
le
 r
at
e)
 p
lu
s 
10
0%
 
of
 a
ny
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 t
ax
 r
ec
ei
pt
 a
cc
ru
in
g 
to
 t
he
 lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
fr
om
 t
he
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
ra
te
.
 PIT share from  to  per cent in . Two years later, the new expenditure
responsibilities defined in Act III of  on Social Administration and Social
Services necessitated a similar action, which made the derivation-based PIT share
melt from  to  per cent. However, these instances of internal reallocation of
the PIT revenues were not completely transparent; neither the annual Budget Acts
of  to  nor any other law mentioned them explicitly.
A major change came in , when for the first time, PIT revenues were divided
into three segments: one part was returned to municipalities on a derivation basis,
another part was distributed among SNGs according to various service-specific
formulae (the so-called ‘norms’, see Section ..) and a third part according to
fiscal capacity indicators. In the revised system, also counties can benefit from the
national PIT collections, albeit to a much lesser extent than municipalities.
The PIT revenue share is one of the major pillars of the municipal budget and,
by virtue of its unconditional character, it is a key component of local revenue
autonomy. However, since both the overall revenue share and its distribution
among SNGs are anchored in the Budget Act and hence subject to annual changes,
any attempt of local governments to plan their revenue flows for several years
in advance is doomed to failure. Its poor predictability makes the PIT revenue
share an important but not fully reliable element of local autonomy. Moreover,
for technical reasons, municipal PIT shares are calculated from the PIT revenues
that had been collected two years earlier. Because of the inflation, this time lag
produces substantial revenue losses for local governments in real terms.
The other three tax categories that are subject to revenue sharing—vehicle
tax, tax on land rent, and luxury tax—are collected and administered by the
municipalities. The reason why they figure under shared revenues is that the
municipalities cannot influence their parameters such as rate, base and exemptions:
all of these are determined by the national legislation.
.. Share of the motor
vehicle tax
At its introduction in , the motor vehicle tax (row
 in Table .) was based on the weight of cars, buses,
trucks, and other road vehicles with an engine, while
a lump-sum tax applied to motorcycles, trailers, caravans and campers. Local
governments were allowed to keep  per cent of the collected revenues; the rest
had to be transferred to the central tax authority. The Act LXXXII of  on Motor
Vehicle Tax also established the applicable rates from which the local governments
From .., the motor vehicle tax has been based on the age and performance (in kW) of the
vehicle. Motorcycles are no longer exempted (art. – of the Act LXI of  on the Amendment
of Selected Financial Laws).

Table 6.9: The importance of revenue sharing for the local budget, 1990–2006
[Source: Ministry of Finance]
Year Shared revenues accruing to local governments at current prices 
(million HUF)
Shared 
revenues 
within total 
GFS revenues 
(%)
Personal 
income tax
Motor 
vehicle tax
Tax on land 
rent
Luxury tax Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1990 70,894 – – – 70,894 n.a.
1991 47,019 – – – 47,019 n.a.
1992 62,986 2,331 – – 65,317 n.a.
1993 48,953 2,480 – – 51,433 n.a.
1994 61,298 2,465 – – 63,763 n.a.
1995 92,944 2,472 – – 95,416 13.5
1996 98,780 7,056 – – 105,836 12.6
1997 126,006 7,910 – – 133,916 12.8
1998 169,590 8,842 125 – 178,557 15.4
1999 180,091 11,444 1,632 – 193,167 14.8
2000 210,239 12,622 2,157 – 225,018 15.8
2001 247,672 14,062 2,424 – 264,158 16.0
2002 288,368 14,584 2,550 – 305,502 16.2
2003 366,253 30,009 1,456 – 397,718 18.6
2004 406,899 45,941 289 – 453,129 19.8
2005 391,573 49,177 194 – 440,943 17.8
2006 406,919 51,266 167 104 458,456 17.5
Revenues are shown not as budgeted but as effectively realised.
n.a.: impossible to calculate because of the missing data on municipal GFS revenues.
Table 3-14
 could not deviate before the amendment of the law in . Starting from that
year, they were allowed to retain  per cent of the minimum revenue (based on
the rate figuring in the national law) and the whole of what had been collected
additionally, due to higher local rates. Another major change occurred in 
when municipalities were allowed for the first time to keep  per cent of the
revenues. Thus, in practical terms, the motor vehicle tax has been removed from
the system of revenue sharing and transformed into a genuine local tax, even
though local governments cannot yet influence any other tax parameter than the
rate. Revenues from this source are constantly growing, although this trend is
more solid in urban areas because of the higher number of registered vehicles.
Thus, while the motor vehicle tax, and particularly the two reforms mentioned
above, enhances the revenue autonomy of local governments, it also contributes to
growing disparities among the jurisdictions, although by far not as much as the
IPA or the PIT do.
.. Tax on agricultural land
rent
The taxation of income that private and legal
persons derive from the rental of agricultural
land (row  in Table .) is regulated in art. 
of the Act CXVII of  on Personal Income Tax and is thus part of the PIT
regime. Initially designed to feed the central budget, all revenues of the tax on
land rent were returned to the collecting municipalities from . However, the
tax parameters such as base, rate ( per cent) and exemptions continue to be
determined by the PIT legislation. After a steady growth to . billion forints in
 (which made still only . per cent of total GFS revenues) for the local public
sector as a whole, revenues from this source suddenly dropped without any change
in the legislation.
.. Luxury tax With the Act CXXI of  on Luxury Tax, a new local tax cat-
egory (row  in Table .) appeared on  January , hitting
private residential buildings of a market value of above  million forints (the rate
is . per cent on the value exceeding this limit). This measure is revolutionary
insofar as it is the first nationwide experiment with value-based property taxation
at subnational level. The law determines the valuation guidelines and sets mini-
mum and maximum values for each type of municipality in each county, but local
governments have still some room for manoeuvre in the assessment. The only
Act XCVIII of  concerning the Amendment of Act C of  on Local Taxes and Act LXXXII of
 on Motor Vehicle Tax.
Art.  para.  of the Act LXII of  on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary for the Year .
blemish on this otherwise equitable regime is that every municipality is obliged to
introduce and administer the luxury tax, which makes it a sort of a ‘deconcentrated
tax’. In the first year of application, the luxury tax yielded only  million forints,
significantly less than expected, due to the low number of luxury villas over the
country and the proliferating practice of tax avoidance. The owner can easily
escape the tax by transforming a large villa into a condominium or by making it
over to his own enterprise.
. Intergovernmental grants and transfers
.. Overview The Hungarian public finance terminology makes a distinction
between intergovernmental grants (‘state contributions and sub-
sidies’, állami hozzájárulások és támogatások; row  of Table .)
and flow-through transfers (‘transfers within the public budget’, államháztartáson
belüli átutalások; row ). Although these categories do not have any exact defini-
tion in the literature, the subordinated revenue items (rows  to  and  to ,
respectively) suggest the difference in the contents.
Grants are direct contributions from the national budget to the costs of the
mandatory and optional responsibilities of subnational governments. Since its
complete renewal in , the grant system has become extremely complicated.
Grants are manifold and arrive through various channels from the central budget.
Although most of them are still unconditional, the period under review witnessed
a light shift towards project-oriented, conditional (matching) grants. Whether
general or conditional, grants have to be used appropriately. Using operational
grants for debt repayment is forbidden. Local governments are accountable for all
their expenditures financed by grants and are obliged to return inappropriately
used or wrongfully accepted grants (including interests) to the national budget.
For each grant fund, the available pool is determined every year in the Budget Act.
Today, four major categories of grants can be distinguished: norm- (or formula-)
based grants, centralised appropriations, investment grants, and deficit grants
(önhiki). Although the central government has an explicit fiscal equalisation policy,
there is no distinct fund for this purpose. Rather, allotments in virtually every
grant category are differentiated according to the needs and/or the revenue capacity
of local governments. PIT revenue shares and norm-based grants play a crucial
role in channelling equalisation transfers to the neediest municipalities.
 .. Norm-based grants With a share of about  per cent of total GFS revenues
and more than  per cent of the total volume of
intergovernmental grants in ), norm-based grants (normatív támogatások;
rows  and  in Table .) constitute one of the main pillars of the decentralised
revenue system. The underlying idea is to compensate subnational governments
for the respect of minimum standards set by the legislative in the various domains
of mandatory public services. These non-matching grants are thus supposed to
finance at least a part of the local current expenditures. They cover virtually the
entire range of local service responsibilities.
About four fifths of the total amount of norm-based grants are unconditional
(general-purpose) grants (row  in Table .), while the rest is conditional (ear-
marked; row ). Yet it is common to both types of norm-based grants that they are
at least nominally supposed to be spent on a target expenditure area, even though
receivers of general norm-based grants are allowed to use the amount as they like.
Another common characteristic of norm-based grants is that their distribution
is based on formulae (‘norms’) that may involve the population size, the number
of beneficiaries, or other output indicators relevant to the specific type of local
public service for which the grant is (nominally) proposed. In some cases, the
basic amount of norm-based grant is defined as a band between a minimum and
a maximum value; the effective amount is then calculated on the basis of specific
needs indicators. Box . provides three examples of general norm-based grants.
Earmarked norm-based grants (row  in Table .) are regulated in a separate
annex of the annual budget law, distributed on the basis of service-related output
indicators and earmarked for the specific public service to which they are associated.
Municipalities providing didactical services for schools (e.g. advanced vocational
training for the teaching staff) or municipal public works programmes are among
the beneficiaries of this arrangement. Norm-based grant supplements are very
similar in scope to some of the centralised appropriations (Section ..; row  in
Table .).
In order to account for regional disparities, the central budget provides for a
general-purpose supplement to the norm-based grant in order to assist munic-
ipalities with low financial capacity. This means that the system of norm-based
grants has an equalisation component. This subject will be further elaborated in
Section ...
The total amount of norm-based grant that the local government receives is
the sum of the amounts calculated after each of the  to  ‘norms’, or service-
specific allocation rules, whereas the number of ‘norms’ depends on the counting
method (P K, , p.  ff.; F, , p. ; G et al., ,
p.  f.). One of the underlying notions is correspondence: revenues should be
provided in accordance with the various types of expenditures provided in each
municipality, which is important because a number of services are not provided
in all municipalities. Another key notion is equity: norms should be sufficiently
differentiated in order to take account of the disparities in the expenditure needs
of municipalities. D and P (a, p. ) deplore the proliferation of
‘norms’, however. Indeed, the allocation rules are manifold, complex and rather
volatile (changing almost every year), which makes it difficult for local governments
to estimate how much they are going to receive from one year to another. The
Ministry of Finance (G et al., ) explains the current chaos with the
ALG that orders the Parliament to provide for the necessary funding whenever it
imposes a new mandatory responsibility to subnational governments. Sector-
specific laws (in particular those on public education, social affairs and culture)
introducing a multitude of new tasks since  are just as much responsible for the
proliferation of norms. Finally, line ministries and lobby organisations in almost
every policy area tend to believe that local government executives (enjoying full
autonomy with regard to the use of most of the norm-based grants) do not provide
sufficient funding to the public service facilities operating in their domain. They
view thus highly specialised task-related norms as a guarantee of independence of
those facilities vis-a-vis the local authority. Regrettably, this prejudice runs against
the logics of the resource-oriented revenue regulation and shifts the system towards
simple task financing (expenditure orientation).
The principle of correspondence—matching the amount of grant to the volume
of mandatory expenditures provided in each municipality—may seem rational
at first sight, but in fact, it can dangerously exacerbate the adverse effects of a
suboptimal expenditure assignment. The example of social policy shows that
norm-based grants, paired with the assignment of tasks according to jurisdiction
size, makes large municipalities better endowed in social services and facilities than
small ones. It is clear that large settlements have to deal with a greater volume of
tasks. However, if we ask where the central government has contributed more to
an improved access to social services, the answer is clear: in large municipalities
that, consequently, dispose (in absolute and relative terms) of a higher amount of
resources for the realisation of social policies than do small jurisdictions.
For an excellent overview of the amendments made to the system of norm-based grant during the
s, see P K () or F ().
Art.  para.  ALG, see Box ..
 Box 6.5: Three examples of ‘norms’ in 2006 [Source: Annex 3 of the Act CLIII of
2005 on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary in Year 2006]
1. General tasks of municipal governments
a) Municipal governance, administration, and sports
Basic amount: HUF 1,400 per capita but not less than HUF 1,500,000 per
municipality. Where the number of inhabitants does not reach 500, the ba-
sic amount is at least HUF 3,000,000 per village.
This contribution to the fundamental mandatory tasks and services (partic-
ularly municipal governance, administration, and sports) is provided to mu-
nicipal governments on the basis of their population size.
b) Public transport
Basic amount: HUF 515 per capita.
This contribution to the public transport services is provided to municipal
governments (except the capital city, its districts, and the counties) in pro-
portion to their population size.
2. Management of residential fluid waste
Basic amount: HUF 100 per m3
This amount is allocated to municipalities that provide fluid waste collection ser-
vices to residents living in neighbourhoods not connected to the sewage network.
Grants are distributed in proportion to the volume of residential fluid waste col-
lected and disposed in officially authorised sites. They are supposed to contribute
to the reduction of the average amount of residential user charges.
3. Tasks related to the access to lodging
Basic amount: HUF 1,150 to 2,200 per capita, but not less than HUF 200,000 per
municipality.
This amount contributes to financing subventions that municipalities provide to
their residents in order to facilitate their access to lodging. Grants are calculated
on the basis of the population size and further differentiated according to the en-
dowment of the municipality in social infrastructure and dwellings and to the ratio
of dwellings connected to drinking water and sewage pipelines. The distribution
formula consists of the following parameters:
– the share of residents aged between 18 and 59 years within the total popu-
lation (weight = 0.15)
– the share of registered unemployed persons (the average calculated from
the monthly labour market statistics of November 2004, February, May, and
August 2005) within the total population (weight = 0.30)
– the share of marriages registered in 2003 and 2004 within the total popula-
tion (weight = 0.10)

– the number of habitable rooms available on 01.01.2005 divided by the total
population (weight = 0.05)
– the share of dwellings not connected to the drinking water and sewage
network (weight = 0.4).
Moreover, large municipalities also have a better chance to acquire capital devel-
opment grants for social policy purposes, due to their enhanced capacity to write
successful proposals and mobilise own resources for matching purposes (H-
 M, ). Analogous considerations apply to the health care system
where only those municipalities are obliged to provide specialised services and,
correspondingly, only those municipalities receive the related norm-based grant
and apply successfully for investment grants that have ‘inherited’ or established
a hospital or an outpatient clinic in their jurisdiction. Both rules of expendi-
ture assignment (based on jurisdiction size and on the availability of facilities,
respectively) together with the norm-based grant system seem to be at least in
part responsible for the significant horizontal disparities in terms of access to, and
quality of, health care and social services described in Section ...
The fact that the majority of norm-based grants is not earmarked (although the
allocation formula is often linked to certain service-specific indicators) reflects the
willingness of the central government to create a flexible revenue system. For some
authors (e.g. F, , p. ; P K, , p. ), the large number
of mandatory responsibilities turns this flexibility into an illusion. In contrast,
advocates of certain policy areas may possibly wish to see even more restrictions on
the use of norm-based grants. Indeed, grants allocated originally to cover the costs
of minor public services are increasingly used for financing more cost-intensive key
services such as primary education, thus making the initial idea of a responsibility-
based grant allocation more or less hollow. In addition, as P K ()
observes, in the absence of monitoring and sanctions, norm-based grants are
provided regardless of service quality. However, as long as no conditions apply
to the use of the grant, there is no reason to condemn those local governments
that disregard the underlying philosophy of a responsibility-based grant allocation
and use the amount for another purpose than the one initially envisaged by the
designer of the distribution formula.
Somewhat contradicting the flexibility argument, another rule fostering sector
neutrality in service provision obliges municipalities providing health and/or social
services via outsourcing to cede at least a part of their norm-based grant allotment
 to the external service delivery agent. Thus, while local governments are normally
free to use their general-purpose norm-based grant allotment as they wish, their
freedom is restricted in the domains of health and social services as soon as they
contract another organisation for service delivery. Such interference with local
revenue autonomy seems to go beyond the declared objective of ensuring sector
neutrality. Besides, it is not clear why the law should protect non-governmental
organisations, churches and private enterprises against potential encroachments
(or just dominant behaviour) by local governments. There seems to be no le-
gitimate counter-argument against letting market mechanisms do their job: the
compensation of service costs could be (as it is, normally) subject to negotiations
and become an integral part of the contract between the municipality and the
agent.
In recent years, the relative value of norm-based grants with regard to the actual
service costs has sunk rapidly (D and P, a, p. ). Cost estimates
from some municipalities suggest that on average, norm-based grants cover about
half of the kindergarten costs and  per cent of the secondary school costs F
(, p. ). On the other hand, norm-based grants are declaredly no cost-
reimbursement grants: the values attached to the individual ‘norms’ are not based
on actual expenditures or costs of service delivery. For lack of explicit national
rules about the specific minimum characteristics in the delivery of mandatory
services, a cost- or expenditure-based norm system is anyway inconceivable. In
most expenditure categories, most local governments spend more than just the
amount of the norm-based grant. However, it is difficult to say whether they
spend more in order to provide superior service levels, or because operational
inefficiencies increase the unit cost of service provision.
In , art.  of the Act III of  on Social Administration and Social Services was completed
with the following rule: ‘Churches in their function as facility owner that have signed an agreement
with the central government are entitled to grants for their basic services in the domain of personal
care’ (whereby personal care includes all social services except social aid and in-kind assistance; art.
 of the Act LXXIX of ). Two years later, this rule was refined as follows: ‘The local government
is obliged to pay non-public institutions and churches in their function as facility owner an amount
equivalent to the costs of service provision minus revenues from user charges. The source of this
payment must be the norm-based grant’ (art.  of the Act IV of ).
.. Equalisation
components in the
norm-based grant system
As has been mentioned in the preceding section, the
‘norms’ also entail differentiation according to the
revenue potential of the beneficiary municipalities.
For the first time in , the central government
converted a part of the subnational PIT share into norm-based grants with an
equalisation purpose (see column  in Table .). The idea was to reduce horizontal
disparities arising from the differences in the revenue generation potential that
the previous (purely derivation-based) redistribution of the PIT was obviously
not able to handle. The contribution of the PIT to the norm-based grant pool
grew steadily. By , however, variation in the local business tax (IPA) revenues
became even more serious. Besides, the weight of IPA in the overall budget of the
local public sector came very close to that of the returned PIT, eventually calling
for the elaboration of a horizontal revenue equalisation scheme involving not only
the PIT but also the IPA-raising capacity of municipalities. The key indicator of
the system, per capita tax capacity (adóero˝képesség), is calculated as the per capita
amount of IPA revenue that a local government can potentially realise by applying
the tax rate that corresponds to the effective average. The effective average rate
is a sort of a benchmark defined every year in the national Budget Act, based on
observations about the IPA rates that municipalities effectively applied during
the precedent year. For example, in , the benchmark rate was . per cent
compared to the maximum applicable IPA rate of . per cent. Another key element
of the system is the set of equalisation limits laid down in the annual Budget Act
for each category of local government (since , some of the categories have
been further differentiated by population size). These equalisation limits mark
the minimum levels of endowment that every municipality in the given category
should reach after equalisation. The per capita minimum endowment consists of
the derivation-based average PIT share and the potentially realisable average IPA
revenue, both characteristic of the given category (and size group) of municipality.
In a next step, for each municipality, the sum of the effective derivation-based
PIT share and the IPA tax capacity (both expressed per capita, in forints) is com-
pared with the relevant per capita minimum endowment (i.e. the equalisation
limits). Those jurisdictions where the sum of the PIT share and the IPA capacity
is lower than the minimum endowment are entitled to a grant supplement in
the framework of norm-based grants equal to the differential between these two
amounts. For those municipalities where the sum of the returnable PIT share and
the IPA capacity would exceed the typical minimum endowment in their category,
the PIT share and, if necessary, also the allotment of norm-based grants are cut
according to a progressive schedule.
 The current system of equalisation is horizontal and indirect. It is horizontal
because it seeks to attenuate disparities between jurisdictions situated at the same
level of government, and because the fund is closed-ended. It is indirect because
grant allotments are differentiated according to the financial capacity of the ju-
risdictions and the nature of their tasks (D, , p.  f.); in other words:
local governments not providing a given public service cannot benefit from the
norm-based equalisation supplement offered in addition to the respective norm-
based grant. Since , municipalities voluntarily assuming county competences
have received a proportionally larger equalisation supplement if they were net
beneficiaries, in order to account for their enhanced service responsibilities. Net
contributors in a similar position have been allowed to reduce their liability by
the amount of marginal expenditure incurred through enhanced public service
provision. Following a three-year period in which net contributors could be de-
prived of up to  per cent of the sum of their PIT share and their norm-based
grant allotment, in , the grant reduction rate was maximised at  per cent.
Also since , net contributors have been allowed to reclaim  per cent of their
contribution in the following year if they invested at least the same amount of
own-source revenues in infrastructure development during the fiscal year. Another
number of rules apply to the technique of estimating IPA revenues, correcting
for wrong estimations, applying the grant reduction schedule and several other
features of the system. Rules change rapidly and the rationale behind them is not
always straightforward for local financial officers.
Table . shows the ‘gains and losses’ of local governments by category for the
years  to . Due to its strong revenue raising potential, Budapest is clearly
the most important net contributor of the fiscal equalisation system. The final
amount of norm-based grant to which it would have been entitled (once all ‘norms’
have been added up) was cut by . to . per cent in the period under review.
All the other categories of local government benefit from the system, although
the positive figures in the ‘Reduction’ columns indicate that there are a few net
contributors in every category. Not surprisingly, the total benefits calculated for
the various categories are inversely related to the size of municipalities belonging
to these categories: villages come out as major beneficiaries of the equalisation.
Overall, in , merely  municipalities (. per cent of the local government
sector) were richer than the average, and  municipalities (. per cent) were not
affected by the equalisation (they did not contribute to the system, nor did they
benefit from it). These facts reflect the excessive fragmentation of the territorial
administrative structure characterised by a large number of local governments with
a wide range of responsibilities but limited revenue capacity (K et al., ).

Table 6.10: Grant supplements and reductions by local government category,
2001–2004 (%) [Source: Kecskés et al. (2005)]
Local government 
category
2001 2002 2003 2004
Supple­
ment
Reduc­
tion
Supple­
ment
Reduc­
tion
Supple­
ment
Reduc­
tion
Supple­
ment
Reduc­
tion
Capital city 0.0 8.61 0.0 10.51 0.0 16.8 0.0 15.6
Towns with county 
rights
4.3 0.7 4.8 0.7 10.9 1.6 9.8 0.9
Other towns 20.2 3.1 22.5 3.4 38.7 3.5 42.4 3.3
Villages 34.0 1.3 38.4 1.3 53.3 1.5 58.5 1.3
Total2 58.5 13.7 65.7 15.9 102.9 23.4 110.7 21.1
Difference financed 
from the PIT 
revenue pool
49.8 54.8 79.5 89.6
Number of 
municipalities 
affected
2,991 83 3,001 81 3,006 88 3,027 81
Total nb of 
municipalities 
affected by the 
equalisation
3,074 3,082 3,094 3,108
1 The data on the capital city for 2001 and 2002 include the 5 billions of HUF transferred from the capital 
government to the capital districts.
2 The 5 billion of HUF transferred to the capital districts are excluded from the total.
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 Between  and , the number of local governments benefiting from
revenue equalisation grew constantly. The table also reveals that the central gov-
ernment recycled a growing part of the subnational PIT share in order to cover the
difference between the ‘savings’ made to the national budget through the reduction
of norm-based grants in the rich jurisdictions and the additional outlays incurred
in favour of the poor jurisdictions (column  in Table .). The data suggest that
in the four years following , the gap became almost twice as large (HUF .
billion in , compared to HUF . billion in ), although the change is
‘only’ .-fold if we take account of the inflation during that period.
The system of indirect revenue equalisation provoked various reactions across
the municipalities. Particularly in the first few years upon introduction, local
governments in the net contributor position vehemently objected to the grant
reduction. Box . reports about the case of Paks. On one hand, it is certainly
disputable whether the arguments of producing nationwide spillover benefits
and developing local public infrastructure are sufficiently strong for exempting a
municipality from playing the game of solidarity. On the other hand, it is just as
questionable whether a fiscal equalisation scheme financed by only  to  per cent
of all municipalities is sustainable on the long term.
Another problem is the excessive fragmentation of the resources serving fiscal
equalisation. In , for example, the distribution of HUF . billion provided
the roughly , beneficiary villages a supplement of HUF  million per village
on average. Even for the smallest rural villages with an average level of HUF 
million of total GFS revenues, this amount is rather modest, although it marks a
relatively high increase (+ per cent on average) in the level of intergovernmental
grants. For towns, the proportions are even lower. It is nevertheless true that, as
the central government argues, a good equalisation policy should never discourage
the generation of local own revenues. For this reason, the fiscal capacity formula
considers only about  to  per cent of the maximum applicable IPA rate, and the
progressive schedule of grant reduction does not concern those jurisdictions whose
tax capacity exceeds the respective minimum endowment by  per cent or less.
The objective is not full equalisation of the revenue situation but merely a reduction
of the disparities. The jury is still out on the question about the performance of
the fiscal equalisation policy with regard to the stated objective. As long as rules
change as frequently as they have done since , the lack of comparable data
permits no valid conclusion.

Box 6.6: A net contributor to the fiscal equalisation scheme: Paks
Situated about 120 km to the south of Budapest, the industrial town of Paks (20,426
inhabitants) accommodates the only nuclear power plant of Hungary. Thanks to the
steady growth of own-source revenues (HUF 2,528 million in 1998 compared to HUF
575 million in 1992) that offset the inflation and the corresponding decrease in the real
value of central government grants, Paks was able to maintain a stable financial position
throughout the 1990s.
The introduction of the new revenue equalisation scheme in 1999 led to a sudden
decline in Paks’ revenues. While in 1999, the municipality received back a PIT share of
HUF 282.4 million following the principle of origin (accounting for 8.2 per cent of its GFS
revenues), in 2000, it not only had to renounce his claim but its overall grant allotment
was curtailed by further HUF 243.6 million (Bor, 2000). In consequence, the sum of
norm-based grants and the derivation-based PIT revenue share (HUF 536 million) fell
almost to the level of 1992 (HUF 497 million).The revenue loss prompted the municipality
to design a severe austerity programme including a 10 per cent reduction of the staff and
the consolidation of several public service facilities.
Rightly or not, the local government executive deplores the fact that Paks receives
virtually nothing back from the national budget, while its residents have to support the
environmental and health risks related to the nuclear power plant that produces 35 to
40 per cent of the total energy consumed in the country. Moreover, the town made
significant effort in the past decades to adjust the level of public infrastructure (which was
practically zero at the start-up of the power plant in 1976) to the needs of the rapidly
growing local population.
 .. Centralised
appropriations
Beside the earmarked norm-based grants mentioned above,
there is another category of earmarked grants, with the only
difference that this latter may cover both current and capital
expenditures. These so-called centralised appropriations (központosított elo˝irányza-
tok, row  in Table .) contribute to the costs of specific local government tasks
for which there is no other support from the central budget, or they encourage the
provision of services that match certain national preferences but are not necessarily
in the (short-term) interests of local governments. Correspondingly, the declared
grant priorities vary from year to year, as does the amount of the available funds.
Examples include the assistance to the organisation of local public transport, the
maintenance of urban road systems, the renewal of ferries, or a contribution to
the expenditures related to the reduction of administrative staff. Some of the
centralised appropriations are accessible to every municipality, while others are
allocated through a competition mechanism.
.. Addressed and targeted
grants
Since , the central government has assisted
subnational investment programmes with condi-
tional grants of the ‘targeted’ (céltámogatások) or
‘addressed’ (címzett támogatások) type (row  in Table .).
The so-called targeted grants are related to certain types of infrastructure defined
in the annex of the Act LXXXIX of  on the System of Addressed and Targeted
Grants of Local Governments, following the national priorities. Targeted grants are
supposed to co-finance small to medium scale projects with a variable matching
rate. The priorities of the period – include sewage pipelines and treatment
plants (matching rate:  to  per cent), medical equipment for hospitals and
outpatient clinics ( per cent), and regional landfills ( per cent).
Addressed grants are reserved for particular large-scale projects producing sub-
stantial spillover benefits especially in the domains of water management, health
and social care, public education, culture. They are provided case by case on a
non-matching basis. Both funds are closed-ended and, unlike in the case of norm-
based grants, the overall pool size determined in the annual Budget Act is not the
sum of the actual infrastructure needs of municipalities. Consequently, even in the
areas of delegated functions, local governments have to go through a competitive
bidding process. Nevertheless, the system is undeniably much more transparent
than the ad-hoc bargaining that characterised the allocation of investment grants
during the socialist period.
The seven councils for regional development manage three further investment
grant programmes (subsumed in row  in Table .) whereby the annual Budget
Act determines the size of the grant pool, the central government sets out the rules
of eligibility and distribution in a decree, but the regional development councils can
follow their own spending priorities. The so-called Vis major grant is reserved for
the prevention and minimisation of losses resulting from natural catastrophes. The
regional equalisation grants for development (területi kiegyenlítést szolgáló fejlesztési
célú támogatások, TEKI) are addressed to less developed municipalities. Finally, the
targeted decentralised appropriations (céljellegu˝ decentralizált támogatások, CÉDE)
is accessible to all local governments and non-governmental organisations for all
purposes. All programmes disburse small grants (under  million forints).
Further discretionary grants are available from various sector ministries and
from the three extra-budgetary funds for environment protection, roads, and water
management. The spending priorities are determined by the Parliament and some
overlapping is possible.
Recent studies have shown that in its current form, the system of investment
grants creates adverse incentives. Several municipalities prioritise local investment
projects according to their potential to generate external funding; whether a spe-
cific project will be implemented depends entirely on the availability of central
government funding. Grants also induce distortion in local investment patterns.
They lead to overinvestment in areas of high national but low local priority, and
ultimately to liquidity problems if the financial costs associated with future projects
(interest, debt service, and the costs of service delivery related to the new infras-
tructure) have not been appropriately taken into account (K et al., ;
J et al., ). Thus, while investment grants as such enlarge the room for
manoeuvre of local governments (at least of those whose efforts in the competition
for the limited funds are crowned with success), they may ultimately restrict local
autonomy by making the municipality run into a financial bottleneck. A thor-
ough review of the incentive system could help to eliminate the adverse effects of
investment grants on local financial autonomy.
Besides, the poor coordination of the various investment grant programmes
spurs local governments and their institutions (schools, libraries, hospitals, etc.) to
apply for every possible grant and for multiple grants serving the same project. The
immense volume of applications makes the administration of grant programmes
extremely costly and promotes the use of political (instead of economic and tech-
nical) criteria in the evaluation of bids. F () provides an excellent overview
on these and other challenges related to the coordination of investment grants.
Finally, the wide variety of grant programmes makes the individual programmes
less reliable. Specifically in relation to targeted grants, the Parliament has the
 right to modify the rules and/or suspend the disbursement of grants following the
macroeconomic situation of the country.
.. Deficit grants The previous sections presented a series of intergovern-
mental grants designed for financing current and capital
expenditures of local governments. The discussion of deficit grants (row  in
Table .) in this context may be surprising to the reader. Indeed, following the
theory of public finance, deficit grants (also called bailout grants) are one-off
revenue allotments provided by a higher-level authority and therefore not part
of the structural revenues of local governments. The case of Hungary provides
for a remarkable exception in two respects. First, because of certain failures in
their design, deficit grants in several municipalities became part of the structural
(recurring) GFS revenues over the years. Second, as one of the few countries in
the world, Hungary has institutionalised a normal bankruptcy procedure that is
analogous to that of private enterprises. Even if it is difficult to separate the revenue
function from the balancing function, we propose to postpone the discussion of
deficit grants as instruments for balancing the budget to Chapter . In the present
section, we will focus our attention on their function as revenue source.
Local governments may resort to three categories of deficit grants:
. The so-called önhiki, serving to stabilise the financial position of local govern-
ments that have run into a deficit through no fault of their own (introduced
in );
. Grants addressed to local governments coping with persistent insolvency
through their own fault (introduced in ). These grants may be used
for three purposes: (a) as a repayable interest subsidy for loans signed in
order to restore liquidity, (b) as an operational grant to help the municipality
ensure the basic public services during the bankruptcy procedure, and (c)
for covering the salary of the trustee during the procedure.
. Grants for bridging short-term liquidity gaps in the operational budget of
municipalities that do not fulfil the önhiki criteria (introduced in ). In
some cases, these grants are repayable and/or earmarked.
For each of these grant categories, the rules of eligibility are laid down in the
annual Budget Act. The most dominant category is önhiki accounting for  to
 per cent of all deficit grants throughout most of the s and s (data from
the Ministry of Finance).
. Flow-through transfers
A final category of local revenues consists of monetary transfers from other parts
of the general government that benefit other agents (mainly contracted partners)
rather than the local government itself (rows  to  in Table .). In principle, they
are similar to earmarked grants, since local governments are obliged to forward
them to the facility to which the transfer is addressed, or spend it on a well-defined
public task. As long as the volume of the transfer is tailored to the expenditure that
it is supposed to cover, this intergovernmental fiscal arrangement has a neutral
effect on the local budget and indirectly on local autonomy as well.
However, as has already been suggested in Section .. (see particularly Box .),
budget neutrality is not provided with regard to the most important flow-through
item, namely, cost reimbursements from the National Health Insurance Fund
(row  in Table .). These account for  to  per cent of the overall volume of
flow-through transfers and  to  per cent of the total GFS revenues of the local
government sector and consist predominantly of the social security contributions.
SNGs are obliged to transfer these funds to the facilities that, on their turn, may only
use them for financing operational expenditures related to the performed health
services. The past decades witnessed a continuous decrease in cost reimbursement
levels, so that local governments are forced to co-finance health services from other
sources. Besides, in their role as facility owners, most of them need to mobilise
additional resources in order to maintain and develop the physical infrastructure
for which the NHIF transfers provide no coverage. The difficulty of financing
health care expenditures from the available resources has already prompted several
municipalities to apply for önhiki.
Another major category of flow-through transfers consists of the so-called special
government funds (elkülönített pénzalapok, row  in Table .). These funds are
established with the purpose of financing (or co-financing) selected government
activities from resources generated outside the general government (contributions
of various economic actors, donations, fines, etc.). In , there were six special
government funds of which the Labour Market Fund was the largest (managing
HUF . billion), followed by the Innovation Fund for Research and Technology
(HUF . billion) and the National Nuclear Fund (HUF . billion).

CHAPTER 
Budgetary Autonomy
The last chapter of this study investigates the meaning of local budgetary autonomy 
in Hungary. In Section .., we defined local budgetary autonomy as the right
and ability of local governments to modulate the budget constraint both within
one generation of taxpayers and between successive generations. Starting with the
presentation and evaluation of the account model of the Hungarian local public
sector in Section ., we will analyse the dynamics of deficits and surpluses for the
overall local government sector between  and  (Section .). Section .
discusses some of the factors that led to the permanent and growing deficit of the
sector in the s. Methods and instruments to overcome vertical fiscal balance
are presented in Section .. Finally, Section . shows how the legislation on
municipal bankruptcy promotes a greater sense of budget responsibility among
local policymakers.
. The account model of local public administration
As has been mentioned in Section .., local governments in Hungary (as other
government tiers as well) have a unified budget. Current and capital revenues are
collected in the same fund and serve together as a basis for financing the totality of
current and capital expenditures (see Section ..). In the structure of the budget,
these four categories appear on different rows but do not constitute two distinct
funds. Also the balance sheet, a compulsory element of the annual draft budget,
includes separate lists of the current and capital items.
Given the possibility of cross-financing between current and capital items, there
 is no ‘golden rule’ in the legislation that would require a balanced position (or
surplus) of the current account over the cycle and tolerate deficit only on the capital
account (i.e. debt for investment purposes). Nevertheless, a survey conducted by
S et al. () suggests that many a local government in Hungary considers
the ‘golden rule’ as a principal goal of budget policy; some of them have even
declared this goal in a local government decree.
Box . presents the Statement of Government Operations as recommended by
the International Monetary Fund in the GFS Manual (GFSM) . Two main ana-
lytic balances can be derived from this scheme. (Current) revenue minus (current)
expense equals the net operating balance which is the summary measure of the
ongoing sustainability of government operations IMF (, p. ). Subsequently
deducing the net acquisition (acquisitions minus disposals and consumption) of
nonfinancial assets, we receive the net lending (C) / borrowing ( ). While the
Ministry of Finance in Hungary regularly calculates this latter balance to find out
whether the subnational public sector and its subsectors produced a deficit or a
surplus by the end of the fiscal year, the access to the net operating balance is more
difficult. This is due to the fact that the structure in which the Ministry of Finance
currently presents its data on intergovernmental grants does not allow us to sep-
arate current and capital revenues clearly from each other. Norm-based grants,
theatre grants and other explicit operational grant programmes can obviously be
classified as current revenues, while addressed and targeted grants, Vis major grants
and other explicit investment grant programmes belong to the capital revenues.
In contrast, the available data on the so-called centralised appropriations (row 
in Table .) and other grants (row ) include both operational and investment
grant elements. As for the centralised appropriations, the annual Budget Imple-
mentation Acts contains only the target spending areas and the respective figures,
and although one might be able (with some risk of error) to separate operational
expenditures from capital expenditures under these target spending areas, the
figures reflect the total amounts of grants paid out to all categories of subnational
units (villages, towns with or without county rights, the capital city and its districts,
micro-regions, and counties) so that a partial analysis for municipalities only is
not feasible. The category of ‘other grants’ is even less transparent.
According to the GFSM, government entities may adjust their net lending /
borrowing position by rearranging transactions in financial assets and liabilities.
All proceeds from privatisation (including the sale of fixed assets) are included
as financial items, and subsidies given in the form of loans are recognised as an
expense IMF (, p. ). At the end of the fiscal year (on  December) and after

Box 7.1: Statement of Government Operations according to the GFSM 2001
[Source: IMF (2001)
TRANSACTIONS AFFECTING NET WORTH:
REVENUE
Taxes
Social contributions [GFS]
Grants
Other revenue
EXPENSE
Compensation of employees [GFS]
Use of goods and services
Consumption of fixed capital [GFS]
Interest [GFS]
Subsidies
Grants
Social benefits [GFS]
Other expense
NET / GROSS OPERATING BALANCE*
TRANSACTIONS IN NONFINANCIAL ASSETS:
NET ACQUISITION OF NONFINANCIAL ASSETS†
Fixed assets
Change in inventories
Valuables
Nonproduced assets
NET LENDING / BORROWING [GFS]‡
TRANSACTIONS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES (FINANCING):
NET ACQUISITION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS
Domestic
Foreign
NET INCURRENCE OF LIABILITIES
Domestic
Foreign
* The net operating balance equals revenue minus expense. The gross operating balance equals
revenue minus expense other than consumption of fixed capital.
† Acquisitions minus disposals and consumption of fixed capital.
‡ Net lending / borrowing equals the net operating balance minus the net acquisition of nonfinancial
assets. It is also equal to the net acquisition of financial assets minus the net incurrence of liabilities.
 taking into account all the transactions in financial assets, the so-called overall fiscal
balance (which is a non-core balance in the GFS) should be zero.
Following art.  of the ALG, the local executive is responsible for a prudent
management of local finances, while the mayor has to ensure that financial man-
agement is in line with the legal regulations. The local government must bear any
consequence resulting from a financial deficit, whereby deficit is understood in
the sense of a negative overall fiscal result (thus after borrowing), and not as a
net borrowing position. The law also stipulates that the central budget does not
account for local government liabilities.
Regrettably, the way in which the GFS account model is implemented in Hungary
softens the budget constraint for local governments in two ways. First, deficit grants
figure under operating revenues, thus ‘embellishing’ the net operating balance and
consequently also the net lending / borrowing position, seemingly reducing or
even offsetting the deficit. In the case of önhiki (Section ..), a possible reason for
this choice is that it is not a genuine deficit grant aimed at balancing the overall
budget. Eligible are those jurisdictions where the sum of norm-based grants and
(potential) local tax revenues (calculated with the maximum rate) falls below the
sum of mandatory expenditures. The comparison is made between two subgroups
and not two totals. Beside norm-based grants and local taxes, municipalities need
not mobilise any other revenue sources in order to become eligible for önhiki. In
this sense, önhiki may also be regarded as just another source of revenue, a grant
supplement to handle (partial) vertical imbalances, similarly to equalisation grants
that handle (partial) horizontal disparities.
However, local governments in Hungary are allowed to plan for a deficit ex ante
and to complete their draft budget with the amount of önhiki they are likely to
apply for (and receive) during the following fiscal year. They are even offered an
advance payment covering the first seven months of the year. If they do not meet
the eligibility criteria of the önhiki programme, they have to cut back expenditures,
increase own-source revenues, or sign a short-term liquidity loan in order to
comply with art.  of the ALG that requires balance or surplus in the overall
budget. Similarly to önhiki, prospective short-term liquidity loans may also be
included into the draft budget, even if it is not sure whether the municipality
is going to receive the amount of loan it is asking for. Thus theoretically, local
governments can never run into a deficit on the operating side of the budget, except
if the sum of önhiki and short-term liquidity loans is not high enough to fill the gap.
We use the attribute ‘partial’ because önhiki considers only norm-based grants and local taxes, while
the equalisation grant is based solely on the origin-based PIT revenue share and the local business
tax (see Section ..).
This worst-case scenario leads directly to a bankruptcy filing. With the right to
plan for a deficit and balance the budget ex ante, the legislative made a considerable
concession to local governments, jeopardising the credibility of the bailout policy
stated in the ALG.
Second, revenues from privatisation appear under the transactions in nonfi-
nancial assets, against the GFSM recommendation of treating all proceeds from
privatisation under financial transactions (thus outside the net lending / borrow-
ing position) even despite the fact that privatisation is the disposal of an existing
asset. The logic behind the GFSM recommendation is that privatisation typically
generates one-off revenues and should therefore not be treated on an equal level
with structural (recurring) revenue sources.
Such concessions in legislation would probably be unnecessary if the intergov-
ernmental fiscal system permitted local governments to plan for budget balance
rather than for a deficit. However, revenue and expenditure flows are hardly
predictable, so that intelligent financial planning remains an illusion for most
municipalities. Art.  of the ALG requires SNGs to draft an economic programme
in every political cycle, including the objectives and tasks related particularly to
infrastructure development, spatial planning, job creation, local tax policy, the
improvement of the quality of local public services. Besides, most of the sector-
specific laws oblige municipalities to prepare medium and long-term strategies
about the provision of the related public goods and services. However, as S
et al. () point out, these rules do not require local governments to compare
the cost effects of planned programmes to the expected volume of revenues. In
consequence, local governments do not take account of the financial constraint
during the planning phase, which often results in postponing or cancelling planned
expenditure programmes due to the shortage of funds. Nevertheless it must be
noted that even if the sector-specific rules were stricter about the feasibility of local
strategies, municipalities would have a hard time making reliable forecasts on their
revenue situation because of the frequent amendments to the intergovernmental
finance system (particularly grants and transfers but also the national framework
of local taxation.
 . The development of vertical fiscal balance between  and

Table . reiterates the major categories of local government revenues and expendi-
tures and shows the net lending / borrowing positions of the municipal sector in
the years  to  at current prices. The bar chart in Figure . recapitulates
the development of this latter measure at current prices.
Net lending / borrowing positions varied turbulently during the period under
review. In seven years out of twelve, the municipal sector ran into deficit. Not
surprisingly, the largest deficits of the period were incurred in the election years
 and . However, it is remarkable that for the first time in , the
vertical fiscal balance was negative even though there were no elections. The local
government sector stayed in the net lending position in the subsequent years as
well.
As has been stated in the previous section, the net operating balance measures
the ongoing sustainability of government operations. It shows whether there is
any cross-financing between the current and capital items of the budget; that is,
whether local governments use the operational surplus for covering the deficit
in the capital accounts, or vice versa. Because of the mixed character of the
centralised appropriations and the subcategory of ‘other grants’ in the budget
of the Hungarian local government sector (subsumed in row  in Table .),
operational and capital grants cannot be separated correctly from each other. From
this mixed category, a certain share is supposed to cover operational expenditures,
so that its elimination from the formula of the net operating balance automatically
produces an underestimation bias.
Nevertheless, the net operating balance calculated in this way (thus from the
‘clean’ figures in rows , ,  and  on the revenue side and rows  and  on the
expenditure side) provides a preliminary answer to the cross-financing question.
The results in row  show that the balance of the hypothetical current account
(hypothetical because the such an account does not figure in the law) is positive
throughout the period except for the ‘austerity years’  and  (stagnation
or decrease of grants and other current revenues in real terms compared to the
A comparison with Table . reveals some minor differences in the figures. This is due to the fact that
the figures in rows  to  in Table . had to be calculated indirectly. First we had to decompose the
aggregate volume of intergovernmental grants into various subcategories (grant programmes) and
then subtract the amounts granted to the counties and (from ) to the micro-regions in each
subcategory of grants. This allowed us to construct two main aggregates (operational and capital
grants) as well as a mixed category. The deviations from the aggregates of Table . are likely to have
their origin in the inconsistency of the data sources.

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-100,000 
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Net lending / borrowing
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Figure 7.1: Net lending / borrowing of local governments 1995–2006 at current
prices (million HUF) [Source: the author, based on data from the Min-
istry of Finance]
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 previous years; a consequence of the Bokros reform package) as well as the election
years , , and . It seems therefore that the net operating balance is not
responsible for the perpetuation of the net lending position in the overall budget.
On the contrary, it is rather the surplus of the current budget that allows several
municipalities to carry out their planned (or promised) investment programmes
particularly in the year following the elections S (, p. ). Obviously,
cross-financing in any direction is unthinkable for about one-third of all local
governments that would not even be able to balance their current budget without
önhiki.
Table . (rows  to ) and Figure . show that both deficit grants and the
proceeds from privatisation have a real impact on the year-end fiscal result of
the local government sector. Their relative importance depends on the volume
of the deficit or surplus that municipalities would realise in the absence of these
items. In  and , they saved the local government sector from slipping into
the red (see Table .); in the rest of the period, they either boosted the surplus
or contributed to lowering the deficit. The importance of the revenues from
privatisation was the highest in the first half of the period, whereas since , they
have hardly made any difference any more.
The trend of repeated and growing vertical fiscal imbalances gives more reason
to worry than the actual size of the deficit. During the ‘red’ years of the period, the
net lending of the local government sector accounted for merely . to . per cent
of the consolidated general government deficit, except for  when the share
of the local sector was . per cent (data from the Ministry of Finance). For the
rest of the period, municipalities served rather as a counterbalance to the negative
results of the general government.
. The sources of deficit
Even in a system of unified budgets, local government accounts should be suffi-
ciently detailed to allow conclusions about whether the deficit emerged from a
mismatch of operating revenues and expenditures or whether it is due to an imbal-
ance of the transactions in fixed assets (including investments). If it emerged in
the operating budget, another question is whether it is the mandatory or voluntary
expenditures that tilt the balance.
Just as the sources of deficit are diverse, it is also impossible to attribute the
current trend of local governments’ turning from net lenders into net borrowers to
a single factor. A part of the municipalities fall regularly back into the deficit trap
because of a mismatch between current revenues and expenditures, while others
slip into the red because of a poorly planned investment programme. Jurisdictions
with low tax capacity find it difficult to finance even the basic public services,
while others get into trouble because of their overly bold attitude with regard to
voluntary functions.
Poorly funded mandates are certainly one of the main reasons behind the ver-
tical fiscal imbalance of the current budget. In Section .., we considered the
mismatch between the volumes of mandated operational expenditures and inter-
governmental grants as an indirect legal constraint on the budgetary autonomy
of local governments, in the belief that if the centre fully reimbursed the costs
of delegated functions, then local governments could dedicate their own-source
revenues entirely to modulating the local budget constraint. This is particularly
true for small towns and villages whose revenue generation potential is relatively
modest compared to the vast amount of public service functions with which they
have to deal.
In order to determine the importance of poorly funded mandates, we should
be able to look behind the figures. However, due to the high complexity and
volatility of sector-specific laws, calculating how much of the actual local gov-
ernment expenditures were mandated in a given year and which part resulted
from voluntary activities (new, more, or better services) necessitates an extremely
time-consuming micro-data analysis of the nearly , municipalities. On the
revenue side, norm-based grants are provided more or less in proportion to the
estimated costs of service provision, but their amount is declaredly below the actual
cost level; other intergovernmental grants and transfers as well as local own-source
revenues are supposed to fill the gap. Inspired by the European Charter of Local
Self-Government, the ALG stipulates the following: ‘Simultaneously with the defi-
nition of mandatory tasks and competences, the National Assembly shall ensure
the material conditions of their execution; in addition, it shall make a decision
on the size and type of contribution from the public budget (art.  para.  ALG,
translation by the author).’
However, the sector-specific laws from which most of the new tasks emerge
usually ignore the financing question and seldom increase the resources of local
governments by assigning them additional revenue raising power or any specific
revenue (P K, ). In consequence, communes often find themselves
constrained to co-finance delegated expenditures from a revenue basis that hardly
increases from one year to another (D and P, a).
The lack of transparency in the calculation of cost estimates and the corre-
sponding reimbursement turns ‘unfunded mandates’ into a popular but dangerous
 argument. The most controversial issue is whether the central budget should cover
the costs of local mandatory functions fully or partially. The various lobby organi-
sations of SNGs plead for full reimbursement, referring to the above-mentioned
rule in ALG. However, the wording of the law is ambiguous. The expression ‘ensure
the material conditions’ says nothing about whether the Parliament has to do so
via grants and transfers exclusively, or whether it can also meet this requirement
through a corresponding enlargement of local taxing powers. The assignment to
‘make a decision on the size and form of contribution from the public budget’
suggests that the first interpretation is the right one; in principle, however, nothing
impedes the Parliament from setting the level of contribution at zero. Also the
definition of local governments ‘becoming insolvent through no fault of their own’
(the primary criterion of eligibility for önhiki) suggests that norm-based grants and
local tax revenues together (and not norm-based grants alone or in combination
with other grants) should be sufficient to cover total operating expenditures.
Regardless of the lawmaker’s intention, local politicians react to the problem of
poorly funded mandates most often with the demand for additional grants and/or
for a re-assignment of expenditure functions. In fact, both types of reaction suggest
the ignorance of the fact that financial capacity is not an exogenous variable. Local
governments may influence it through both the expenditure side (e.g. through
improving efficiency in service delivery) and the revenue side of their budget (e.g.
through increasing tax rates and/or introducing new user charges). Moreover,
economic growth enlarges the tax base, which leads to additional revenues over
time, even though few municipalities have recognised this so far (S et al.,
). As has been shown in Chapter , for a multitude of reasons such as strategic
horizontal interactions or the fear of political risks, only few local governments
exploit their full potential for raising revenues or reducing expenditures. One
could thus argue, as the saying goes, ‘give a man a fish and you feed him for a day;
teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.’
Nevertheless, the counter-arguments cited in Section .. also merit some
reflexion.
First, the suboptimal utilisation of formal taxing powers at the local level in Hun-
gary has much to do with what we called ‘fiscal crowding out’ in Section ... The
high rates of national taxes discourage local governments from further increasing
the pressure on taxpayers.
Second, if municipalities have to spend a part of their own resources on manda-
tory functions, they might not have enough revenue left for financing voluntary
expenditures. As P K (, p. ) observes, in line with the ALG
that stipulates the primacy of mandatory tasks, local governments in a financial
bottleneck situation are expected to cut voluntary expenditures first. This is a
painful step that implies giving up an important component of local expenditure
autonomy. It is even more painful if it is obvious that the financial hardship is due
to poorly funded mandates and not to an oversized concert hall or an ill-designed
school bus service. In addition, despite the arguments in favour of a unified budget,
some revenue sources are just not adapted to filling the gap in the current budget.
User charges are raised in order to cover the costs of the related public good or
service; for his reason, they are normally earmarked and cannot be spent in any
other policy area than the one in which they were raised. Debt is the optimal
instrument for investment funding because it allows local governments to spread
the investment costs over more than one generation of taxpayers; for the same
reason, it is not equitable to use it for financing current operating expenses.
Poorly funded mandates are just one of the several possible reasons for a deficit.
Analysing nine cases of municipal bankruptcy between  and , J et al.
() explain how voluntary tasks can also lead to vertical fiscal imbalance. In
their view, the in-built asymmetry between the unfettered right of municipalities
to assume voluntary functions and the scarcity of their revenue sources makes
fiscal imbalance virtually unavoidable. Following the ALG, the only principle to
respect with regard to voluntary functions is the primacy of mandatory functions:
municipalities have to fulfil their mandatory tasks before assuming any other
competence. However, this principle was eventually hurt when local governments
(initially in a good financial position) assumed a number of voluntary functions
beyond their actual financial capacity. The lack of internal municipal controlling
mechanisms and the limited capacity of the Hungarian State Audit Office, but also
wrong practices of accounting, reporting and auditing contributed to the crisis in
many a municipality.
The survey carried out by J et al. () suggests that typically small towns
and large villages tend to underestimate their financial capacity and continue
assuming voluntary tasks, which eventually leads to (or exacerbates the existing)
fiscal imbalance. Few of them make use of their legal power to increase local
tax rates to the legal maximum, or to organise administrative tasks and service
delivery in co-operation with other municipalities. Other factors of recurring
fiscal imbalance include (i) the depletion of financial reserves accumulated during
the period of economic boom, (ii) the high rate of debt service compared to the
financial capacity, and (iii) the poor organisation of service facilities.
Voluntary tasks often involve new investment, such as the construction of a
public theatre or the conversion of a former industrial site into a centre for sports
and recreation. Examples from the practice suggest that among all investments, it is
 mainly the ones related to voluntary tasks that drive municipalities into insolvency.
Referring to art.  para. /b of the ALG that allowed local governments to pursue
entrepreneurial activities at their own risk, several municipalities decided to venture
into this domain without being actually prepared in terms of know-how and
management skills. Commercial banks initially considered local governments
as reliable borrowers. However, the allocation rules of central matching grant
programmes for investments allowed municipalities to bring in loans as part of the
match. Many of those applicants who received less than they had expected returned
to their bank to negotiate for a higher amount of loan, because abandoning the
project would have implied giving up the grant as well. Assuming additional
debt without the necessary debt service capacity is what ultimately drove these
municipalities into bankruptcy (J et al., ).
Not only the voluntary functions but also mandated ones generated a large
volume of investment during the period under review. According to a report of
the State Audit Office (SAO, ), the need for modernising the depleted public
infrastructure inherited from the socialist era drove many a municipality into huge
local investment programmes. Rather than deliberating the real needs of the local
constituency and comparing it with their financial room for manoeuvre, most of
them oriented their development policy at the terms and conditions of central
investment grant programmes. In contrast to operating expenditures that the
central government attempts to compensate at least in part, no reliable revenue
source is automatically available for financing the construction and renovation of
public hospitals, schools, temporary shelters, etc. The available investment grants
are limited and the competition is tough; besides, grant flows are unpredictable
and therefore little adapted to long-term financing. Norm-based grants and flow-
through transfers from the National Health Insurance Fund cannot be used for
capital development. In most municipalities, own-source revenues are hardly
enough for covering operating expenses, not to mention capital outlays.
In another report, the State Audit Office of Hungary observes serious fiscal
imbalances already in the draft budgets of local governments (SAO, a, p. ).
Planned revenues (without deficit grant) did not cover planned expenditures in
ninety per cent of the municipalities surveyed in . The imbalance was caused
by operating expenditures in around three-third of these municipalities, while half
of them had a gap in the capital budget. According to the SAO, the reasons behind
the deficit planning have been the same for several years: (i) inefficient service
provision, (ii) under-utilisation of infrastructure capacities, (iii) engagement in
voluntary tasks beyond the financial capacity limits, (iv) planning errors, and (v)
oversized capital expenditures.
. Options for balancing the budget
.. Overview Depending on the source of the deficit (net borrowing position)
in the overall budget, local governments may follow different
paths in order to obtain a zero overall fiscal result and thus
comply with art.  of the ALG. Without pretention of full accuracy, we tried
to illustrate these paths in Figure .. Such schemata make it usually easier to
understand complex systems or processes, but they bear the risk of oversimplifying
reality. Our flowchart is no exception to this rule. Therefore, rather than describing
every single step in words, here we try to complete it with a few comments in order
to bring it closer to reality. We divided the diagram into four channels, from [] to
[], in the hope that they make the discussion easier to follow. Two remarks are
indispensable at this point.
First, it needs to be emphasised that Figure . relates to balancing the budget
ex ante, at the very beginning of the drafting stage. It is possible that the local
government applying for an önhiki grant, an investment grant or a commercial
bank loan receives eventually nothing or less than expected. Instead of cutting
or abandoning certain expenditure programmes, it is then likely to switch to
alternative funding options, for instance, a short-term liquidity grant as a substitute
for önhiki, or a long-term loan as a substitute for the investment grant. For fear of
making the diagram overly complex, we did not include these reactions, even if a
part of them may occur in the drafting stage.
The second remark to the flowchart concerns the channels [] to []. The figure
is structured according to the original (or primary) causes of the vertical fiscal
imbalance. In reality, vertical fiscal imbalance cannot always be explained with
a single factor but rather with a combination of factors that together provoke a
chain reaction. A commercial bank loan facilitating the construction a swimming
pool (voluntary capital expenditure) may impose interest obligation on the current
budget to the extent of jeopardising the provision of basic public services (manda-
tory current expenditure). As we will see, this does not make the municipality
automatically eligible for önhiki. Neither interest expenses nor debt repayment is
part of the acceptable expenditures under the grant regime, and in order to become
eligible, the municipality is first obliged to downsize or postpone the investment
programme in order to obtain a balance between planned capital expenditures and
capital revenues.
In the following sections, we are going to treat the two main options for ob-
taining a zero overall fiscal result ex ante, namely, applying for an önhiki grant
(Section ..) and borrowing (Section ..). Filing for bankruptcy is not going to

due to operating expenditures/revenues
(net operating balance < 0)
related to mandatory 
functions
related to voluntary 
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eligible for önhiki?
apply for 
önhiki
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revise the draft budget
Overall fiscal result = 0
credit rating
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Figure 7.2: Options for balancing the budget ex ante [Source: the author]
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related to mandatory functions
 restore budget balance, yet, it is a solution: a final solution for municipalities with
irreparable budgets. Bankruptcy will be briefly discussed in Section ..
.. Önhiki Municipalities facing a gap between current revenues and current
expenditures related to mandatory tasks (channel []) are likely
to comb through their draft budget once again to see whether there is a potential
for further cost containment or revenue generation. However, probably only a
few of them will stop at this point (their choice is indicated with the staggered
arrow). The majority will check whether they fulfil the other conditions to become
eligible for the önhiki grant, the deficit grant that has been introduced briefly in
Section ...
Since its introduction in , önhiki (an acronym for önhibájukon kívül, ‘through
no fault of their own’) has helped insolvent subnational governments preserve
their independence in managing their financial affairs, i.e. avoid bankruptcy.
Following art.  para. /b of the ALG, ‘municipal local governments that come into
difficulties through no fault of their own are entitled to additional support from
the state’. Originally conceived as a measure to strengthen local democracy and
to assist local governments through the difficulties of transition (G et al.,
), önhiki became a popular and relatively easily accessible means of bridging
operational deficit. Eligible are those municipalities that are unable to finance
their mandatory operating expenditures from the sum of their operating revenues
in spite of a maximum effort to exploit the potential for cost containment and
revenue generation. Applicants must be able to prove that they have rationalised
their institutions and service delivery as much as possible, make a due revenue
effort, and manage their portfolio of real and financial assets in a way to generate
income for financing basic services (J et al., ).
From , the rules of eligibility changed almost every year (Box .), alike the
directives concerning application procedure and grant calculation published in
a joint decree by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance. The
present system excludes those local governments that manage their affairs in an
inefficient way. Beside a number of further conditions, the municipality is not
eligible:
– if it had  or less inhabitants on  January of the year preceding the grant
application, and it does not belong to any district secretariat;
Counties are also eligible for önhiki, but in order to preserve the focus on local financial autonomy,
in the following we will not deal with this category of SNG.
District secretariat is a basic form of association in which local governments with less than ,
– if it runs no other public service facility than the office of the local executive
(except if it participates in an inter-municipal co-operation agreement);
– if the capacity utilisation in the pre-primary and primary education facilities
is below  per cent (if population < ,), or  per cent (if population >
,), respectively (special rules apply to participants of inter-municipal
co-operation agreements and to the municipalities with less than  inhab-
itants);
– if it has not introduced (nor is it planning to introduce) any type of local tax;
– if it has a bank deposit of at least three months in term
– if its planned capital expenditures exceed its resources for capital develop-
ment (including communal taxes,  per cent of the property taxes, invest-
ment grants,  per cent of the conditional norm-based grant for public
education and information technology, loans, etc.)
Box 7.2: Sixteen years of önhiki: milestones in the regulation [Source: the author,
based on Gurnik et al. (2005)]
1991 – The önhiki is introduced in the annual Budget Act. All grant applications are
evaluated by the Parliament. The objective is ensuring the continuous operation of local
facilities delivering basic public services. Newly established local governments are also
entitled to a one-off start-up grant in proportion to their population size.
1992 – The discrimination between new and existing municipalities is cancelled. Grant
applications are evaluated by the central government.
1993 – The conditions of eligibility are laid down in Annex 6 of the Budget Act. Appli-
cations may be submitted once during the running fiscal year. Municipalities benefiting
from a targeted grant for an investment programme are excluded from the grant.
1995 – Applications may be submitted twice a year. Municipalities benefiting from a
targeted grant are no longer excluded. As a new rule, however, applicants must demon-
strate that local capital revenues provide a sufficient coverage for capital expenditures.
inhabitants operate a joint office for the daily administration (art.  to  ALG). In , ,
municipalities were organised in this form; together, they were running  district secretariats.

1996 – Before taking a final decision, the Minister of Finance consults the Local Govern-
ment Committee of the Parliament.
1997 – Since the first round of applications is not evaluated before 15 July, grant recip-
ients of previous years still coping with liquidity problems in the running fiscal year are
allowed to apply for an advance payment to cover the expenditures of the first six months.
1998 – The right to apply for an advance payment is extended to new applicants.
The amount of grant payable to a municipality is adjusted to the average opera-
tional expenditure level characteristic of the given category of municipality. (Today,
the system helps the poorest municipalities to reach 90 per cent of the average opera-
tional expenditure level and disregards those that perform at 110 per cent of the average.)
1999 – Advance payment can be required for the first seven months of the year. Further
modifications are made in the calculation in order to filter out capital-related deficits and
to take account of increases in current own revenues.
2000 – Municipalities with a population below 1,100 are excluded from önhiki if the
capacity utilisation in any of their educational, social and health care facilities is lower
than 50 per cent; a 70 per cent ratio applies to those with a population above 1,100.
Villages with less than 500 inhabitants are exempted from this rule if they run only one
facility per category and/or if their primary school provides only four years of education.
The definition of capital revenues (that önhiki applicants cannot use to cover operational
expenditures) is completed by further revenue items.
2001 – The benchmark population size underlying the criterion of capacity utilisation is
modified from 1,100 to 3,000. Further amendments are made to the calculation method.
The amount of grant cannot exceed the level of short-term loans budgeted for the given
fiscal year.
2003 – A part of the önhiki grant must be repaid at the end of the year if the actually
realised level of current revenues exceeds the budgeted one, or if the municipality
received a supplement to the norm-based grants during the year.
2004 – Minor amendments to the criterion of capacity utilisation. A further modification
applies to the way of calculating the differential between the actual level of local
operational expenditure and the respective national average.
2005 – With regard to the communication between the Minister of Finance and the Local
Government Committee of the Parliament, prior consultation is replaced by annual ex post
information. The criterion of capacity utilisation is restricted to pre-primary and primary

education facilities. Municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants that cannot fulfil the
criterion may receive a reduced amount of önhiki. The goal is to encourage more efficient
service provision through inter-municipal co-operation.
The ministerial directives define carefully which categories and levels of expen-
diture and revenue are taken into consideration in the evaluation of the demands.
Expenditure is accepted up to the level of the operating expenses of the previous
year (except for expenses financed by NHIF transfers) multiplied by the expected
rate of inflation in the running year. The considered revenue categories include the
operating revenues of own public service facilities (e.g. user charges and fees), local
taxes, norm-based grants, equalisation supplements and flow-through transfers
(except for NHIF transfers). Again, the system takes into account the revenues of
the previous year indexed to inflation. Within local taxes, the expected level of IPA
cannot be lower than the potentially realisable average (adóero˝képesség).
On the whole, the conditions of eligibility are well-designed and consistent with
the main objective of the önhiki fund. However, three features of the list of accepted
outlays and expected revenues may cause irritation.
First, the range of expenditures taken into account is not limited to the manda-
tory ones, although önhiki declaredly pursues the objective of restoring vertical
fiscal balance in order to ensure the continuous provision of the delegated public
services. The Ministry of Finance argues that even if the list does not distinguish
between expenditures related to voluntary and mandatory functions, the typi-
cal önhiki applicant is in deficit because of the latter. It must be noted that the
complexity of sector-specific regulations makes it virtually impossible to separate
mandatory and voluntary outlays within the same policy area.
At the same time—and this is the second problem related to the conditions
of eligibility—, the list of accepted outlays includes interest expenses. Therefore,
the interests on a loan that financed the construction of a new concert hall may
drive the municipality into a deficit in the operating part of the budget. Luck-
ily, but somewhat inconsistently, debt repayment cannot be acknowledged as an
expenditure under the önhiki rules.
Third, it is not clear why, out of the five categories of local taxes, only IPA is
taken into account at the average rate. Particularly in the field of taxation and
As has been explained in Section .., the so-called adóero˝képesség is the key indicator of the fiscal
equalisation system. It is calculated as the per capita amount of IPA revenue that a local government
can potentially realise by applying the tax rate that corresponds to the effective average of all
municipalities.
 user charges, villages could make a greater effort than they do at present. At the
same time, fiscal competition (or more generally, the desire to remain attractive to
existing and potential taxpayers) sets a natural limit to tax increases.
In principle, önhiki is an open-ended fund in the sense that SNGs meeting the
eligibility criteria automatically receive a share of it. The overall size of the fund is
determined in the annual Budget Act but may be amended during the fiscal year if
the demand turns out to be substantially higher than in the previous year. Oddly
enough, municipalities are allowed to ‘plan for the deficit’, that is, to include the
expected amount of önhiki into their budget for the following year, even if they are
not sure whether they will ultimately receive anything. Balancing the budget at
least ex ante is therefore a relatively easy task for local governments in Hungary:
the önhiki on the revenue side caters for a nominal equilibrium in every case.
Local governments are strictly forbidden from using önhiki for covering capital
expenditures; otherwise, the grant could not fulfil its basic role of closing the
fiscal gap on the operating side. Thus, the principle of the unified budget is
dropped here for the sake of restoring the basic functions of local governments in
distress. As we saw in Section ., the Hungarian public sector accounting system
does not distinguish between current and capital budgets in order to provide
maximal freedom to decentralised governments with regard to the use of their
resources. However, a clear separation is made as soon as the financial situation of
the municipality calls for an immediate and exclusive concentration of all available
resources on the maintenance of a basic level of public services.
Figures . and . show the importance of önhiki for the municipal sector during
the period –. As the graphs suggest, the volume of önhiki grants disbursed
in the local government sector grew steadily in nominal terms, except for 
where the Bokros austerity package necessarily dampened central government
spending. Following the relatively modest  millions of forints in , grant
disbursement in nominal terms almost doubled from  to  and hit the
-billion-mark in . The growth is less spectacular if we take inflation into
consideration, but even at constant prices, the total volume of önhiki grants more
than quintupled between  and . At the same time, the Ministry of Finance
has repeatedly warned the public opinion not to dramatise the growing number
of önhiki cases. After all, less than  per cent of the total GFS revenues of the local
public sector (and  to  per cent of the sum of intergovernmental grants and the
PIT share) have been sufficient so far to guarantee the continued provision of
basic public services in every municipality (G et al., ). Besides, experts
working on municipal bankruptcy procedures are convinced that the deficit grant
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Figure 7.3: Total önhiki grants allocated between 1993 and 2004 (million HUF)
[Source: the author, based on data from the Ministry of the Interior]
system has prevented many a local government from bankruptcy (J et al.,
).
While the overall amount of public money allocated under the önhiki system is
indeed not dramatic, the created incentives are more than alarming and cry out
for a thorough revision of the intergovernmental fiscal system and service delivery
structures especially in the most fragmented regions of the country.
One reason for the constant increase of the total grant disbursements is the fact
that most beneficiaries resort to önhiki repeatedly and some of them even depend
on it for their survival. According to a recent study of the TÁRKI Social Research
Institute, between  and ,  per cent of the , municipalities benefited
from önhiki at least once, while  per cent never applied for the grant (S
and M, ). Estimates from the Ministry of the Interior suggest that
deficit grants are given to approximately  small villages every year, signalling
that the latter cannot fulfil their mandatory responsibilities because of the poor
opportunities to realise economies of scale. Moreover, a quarter of the towns and
two-thirds of the counties received önhiki in , , and  (J et al.,
, p. ).
A simple descriptive method (comparison of group averages) followed by logistic
regression allowed S and M () to describe some major
differences between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of önhiki and to identify
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Figure 7.4: The number of municipalities benefiting from önhiki between 1993
and 2004 [Source: the author, based on data from the Ministry of the
Interior]
some of the factors that make SNGs more susceptible to fiscal imbalances in their
operational budget. In a second step, the authors compared occasional önhiki
recipients with those that resort to the grant on a regular basis to find out about
the key determinants of grant dependence.
According to the results, önhiki recipients on average exhibit a higher proportion
of welfare recipients and unemployed in their constituency (poverty indicators)
than do non-receivers. The share of individuals of working age is smaller and the
share of persons aged above  is higher (demographic indicators). Inhabitants
have a lower number of cars and phones, and there are less registered enterprises
and retailers in the jurisdiction, whereas there is no difference in the number of
flats connected to the drinking water network (modernity indicators). Rather
than access to drinking water (which was provided in . per cent of households
in  according to data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office), other
domains of public infrastructure such as roads or telecommunications may be in
a completely different stage of development in beneficiary and non-beneficiary
jurisdictions.
Not surprisingly, many of these variables are interrelated. A high unemployment
All indicators are relative measures (per , inhabitants) in order to ensure the comparability of
jurisdictions of different size.
rate implies shrinking revenues from the personal income tax and a higher volume
of social aid. The high number of old persons explains why the death rate is higher
in the önhiki jurisdictions, but ageing local population also means less taxpayers.
The scarcity of enterprises may result from the difficulty of accumulating the seed
capital and/or from the gloomy prospects for profit generation; in any case, the
lack of business initiatives reduces the level of local business tax over the years. As
own-source revenues shrink and expenditure needs rise, the tension in the local
budget mounts gradually and prompts especially young skilled workers to move to
another jurisdiction with better employment opportunities and a higher level of
net fiscal benefit.
The interplay of these circumstances makes local governments more vulnerable
to minor economic shocks. The last straw that ultimately drives them into a situa-
tion of insolvency is typically an insignificant external shock to the economy, such
as a wage increase of local public employees ordered by the central government, a
modification of the VAT rate schedule, or rising energy prices.
As for its geographical situation, size and administrative status, the typical önhiki
recipient is a small village situated in South-Transdanubia, in the northern part of
the Great Plain, or in North-Hungary. Between  and , an average of  per
cent of the villages with less than , inhabitants received a grant. The authors
could confirm thus a negative relationship between population size and the risk
of insolvency. Not surprisingly, the three regions exhibiting the highest share of
önhiki recipients are those with the most fragmented territorial structure.
Even more interestingly, comparing the average values of the poverty and demog-
raphy indicators of beneficiary jurisdictions with the national average, it turns out
that municipalities that applied for a grant once or twice between  and , are
either on the level of the average or in a more favourable position. Those depending
on önhiki (having received the grant during seven years or more during the period
under review) are almost exclusively small villages with a population of less than
,, situated in the northern part of the Great Plain or in North-Hungary.
While the system of önhiki gave thousands of municipalities the feeling of
increased (or at least, restored) financial autonomy over the years, in fact, it is
just another warning signal indicating that the current system of revenue and
expenditure assignment is unable to guarantee effective autonomy, as it cannot
create the necessary conditions for the independent management of local affairs.
If the characteristics of a typical önhiki recipient are identical with those of an
average municipality, as S and M () confirmed, then any
local government operating smoothly during several years may happen to slip into
the role of a grant applicant overnight. The volatility of the legal rules governing
 intergovernmental finances and the general exposure of local governments as small
open economies to macroeconomic shocks only contribute to the uncertainty. At
the same time, the results of the TÁRKI study also suggest that the fiscal equalisation
policy does not perform the way it should; or else, the central government would
not need to distribute vertical grants to resolve a problem that is inherently linked
with horizontal inequalities.
The future of önhiki is uncertain. The Ministry of Finance views it as a comple-
mentary mechanism that must necessarily accompany the current norm-based rev-
enue regulation. Following their argument, the sum of locally generated revenues
and central government grants cannot take account of the situational differences
in the conditions of local public service provision. On the other hand, in order
to preserve local self-government as an institution, the continuous provision of
the fundamental local public services needs to be ensured in one way or another
P (, p. ). The central government faces, however, a mounting dis-
content on the side of those municipalities that have never benefited from önhiki.
They claim that the system of deficit grants conserves an ill-designed pattern of
revenue and expenditure assignment and helps thousands of inefficiently operating
municipalities survive at the expense of a well-managed minority. önhiki allows
its beneficiaries to continue the mismanagement without any risk of sanction
and penalises those municipalities that try to make ends meet even in periods of
economic hardship.
While maintaining önhiki could indeed perpetuate moral hazard problems, hurt
interjurisdictional equity and delay intergovernmental fiscal reform, the question
of how to banish it requires careful deliberation. Hardening the budget constraint
makes sense from a macro-economic point of view, but it works only if local
governments are provided adequate conditions for a responsible management of
their finances.
Any radical cutback of the grant allotments or the complete eradication of
önhiki without any other change to the revenue system bears the risk of a massive
growth in the number of bankruptcy cases among subnational governments. The
economic and political consequences of such a measure would be devastating.
For dealing with SNGs that fell into a deficit trap, Bird advocates a follow-
up procedure to ensure that beneficiaries make an effort to avoid insolvency in
the subsequent years: ‘Emergency central support may sometimes be needed to
resolve such debt problems. If so, however, any such support should carry with it
See e.g. the written contribution of András Rapcsák MP, Archives of the Hungarian Parliament, con-
tribution no. K/, http://www.parlament.hu/iromany/fulltext/03261txt.htm, date
of retrieval: ...
the obligation to introduce and make effective any necessary reforms under the
supervision of a review board’ B (, p. ).
It is doubtful, however, whether a reform of the local policies and budget en-
forced by a watchdog can help municipalities improve their performance, especially
if the central government recognises that they became insolvent through no fault
of their own and they had exploited their full potential to reduce the deficit.
Rather than abolishing önhiki or forcing beneficiaries to revise their budget once
again, it may be perhaps wise to investigate the reasons why hundreds of munici-
palities are dependent on the deficit grant. The key question is why the available
grants, including the equalisation component of the norm-based grant that is sup-
posed to correct situational disparities described by S and M
(), have not been able to complete local own-source revenues in a way to
ensure vertical fiscal balance in municipalities that have otherwise done every effort
in order to rationalise their operations and exploit their revenue potential. In
a second step, depending on the results of such a study, the central government
and the legislative could redesign intergovernmental fiscal relations in a way to
help recurring beneficiaries break the vicious circle of önhiki. Once the quality
of revenue assignment is improved to a level where equalisation grants alone can
ensure budget balance even in the neediest municipalities, there will be no need
for önhiki any longer.
Alternatively, or as an accompanying measure, the central government could
strengthen financial and technical support for inter-municipal co-operation (which
it has actually been doing for the last few years already) and consider possible ways
of encouraging the amalgamation of municipalities. Considering that much of the
önhiki dependence is related to the territorial fragmentation of the country, the
centre could promote amalgamations in general, while offering enhanced support
to the excessively fragmented regions and special incentives to local governments
that are willing to amalgamate with one or more önhiki recipients.
.. Borrowing If a municipality facing fundamental operating difficulties
‘through no fault of its own’ does not fully comply with the
eligibility criteria of the önhiki programme and is unable to adjust its institutions
and budget in the short run, it is expected to resort to the financial market in order
to balance the local budget. Since its budget is unsustainable, chances are rather
low that it will obtain anything else than a so-called liquid loan that is subject to
relatively soft rules, as we will see later on.
As Figure . suggested, short-term borrowing is likely to be an option also for
local governments that ran into an operating deficit because of oversized expen-
 ditures in the domain of voluntary competences. As long as they are considered
credible by the market participants, a revision of the expenditure and/or revenue
plan will be the second-best option for balancing the budget.
Long-term borrowing is mainly used for the implementation of investment
programmes whose costs would otherwise explode the municipal budget. These
may be related to both voluntary and mandatory tasks. The difference is only
in the alternative funding options. For financing new infrastructure in relation
with a delegated function such as health care or environmental protection, local
governments are more likely to apply for an investment grant from the central
budget; although loans and bonds may also play a role as subsidiary revenues
when the grant falls short of the expectations, or as part of the local government
matching. Besides, long-term borrowing is one the most important instruments of
local budgetary autonomy, as it allows municipalities to adjust revenue levels to
expenditure levels by involving several generations of taxpayers.
Notwithstanding the broad range of situations in which it could be solicited,
borrowing plays only a minor role in local government finance. As Figure .
shows, between  and , only . to . per cent of total expenditures were
financed from debt. The election years , , and  feature particularly
high borrowing levels, even though the cyclical movements are less spectacular than
in the domain of public expenditures. The local maximum value in post-election
year  is presumably due to promised investment programmes.
The weak significance of debt as a funding source also manifests itself in the share
of debt-related expenditures within the local budget. For most of the period under
review, interest expenses accounted for . to . per cent of total GFS expenditures,
while debt repayment equalled  to  per cent of the overall expenditures (including
all other transactions in financial assets outside the GFS, see Table .). In 
and , the respective shares were substantially higher (. and . per cent
for interest payments and . to . per cent for debt repayment). If pure local
government data were available for the period – as well, we could probably
demonstrate that  and  represent the end of an era where borrowing used
to be a much more popular funding instrument in the decentralised public sector.
Analysing respective data of the overall subnational government sector (including
counties), B and H () come to this conclusion and explain it with
the absence of borrowing rules, limits on debt service and reporting requirements
between  and . The same authors warn that the data cover only a part of
the subnational government sector. Off-budget entities (see Section ..) are not
included, although they are presumably much more active on the financial markets
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Figure 7.5: The development of local government borrowing 1995–2006 [Source:
the author, based on Balás and Hegedu˝s (2004); data from the Min-
istry of Finance]
 than local governments are, due to their role in providing infrastructure-intensive
public services such as drinking water and heating.
Even if the adoption of fiscal rules has dampened local borrowing to some extent,
concluding that the low levels of debt result from an overly restrictive national
regulation would be fallacious.
The theory of fiscal federalism and decentralisation proposes various approaches
to systematising the policy instruments aimed at controlling sub-national borrow-
ing and debt. Here we follow the proposal of T-M and C ()
who distilled a wide range of country experiences into four broad categories:
. Reliance on market discipline requires that financial markets exert effective
control over subnational borrowing.
. Co-operative approaches imply that fiscal rules emerge from negotiations
between the central government and lower levels.
. Rules-based approaches are based on standing rules specified in the consti-
tution or in laws. These specify e.g. the absolute level of indebtedness, the
purpose of long-term borrowing, etc.
. Direct control of the central government over subnational borrowing may
take the form of an annual limit on the overall debt of individual juris-
dictions, the review and authorisation of individual borrowing operations,
etc.
The Hungarian approach to controlling subnational borrowing and debt com-
bines the reliance on market discipline () with certain formal rules ().
Reliance on market discipline has primary importance. According to art. 
of the ALG, local authorities may obtain a loan from any domestic or foreign
financial institution (except for central banks) and issue bonds on both domestic
and foreign markets. Lenders assess them directly for creditworthiness. Borrowing
and bonds issuance are admitted for both operating and investment purposes and
thus on both short and long term. However, long-term loans cannot be signed
without the approval of the local assembly. Temporary liquidity gaps hampering
the continuous provision of public goods and services may be bridged with a so-
called liquid loan that must be repaid within the same year. Another manifestation
of the dominance of market mechanisms is the law on municipal bankruptcy
(Section .).
See e.g. T-M and C (), D (b), or S (a).
As a secondary approach to controlling local borrowing and debt, the Parliament
adopted certain fiscal rules starting from  (not applying to the liquid loan):
– Core assets, norm-based grants, other central government grants, the PIT
revenue share and intergovernmental flow-through transfers cannot be used
as collateral.
– The upper limit to annual expenses resulting from borrowing, bonds is-
suance, leasing, and the provision of guarantees is the adjusted current own
revenue of the local government that is calculated as
Bmaxt D ACORt D 0:7  .CORt   SLt / , (.)
where Bmaxt is the upper limit of borrowing in year t , ACORt the adjusted
current own-source revenue in year t , CORt the current own-source revenue
budgeted for year t (including local taxes, administrative fees, motor vehicle
tax, interests received, fines, dividends; rental fees, leasing fees, and other
revenues related to the asset for which the debt was incurred as well as
other own-source revenues), and SLt the short-term liabilities (equivalent to
interest expenses, debt repayment, leasing fees, accounts payable, and other
liabilities) due in year t .
– Local governments that sign a loan must have their budgets audited inde-
pendently. The independent auditor has to make sure that the municipality
does not hurt the above-mentioned rules.
– Following art.  para.  of the ALG, the central government refuses any
responsibility for the default of local governments, which is equivalent to a
formal no-bailout commitment.
– Further minor restrictions concern the issuance and trading of local govern-
ment bonds. This is regulated in the Act CXX of  on Capital Markets.
As has been mentioned in Section ., local governments may voluntarily adopt a
‘golden rule’ that restricts borrowing to the single purpose of capital development.
Other regulations indirectly affecting the borrowing and debt behaviour of local
governments include the obligation to cash-based accounting, recording the assets
at face value, and monitoring by the State Audit Office.
See footnote  on page .
These rules appeared originally in the Act CXL of  on the Issuance of Securities, on Investment
Services and the Stock Exchange.
 Although the fiscal rules are not overly strict, they are already prohibitive for
small villages with a modest level of own-source revenues, according to a survey
conducted by B and H (). The fragmented territorial structure is
also one of the constraints on the increase of bonds issuance: villages have difficulty
presenting collaterals and stable own-source revenue flows that are, however, vital
for creditworthiness. However, fiscal rules are not the only factor excluding small
jurisdictions from the credit market. Other factors include poor debt management
capacity and a low level of the individual demand for loans that does not allow the
bank to realise a profit. Enhanced horizontal co-operation between the smallest
municipalities is a possible remedy to this situation.
Large towns seldom reach the official borrowing limit, partly because the limit
is already higher due to the substantial amount of own-source revenues (ACORt
criterion). By contrast, small towns with relatively modest revenue capacity but
high ambitions in terms of public service provision and infrastructure development
have a tendency to exploit their borrowing rights to the maximum.
Statutory rules on borrowing and debt are just one factor behind the relatively
modest volume of loans and bonds in the local government sector. At least two
other factors merit consideration.
First, the alternative revenue sources of local governments are highly unpre-
dictable. This fact evokes three problems:
. It makes it difficult for lenders to assess the creditworthiness of municipalities
and hence act as a natural impediment to borrowing (K et al., ,
p. ).
. Investment grants and shared revenues are often used as complementary
resources for funding investment. The limited transparency and reliabil-
ity of these revenue sources jeopardises the implementation of the whole
investment programme.
. A high share of such revenues in the local budget increases uncertainty about
whether the municipality will be able to cover debt repayment and interests
as well as the maintenance and operation of the new infrastructure and the
related public services during the following years.
Second, indebtedness is associated with a (perceived or real) political risk. In
the survey conducted by B and H (), half of the responding
municipalities reported about the negative attitude of the local assembly towards
borrowing. Surprisingly, the aversion is the greatest in large towns, although they
provide the best performance in terms of debt management among all categories
of local government.
. Local government bankruptcy
One cannot discuss local budgetary autonomy in Hungary without taking into
account the institution of municipal bankruptcy. It is certainly not something that
enhances budgetary autonomy. The opposite is true: once a local government has
filed (or has been filed) for bankruptcy, it actually gives up self-government and
subordinates itself to the court and the trustee.
If the institution of bankruptcy does not enhance budgetary autonomy, at least
it has a positive effect on budget responsibility. As has been discussed in Chapter ,
autonomy and responsibility are two sides of the same coin, two notions that are
inherently connected.
The risk of municipal insolvency appeared in the decentralised system as soon
as  when the ALG conferred local governments the property and management
right of virtually all local public assets together with the right to get involved in
for-profit entrepreneurial activities, to manage portfolios of securities, and to
borrow without any restriction.
The need for bankruptcy legislation emerged in the summer of  when four
severely indebted municipalities (Bakonszeg, Bátorliget, Nágocs, and Szerencs)
experienced such a serious crisis that they lobbied for a bailout from the central
government. The investigations revealed that all four villages had become insol-
vent because of own management failures. In spite of this finding, the central
government created an ad-hoc fund of  millions of forints. Following the
publication of the related central government decree, three out of the four munici-
palities applied for and received a one-time repayable grant for covering the costs
of basic public services. In November, a similar grant was provided to a fourth
municipality (Páty). The modalities of the grant repayment were supposed to
appear in a separate law on debt adjustment. Since the intervention threatened to
create a precedent with unforeseeable contingent liabilities for the central budget
the government decided to regulate the issue of municipal insolvency as soon as
possible (J et al., ). This task was completed with the adoption of the
Act XXV of  on Municipal Debt Adjustment that is the first law on municipal
bankruptcy in Europe, inspired by the bankruptcy rules of private law. Table .
provides a brief overview of the procedure.
Government Decree no.  of  ( September); see also SAO ().

Table 7.2: Municipal bankruptcy procedure according to the Act XXV of 1996
[Source: the author]
Initiation As a rule, the procedure must be initiated by the local government in 
distress, but it may also be initiated by the creditor(s).
The Court appoints a trustee, if the local government or any of its 
institutions failed to meet its debt obligation within 60 days after the 
deadline.
Phases 1. Setting up a commission for debt settlement
2. Emergency budget
3. Reorganisation programme (expenditure cuts, exploitation of revenue 
potential, co-operation with neighbouring municipalities etc.) + 
Settlement proposal
4. Negotiations with creditors
5a. If there is an agreement, 
the Court concludes the 
procedure
6a. Execution of the agreement.
5b. If there is no agreement, the 
Court decides on the distribution 
of local government assets
6b. The Court concludes the 
procedure.
Constraints on 
the municipality
The local government is obliged to ensure the continuous provision of basic 
public services. It may not assume new obligations nor sell any of its assets.
Funding As a rule, the local government assumes the costs of the legal procedure, 
but it may apply for central government grant both for covering the salary 
of the trustee and for financing the continuous provision of basic public 
services during the procedure.
Table 3-19
The institution of municipal debt adjustment has been a success ever since its
introduction. Until , there were only eighteen bankruptcy filings involving
sixteen municipalities (G et al., ), most of them suffering from the
consequences of oversized and financially unsustainable investment programmes.
According to inquiries by J et al. () for the period –, all villages
that asked for debt adjustment were of small size, and most of them were engaged
in large infrastructure projects such as gas supply or sewage pipelines that were
both technically and financially unrealistic.
The low number of filings suggests that the bankruptcy law exerts its real impact
not so much through the sanctioning of those few villages that failed but through
warning off the rest. One could argue that the deficit grants (önhiki and the ones
reserved for financing the municipal debt adjustment procedure and other sources
of vertical fiscal imbalance) weaken the effect of the bankruptcy legislation. Indeed,
as has been mentioned in Section .., many more local governments would have
to face bankruptcy if there were no bailout grants. It is also possible that deficit
grants and bankruptcy legislation together weaken the forces of the market. Just as
it is easy to plan a deficit ex ante and apply for önhiki in order to bridge the gap,
it is also relatively easy to file for bankruptcy, especially if the central government
offers further grants for covering the costs of the procedure. However, there is
presumably nothing more frightening for a mayor than the mere thought of a
possible liquidation of its municipality and the distribution of assets. The tenacious
insistence on autonomy caters for extreme caution in the management of the local
budget, thus turning the mere existence of bankruptcy legislation into an effective
measure against irresponsible behaviour.

PART III
Conclusions and Outlook

CHAPTER 
Understanding Local Financial Autonomy
In the Introduction to this piece of research, we formulated two sets of research 
questions with the aim to channel the inquiry through the realm of local financial
autonomy. The purpose of the present chapter is to summarise the major findings
that may contribute to elucidating those questions.
Chapter  shows to what extent the literature review in Part I could help identify
the main components and constraints of local financial autonomy, to clarify its
relationship to other objectives of a decentralised system, and to understand the
challenges related to measuring autonomy. Chapter  summarises the major
insights about the determinants of local financial autonomy in Hungary.
This first group of research questions about the components, constraints, con-
text, and measurement of local financial autonomy has received an adequate, albeit
not exhaustive answer in Part I. Five major issues merit some reflexion here.
. The review of the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralisation revealed
that local autonomy has rarely been in the focus of scientific analysis, al-
though it is generally recognised as a central term in the discussion about
multi-level government systems. Local autonomy appears thus to be one of
the most commonly cited but also one of the least precisely defined terms
in the decentralisation vocabulary. Lacking a universal definition, local au-
tonomy is a rather vague issue. As a theoretical concept and a higher-level
principle of territorial organisation, it tends to be overvalued. This may have
its origins in the European political discourse on territorial reforms during
the s where local autonomy emerged as a valence issue, a subject that
united public opinion rather than dividing it. Even today, and presumably in
 most countries of the world, policymakers at all levels of government are will-
ing to recognise and support, at least in words, the vertical decentralisation
of power and the resulting autonomy of subnational levels.
However, because of the very fact that local autonomy is conditional upon
power sharing, it becomes a highly contentious issue as soon as it comes
to implementation. The question of ‘who should decide what in a federal
system’ (D, ) is all the more important as the general government
with all its subsectors must be able to manage the country to success (in
whatever way success is defined) through the sum of its decisions. The
autonomy of governments (at any level) becomes thus subordinated to
higher objectives such as economic growth, optimum level of employment,
political stability or social cohesion. In its relations to the role of the state,
namely allocation, distribution and stabilisation, local autonomy involves
important trade-offs. If society values some other objectives higher than it
does local autonomy (which is more likely than the opposite case), then less
autonomy may be of a higher value for the achievement of these objectives.
With his double definition of local autonomy as ‘freedom to’ (regulate and
legislate in own interests; also called the power of initiation) and ‘freedom
from’ (oversight by higher tiers of the state; also called the power of im-
munity), C () sets the benchmark at the level of absolute (perfect)
autonomy, which is far too idealistic and therefore unsuitable for the practice
of decentralisation. Another problem with this early definition of autonomy
is the ignorance of the effective capacity of local governments to make use
of their freedom. Hence, it is not surprising that those more recent defi-
nitions combining the notion of right with that of capacity (ability) have
had a longer and greater impact on territorial reforms worldwide than those
that promote the right component only. The definition laid down in the
European Charter of Local Self-Government (C  E, a) is
a key example. By integrating the notion of ability into the broader concept
of local autonomy, the Council of Europe urged its member countries to
enhance the financial, administrative, technical, professional, etc. capacity
of their local governments. Considering the diversity of domains in which
decentralised authorities need to be empowered in order to make use of
their rights, it is clear that ability and financial autonomy are not synonyms.
Rather, the definition of each aspect of autonomy (political, administrative,
judicial, financial autonomy, etc.) entails right and ability as the two consti-
tutive elements. In consequence, conceiving financial autonomy as the sum
of expenditure autonomy, revenue autonomy, and budgetary autonomy, as
we proposed in Section ., implies that both right and ability appear as
constitutive elements in each of these three subcategories (or again, aspects)
of financial autonomy.
. If the financial autonomy of local governments is limited, it means that
either their rights are trimmed (or defined narrowly) or they lack the ability
to make use of those rights, or both. Hence, it seems to be appropriate to
consider exogenous legal constraints on local financial autonomy as restric-
tions on the rights of decentralised authorities, and exogenous non-legal
(economic, cultural, geographical, etc.) constraints as restrictions on their
ability. These recognitions have ultimately lead us to draft the three matrices
of constraints in Section . (Figures . to .) that proved to be useful as
a lecture grid for the subsequent practical analysis of local financial auton-
omy in Hungary, although they are not free from overlapping and would
possibly merit some further extension and refinement. Besides, both right
and ability are further restrained by endogenous factors (arising from some
autonomous decisions of the local government or the local community) that,
however, the present study was not able to cover in detail.
. Identifying and describing the exogenous constraints in the greatest possi-
ble detail appears to be a key condition for a correct measurement of local
financial autonomy. At least this is what we could learn from the review
of the existing measurement approaches in Section .. Simple (general)
measures such as the GFS indicator of subnational expenditure (or revenue)
within the general government expenditure (revenue), the GDP, or another
macroeconomic variable, fail to provide a reliable result because they disre-
gard the fact that subnational governments may have no influence on a part
of their expenditures and/or revenues, these being delegated or dictated by a
higher-level authority or determined by other (non-legal) factors. The more
recent and also more sophisticated approaches (see e.g. B et al.,  for
expenditure autonomy, B and K,  for revenue autonomy)
involve at least some of the exogenous constraints. A deeper knowledge of
the constraints would help to refine the measurement techniques, whereby
there is an obvious trade-off between the simplicity of the formula and the
number of variables (constraints) involved. Complicated models with a
large number of specific constraints may not be suitable for cross-country
comparisons. For instance, the duty of the counties in Hungary to take over
certain expenditure responsibilities from the municipalities upon request by
 the latter is an important restriction on the counties’ expenditure autonomy
but completely unknown and irrelevant for decentralised governments in an-
other country. Such sophisticated models are, however, useful for analysing
the change in the scope of local financial autonomy in a given country within
a given period, on condition that the cost of access to the relevant data is not
disproportionately high.
. The crux of all techniques of measuring local financial autonomy is the
fact that one can integrate an infinite number of constraints (even if one
limits the model to the exogenous ones) and still obtain a result that poten-
tially overestimates the real extent of autonomy—as do all four qualitative
approaches presented in Table . for measuring subnational revenue au-
tonomy. The overestimation bias of quantitative models is less significant;
however, a substantial part of the constraints is not quantifiable. More com-
prehensive inventories of constraints such as the ones proposed in Figures .
to . may contribute to a further refinement of the indicators of local fi-
nancial autonomy. The questions as to whether it is necessary to include
any endogenous constraint into the measurement formula and if yes, which
ones, opens avenues for further research.
. Finally, the examination of constraints—particularly of legal constraints—
raises the question about the conditions under which it is justifiable for
higher-level authorities in a decentralised government system to impose
such constraints on the lower level(s). The review of the literature about
the relationship between local autonomy and the principle of subsidiarity
(Section .) reveals autonomy as being the underlying socio-philosophical
idea of subsidiarity. Indeed, the first part of the principle of subsidiarity is
relatively clear: every task belongs to the lowest competent level. By contrast,
the second part that specifies the conditions of legitimate withdrawal of a
competence from the lower authority is usually marked by vague expressions
such as ‘incapacity’, ‘undertaken more effectively’, or ‘cannot be sufficiently
achieved’. For the practical implementation of the universal principle of
subsidiarity in a given local institutional context, it is essential that the
various governmental actors (at various levels) agree upon the meaning of
these expressions as well as upon the conditions justifying the withdrawal
of competences from the lower level. As a general rule, we propose that the
following conditions be met simultaneously:
– Within the limits of its competence and capacity, the higher authority
has offered all reasonable assistance to the lower authority in order to
address the (managerial, administrative, financial, etc.) incapacity of
the latter;
– The lower authority has already exploited every opportunity within its
competence in order to regain capacity or it is unwilling to search for
an autonomous solution;
– Either the demand for a re-assignment of the competence comes from
the lower authority or, if it comes from the higher authority, it is
consulted with the lower organisation before any action is undertaken.
Even if adopting this formula, the negotiating authorities still need to define
the terms ‘reasonable assistance’, the ‘limits of competence and capacity’ of
the higher authority, the effort that can realistically be expected from the
lower authority to exploit its potentials, and the contents of ‘consultation’
between both levels.

CHAPTER 
Local Financial Autonomy in Hungary:
Lessons to Learn
As one could expect, the study of fiscal decentralisation in Hungary and its impact 
on the financial autonomy of local governments resulted in a multitude of findings.
The initial question as to whether the scope of local autonomy has decreased
since the start of the decentralisation process cannot be concluded with a simple
yes/no answer. Both expenditure and revenue autonomy and the freedom to
modulate the local budget constraint have been subject to antagonistic forces. The
reader may remember that we postulated local autonomy as being just one of
several concurring objectives in a multi-level government system. According to the
normative theory of constitutional economics, the assignment of responsibilities
and revenues should be consistent with the economic role of government that
consists (simply formulated) in increasing efficiency while achieving some degree
of equity and stability. It follows that local autonomy, the extent of which is
determined by the division of expenditure and revenue powers among the various
levels of government, is ideally subordinated to equity, efficiency and stability.
Following this line of argumentation, local authorities should desire neither more
nor less autonomy than what is necessary for ensuring that the general government
system fulfils its economic role. Autonomy in this context is not an objective per
se, but rather an instrument that allows the achievement of other objectives. The
optimum degree of decentralisation (and hence, the optimum degree of autonomy)
cannot be determined objectively, as the positive effects of decentralisation on
efficiency and its adverse effects on equity can only be estimated with a certain
 error. How much autonomy we consider as desirable depends ultimately on the
importance we attach to efficiency as opposed to equity.
While this argumentation may sound overly normative and perhaps slightly
conservative, it contributes to a better understanding of the forces that influenced
the degree of local financial autonomy in Hungary throughout the s and the
s. If we consider local financial autonomy as the right and the ability of local
authorities to manage their financial affairs, then we can conclude that each of
these components has been subject to different kinds of influence.
The first component, right, has mainly been modulated through legislation
according to the preferences of citizens (as perceived by their elected represen-
tatives) in terms of efficiency and equity. Quite in the spirit of fiscal federalism
theory, measures enhancing local financial autonomy came to the fore whenever
the society pleaded for more efficiency in resource allocation, whereas autonomy
was restrained whenever the quest for more equity, stability, or other goals that
can be better achieved in a centralised setting, dominated the public discussion.
The indirect regulation of local financial autonomy through the expenditure and
revenue assignment requires continuous monitoring and adjustment, all the more
because on some occasions, the rights of local governments were trimmed more
seriously than what equity or stability considerations could justify.
Whereas financial autonomy in terms of rights changed in the same direction
for all local governments more or less, the second component of autonomy, ability,
has developed differently across the jurisdictions. Some local authorities have
succeeded in strengthening their managerial, technical and financial capacity, thus
filling their formal (legal) autonomy with real content. Among other qualities, they
are successful in tailoring the supply of public services to local needs, in setting
adequate tax prices, and in pursuing a sound and sustainable debt policy. Other
municipalities that lack adequate conditions or capacity are lagging behind in
applying the letter of the law for the benefit of their constituency. Economic and
political cycles as well as the demographic challenge may also influence the ability
of certain local governments to make use of their formal powers.
The main output of Part II is a vast set of qualitative and quantitative (partly
processed) information that allows us now to compile a nearly exhaustive cata-
logue of the exogenous determinants of municipal financial autonomy in Hungary
(Table .).
The catalogue consists of two major vertical blocks—positive and negative deter-
minants of local financial autonomy (components and constraints, respectively)—
linked together by upward and downward arrows in the middle to indicate of
the domain(s) of autonomy they affect in the first instance. Furthermore, each
negative determinant is completed with a reference to the relevant matrix of con-
straints (Figures . to . proposed in Chapter ) and the corresponding element
of that matrix. The catalogue includes some of the endogenous restrictions as well,
without claim of completeness, however.
The catalogue proposed in Table ., particularly the list of constraints, may be a
first step towards measuring the expenditure, revenue and budgetary autonomy of
the municipal sector in Hungary. The identification and description of constraints
that has been the main objective of the present piece of research is notably only
a part of the challenge of measurement. The next step consists in the integration
of these and other, not yet identified constraints into the measurement device (a
qualitative model or an indicator formula) provided that the latter has previously
been revised and extended in order to accommodate the new constraints.
Neither qualitative tools of measurement (typology, ranking, etc.), nor quan-
titative indicators can do without an appropriate system of weights. However, in
order to assign weights to the variables in a model for measuring local financial
autonomy, one needs to have some approximate information about the relative
importance of the individual constraints. Such information is hardly obtainable
without a quantitative analysis of the related data. But even a purely qualitative
analysis of local financial autonomy (from the institutional perspective) delivers
more reliable results if it is based on solid statistics that allow the analyst to judge
the relative importance of the issues raised.
Regrettably, the inadequate quality and structure as well as the poor accessibility
of the data on the subnational government sector in Hungary make it difficult,
for the time being, to carry out any profound statistical analysis of the constraints
local financial autonomy.
As a key component of this job, one should be able to separate the actual
expenditures on delegated and deconcentrated (mandatory) functions or tasks
from those on devolved (voluntary) functions or tasks. This implies, within each
function, the ability to distinguish between that part of the expenditure which
results directly from a legal provision (a mandate) and the rest that reflects the
preferences of the local constituency. Such distinction is impossible, however, for
the following reasons:
. In each policy sector, local government responsibilities are affected by a
multitude of legal provisions of various origins. These legal provisions are
frequently amended and the related information is diffuse. Table . on the
assignment of functions and their classification into mandatory, optional
and subsidiary categories is the output of several days of meticulous work,

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yet it provides only a snapshot view of the situation on ... In order
to find out whether local expenditure autonomy increased or decreased
compared to an earlier date, the entire matrix needs to be reproduced for
that date.
. No information is available about the expected average costs of a new local
government task as calculated by the Ministry of Finance. Calculating these
average costs indirectly, through decomposing the marginal increment in
grant allotments in the annual Budget Acts, bears a substantial risk of error
because the Budget Acts are not explicit about the causes behind the change
in a specific grant allotment or in the allocation formula.
The expenditure data according to the functional classification of expenditures
are available in the annual statistics collected by the Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron County
Directorate of the Hungarian State Treasury, but they fail to provide sufficient
detail on the questions above, and the preparation of the underlying micro-level
data according to the desired criteria demands several man-days of work.
Dealing with the available mass of information on intergovernmental grants
represents another challenge, again due to the high number and complexity of
grant programmes. Under these circumstances, the estimation of the volume
of unfunded mandates is virtually impossible. Likewise, it is hard to make an
educated guess about whether the claim of local governments and their interest
organisations, according to which a growing part of mandatory responsibilities
must be financed from own-source revenues, is justified or not.
Furthermore, as a consequence to the principle of the unified budget, the local
government statistics of the Ministry of Finance lack a systematic distinction be-
tween current revenues/expenditures on one hand and capital revenues/expenditures
on the other. In order to calculate the net operating balance and detect whether
there is any cross-financing between operational spending and investments (an im-
portant lever of local budgetary autonomy), a clear separation is needed especially
in the categories of centralised appropriations and other grants.
By conducting a micro-level survey among local government officials, reviewing
the analytical accounts of a sample of municipalities through a longer period, or
working with a panel of independent experts, one could possibly make up for some
of the deficiencies in the statistics. Because of time limitations, such methods could
not be applied in this first (rather exploratory) phase of research.
There is a scope for improvement also in the selection and structure of the data
intended for the wider public. The ongoing political debate about local financial
 autonomy could clearly benefit from a clear separation between county, micro-
regional and municipal data. Even if the national Constitution postulates the
identity of their legal status as local governments, their expenditure responsibilities
and revenues are to a large extent different, so that the annual financial reports of
the aggregate local government sector published by the Ministry of Finance are of
little use for the debate about financial autonomy in the individual subsectors.
Better data are likely to provide a fruitful basis for further research into specific
questions of local financial autonomy in Hungary. By way of an example, it
would be particularly interesting to quantify the secondary effects of poorly funded
mandates on local expenditure autonomy. Notably, it can be suspected that in order
to guarantee the continuous provision of basic public services, local governments
facing a financial bottleneck because of poorly funded mandates are willing to
cut voluntary expenditures first. Abandoning such expenditures implies, however,
the loss of a crucial element of local autonomy (P K, , p. ). A
targeted analysis of the financial data of a sample of municipalities could deliver
some insights into the importance of this phenomenon.
Further research is needed also into the reasons behind unfunded or poorly
funded mandates and the possible (proactive) solutions. One of the key questions
is whether unfunded mandates could be avoided by assigning a fixed percentage of
the general government budget to the local government sector (D and P,
a, p. ) or, on the contrary, such an arrangement would be too rigid and
produce even more unfunded mandates in light of the rapidly changing volume
of delegated expenditures. Developing this idea further, several experts in the
past few years proposed drafting a separate law on the expenditure and revenue
regulation of the subnational government sector (K et al., , p. ). It
would make sense to examine from the perspective of Constitutional Economics
whether the separation could reduce the financial dependence of the subnational
sector from the general government budget insofar as as the available grants would
no longer be determined in the annual Budget Acts. Alternatively, the result of such
investigations could confirm the position of the Ministry of Finance according to
which the decentralised government system in Hungary is not yet mature enough
to ensure the successful regulation of subnational finances outside the general
government budget and independently from the national economy that is still in
the phase of transition.
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Although financial autonomy is a recurrent notion in the literature on 
fiscal federalism and decentralisation, it has seldom been the focus 
of scientific analysis. This book explores the meaning of financial 
autonomy at subnational levels of government, its relationship 
with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as its impact on the three 
economic branches of government activity: allocation, distribution, 
and stabilisation. The major contribution of the book is a structured 
overview of the factors that may potentially impinge on the freedom 
of subnational authorities with regard to their budget decisions. 
This analytical tool may help pave the way towards the elaboration 
of more accurate techniques for measuring subnational financial 
autonomy in future. A tentative application of the new theoretical 
framework is provided in the second part of the book that delves into 
the complex issues of municipal revenue and expenditure autonomy 
in Hungary after 1990.
